A partnership with academia

Building knowledge for trade and development

Vi Digital Library - Text Preview

The African Growth and Opportunity Act: An Empirical Analysis of the Possibilities Post-2015

Report by UNECA, 2013

Download original document

This report provides an analysis of outcomes of U.S.-Africa trade under five categories of post-2015 scenarios. These scenarios look at the trade and income implications of not extending AGOA beyond 2015; expanded product eligibility for AGOA; revisions to the currently eligible countries; a restructuring of AGOA to resemble the economic partnership agreements (EPAs) of the European Union; and the effects that a possible EU-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) could have on AGOA or an EPA-like situation, with an additional scenario examining how a continental free trade area (CFTA) would play into such an integrated trade environment. The results indicate, first of all, that should AGOA not be extended and current AGOA-eligible countries revert back to the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), then trade losses would be distributed in a very unequal fashion across the continent due to the variation in AGOA-eligible products that are exported by different countries. The results also show that expanding product eligibility for AGOA would only have small effects on the exports coming from AGOA-eligible countries— unless complete duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) market access was granted because the most import-sensitive sectors for the U.S. (e.g., sugar, cotton and clothing) are still where Africa would gain the most.

African
The


Growth and Opportunity Act


An Empirical Analysis of the Possiblilities Post-2015


Africa Growth Initiative
at BROOKINGS


JULY 2013




Acknowledgements:
The report, “The African Growth and Opportunity Act: An Empirical Analysis of the Possibilities Post-2015,”
has been prepared by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the African Growth Initiative (AGI) at
Brookings Institution, under the leadership of Carlos Lopes, ECA’s Executive Secretary. The report has been
written by Simon Mevel, from ECA, Zenia Lewis and Anne Kamau, from AGI, under the overall guidance and
supervision of Stephen Karingi, ECA’s director of the Regional Integration and Trade Division, and Mwangi
Kimenyi, director of AGI at the Brookings Institution. Post-2015 scenarios were defined by all the team, while
the modeling exercise was undertaken and results interpreted by ECA.


About the Africa Growth Initiative:
The Brooking Institution’s Africa Growth Initiative brings together African scholars to provide policymakers with
high-quality research, expertise and innovative solutions that promote Africa’s economic development. The ini-
tiative also collaborates with research partners in the region to raise the African voice in global policy debates on
Africa. Our mission is to deliver research from an African perspective that informs sound policy, creating sustained
economic growth and development for the people of Africa.


The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent
research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the
public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and
do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars.


Brookings recognizes that the value it provides is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact.
Activities supported by its donors reflect this commitment and the analysis and recommendations are not deter-
mined or influenced by any donation.


About the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (ECA):
ECA’s mandate is to promote the economic and social development of its member States, foster intra-regional
integration, and promote international cooperation for Africa’s development. Made up of 54 member States, and
playing a dual role as a regional arm of the UN and as a key component of the African institutional landscape, ECA
is well positioned to make unique contributions to address the Continent’s development.


ECA’s strength derives from its role as the only UN agency mandated to operate at the regional and subregional
levels to harness resources and bring them to bear on Africa’s priorities. ECA’s thematic areas of focus are: macro-
economic policy, regional integration and trade, social development, natural resources, innovation and technology,
gender and governance.


To enhance its impact, ECA places a special attention on collecting up to date and original regional statistics in or-
der to ground its policy research and advocacy on clear objective evidence; promoting policy consensus; providing
meaningful capacity development; and providing advisory services to African governments, intergovernmental or-
ganizations and institutions in key thematic fields. In addition, it formulates and promotes development assistance
programmes and acts as the executing agency for relevant operational projects.


Photo Credits:
Coffee photo: http://www.flickr.com/photos/misskei/5611960807/lightbox/
Factory photo: Nathaniel Adams




African
The


Growth and Opportunity Act


An Empirical Analysis of the Possibilities Post-2015


JULY 2013


Africa Growth Initiative
at BROOKINGS


Simon Mevel
Zenia A. Lewis
Mwangi S. Kimenyi
Stephen Karingi
Anne Kamau




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


i i


Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi


Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


Category I Scenarios: AGOA Expires in 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4


Category II Scenarios: Expanding AGOA Product Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9


Category III Scenarios: Revising the List of AGOA-Eligible Countries and Extending
AGOA-Like Benefits to Non-African Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13


Category IV Scenarios: Restructuring AGOA Based on the EPAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16


Category V Scenarios: AGOA within a Different Global Trading Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25


Conclusions and Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31


Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33


Annexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38


List of Figures


Figure 1 . Average Ad Valorem Protection Faced by Africa on Its Exports to the
United States, by Main Sector, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1


Figure 2 . Total Trade Volumes for China, the EU and the U .S . with Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2


Figure 3 . Changes in Exports from Initially AGOA-Eligible Countries to the
U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming a Return to the GSP
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5


Figure 4 . Changes in Export Products from AGOA-Eligible Countries to the
U .S ., Following a Scenario Assuming a Return to the GSP
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6


Figure 5 . Changes in Percentage Compared to the Baseline Scenario in 2025 in
Real Wages for Skilled Workers and Unskilled Workers Engaged in the Agricultural
Sector and Unskilled Workers Engaged in the Nonagricultural Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7


Figure 6 . Changes in Exports from Main Regions to the United States,
Following Scenarios Assuming an Extension of AGOA Eligibility by Product
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


i i i


Figure 7 . Changes in Exports from Main Regions to the U .S ., Following
Scenarios Assuming Revisions of AGOA Eligibility by Countries Compared to the
Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14


Figure 8 . Changes in Total Exports from Main Regions, Following Scenarios Assuming
Revisions of the Structure of AGOA Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . .18


Figure 9 . Changes in Exports from African Countries/Regions to the U .S ., Following
Scenarios Assuming Revisions of the Structure of AGOA Compared to the
Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22


Figure 10 . Changes in Exports from Africa by Main Destination, Following
EPA-Like Scenarios Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23


Figure 11 . Changes in Exports from Africa by Sector, Following
EPA-Like Scenarios Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24


Figure 12 . Changes in Africa’s Exports/Imports from/to the U .S ., Following
EPA-Like Scenarios Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24


Figure 13 . Changes in African Countries’ Real Income, Following EPA-Like
Scenarios Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25


Figure 14 . Changes in Tariff Revenues by African Countries, Following
EPA-Like Scenarios as Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26


Figure 15 . Changes in Total Exports from Main Regions, Following Scenarios
Looking at a Different Global Environment Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . .30


Figure 16 . Changes in Africa’s Exports by Main Destinations, Following Scenarios
Looking at a Different Global Environment Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . .31


Figure 17 . Changes in African Countries’ Exports to the EU, Following Scenarios
Looking at a Different Global Environment Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . .33


Figure 18 . Changes in Intra-African Trade by Main Sectors Following
Scenario IV .B Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34


List of Tables


Table 1 . Highest Changes in Exports in the Textile & Apparel Sector from African
Countries/Regions by Sectors to the U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming an Extension
of AGOA Eligibility by Product as Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


i v


List of Annexes


Annex A . Average Ad Valorem Protection Faced by African Countries on Their Exports
to the U .S . by Main Sector in 2013 vs . Return to the U .S . GSP by 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43


Annex B . Changes in Exports from African Countries/Regions and Other Main Regions
to the U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming an Extension of AGOA Eligibility by
Product Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44


Annex C . Changes in Exports from African Countries/Regions and Other Main Regions
to the U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming Revisions of AGOA Eligibility by
Countries Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45


Annex D . Average Global Ad Valorem Protection Faced by Non-African LDCs on Their
Exports to the U .S ., Current vs . After Scenarios, Assuming Revisions of AGOA-Eligibility
by Countries (Where Changes Are Implied for Non-African LDCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46


Annex E . Changes in Exports from African Countries/Regions and Other Main Regions
to the U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming Revisions of AGOA Eligibility by Countries
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47


Annex F . Detailed List of the 1 Percent Most Sensitive U .S . Imports (at HS-6 Level)
from AGOA-Eligible Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48


Annex G . Changes in Exports from African Countries/Regions and Other Main Regions
to the U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming Revisions of the Structure of AGOA
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49


Annex H . Changes in Exports from Initially AGOA-Eligible Countries/Regions
to the U .S ., Following Scenarios Assuming a Return to the U .S . GSP, by Sector, 2025 . . . . . . .50


Annex I . Changes in Total Exports by Country/Region, Following Scenarios Assuming
Revisions to the Structure of AGOA Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . .52


Annex J . Changes in Real Income by Country/Region, Following Scenarios Assuming
Revisions to the Structure of AGOA Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . .53


Annex K . Changes in Tariff Revenues by Country/Region, Following Scenarios Assuming
Revisions of the Structure of AGOA Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . .54


Annex L . Changes in Total Exports by Country/Region, Following Scenarios Assuming
a Different Trading Environment Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55


Annex M . Changes in Exports by Origin and Destination Following Scenario IV .A
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


v


Annex N . Changes in Exports by Origin and Destination Following Scenario IV .B
Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57


Annex O . Average Ad Valorem Protection Faced by African Countries on Their
Exports to the EU, By Main Sector, 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58


Annex P . Changes in Exports from All Countries/Regions to the EU, Following
Scenarios Assuming a Different Trading Environment Compared to the
Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59


Annex Q . Changes in Real Income by Country/Region, Following Scenarios Assuming
a Different Trading Environment Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60


Annex R . Changes in Tariff Revenues by Country/Region, Following
Scenarios V .A and V .B Compared to the Baseline Scenario, 2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61


Annex S . Sector Categorizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62


Annex T . Country Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


v i


Executive Summary


The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), one of the defining characteristics of the trade and commercial relationship between
the United States and Africa, will expire on Septem-
ber 30, 2015. So far, there have been heightened
discussions both by African and U.S. policymakers
on the post-2015 commercial relationship between
the United States and African countries, excluding
North Africa. These discussions have largely focused
on whether to extend the current legislation, and, if
so, for how long, and what elements of the current
legislation should be changed. Although there have
been propositions as to what may happen under
different scenarios, these are not supported by hard
empirical evidence and thus are not very useful in
informing the design of the post-2015 relationship.
As AGOA’s extension is debated, it is important to
have empirically based analyses of how changes to
the legislation could affect trade patterns as well
as how changes in the global trading environment
could affect U.S.-Africa trade volumes and African
economies more broadly.


This report provides an analysis of outcomes of
U.S.-Africa trade under five categories of post-2015
scenarios. These scenarios look at the trade and
income implications of i) not extending AGOA
beyond 2015; ii) expanded product eligibility for
AGOA; iii) revisions to the currently eligible coun-
tries; iv) a restructuring of AGOA to resemble the
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) of the
European Union; and v) the effects that a possible
EU-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) could have on
AGOA or an EPA-like situation, with an additional
scenario examining how a continental free trade area


(CFTA) would play into such an integrated trade
environment.


The results indicate, first of all, that should AGOA
not be extended and current AGOA-eligible coun-
tries revert back to the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), then trade losses would be dis-
tributed in a very unequal fashion across the conti-
nent due to the variation in AGOA-eligible prod-
ucts that are exported by different countries. The
results also show that expanding product eligibility
for AGOA would only have small effects on the
exports coming from AGOA-eligible countries—
unless complete duty-free and quota-free (DFQF)
market access was granted because the most im-
port-sensitive sectors for the U.S. (e.g., sugar, cot-
ton and clothing) are still where Africa would gain
the most. The results of the analysis also show that
U.S. producers and exporters would not be affected
by providing these additional benefits. In addition,
the analysis shows that excluding middle-income
countries that are currently eligible for AGOA or
adding other non-African least-developed coun-
tries (LDCs) that are currently not AGOA-eligi-
ble would result in considerable trade losses and
increased competition for Africa. Last, the results
show that EPA-like agreements could result in large
losses in tariff revenue for African countries, but also
demonstrate the importance of regional integration
because there is a higher increase in intra-African
trade when EPAs are in place with a CFTA instead
of the currently proposed regional FTAs.


These findings suggest certain recommendations for
policymakers, including extending AGOA beyond




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


v i i


necessary for countries to ensure sufficient progress
in this area. There is also an obvious need for poli-
cymakers to examine the idea of granting complete
DFQF access to the U.S. market for Africa because
of the large benefits it would provide for AGOA-el-
igible countries and the low cost to the U.S. They
should also be careful in considering an extension
of AGOA benefits to LDCs outside Africa due to
the negative effects it could have for African econo-
mies. Last, there is an obvious need for AGOA-eli-
gible countries to further exploit the benefits of the
trade preferences available under the legislation.


2015: Without an extension, there will be declines
in African exports, economic diversification and
employment for many AGOA-eligible countries.
Thus, there remains a strong case for continuing or
expanding the current preferences. The results also
show the importance for regional integration of
allowing African exporters to remain competitive,
and making efforts toward offsetting the potential
tariff revenue losses that could be experienced with
EPAs (or agreements like them) or external FTAs
that would compete with African exports. Increased
trade assistance and investment will likely be




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1


Introduction


facing an average protection of less than 1 percent.5
While African countries that are not eligible for
AGOA face nearly 2 percent protection on their
exports to the U.S., AGOA-eligible countries have
much better access to the U.S. market, with tariff
barriers averaging only 0.15 percent (see figure 1).


However, this average global protection masks strong
disparities across sectors and countries. Indeed, the
U.S. remains more protectionist on its agricultur-
al imports (especially sugar, cotton and milk) than
on its industrial imports from Africa. Nevertheless,
even in industry, some key sectors for Africa are still
significantly protected, such as textiles and wearing


The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was signed into law in 2000, marking the beginning of a new trade-focused relation-
ship between the United States and Africa.1 AGOA
provides trade preferences for the continent that,
combined with the U.S. Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP),2 allow for duty-free export ac-
cess to the U.S. market for up to 6,400 product
lines3 coming from 39 countries in Africa.4


Snapshot of U.S. Market Access under
AGoA


As a consequence, Africa currently enjoys excel-
lent access when exporting to the U.S. market,


Source: Authors’ calculations based on MAcMapHS6v2 database.


0.0


0.5


1.0


1.5


2.0


2.5


3.0


3.5


4.0


Global Agriculture Industry


Africa total


AGOA-eligible countries


Non-AGOA-eligible countriesPE
R


C
EN


T


Figure 1. AverAge Ad vAlorem Protection FAced by AFricA on its exPorts to the
united stAtes, by mAin sector, 2013




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2


Trade is expected to play a key role in catalyzing
growth and development. Africa’s total trade with
its traditional partners, like the European Union,
has remained high, and at the same time China,
Turkey, India and many other countries have seized
the opportunities for mutually beneficial growth
and commerce by engaging the continent. China’s
trade with Africa was about $10 billion in 2000,
jumped to $155 billion in 2011, and reached $180
billion in 2012.6 Therefore, and despite AGOA be-
ing in place since 2000, China has surpassed the
U.S. to become Africa’s second-largest trade partner
after the EU (as shown in figure 2). U.S. imports
from AGOA-eligible countries have also increased
over the last decade, though they declined with the
onset of the global financial and economic crisis in
2008 and again in 2012. Total trade between the
U.S. and Africa decreased by almost $30 billion
from 2011 to 2012;7 mineral oil and fuel exports
from Africa constituted a large portion of this de-
crease—making up about $22 billion of the total
trade decline.8 Under these conditions, although
AGOA certainly played a key role in reinforcing
U.S.-Africa trade relationships, trade preferences


apparel, especially those that are not eligible for the
textile and apparel clause under AGOA. As a con-
sequence, a few countries, such as Burkina Faso (a
large cotton producer and an AGOA-eligible coun-
try) and Madagascar (a large textile and apparel
producer and currently not AGOA-eligible), face
significant average tariff barriers when exporting to
the U.S. (see annex A).


Beyond the better market access obtained by Afri-
can countries when exporting to the U.S., the first
priority for AGOA, as written in the legislation,
is to “promote stable and sustainable economic
growth and development in Sub-Saharan Africa.”


In fact, since 2000 Africa has seen previously un-
precedented levels of economic growth. Many an-
ticipate that the decade ahead will continue with
these positive trends because the region is forecasted
to remain one of the fastest growing on the planet.
Along with its increasing growth rates, Africa has
also quickly become a much more desirable region
in which to invest and with which to do business.


0


50


100


150


200


250


300


350


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012


China United States European Union


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Figure 2. totAl trAde volumes For chinA, the eu And the u.s. with AFricA


Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3


This report’s Structure and Baseline


The following sections of this report present addi-
tional descriptions and results for the different pos-
sible scenarios that could unfold at the end of 2015.
A baseline scenario is used to compare the effects of
each of the scenarios described in the report. The
baseline scenario proposes an extension of AGOA
to 2025, under the same preferential arrangement
whereby 26 of the 39 countries under AGOA qual-
ify for the textile and apparel clause. A 10-year
timeframe was selected for the extension period in
part because it seems the most likely period of time
based on recent discussion. It is perceived to be a
period that will allow enough time for continued
investment in AGOA-eligible countries and sec-
tors that benefit from AGOA-eligibility while also
keeping in mind that the rapidly changing global
trade environment may prompt the U.S. to enter
into different types of preferential trade agreements
for Africa in the near future, such as reciprocal ne-
gotiated agreements in lieu of unilaterally granted
trade preferences. Though shorter or longer periods
are possible, the 10-year period will allow for suf-
ficient analysis of trends. Below, five categories of
scenarios are compared to the baseline to gauge the
effects of changing the AGOA legislation from the
status quo.


granted by the U.S. have certainly not been fully
exploited by Africa.


Looking Beyond 2015


As the U.S. considers its strategy for trade and in-
vestment with Africa and the possible extension
of the AGOA legislation, understanding the ways
in which different forms of engagement could
affect trade with the region is crucial. AGOA ex-
pires in 2015, and when this time comes there
are two obvious options: AGOA could be ex-
tended, or it could simply be allowed to expire.
If AGOA expires, it would mean the end of ex-
tended trade preferences for Africa and a return
to earlier trade arrangements under the GSP,9
conditional upon the extension of the GSP, which
otherwise expires at the end of July 2013. Under
the possibility of extension, there are several differ-
ent scenarios, some in which AGOA’s trade bene-
fits could be restructured, others in which it could
be continued within the context of a very differ-
ent external trading environment. AGOA could be
restructured in a number of ways: It could include
or exclude certain countries; provide different or
extended benefits; or provide reciprocal benefits. In
addition, such scenarios could also occur within a
different global trading environment.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4


Category I Scenario: AGoA Expires in 2015


Description of the Scenario


If the AGOA legislation is not reauthorized in 2015, the U.S. would revert to the GSP granted to LDCs.
As mentioned above, returning to the GSP would mean that the extra 1,800 product lines for which
AGOA provides preferential access would no longer be duty free. The GSP would be the only prefer-
ential scheme offered by the U.S. to Africa, which is also granted to 127 other developing countries in
the world.10 The following scenario examines how a return to the GSP would differ from the baseline
scenario of a 10-year extension of AGOA to 2025.


Results for the Category I Scenario


The first scenario envisaged in revising the struc-
ture of AGOA is a return to the U.S. GSP for all
AGOA-eligible countries. Compared to the base-
line scenario, which assumes extension of the cur-
rent AGOA situation until 2025, a return to the
GSP provides a better understanding and quanti-
tative evidence regarding how much Africa would
lose if a phase out of AGOA were to happen.


It should also be noted that the results for this sce-
nario look not only at the effects upon trade and real
income for AGOA-eligible countries individually
and as a whole, but also at the effects of AGOA
on economic diversification and employment, since
comparing an extension of AGOA through 2025
(the baseline) to its expiration in 2015 provides the
most obvious evidence of its broader effects.


From a protection perspective, annex A shows that
the removal of AGOA preferences would not have
a large effect upon the access of AGOA-eligible
countries to the U.S. market, with average glob-
al protection increasing from 0.15 percent under
AGOA to 0.76 percent after a return to the U.S.
GSP, which continues to be low overall. Therefore,
it is evident that the rather good access enjoyed
by African countries when exporting to the U.S.
is essentially the result of the GSP scheme, thanks
to about 4,600 product lines already eligible for
DFQF market access under the GSP. This result
suggests that the additional 1,800 lines subject to
DFQF eligibility under AGOA do not considerably
improve the access of African countries to the U.S.
market on average. Having said that, some African
countries and products would actually see their pro-
tection levels soar if AGOA preferences were to be
discontinued. For example, the average protection


Overview


AGOA expires at the end of 2015, and the U.S. reverts back to the GSP for Africa,
excluding North Africa.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5


Not surprisingly, the countries/regions exporting
products to the U.S. that would face the highest tar-
iff increases due to the discontinuity of AGOA pref-
erences would be the ones experiencing the largest
export losses. See the methodology section for the
countries/region classifications used in this report.
For example, as the U.S. average protection imposed
on Namibia’s exports of agricultural products would
increase from 0.0 to 13.0 percent, and the ones im-
posed on Lesotho’s and Swaziland’s exports of indus-
trial products would change from 0.0 and 0.4 per-
cent to 11.4 and 6.9 percent, respectively, following
a return to the U.S. GSP. The rest of the Southern Af-
rican Customs Union’s (SACU’s) total exports to the
U.S. would drop by 17.1 percent (see figure 3), with
exports of specifically milk and dairy products and
textiles and wearing apparel products dropping by
76.2 and 56.2 percent, respectively, as compared to
the baseline in 2025 (see annex H). In fact, a phase-
out of AGOA preferences would have the largest
effect upon several specific categories of products
exported from current AGOA-eligible countries to


faced by Botswana and Namibia when exporting
agricultural products to the U.S. would pass from
fully free access for both countries under AGOA
to an average 17.3 percent and 13.0 percent under
only the U.S. GSP, respectively. As far as industrial
products are concerned, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauri-
tius, Swaziland, Cape Verde and Kenya would also
face considerably higher average protection levels
on their exports to the U.S. strictly under the U.S.
GSP compared to AGOA.


Those higher levels of average protection follow-
ing a return to the GSP for currently AGOA-
eligible countries when exporting to the U.S. trans-
late into export losses for African countries to the
U.S. market. A return to the GSP would be det-
rimental for currently AGOA-eligible countries as
a whole because their exports to the U.S. would
be reduced by 2.1 percent (or $1.3 billion) when
compared to the baseline in 2025 (see figure 3 and
annex G).


-18 -16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2


Rest of SACU


Mauritius


Rest of East Africa


South Africa


Botswana


Nigeria


Malawi


Rest of Central Africa


Mozambique


Rest of West Africa


Tanzania


Uganda


Ethiopia


Senegal


Zambia


Angola and the DRC


AGOA-eligible countries


PERCENT


Figure 3. chAnges in exPorts From initiAlly AgoA-eligible countries to
the u.s., Following scenArios Assuming A return to the gsP comPAred


to the bAseline scenArio, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


6


concentrated in a few countries: High export reduc-
tions can be observed in milk and dairy products
for Nigeria, South Africa and regional groupings,11
such as the rest of SACU, rest of West Africa, rest
of Central Africa and rest of East Africa and in
meat products for Botswana, Nigeria and South
Africa. Lower but still meaningful export losses are
registered for South Africa in other food products
and other manufactured products, as well as for


the U.S. The most affected would be milk and dairy
products (-10.2 percent), meat products (-60.7 per-
cent), textiles and apparel products (-51.2 percent)
and leather products (-8.8 percent) (see figure 4).
Apart from textiles, apparel and leather products—
for which the exports reductions from current-
ly AGOA-eligible countries to the U.S. are to be
found in nearly all countries and are often large—
decreases in exports in other products are generally


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.


-70


-60


-50


-40


-30


-20


-10


0


10
Pla


nt-
ba


se
d f


ibe
rs


(in
clu


din
g c


ott
on


)


Ce
rea


l a
nd


gr
ain


s


Ot
he


r c
rop


s


Me
at


pro
du


cts


Ot
he


r fo
od


pr
od


uc
ts


Cr
ud


e a
nd


pr
oc


es
se


d o
il


Ot
he


r e
ne


rgy


Mi
nin


g


Mi
ne


ral
an


d m
eta


l p
rod


uc
ts


Te
xti


le
an


d w
ea


rin
g a


pp
are


l


Fo
res


try


Fis
hin


g


Le
ath


er
pro


du
cts


Ch
em


ica
l p


rod
uc


ts


Ot
he


r m
an


ufa
ctu


re
pro


du
cts


Tra
ns


po
rt s


erv
ice


s


Ot
he


r s
erv


ice
s


Mi
lk


an
d d


air
y p


rod
uc


ts


Ve
ge


tab
le,


fru
it a


nd
nu


ts


Liv
e a


nim
als


, a
nim


al
an


d w
oo


l p
rod


uc
ts


Su
ga


r


Figure 4. Changes in export produCts From agoa-eligible Countries to the u.s., Following
a sCenario assuming a return to the gsp Compared to the


baseline sCenario, 2025




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


7


trend tends to highlight the necessity for AGOA to
become more inclusive.


Employment


In addition, evaluating the effects upon wages in
this scenario demonstrates the effects that a return


Mozambique, the rest of East Africa, South Afri-
ca again and the rest of SACU in vegetables, fruit
and nuts, and also for Nigeria in oil (see annex H).
The fact that AGOA is having considerably larger
trade effects upon certain countries and regions is
also indicative of the limited role it has played in
diversifying African economies (see figure 4). This


Figure 5. Changes in perCentage Compared to the baseline sCenario in 2025 in real wages
For skilled workers and unskilled workers engaged in the agriCultural seCtor and


unskilled workers engaged in the nonagriCultural seCtor


Rest of SACU


South Africa


Botswana


Rest of East Africa


Zambia


Uganda


Tanzania


Mozambique


Mauritius


Malawi


Ethiopia


Rest of Central Africa


Angola and the DRC


Rest of West Africa


Senegal


Nigeria


0.1 0.20-0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1


Unskilled in non-agricultural sectors Unskilled in agricultural sectors Skilled


PERCENT


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


8


for the rest of SACU, but also for South Africa,
Nigeria and the rest of East Africa. Wages for skilled
labor would be negatively affected in the rest of
SACU, Mauritius and Malawi—likely due to the
more skilled jobs within some of the industry-re-
lated sectors (e.g., textiles and apparel) that would
be negatively affected. Many of the other regions
not mentioned above would see little or virtually no
effects upon wages in these sectors. The countries/
regions that would see declines in wages are also
the countries that would experience the largest de-
clines in exports should AGOA expire in 2015.12
Overall, however, it is clear that a return to the GSP
would cause large declines in wages for some coun-
tries and regions.


These findings indicate that AGOA is clearly supporting African countries’ exports to the U.S.,
higher wages and, implicitly, employment. These gains do, however, seem to be large for only a
few countries and products and, as a consequence, a return to the U.S. GSP would affect African
economies and sectors quite unequally. Some export sectors, like milk and dairy products, leath-
er, meat products, textiles and apparel, and other manufactured goods would see less exports as
a result of the slower growth that these export sectors would experience. Whereas some coun-
tries (in particular, Mauritius, Nigeria, Malawi, Botswana, South Africa, and a few countries from
the rest of SACU and the rest of East Africa) would be strongly hurt as far as trade and wages are
concerned by a return to the GSP. Others would not see their access to the U.S. market worsen
or their wages decline considerably after losing AGOA preferences.


to the GSP would have on employment. Generally,
a return to the GSP would cause losses—although
quite marginal ones—in real wages, but the effects
on different regions and sectors vary significantly.
Wages for unskilled nonagricultural employment
would see very large declines for specific regions,
concentrated especially in those with a larger tex-
tile and apparel sector, such as the rest of SACU
(which includes Lesotho), Mauritius and, surpris-
ingly, Malawi, which does not have a very large
textile and apparel sector but which significantly
benefits from AGOA and would therefore be very
negatively affected should there be a return to the
GSP. Wages for unskilled labor in the agricultur-
al sector would not only be negatively affected




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


9


Category II Scenarios: Expanding AGoA
Product Eligibility


Descriptions of Scenarios


The following four scenarios are built on the premise of extending AGOA product eligibility by includ-
ing more items on the list of eligible commodities available for countries to export to the U.S. under
AGOA. The first scenario focuses on textile and apparel products only, while the second, third and fourth
scenarios examine what would happen if AGOA is extended to other product lines.


Currently, AGOA provides duty-free export eligibility for textiles and apparel to 26 of the 39 AGOA-el-
igible countries under the special textile and apparel provision. In order to qualify for the special tex-
tile and apparel provision of AGOA, countries must establish a visa system that signifies that they are
able to prevent trans-shipment of textile goods as well as effectively monitor and track the sourcing
and sale of textiles. In addition to the textile and apparel clause, there is also the third-country fab-
ric rules of origin provision that allows “lesser developed,”13 AGOA-eligible, textile-producing coun-
tries to source fabric for the production of textiles from other countries regardless of the source.14
Not all the AGOA eligible countries fall into the category of “lesser developed,” and thus all are not eli-
gible for the third-country fabric rules of origin eligibility.


Whether countries lack the visa for exporting apparel due to low production capacity of textiles and ap-
parel, are not eligible for the third-country fabric provision, or have difficulty regarding the capacity to set
up the needed visa system, it would be interesting to understand the ways in which having the textile and
apparel provision extended to all currently AGOA-eligible countries would affect exports in this sector.
The first scenario (II.A) thus explores this possibility.


Overview


(A) The textile and apparel export provision is granted to all currently AGOA-eligible countries.
(B) DFQF access is given to 97 percent of all exports from AGOA-eligible countries.
(C) DFQF access is given to 99 percent of all exports from AGOA-eligible countries.
(D) DFQF access is given to 100 percent of all exports from AGOA-eligible countries.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 0


slight amount of market access to the U.S., facing
higher competition from African countries. How-
ever, overall, the changes in legislation would be
net trade creating. It is, however, important to note
that some African countries/regions would be able
to grab more trade opportunities than others—in
particular, the rest of West Africa, Ethiopia, Mauri-
tius, Tanzania, the rest of East Africa, South Africa
and the rest of SACU would gain some additional
export markets to the U.S. (see annex B).


Potential gains can become quite significant at the
country/region and sector levels. Table 1, which
depicts the highest export increases depending on
scenarios exploring AGOA eligibility expansion
by product, indicates that when the textile and ap-
parel clause is extended to all 39 AGOA-eligible
countries, exports of textiles and wearing apparel
products to the U.S. from the rest of Central Afri-
ca15 and the rest of West Africa would increase by
14.8 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively, com-
pared to the baseline scenario in 2025. Not surpris-
ingly, extension of DFQF to up to 97 percent or 99


Results for the Category II Scenarios


Considering African economies’ already good ac-
cess to the U.S. market, it would be expected that
scenarios looking at the extension of AGOA eligi-
bility by product would not translate into a surge of
African exports to the U.S. when compared to the
product eligibility currently existing under AGOA.

The results of the analysis confirm this assumption.
Indeed, current AGOA-eligible countries would
only increase their exports to the U.S. by $3.2 mil-
lion following an extension of the textile and apparel
clause to all AGOA-eligible countries as compared
to an extension of the current AGOA situation in
2025 (scenario II.A). In the case of DFQF being
extended to 97 percent (scenario II.B) and 99 per-
cent (scenario II.C) of AGOA-eligible countries’ ex-
ports, then the increase of AGOA countries’ exports
to the U.S. would also be relatively limited, with
an additional $15.0 million and $33.3 million, re-
spectively, compared to the reference case in 2025
(see figure 6). Other regions would therefore lose a


For the next three scenarios, extended product eligibility is considered more broadly, but keeping in place
the same textile and apparel clauses that existed as of April 2013. AGOA (including the GSP) provides
duty-free access to thousands of product lines, but there are still categories of products being exported
from AGOA-eligible countries to the U.S. that are not eligible for duty-free status, among them many
food and agricultural goods. Agricultural products account for a small percentage of all AGOA-eligible
exports to the U.S. Further, certain quotas are imposed on imports of agriculture commodities—such as
sugar, tobacco and peanuts—which are important exports for Africa.


Expanding AGOA eligibility to additional product lines could be beneficial for African countries. In the
following two scenarios in this category, we assume that DFQF access is extended partially or fully to all
exports from AGOA-eligible countries. An index was computed to establish the products that are consid-
ered most sensitive to the U.S. market. Import-sensitive products would be those that the U.S. produces
that are considered particularly susceptible to competition from foreign imports. The second scenario
(II.B) extends DFQF access to 97 percent of AGOA-eligible countries’ exports to the U.S., with the
remaining 3 percent of the most sensitive sectors for the U.S. market being excluded. The third scenario
(II.C) extends DFQF access to 99 percent of AGOA-eligible countries’ exports to the U.S., with only 1
percent of sensitive product lines being excluded (e.g., sugar and cotton). And the fourth scenario (II.D)
extends DFQF access to 100 percent of AGOA-eligible countries’ exports to the U.S.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 1


2025 compared to an extension of current AGOA,
simply adding the residual 1 percent to the DFQF
list would increase African exports by another $72.5
million. Specifically, if African exports were to be
granted 100 percent DFQF to the U.S., then Afri-
can exports of sugar would be considerably boost-
ed, increasing by 121.5 percent, 95.3 percent and
94.9 percent for South Africa, Nigeria and Malawi,
respectively, in comparison to an extension of cur-
rent AGOA product eligibility. Sugar exports to the
U.S. would also be enhanced in the rest of SACU
and Mauritius; plant-based fiber (essentially cotton)
exports from the rest of West Africa (inclusive of
Burkina Faso) would also be augmented quite sig-
nificantly, increasing by 21.7 percent. Africa’s exports
of textiles and wearing apparel to the U.S. would
also rise considerably—increasing by more than 30
percent in Zambia, Nigeria, the rest of West Africa,
Tanzania, the rest of Central Africa and Ethiopia, as
well as in most other African countries/regions, but
in more moderate proportions. Exports of fish from


percent of product lines would provide larger mar-
ket opportunities to AGOA-eligible countries,
thanks essentially to the inclusion of textiles and
wearing apparel products not initially part of the
textile and apparel clause. For example, Zambia
and Nigeria would increase their exports of textiles
and apparel to the U.S. by more than 50 percent in
2025 following an extension of DFQF to 99 per-
cent of their exports to the U.S. when compared
with current AGOA product eligibility.


Nevertheless, if the remaining 1 percent of protec-
tion imposed by the U.S. on its sensitive imports
(e.g. sugar, cotton, diamonds, fish and some cere-
als, as well as textiles and apparel and a few other
industrial products) from African countries were
to become eligible for DFQF access, then much
larger export gains could be registered by African
countries. Indeed, while—as already observed—an
extension of AGOA-eligible products to 99 percent
DFQF would bring an additional $33.3 million in


-100


-80


-60


-40


-20


0


20


40


60


80


100


120


Scenario II.A Scenario II.B Scenario II.C Scenario II.D


M
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


AGOA-eligible countries African non-AGOA-eligible
countries


Rest of the world


Figure 6. Changes in exports From main regions to the united states,
Following sCenarios assuming an extension oF agoa eligibility by produCt


Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 2


Senegal, Uganda, the rest of West Africa, South Af-
rica, Mauritius and the rest of Central Africa would
increase. Mineral and metal products from the rest
of SACU and Malawi, and leather products from
South Africa and Mauritius would also significantly
increase, although to a lesser extent. Moreover, it is
important to note that if the U.S. is to grant 100
percent DFQF to AGOA-eligible countries, then
U.S. producers would only see their production di-
minishing by $9.6 million, compared to an AGOA
extension until 2025 under current conditions.


Thus, expanding AGOA benefits by increas-
ing product eligibility would only deliver sig-
nificant and better distributed export ben-
efits across African countries if full DFQF
access was to be granted by the U.S. to Af-
rican economies. Moreover, it is important
to note that U.S. producers and exporters
would not be affected by having such con-
cessions given to African countries.


table 1. highest Changes in exports in
the textile & apparel seCtor From aFriCan
Countries/regions by seCtors to the u.s.,


Following sCenarios assuming an extension
oF agoa eligibility by produCt


Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025
(pErcEnt chAnGE)


Scenario II.A


Country/Region %


Rest of Central Africa 14.8


Rest of West Africa 9.1


Angola and the DRC 2.1


Rest of East Africa 0.7


Scenario II.B


Country/Region %


Zambia 47.0


Nigeria 37.4


Rest of Central Africa 15.6


Rest of West Africa 12.8


Angola and the DRC 10.5


Scenario II.C


Country/Region %


Zambia 64.2


Nigeria 50.8


Rest of West Africa 32.4


Rest of Central Africa 23.3


Tanzania 22.3


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 3


Category III Scenarios: revising the List of
AGoA-Eligible Countries and Extending
AGoA-Like Benefits to Non-African Countries


Description of Scenarios


We build four scenarios that revise the list of AGOA-eligible countries, including removing some currently
eligible countries and extending AGOA-like benefits to some countries outside Africa. Recently, there have
been commentary and media reports on the possibility of South Africa being excluded from AGOA. Ideas
of whether middle-income countries (MICs) should be excluded or graduated from the benefits of AGOA
remain a topic of consideration in policy circles. The first scenario in this section (III.A) revises the list of
AGOA-eligible countries to exclude all MICs that are currently benefiting from the legislation.


For the following two scenarios in this category, additional countries receive AGOA benefits but the
MICs remain excluded. Congress has introduced bills in the past16 suggesting the extension of AGOA-
like benefits to other developing economies—including countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia and Laos,17
which are low-income countries but whose production levels in many sectors, like textiles and apparel
are very large, in some cases much more than what the whole of Africa produces (e.g., Bangladesh).18
In that sense, the second scenario (III.B) examines the effects of extending AGOA-like benefits to other
LDCs, while still excluding MICs (with no access to the textile and apparel provision). The third scenario
(III.C) is the same but also extends the textile and apparel provision eligibility to all LDCs. These sce-
narios are also aligned with possible DFQF extension to all LDCs under the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in the near future, which would imply an erosion of preferences for African countries when
exporting to the U.S. market.


In the last scenario in the category (III.D), MICs remain eligible along with non-African LDCs, and the
textile and apparel provision is kept as it is today and not extended to additional countries.


Overview


(A) Middle-income countries are excluded from AGOA.
(B) Middle-income countries are excluded from AGOA, but all LDCs (African and non-African)


are included.
(C) Middle-income countries are excluded from AGOA, but all LDCs are included, and the tex-


tile and apparel provision is extended to all.
(D) Both middle-income and non-African LDCs are included (but the textile and apparel provi-


sion is unchanged from 2013).




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 4


being more than $500 million. This dramatic drop
shows how much this oil exporter is currently ben-
efiting from AGOA. Annex 7, which indicates ex-
port changes by countries/regions and main sectors,
shows that all MICs except Nigeria would mainly
see their market access to the U.S. reduced in the
textile and apparel markets. Exports from Nigeria to
the U.S. would, not surprisingly, decrease in mining
and energy, as well as in agriculture and food. Ex-
ports to the U.S. in agriculture and food would also
be considerably reduced for Botswana and South
Africa, essentially due to the loss of preferences for
key products such as meat and milk.


LDCs that are currently AGOA eligible would not
draw much benefit from the exclusion of initially eli-
gible MICs from the agreement, as LDCs would only
marginally increase their market access to the U.S.
(scenario III.A). Angola and the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo (DRC) would register the highest


Results for the Category III Scenarios


Of the 39 AGOA-eligible countries, 14 are MICs.19
Losing AGOA preferences (i.e., returning to the
U.S. GSP) would imply important trade losses for
all African MICs to the U.S. market, thereby offer-
ing additional opportunities to export to the U.S.
for other countries, especially for those outside the
African continent (scenarios III.A, III.B and III.C;
see figure 7).


Proportionately, Mauritius would be the most af-
fected if it were to be removed from AGOA, with
a decrease of its exports to the U.S. above 9 percent
compared to the baseline in 2025, regardless of the
scenario envisaged (see annex C). African MICs from
the rest of SACU and the rest of East Africa would
also register large drops in their exports to the U.S. In
absolute terms, Nigeria would be the country losing
the most, with a reduction of its exports to the U.S.


-4,000


-3,000


-2,000


-1,000


0


1,000


2,000


3,000


4,000


5,000


AGOA-eligible
countries - LDCs


AGOA-eligible
countries - MICs*


African non-AGOA-
eligible countries


Non-African LDCs Rest of the world


M
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Scenario III.A Scenario III.B Scenario III.C Scenario III.D


Figure 7. Changes in exports From main regions to the u.s., Following sCenarios assuming
revisions oF agoa eligibility by Countries Compared to the


baseline sCenario, 2025


Note: * indicates that some LDCs are also included in the regional groupings defined in the GTAP database (e.g., the rest of West Africa) and
cannot be broken down, and therefore LDCs and MICs cannot be separated.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 5


is extended to all LDCs, then non-African LDCs as
well as Madagascar would get a boost in their textile
and apparel exports to the U.S. While Madagascar’s
exports of textiles and apparel to the U.S. would in-
crease by 99.9 percent (or $158.6 million), non-Af-
rican LDCs’ exports to the U.S. of similar products
would be augmented by 63.8 percent (representing
as much as an additional $4.5 billion), compared to
the baseline in 2025 (see annex C). This consider-
able trade expansion for the East Asian economies
would be essentially and relatively equally divided
between Bangladesh and Cambodia, with $2.2 bil-
lion and $1.9 billion, respectively.


As a result, African countries would face higher com-
petition with East Asian economies when exporting
textile and apparel products to the U.S. market and
see significantly decreased exports to the U.S. Annex
C clearly indicates that all African countries—with
the exceptions of Madagascar, Angola and the DRC22
—would see their exports of textile and apparel to
the U.S. diminishing if all LDCs were to be granted
the textile and apparel clause. As a whole, exports of
textile and apparel from AGOA-eligible countries
to the U.S. would decrease by 37.5 percent (see an-
nex E) if the textile and apparel clause were to be
granted to all LDCs, as compared to the current
AGOA situation in 2025.


The results from scenario III.D—which reflect a
situation where current AGOA eligibility is pre-
served, AGOA-eligible MICs are included, and all
LDCs are also included (without the textile and ap-
parel clause granted to all)—confirm that textiles
and apparel is the category where competition from
non-African LDCs would have the largest negative
effect on African exports. Thus, unless the textile
and apparel clause is granted to all countries, the
competition with non-African LDCs should not
strongly limit African exports to the U.S.


gains, which would still only be a 0.2 percent (or $13
million) increase in terms of their exports to the U.S.
If the eight African LDCs that are not currently
AGOA eligible20 as well as the 15 non-African LDCs21
were to also receive the benefits of AGOA (scenarios
III.B, III.C and III.D), the main beneficiaries would be
non-African LDCs, even though their exports to the
U.S. would still remain rather moderate, with up to an
increase of 0.2 percent (or $71.4 million), unless the
textile and apparel clause were also granted to them.


The limited gains when the textile and apparel
clause is not granted to all LDCs (scenarios III.B
and III.D) are consistent with the fact that the pro-
tection faced when exporting to the U.S. market
for non-African LDCs is essentially concentrated in
textile and apparel products. Indeed, non-African
LDCs currently face an average global protection
rate of 9.2 percent when exporting to the U.S. (see
annex D). If these LDCs are to be granted AGOA
preferences not including the textile and apparel
clause by the U.S., then the level of protection im-
posed by the American economy on non-African
LDCs would still be quite high, standing at 8.9
percent. Nevertheless, assuming that the textile and
apparel clause is extended to non-African LDCs,
it would make the average global protection level
faced by these countries when exporting to the U.S.
drop to as little as 0.3 percent—reflecting the fact
that protection faced by non-African LDCs when
exporting to the U.S. is mainly concentrated in tex-
tile and apparel products. As a consequence, unless
preferential access is given by the U.S. to non-Af-
rican LDCs for textile and apparel products, then
trade changes cannot be expected to be large. In that
sense, assuming that the textile and apparel clause
would also be granted to non-African LDCs would
hugely enhance trade gains for these countries
on the U.S. market. Indeed, if the clause offering
DFQF to a number of textile and apparel products


In brief, African MICs currently eligible for AGOA would suffer considerable trade losses if they
were to become ineligible for AGOA. Extending AGOA to all LDCs would only be a concern for
African countries if the textile and apparel clause were to be granted to all, in which case the
added competition would severely limit African exports to the U.S.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 6


Category IV Scenarios: restructuring AGoA
Based on EPAs


Description of Scenarios


Category IV consists of scenarios related to changes to the current AGOA legislation. One such possible
scenario is for AGOA to be restructured into a form similar to the trade preference agreements being ne-
gotiated elsewhere with the countries of Africa. The preferential trade agreements that have been getting
the most attention lately are the ones that the European Union is in the process of negotiating with the
countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions, called economic partnership agreements
(EPAs). The EU has had preferential trade agreements with the ACP countries for about 30 years. These
agreements have provided preferential market access to the EU in an effort to foster growth and develop-
ment. The EPAs would be different from these historical agreements in that they would provide partially,
though largely, reciprocal trade preferences that would involve the ACP countries opening their markets
and in turn providing preferential access to the EU.


These agreements would gather the ACP countries into specific regional groupings. The five African
EPA-specified regions are labeled West Africa, Central Africa, and East and Southern Africa, the South-
ern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC). Only the
EAC corresponds completely with an existing African regional economic community (REC), while only
SADC corresponds in name with an existing REC (the methodology section contains a complete list of
the countries in each regional group and additional information on regional economic groups).23


The EPAs plan to provide full market access for ACP countries when exporting to the EU, and then
reciprocal access for the EU’s exports to the markets of the ACP regional groups within an agreed-upon
time frame while still providing certain protections for African markets. It is anticipated that 80 percent
of EU exports will have DFQF access to these regional markets and, therefore, the 20 percent most sensi-
tive products for African countries will still be excluded. For the scenarios in this report, complete DFQF


Overview


(A) The U.S. has an agreement modeled after the European Union’s EPAs.
(B) The U.S. has an agreement modeled after the European Union’s EPAs, while a continental


FTA is in place for Africa (unlike the regional FTAs of the normal EPAs).




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 7


Therefore, while the following results show indica-
tions of increases in trade flows, they do not totally
capture the way in which the EPAs are also working
against efforts toward increased intra-African trade.
The following results also indicate the importance
of establishing a CFTA in order to counteract these
effects. While a CFTA would help offset the possi-
ble declines in intra-African trade that would result
from EPAs, it will be costly to finance necessary
complementary measures to tariff reductions, such
as improved trade facilitation.


Having said that, when one looks at total export
variations from countries and regions following im-
plementation of scenarios assuming revisions of the
structure of AGOA, it appears that agreements that
envisage (asymmetric) reciprocity in terms of tar-
iff barrier reductions between the U.S. and Africa
would deliver higher gains than any of the cases an-
alyzed looking at an expansion of AGOA eligibility
by products or countries. Indeed, whereas Africa’s
exports would decrease by $400 million after a re-
turn to the U.S. GSP, the continent would see its
exports increasing by $6.9 billion and $21.7 billion
if EPA-like scenarios were to be concluded between
the U.S. and Africa along with establishment of five
African regional FTAs or a single African CFTA,
respectively, compared to the baseline scenario in
2025 (see annex I for details by country/region).


However, decomposing export variations by des-
tinations of exports show that the trade benefits
that Africa would get from such EPA-like scenarios
are due to the trade creation within African FTAs


access to the EU market will begin immediately (in 2016), and the delayed reciprocity portion will be
effective seven years later to allow some demonstration of the effects of these changes.24


Thus, there are two scenarios modeled on the EU’s EPAs whereby the U.S. restructures its current trade
preference program to be exactly like the EU’s EPAs but only for African countries. The first of the two EPA-
like scenarios uses the exact same model of the EU, with the African countries of each regional group also
establishing an FTA (scenario IV.A); the second scenario has a CFTA in place beginning in 2017 (scenario
IV.B), which is the year that the Heads of State and Government of the African Union have decided upon25
for implementing a CFTA.26


Results for the Category IV Scenarios


There has been a fair amount of discussion as to
whether a reciprocal agreement between the U.S.
and Africa—designed based on the EPAs currently
being negotiated by the European Union with the
ACP countries—could offer brighter perspectives
than a phase-out of AGOA or if it could represent
an agreement that is more likely than an extended
AGOA, since the EU is currently negotiating these
types of agreements.


Before discussing the results of the EPA-like scenar-
ios, it should be noted that one of the disadvantages
posed by the EPA design is that the EPAs impose
certain structures of regional integration upon the
countries with which they propose to cooperate
and disincentivize forms of intra-African trade out-
side those structures. By creating FTAs with specific
regions, certain countries are simultaneously being
excluded from other relevant EPA-established re-
gional FTAs. For example, the EPA group called
SADC includes only some of the countries that are
actually part of that regional economic community,
namely, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique,
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. The other
members of SADC are the DRC, Malawi, Mau-
ritius, Zambia and Zimbabwe, which have been
placed into different EPA regional groups. This
means that countries that border one another, like
Malawi and Mozambique, will not share a common
regional FTA and will not be incentivized to trade
with one another to the same degree that those
within the EPA-established FTA will.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 8


those exporting products in high demand outside
the African continent (e.g., oil from Nigeria).


Second, African exports to the U.S. are being substi-
tuted or replaced (limiting their magnitude or even
implying a reduction) by African exports to Afri-
can partners, thanks to the reduction of often high
tariff barriers that would be removed for countries
trading with others within their respective regional
FTAs. Therefore, EPA-like scenarios between Afri-
ca and the U.S. would be trade creating for Africa,
thanks mainly to the deepened regional integration
in Africa envisaged by the agreement. Figure 10
confirms that Africa’s exports directed toward Africa
(i.e., intra-African trade) would increase signifi-
cantly following the establishment of FTAs.


In the context of U.S.-Africa EPAs, the formation
of five regional FTAs would contribute to increasing
intra-African trade by $8 billion, while a CFTA would
help create as much as $37.5 billion in intra-Afri-
can trade, as compared to the baseline of simply


rather than increases in trade between Africa and
the U.S.


Indeed, it turns out that none of the African coun-
tries would see their exports to the U.S. consider-
ably increase as a result of being granted 100 per-
cent free access to the U.S. market following an
EPA-like scenario, as compared to the baseline,
assuming extension of current AGOA preferences
(see figure 9). There are at least two reasons for this.


First, since African countries already enjoy relative-
ly good access to the U.S. market, and as observed
in the analysis of scenarios looking at extension of
AGOA eligibility by products, a surge of exports
cannot be expected from fully free access to the
U.S. However, some countries, especially those fac-
ing initially higher tariff barriers when exporting
to the U.S., would get non-negligible export—for
example, textile and apparel exporters (e.g., Mad-
agascar, which is non-AGOA eligible, and Mauri-
tius) and exporters of sugar (e.g., Malawi), as well as


African non-AGOA-
eligible countries


-10


-5


0


5


10


15


20


25


AGOA-eligible
countries


United States European Union Rest of the world


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.


Figure 8. Changes in total exports From main regions, Following sCenarios assuming
revisions oF the struCture oF agoa Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


1 9


forms, which are expected to considerably enhance
intra-African trade.27


Additionally, a decomposition of these intra-Afri-
can trade gains from FTA reforms shows that the
deeper regional integration in Africa, the stronger
the potential to increase the industrialization of
intra-African trade. Indeed, gains in textiles and
apparel and other industries account for about 55
percent and 62 percent of the total intra-African
trade gains, considering FTAs and CFTA, respec-
tively.


As far as the U.S.-Africa trade relationship is con-
cerned, U.S. exports to Africa would increase more


extending the status quo AGOA in 2025. As previously
alluded to, the large difference in intra-African trade
gains between the scenario considering regional FTAs
and the one assuming CFTA attests to the still high
tariff barriers remaining between regional groupings
in addition to those within regional groups (which
are already being reduced) and provides a strong ar-
gument in favor of an African continent free of tariff
barriers to help African countries take advantages of
economies of scale and trade opportunities. Further-
more, the above-mentioned intra-African trade gains
would only be the results of a reduction or elimina-
tion of tariff barriers to trade. Policymakers should
consider complementary reforms, such as the adop-
tion of trade facilitation measures on top of FTA re-


Nigeria


Madagascar


Angola and the DRC


Malawi


Rest of East Africa


Mauritius


Rest of Central Africa


Zimbabwe


Mozambique


Zambia


Senegal


Botswana


Ethiopia


Tanzania


Uganda


Rest of SACU


North Africa


Rest of West Africa


South Africa


-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


BILL IONS OF USD


Figure 9. Changes in exports From aFriCan Countries/regions to the u.s., Following
sCenarios assuming revisions oF the struCture oF agoa Compared to the baseline


sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 0


In other words, the U.S.-Africa two-way trade vari-
ations under the EPA-like scenarios reveal that al-
though such a trade agreement would be asymmet-
rical, with Africa apparently required to grant fewer
concessions than the U.S.—which would immedi-
ately grant 100 percent DFQF on its market to Af-
rican exports while Africa would progressively open
its market to provide 80 percent DFQF to U.S.
exports—such an agreement would favor the U.S.
in terms of the magnitude of market access gained
when exporting and therefore create potential trade
benefits. Indeed, average protection faced by Africa,
excluding North Africa (as these countries are not
part of the EPA-like scenario), when exporting to
the U.S. would be lowered to 0.0 percent from an
average tariff of about only 1 percent today, thanks
to the U.S. GSP and AGOA. At the same time, av-
erage protection faced by the U.S. when exporting
to Africa would decrease from 11.3 to 9.9 percent.28
Although 9.9 percent remains very high, thanks to
20 percent of Africa’s imports from the U.S. being
classified as sensitive from an African perspective,
it still provides an average 1.4 percentage point


than Africa’s exports to the U.S. after the imple-
mentation of an EPA-like arrangement between
the U.S. and Africa. Indeed, a scenario assuming
regional FTAs (scenario IV.A) in Africa would re-
sult in an increase of Africa’s exports to the U.S. of
$100 million when U.S. exports to Africa would be
augmented by $2.4 billion, compared to the base-
line in 2025. In the case of a CFTA within Africa
(scenario IV.B), Africa’s exports to the U.S. would
decline by $600 million, whereas U.S. exports to
Africa would still increase, but by $1.8 billion (see
figure 12). While the reasons for a relatively low
increase or even decrease (i.e., scenario considering
a CFTA) in Africa’s exports to the U.S. have already
been given, the increase in U.S. exports to Africa is
strictly due to the improved market access for the
U.S. when exporting to Africa as implied under the
EPA-like scenario. Under a CFTA, however, the
U.S. exports less to Africa than when regional Afri-
can FTAs are established because African countries
are offering more competition to the U.S. in the
African market, thanks to the lower tariff barriers
that would be in place on the African continent.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.


United States Africa AfricaUnited StatesRest of the
world


Rest of the
world


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


40.0


35.0


30.0


25.0


20.0


15.0


10.0


5.0


0.0


-5.0


-10.0


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Figure 10. Changes in exports From aFriCa by main destination, Following
epa-like sCenarios Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 1


-5


0


5


10


15


20


25


Energy and mining
(excluding metal)


Agriculture
and food


Textile and
apparel


Other industry Services


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


-1.0


-0.5


0.0


0.5


1.0


1.5


2.0


2.5


3.0


Africa’s exports Africa’s imports Africa’s exports Africa’s imports


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Figure 11. Changes in exports From aFriCa by seCtor, Following epa-like sCenarios
Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Figure 12. Changes in aFriCa’s exports/imports From/to the u.s., Following
epa-like sCenarios Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 2


First, some countries initially face higher tariff bar-
riers, not only when exporting to the U.S. but also
when exporting to African partners, and thus regis-
ter significant gains from the liberalization reforms
(e.g., the rest of SACU). When these economies
are exporting more than importing, this leads to
real exchange rate appreciation, improving their
real incomes. This is often observed when coun-
tries are more diversified in terms of their exports
(e.g., South Africa). Second, other countries already
enjoy good market access on their exports, which
does not improve much following the reforms
(e.g., Nigeria, Angola and the DRC). As a result,
these countries’ imports tend to increase more than


improvement for a wide range of products in terms
of market access.


It is also important to note that despite trade gains
for Africa—essentially coming from the region-
al integration dimension of the EPA-like scenar-
ios—the effects of such scenarios on real income
are quite ambiguous. Indeed, although as a whole
Africa would increase its real income with the en-
suing regional integration, figure 13 and annex J
indicate that some countries might be hurt while
others might get benefits. Such variable outcomes
for African countries could be explained by a num-
ber of reasons.


Zimbabwe


Mauritius


Malawi


Nigeria


Mozambique


Botswana


Angola and the DRC


Rest of Central Africa


Rest of East Africa


North Africa


Zambia


Senegal


Ethiopia


Tanzania


Uganda


Madagascar


South Africa


Rest of West Africa


Rest of SACU


African non-AGOA-eligible countries


AGOA-eligible countries


-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


PERCENT


Figure 13. Changes in aFriCan Countries’ real inCome, Following epa-like sCenarios
Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 3


whenever the trade reforms result in important
tariff revenue losses, real income can be negatively
affected. Countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi and
Mozambique see their tariff revenues reduced by
more than 50 percent after implementation of an
EPA-like scenario, assuming a CFTA reform; these
countries are among the most hurt in terms of real
income following the reform.


their exports. It follows that a depreciation of their
real exchange rates leads to a decrease in their real
income. This especially occurs when a country is
strongly dependent upon a few partners and prod-
ucts for its imports (e.g., Botswana depends heavily
on South Africa for its imports). Third, and perhaps
most important, liberalization implies governments
renouncing tariff revenues, which often represent
a significant share of their incomes. Therefore,


-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10


Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


Zimbabwe


Zambia


Malawi


Mozambique


Tanzania


Rest of Central Africa


Uganda


Angola and the DRC


Mauritius


Nigeria


Rest of East Africa


Ethiopia


Senegal


Rest of West Africa


North Africa


Madagascar


Botswana


Rest of SACU


South Africa


African non-AGOA-eligible countries


AGOA-eligible countries


PERCENT


Figure 14. Changes in tariFF revenues by aFriCan Countries, Following epa-like sCenarios
Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 4


The EPA-like scenarios present varying advantages and disadvantages for the U.S. and Afri-
can countries. The U.S. would see significantly increased exports because its market access
on the African continent would greatly improve, but it would actually see less of an increase
were a CFTA to be in place because the increases in intra-African trade that would follow such
an agreement would compete with U.S. exports.


African countries would experience some trade gains, which would mostly be thanks
to deepened regional integration—especially if a CFTA was in place—but these trade
gains would be accompanied by varying effects upon real income, with some coun-
tries seeing large declines likely due to reductions in tariff revenues. It should be not-
ed, however, that increased trade and transportation facilitation aimed at improv-
ing cross-border trade could work to offset some of the potential real income losses.29
However, such measures in and of themselves could be very costly for African countries;
therefore, these countries should focus on seeking additional trade assistance.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 5


Category V Scenarios: AGoA within a
different Global Trading Environment


Description of Scenarios


Category V scenarios examine the ways that Africa would be affected by the implementation of an FTA
between the U.S. and the EU. The possibility of such an agreement has been growing since the U.S.-
EU Summit in November 2011, when an exploratory process on the issue began. The idea was publicly
announced by President Obama during his State of the Union Address in February 2013, and in March
2013 he officially stated his intent to negotiate such an agreement to Congress. As of May 2013, com-
ments on the topic were being publicly accepted by the Office of the United States Trade Representative.30

While it is too early to know the complete details that may be part of such an agreement, the scenarios
for this category are designed using information from the WTO negotiations in the most recent Doha
Development Round. In the first scenario (V.A), in addition to the U.S. and the EU having an FTA, the
U.S. continues to use AGOA as it is (as of April 2013), and the EU implements EPAs with the five dif-
ferent regional groups. The five regional FTAs take effect in 2017, to provide the most realistic timeframe
possible. In the second model of this scenario (V.B), both the U.S. and the EU implement EPAs with
Africa, but there is also a CFTA in place within Africa beginning in 2017 (as mentioned above, the year
that the African Union has tentatively decided upon for implementing the CFTA).31 In both scenarios,
the EU-U.S. FTA takes effect in 2017 as well in order to provide a more realistic timeframe for its im-
plementation—it is assumed, for the sake of this scenario, that such an agreement, if signed, would take
effect before the end of President Obama’s current term.


Overview


(A) There is an EU-U.S. FTA, and the EU implements its EPAs while the U.S. maintains AGOA.
(B) There is an EU-U.S. FTA, but both the U.S. and the EU have EPAs with Africa, and there is a


CFTA in place in Africa.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 6


Whereas the large trade benefits for the EU and the
U.S. may not appear to be a surprise, the magnitude
of the gains for Africa is interesting and deserves
scrutiny. In that sense, breaking down the expected
export benefits by destination may help one to better
understand the outcomes of the assumed reforms.


To begin, the EU-U.S. trading relationship would
be strongly reinforced, thanks essentially to the
establishment of an FTA between the two giant
economies. Indeed, both U.S. exports to the EU
and EU exports to the U.S. would increase by more
than $50 billion (i.e., about an 11 percent increase
in U.S. exports to the EU and a 10 percent increase
in EU exports to the U.S.) resulting in an augmen-
tation of two-way trade between the EU and the
U.S. by over $100 billion, compared to the baseline
scenario in 2025 (see annexes M and N).


Results for the Category V Scenarios


If an FTA is to be established between the EU and
the U.S., either in the context of an extension of
AGOA in the U.S. and negotiated EPAs between
the EU and Africa, or with the U.S. also taking
on an EPA-like reform, this could result in the
expansion of exports worldwide ranging between
$107 billion and $124.2 billion (see figure 15 and
annex L).


Half the gain would be captured by the EU alone,
with the U.S. capturing the next largest piece.
Africa, especially the countries that are currently
AGOA eligible, would also benefit; the rest of the
world not part of any of the above-described agree-
ments would see its exports reduced facing higher
competition on EU, U.S. and African markets.


70.0


60.0


50.0


40.0


30.0


20.0


10.0


0.0


-10.0


-20.0


-30.0
AGOA-eligible


countries
African non-AGOA-
eligible countries


United States European Union Rest of the world


Scenario V.A Scenario V.B


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Figure 15. Changes in total exports From main regions, Following sCenarios
looking at a diFFerent global environment Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 7


more access to the African market than the U.S.,
and the EU would increase its exports to Africa by
$8.4 billion, while the U.S. would register a more
modest gain of $1.9 billion. At least two justifica-
tions can be advanced for such an outcome: First,
the EU initially faces slightly higher tariff barriers
on average when exporting to Africa than the U.S.
does, with average protection rates of 13.0 and
11.3 percent, respectively, and EPAs therefore im-
ply slightly better improvements in market access
to Africa for the EU than for the U.S. Indeed, EPAs
scenarios imply that 80 percent of EU exports as
well as 80 percent of U.S. exports to Africa become
DFQF. As a consequence, the final average protec-
tion faced by the EU and the U.S. when exporting
to Africa after implementation of the EPA-like sce-
narios are 11.3 percent and 9.9 percent, giving the
EU a 0.3 percent larger decrease in protection faced
than the U.S. when exporting to Africa after EPAs.


While the two nations would register relatively sim-
ilar export gains when trading with each other, the
EU would benefit more than the U.S. from its re-
spective agreements with Africa.


Whereas under scenario V.A, the U.S. would not
gain any additional market access to African coun-
tries, which is consistent with the fact that AGOA
is maintained as also assumed in the baseline. The
EU would increase its exports to Africa by about $12
billion (i.e., a growth of 9.7 percent), thanks to the
EPAs in comparison to the reference case in 2025.


When the EU and the U.S. would—in addition
to their FTA—both also conclude agreements de-
signed after the EPAs but assuming a CFTA within
Africa (scenario V.B), both the EU and the U.S.
would see their exports to Africa increasing, but in
different proportions: The EU would again gain


40.0


35.0


30.0


25.0


20.0


15.0


10.0


5.0


0.0


-5.0


-10.0


-15.0
Africa United


States
European


Union
Rest of the


world


Scenario V.A


Africa United
States


European
Union


Rest of the
world


Scenario V.B


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Figure 16. Changes in aFriCa’s exports by main destinations, Following sCenarios
looking at a diFFerent global environment Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 8


of the EPAs) and scenario V.B (when an African
CFTA is considered), respectively, compared to the
baseline in 2025 (see figure 16 and annex P).


While the lower magnitude of African exports’ gain
to the EU, following the scenario inclusive of a CFTA
reform compared to FTAs within Africa, is logical
considering the strong boost in intra-African trade,
resulting in the substitution of some of Africa’s ex-
ports to the EU by Africa’s exports to Africa itself, the
high volume observed in the case of “regular” EPAs is
quite interesting and requires some attention. In fact,
most of the increase in Africa’s exports to the EU is
highly concentrated in a handful of countries, essen-
tially the rest of SACU and to a lesser extent Botswa-
na, Mauritius, the rest of Central Africa and the rest
of West Africa (see figure 17 and annex P). Interest-
ingly, these countries/regions are those initially facing
the higher tariff barriers on their exports to the EU.
While the average protection faced by Africa today
when exporting to the EU is 1.2 percent—which is
comparable to the average protection faced by Afri-
can countries when exporting to the U.S.—there are
very strong disparities across countries and sectors.
Indeed, the 33 African LDCs eligible for the Every-
thing But Arms initiative enjoy nearly free access to
the EU market, but African MICs can sometimes
face high tariffs, largely in agriculture.33


Therefore, countries with initially easy access when
exporting to the EU could not expect strong export
increases when granted 100 percent DFQF thanks
to EPAs, whereas countries facing initially high tar-
iff barriers on their exports to the EU would see
them increasing, and sometimes to a large degree.
For example, Swaziland and Namibia, two MICs
which belong to the rest of SACU, along with
LDCs—namely, Lesotho—face average protection
rates in agriculture of 100.3 and 70.9 percent when
exporting to the EU, respectively (see annex O) be-
cause tariffs are particularly high in meat products
and sugar for these countries. The same can be ob-
served for countries such as Botswana, Mauritius,
the Republic of the Congo, Malawi or Zambia. As a
result, EPAs concluded with the EU generate great
export gains for these countries. In particular, just
the rest of SACU would see its exports to the EU


Second, and probably more important, the EU is
by far the main source of imports for Africa, with
nearly 40 percent of Africa’s total imports coming
from the EU, whereas the share of Africa’s imports
from the U.S. accounts for less than 10 percent.32
Under this condition and the geographic proximi-
ty dimension, when both the EU and the U.S. are
getting relatively equivalent market access improve-
ments when exporting to Africa, then the EU’s
exports to Africa tend to expand more than U.S.
exports to Africa.


In addition, Africa’s export variations by main des-
tinations would increase toward Africa itself and
the EU, but would decrease toward other destina-
tions (see figure 16). Africa’s exports’ decrease to-
ward the rest of the world is evident as none of the
agreements designed in this fifth category of scenar-
ios envisage market access improvements for Africa
when exporting to those countries.


The reduction by $2.1 billion of Africa’s exports
toward the U.S., at least under the scenario assum-
ing extension of AGOA (also assumed in the base-
line scenario), is straightforward, considering the
market shares lost because of the EU-U.S. FTA as
Africa faces more competition from the EU when
exporting to the U.S. However, a similar reduction
of Africa’s exports to the U.S. is observed when an
EPA-like scenario between the U.S. and Africa is
assumed along with EPAs between the EU and Af-
rica in the context of an African CFTA. Such an
outcome is not really surprising since—as already
indicated in the scenario for the fourth catego-
ries, assuming an EPA-like scenario with the U.S.
only—deepened regional integration in Africa
would strongly stimulate intra-African trade, with
some of African exports toward the U.S. being re-
placed by African exports toward African partners.


Moreover, a few African exports toward the U.S.
may also be replaced by new African products to
the EU. Indeed, and despite the establishment of
an EU-U.S. FTA, an EPA between the EU and
Africa would actually enhance Africa’s exports by
$15.8 billion and $13.8 billion to the EU after sce-
nario V.A (five regional FTAs within Africa as part




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


2 9


However, real income effects would still be margin-
al for African nations under a CFTA. Indeed, Africa
as a whole would improve its real income by $686.2
and $912.8 million following scenarios V.A and
V.B, respectively, compared to the baseline in 2025.
Nevertheless, many countries (e.g., Nigeria, Angola
and the DRC, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia and
the rest of East Africa) would still see their real in-
come decrease, depending on the trade reform im-
plemented (see annex Q). Significant tariff revenues
losses implied by trade liberalizations would greatly
explain such outcomes.


increasing by over $8 billion (or 300 percent), repre-
senting more than half of Africa’s exports increase to
the EU, following an EPA with the EU compared
to the baseline scenario in 2025 (see figure 17 and
annex P). This would come from relatively com-
parable increases in just meat products and sugar
exports to the EU.


As already mentioned in scenarios defined under
category IV, African countries’ exports to African
partners would increase greatly if a CFTA is to be
established, and it would also favor intra-African
trade of industrial products (see figure 18).


South Africa


North Africa


Uganda


Senegal


Zambia


Madagascar


Mozambique


Ethiopia


Angola and the DRC


Tanzania


Zimbabwe


Malawi


Rest of East Africa


Nigeria


Rest of West Africa


Rest of Central Africa


Mauritius


Botswana


Rest of SACU


-2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0


Scenario V.BScenario V.A


B ILL IONS OF USD


Figure 17. Changes in aFriCan Countries’ exports to the eu, Following sCenarios looking at
a diFFerent global environment Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 0


Figure 18. Changes in intra-aFriCan trade by main seCtors Following
sCenario iv.b Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


20.00


15.00


10.00


5.00


0


-5.00
Agriculture and food Textile and apparel Other industryEnergy and mining


(excluding metal)
Services


B
IL


LI
O


N
S


O
F


U
S


D


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.


An African continent that is highly integrated with potentially reciprocal agreements between
the U.S. and Africa as well as between the EU and Africa would limit some of the potential trade
diversion for Africa if an EU-U.S. FTA is to be implemented. An increase in intra-African trade
following FTA reforms would produce enough export gains for Africa to compensate any export
losses that could occur due to the formation of an EU-U.S. FTA and EPA-like scenarios. More-
over, EPAs could actually benefit a handful of African countries, especially those that still face
significant protection today, when exporting to the EU. Nevertheless, for most African countries,
export gains would not be sufficient to ensure real income benefits due partly to tariff revenues
losses implied by the trade reforms. As a consequence, tariff reduction alone does not appear
to be sufficient for producing positive trade and real income benefits to all, thereby justifying the
need for complementary measures.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 1


Conclusions and Policy recommendations


overview of the Scenario results


The scenarios modeled in this report show a va-riety of possible outcomes for U.S.-Africa trade through 2025 and also demonstrate important
trends regarding the current direction for African
trade should AGOA benefits continue or be mod-
ified. It is important to note that discontinuing
AGOA would be detrimental for African economies.
There would be declines in exports, decreases in the
possible progress of economic diversification, and a
decline in wages for unskilled nonagricultural wages
and skilled wages. The effects would vary based on
country/region and sector, with some being more
negatively affected than others, but keeping AGOA
in place would definitely provide much better results
than a return to the GSP. If AGOA is to be extended,
it should be noted that expanding product eligibili-
ty is not anticipated to make a significant difference
in export benefits for Africa unless AGOA-eligible
countries are given 100 percent DFQF access. Even
with 99 percent DFQF access to all products, it is
still the 1 percent most sensitive import products
for the U.S. that would provide the most benefits.
Such access could be provided at a minimal cost for
the U.S. (data indicate that it would only cost about
$9.6 million to U.S. producers while Africa’s export-
ers would gain over $105 million).


Scenarios that consider removing MICs from
AGOA eligibility indicate that they would suffer
export losses in their exports to the U.S. On the
other hand, granting AGOA eligibility to other


non-African LDCs would not actually have much
effect on the exports of African LDCs to the U.S.,
unless the textile and apparel clause were also to be
granted to them, which would be expected to have
severe effects on Africa’s textile and apparel industry.


Scenarios that assume some degree of reciprocity
between the U.S. and Africa in terms of preferenc-
es granted would be beneficial for African exports
if they were also accompanied by deeper region-
al integration within the continent, specifically if
the anticipated CFTA were to be in place. With-
out considerably more regional integration on the
continent, there would not be such significant ex-
port gains. It should also be noted that reciprocity
would result in large tariff revenue losses that could
have a negative impact on real income levels. Some
of the losses of tariff revenue could be offset by en-
hancements to intraregional trade and transporta-
tion facilitation; however, it should be stressed that
the level of regional integration required to coun-
teract these losses would be very costly to finance
and difficult to achieve without additional financial
support (e.g., additional aid directed at trade facil-
itation).


Similarly, should the EU and the U.S. agree upon
and implement an FTA, deepened regional inte-
gration in Africa could help offset export losses
that would follow as EU-U.S. trade would increase
and take some of the market share of African coun-
tries—specifically, if a CFTA were to be put in place,
intra-African trade would increase. Increases in




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 2


Reconsidering AGOA Product Eligibility


The report identifies that products that are within
the most sensitive import sectors for the U.S. are
also the sectors where Africa stands to gain the most
by having DFQF access. It also shows that having
100 percent DFQF would not harm U.S. produc-
ers and exporters. The U.S. could therefore consider
granting complete DFQF access to AGOA-eligible
countries because of the benefits it could provide in
terms of diversification and market access.


Better Exploitation of AGOA Preferences


Africa must look at taking better advantage of the
preferences it is being granted by the U.S. and other
partners, in particular identifying sectors with supply
chain potential. Additionally, lowering the often rela-
tively high tariffs imposed by African countries on their
imports of intermediate goods (as it could be expected
from an African common external tariff set under a
Continental Customs Union) may allow them to use
cheaper inputs into their production process and add
value to the goods that can then be exported.


Prioritizing Regional Integration


A recurring theme throughout the report is the impor-
tance of pursuing deeper regional integration within
the African continent (preferably a CFTA). This move
would strongly stimulate intra-African trade and help
in the movement toward more industrialized econ-
omies. It would also help African countries be more
competitive in the face of external trade agreements
that will increase competition for African export desti-
nations both on and away from the continent. Achiev-
ing a CFTA would likely call for an increase in aid for
trade directed toward trade facilitation measures. Af-
rican governments should prioritize a CFTA and en-
courage their development partners to assist with this
as well. The U.S. should consider scaling efforts aimed
at trade facilitation and officially integrating a com-
prehensive trade assistance strategy as part of AGOA.
This is particularly important as AGOA has two com-
ponents: trade and investment. While both compo-
nents are distinct, they also go hand in hand, because
strengthening one can help strengthen the other.


intra-African trade in this case would be accompanied
by some increases in EU-Africa trade (thanks to only
a handful of African countries, mostly from SADC,
following a rise of meat and milk exports to the EU),
but decreases in U.S.-Africa trade. While the increas-
es in trade would be beneficial, there would still be a
significant loss in tariff revenue that could have nega-
tive real income effects for many countries.


Thus, all the scenarios designed and analyzed pro-
vide useful indications for post-2015 options, but
none of them actually allow for a clear win-win
scenario between the U.S. and Africa. In fact, it ap-
pears from the findings that scenarios considering
only tariff barrier removal would not be sufficient,
and complementary measures would be required
to ensure that countries are better off following the
trade reforms.


Policy recommendations


The results from these scenarios demonstrate a num-
ber of lessons and options for increasing trade and
further developing the commercial relationship be-
tween AGOA-eligible countries and the U.S. There
are also many implications regarding the necessary
strategies to pursue while promoting development
in Africa through real income growth, economic
diversification, and an increase in wages and em-
ployment. This section provides policy recommen-
dations for how both the U.S. and AGOA-eligible
countries can use the scenario results to promote
growth and better engagement.


Renewing AGOA beyond 2015


By far the most obvious result from these scenar-
ios is that AGOA provides, though with varying
strength, a great deal of benefits to the countries
of Africa and discontinuing AGOA or allowing it
to expire would create losses in exports and harm
employment. Should Congress decide to extend
AGOA benefits to additional countries outside the
African continent, African economies would suffer
export losses and lose market share when exporting
to the U.S. if complete DFQF benefits were given
to other LDCs.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 3


Methodology


data and Modeling


The scenarios in this report were modeled using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) mod-el. Although they have significant constraints/
limitations, CGE models are the sole tools available
today capable of capturing multiple interactions
taking place within the different agents of the world
economy, thanks to many interconnected equa-
tions representing behaviors of economic agents
and various economic linkages. A CGE model uses
economic data to predict how economies react to
changes in policy, in this case, how U.S.-Africa
trade patterns react to changes in trade policy. In
other words, it compares the changes between any
scenario (after implementation of specific policy re-
forms) and the reference case (or baseline), which
usually correspond to a prolongation of the current
situation.


The CGE model used for this report is the MIRAGE
model, which stands for Modeling International
Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium. The
model is described as a multicountry, multisector,
recursive dynamic model.34 It was first developed to
analyze and study trade policy scenarios like bilateral
and multilateral agreements, which is why it is espe-
cially useful for modeling the scenarios in this report.
The CGE model generates indicators for regions that
allow it to measure the effects of changes related to
trade policy, including changes in exports, imports,
terms of trade, real GDP, real income and produc-
tion factor uses, among many other indicators.


The data used for the model comes from the Glob-
al Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 7 database, and
the Market Access Map version 2 database, which
uses the six-digit Harmonized System (MAc-
Map-HS6v2). The GTAP database contains com-
plete bilateral trade information as well as trans-
portation and protection linkages between 113
regions for 57 sectors. These data were paired with
the MAcMap tariff data because MAcMap gives
more exhaustive information on tariff lines than
the GTAP data, including ad valorem tariffs, spe-
cific tariffs and preferences.35 MAcMap has data
for 169 countries, 220 trading partners and 5,113
HS6 products. MAcMap also provides a group of
reference weights, which allows for more accurate
demonstration and weighting of tariff and protec-
tion data when aggregating tariff information across
countries and sectors.


The data depict the global economy in 2004, but
they have been updated to reflect protection infor-
mation as of April 2013, since a number of signif-
icant events and policy changes have taken place
since that time. Relevant protection information
regarding the most recent AGOA-eligible tariff lines
inclusive of textile and apparel clauses, the GSP tar-
iff lines and eligible countries, the Everything But
Arms trade preference of the European Union and
the expiration of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement have
all been taken into account.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 4


Sectoral Classifications


Commodities were placed into one of five broad
categories for analysis: agriculture and food; mining
and energy; textiles and apparel; other industry; and
services. The data breakdown used for the modeling
has information for 21 commodity sectors in total,
and the broader commodity categories were con-
structed from these to provide broader overviews of
the trends. A complete list of the sectors and cate-
gories can be found in annex S.


Import-Sensitive Products and Index


For scenarios B and C in category II as well as sce-
narios A and B in category V, an index was used to
identify the commodities that are thought to be im-
port sensitive for the country receiving the goods.36
This index stipulates that commodities or sectors
that are usually import sensitive are those which
have high initial tariffs, which are highly traded,
and would have a high tariff reduction if the tariffs
were to be cut. Therefore, higher values of comput-
ed index correspond to highly sensitive products.


Economic Partnership Agreements: Country
Groupings


The EPAs in the West Africa region include Be-
nin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
and Mauritania—almost the exact same countries
as the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) except for the inclusion of Mau-
ritania. The EPAs in the Central Africa region in-
clude Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
the Republic of the Congo, the DRC, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe—six
of these eight countries (Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Con-
go, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon) are part of the
regional economic group called la Communauté
Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (in
English, the Economic and Monetary Community
of Central Africa) and use the same currency.


Country/region Classifications


For this report, unless otherwise indicated, the fo-
cus of the modeling results was on the countries
of Africa, specifically the AGOA-eligible countries,
and the United States. In scenarios where the EU
was involved the effects of trade, involving the EU
was also examined. There are multiple scenarios
that involve other LDCs, and the results of the
trade policies involving them are relevant in those
scenarios.


It should be noted that AGOA-eligible countries
included in the study lists Sudan, although Sudan is
not eligible for AGOA. South Sudan does not have
sufficient data available, thus Sudan as one country
serves as a proxy.


The annexes include a list of the categorizations of
the countries (see annex T). Due to existing group-
ings in the data, certain countries did not have indi-
vidual data available and thus were analyzed as a re-
gional group with other nearby countries. In some
cases, countries in one group crossed income levels,
and they were then classified as “rest of least-devel-
oped countries,” which includes some non-LDCs
(because it is impossible to isolate only LDCs). The
one exception is Yemen, which is actually in a group
with many middle-income developing countries of
the Middle East and and is included in the group
“rest of developing countries.”


Throughout the paper, different regional labels
apply. The “rest of West Africa” includes Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gam-
bia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. The “rest
of Central Africa” includes Cameroon, Central Af-
rican Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe. The “rest of
Eastern Africa” includes Burundi, Comoros, Dji-
bouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia
and Sudan (South Sudan is part of Sudan in the
GTAP database). The “rest of the Southern African
Customs Union (SACU)” includes Lesotho, Na-
mibia and Swaziland.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 5


was used in the assumptions of the FTA’s design.
The EU-U.S. FTA model assumes that there would
be no tariffs on 100 percent of industry related
commodities. Of the 677 agricultural commodities
(at the HS-6 level), it is anticipated that certain lev-
els of protection would remain in place for the 4
percent most sensitive import items.


For those 4 percent sensitive products, proposed
negotiated tariff rate cuts were used in the model.
For tariffs that were between 0 and greater than or
equal to 20 percent, then the 50 percent cut that one
would expect for a WTO-negotiated tariff would
be cut by two-thirds. For those between 20 and less
than 50 percent, then it would be two-thirds of the
57 percent cut; for those between 50 and less than
75 percent, then it would be two-thirds of the 64
percent cut; and for those greater than 75 percent,
it would be two-thirds of the 70 percent cut. In in-
stances where the most-favored-nation (MFN) tar-
iff rate would be lower than the sensitive tariff cuts,
then the MFN tariff rate would remain in place.


The East and Southern Africa region includes a va-
riety of countries that are not in a closely established
regional group and are not located in especially close
proximity to one another. They include the Indian
Ocean islands (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius
and Seychelles) and the countries on the Horn of
Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sudan), as
well as Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Interest-
ingly, the group labeled SADC includes only some
of the countries that are actually part of that region-
al economic community, namely, Angola, Botswa-
na, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland
and South Africa. The other members of SADC are
the DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Zambia
and Zimbabwe, which have been placed into dif-
ferent EPA regional groups. The only group that
involves all the members of an already-established
and well-integrated regional economic community
is the EAC, which contains Kenya, Uganda, Tanza-
nia, Burundi and Rwanda.


The EU-U.S. Free Trade Agreement


For the situation involving the possible EU-U.S.
FTA, the most recent round of WTO negotiations




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 6


Endnotes


1. Henceforth, “Africa” refers to Africa, excluding
North Africa.


2. GSP offers preferential duty-free treatment for up
to 5,000 products—using the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule (HTS) 8-digit codes—from 127 devel-
oping countries in the world, as indicated by the
Office of the United States Trade Representative
in its December 2012 GSP Guidebook; see http://
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/GSP%20Guide-
book%20Dec%202012%20%20%20final%20ver-
sion_0.pdf. AGOA adds an additional 1,800 HTS-
8 product lines. In this report, “AGOA” refers to
both AGOA and the GSP benefits as one.


3. This is using the 8-digit-level HTS.
4. The AGOA-eligible countries include Angola, Be-


nin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, the Republic of the
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon,
the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ken-
ya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sey-
chelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tan-
zania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia.


5. Further explanatory information on average protec-
tion levels are provided in the methodology section
and annex T.


6. The source for these data is the International Mone-
tary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.


7. The source for these data is the International Mone-
tary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.


8. The source for these data is the U.S. Internation-
al Trade Commission, Interactive Trade and Tariff
Dataweb.


9. This arrangement offers preferential duty-free treat-
ment for up to 5,000 products from 127 developing
countries in the world.


10. It should also be noted that the U.S. GSP is set to
expire in July 2013, but this report is written with
the expectation that it will be renewed.


11. While we cannot distinguish effects by countries
within the regional groups, it is likely that those
results are driven by just few countries, based on
observations from protection level in annex A. For
example, it is expected that Namibia is responsible
for the outcome observed in the rest of the SACU,
Burkina Faso for the rest of West Africa, Gabon for
the rest of Central Africa, and Tanzania for the rest


of East Africa. Africa. See the methodology section
and annex T for details on country classifications.


12. The model closure assumes full employment due to
the lack of data reliability and availability. There-
fore, workers are only reallocated from the least-ef-
ficient sectors to the most-efficient ones following
policy reforms. As the aggregated employment is
fixed in all regions, wages are assumed to be flexi-
ble. As a consequence, it is not surprising that in a
selected country, some workers (those who are the
most negatively affected by trade reforms) see their
wages decreasing, while other categories of workers
(those that are the least affected by the reform) see
their wages increasing.


13. See H.R. 434 (106th), the Trade and Development
Act of 2000, which states: “LESSER DEVELOPED
BENEFICIARY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN
COUNTRY - For purposes of this subparagraph the
term ‘lesser developed beneficiary sub-Saharan Afri-
can country’ means a beneficiary sub-Saharan African
country that had a per capita gross national product
of less than $1,500 a year in 1998, as measured by
the World Bank.” (Text linked here: http://www.gov-
track.us/congress/bills/106/hr434/text). This Act was
amended in 2002 to include Botswana and Namibia
(in H.R. 3009 (107th): Trade Act of 2002). It should
be noted, however, that for the purposes of this report,
the “LDC” category actually consists of least-devel-
oped countries as categorized by the United Nations.


14. See H.R. 434 (106th): Trade and Development Act
of 2000 available online here: www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/106/hr434/text.


15. Likely driven by São Tomé and Príncipe, as the
country registers the highest drop from the rest of
Central Africa in protection faced when exporting
to the U.S. following the implementation of scenar-
io I.A. As far as the rest of West Africa is concerned,
Mauritania is gaining market access to the U.S.
thanks to the extension of textile and apparel clause
to the country.


16. Tariff Relief Assistance for Developing Economies
Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bills/111/s1141/text.


17. Other countries include Afghanistan, Bhutan, the
Solomon Islands, Myanmar, Kiribati, Haiti, Laos,
Nepal, Vanuatu, East Timor, Samoa and Yemen.


18. See http://thewhitakergroup.us/wordpress/2010/05/
05/collier-warns-against-expanding-agoa-to-non-




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 7


tended deadlines this date is used for the modeling.
27. Simon Mevel and Stephen Karingi, “Deepening Re-


gional Integration in Africa: A Computable General
Equilibrium Assessment of the Establishment of a
Continental Free Trade Area Followed by a Conti-
nental Customs Union,” paper presented at 7th Af-
rican Economic Conference, Kigali, Rwanda, 2012.


28. These average protection levels were computed by
the authors using the MAcMap-HS6v2 database.


29. See Simon Mevel and Stephen Karingi, “Deepen-
ing Regional Integration in Africa: A Computable
General Equilibrium Assessment of the Establish-
ment of a Continental Free Trade Area Followed by
a Continental Customs Union,” paper presented at
7th African Economic Conference, Kigali, Rwanda,
2012).


30. See https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/
04/01/2013-07430/request-for-comments-con-
cerning-proposed-transatlantic-trade-and-invest-
ment-agreement.


31. The year 2017 was agreed as an indicative date by
African Heads of State and Government at the 18th
AU Summit.


32. Authors’ calculation based on MIRAGE model,
2013 data.


33. This is except for LDCs exporting important vol-
umes of sugar, rice or bananas, which are not ful-
ly exempted of tariff duties under Everything But
Arms, e.g., Malawi.


34. A recursive dynamic model is a model that solves
each year before solving for the following year.


35. The source for these data is H. Boumellassa, D.
Laborde and C. Mitaritonna, A Picture of Tariff Pro-
tection Across the World in 2004: MAcMap-HS6, Ver-
sion 2, IFPRI Discussion Paper 00903 (Washing-
ton: International Food Policy Research Institute,
2009).


36. The index used is based on S. Jean, D. Laborde and
W. Martin, Choosing Sensitive Agricultural Prod-
ucts in Trade Negotiations, IFPRI Discussion Paper
00788 (Washington: International Food Policy Re-
search Institute, 2008).


african-least-developed-countries.
19. Namely, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Con-


go, Gabon, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mau-
ritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa
and Swaziland (country income classifications are
categorized according to the United Nations clas-
sifications).


20. These countries include the Central African Repub-
lic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equa-
torial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar,
Mali and Somalia. Note that Sudan is not included
in AGOA, whereas South Sudan is included. How-
ever, considering the data limitations for South Su-
dan, Sudan is considered as part of the currently
AGOA-eligible countries for the simulation exercise.


21. Namely, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cam-
bodia, Kiribati, Laos, Myanmar, Nepal, Samoa, the
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu,
Yemen and Haiti.


22. Note that Madagascar and the DRC are African
LDCs not currently AGOA-eligible, which is the
reason why they would benefit from being granted
AGOA preferences. Angola (currently AGOA-eligi-
ble) cannot be differentiated from the DRC in the
GTAP database; therefore the results in this report
are given for Angola and the DRC as a whole.


23. The EU’s EPAs, as mentioned above, will also be ex-
tended to other regions outside Africa, but demon-
strating this model is outside of the scope of this
report.


24. The EU Web site says opened up EU markets fully
and immediately (unilaterally by the EU since Jan-
uary 1, 2008), but allowed ACP countries 15 (and
up to 25) years to open up to EU imports while
providing protection for the sensitive 20 percent of
imports.


25. As noted in the Decisions, Declarations and Resolu-
tions decided upon during the Eighteenth Ordinary
Session of the African Union in January 2012.


26. It appears that there may not be sufficient progress
toward the CFTA for it to actually be implemented
in 2017, but for the sake of scenarios and the in-




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 8


Annexes
Annex A. AverAge Ad vAlorem Protection FAced by AFricAn countries on their exPorts to the


u.s. by mAin sector 2013 vs. return to the u.s. gsP by 2016 (pErcEnt)


2013 After return to U.S. GSP


Global Agriculture Industry Global Agriculture Industry
Africa total 0.9 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.9 1.2
AGOA-eligible countries 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.8 1.5 0.6
Angola 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Benin 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.3
Botswana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 17.3 0.2
Burkina Faso 5.3 8.0 1.0 5.3 8.0 1.1
Burundi 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3
Cameroon 0.4 1.6 0.0 0.6 1.6 0.3
Cape Verde 0.1 0.2 0.1 5.8 0.5 6.2
Chad 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Comoros 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Republic of the Congo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.3
Côte d’Ivoire 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.5
Djibouti 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.5
Ethiopia 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.5
Gabon 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.3 2.5 0.3
Gambia 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.5
Ghana 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4
Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kenya 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.9 0.4 4.4
Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 1.4 11.4
Liberia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Malawi 1.6 1.7 0.1 2.6 1.7 9.0
Mauritania 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3
Mauritius 0.2 0.6 0.1 7.1 0.7 8.6
Mozambique 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Namibia 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.6 13.0 0.7
Niger 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
Nigeria 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.3
Rwanda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
São Tomé and Príncipe 0.5 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.9
Senegal 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3
Seychelles 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1
Sierra Leone 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.6
South Africa 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.7 3.2 0.5
Sudan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Swaziland 0.5 0.7 0.4 4.7 1.4 6.9
Tanzania 1.1 4.0 0.2 1.2 4.0 0.3
Togo 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1
Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4
Zambia 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Non-AGOA eligible countries 2.0 3.4 1.9 2.0 3.4 1.9
Algeria 0.2 1.7 0.2 0.2 1.7 0.2
Central African Republic 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Egypt 2.8 5.5 2.5 2.8 5.5 2.5
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0
Eritrea 1.7 4.6 0.8 1.7 4.6 0.8
Guinea-Bissau 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Libya 0.6 3.2 0.6 0.6 3.2 0.6
Madagascar 4.4 1.3 6.0 4.4 1.3 6.0
Mali 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
Morocco 5.0 3.6 5.2 5.0 3.6 5.2
Somalia 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2
Tunisia 5.5 0.7 5.7 5.5 0.7 5.7
Zimbabwe 2.5 5.2 0.5 2.5 5.2 0.5


Source: Authors’ calculations based on MAcMapHS6v2 database.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


3 9


annex b. Changes in exports From aFriCan Countries/regions and other main regions
to the u.s., Following sCenarios assuming an extension oF agoa eligibility by produCt


Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario II.A Scenario II.B Scenario II.C Scenario II.D


%
Billions of


USD
%


Billions of
USD


%
Billions of


USD
%


Billions of
USD


AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 3.2 0.0 15.0 0.1 33.3 0.2 105.8


Nigeria* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0


Senegal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of West Africa* 0.0 1.2 0.1 1.8 0.1 4.4 0.2 5.9


Angola and the DRC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2


Rest of Central Africa* 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4


Ethiopia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.7 0.3 2.9


Malawi 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.4


Mauritius* 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.2 2.2 0.5 5.6


Mozambique 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0


Tanzania 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 1.6 0.4 2.5


Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3


Zambia 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.6


Rest of East Africa* 0.1 1.9 0.2 4.0 0.4 9.0 0.4 10.6


Botswana* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1


South Africa* 0.0 0.0 0.1 5.9 0.1 11.7 0.6 62.0


Rest of SACU* 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.1 1.7 1.0 12.7


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.5


Madagascar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


North Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.4


Non-African LDCs 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.0 -2.0


Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4


Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.4


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -1.3


European Union 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -1.1 0.0 -2.2 0.0 -10.4


Rest of the world 0.0 -2.3 0.0 -10.3 0.0 -23.0 0.0 -63.1


Rest of developed countries 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.7 0.0 -1.5 0.0 -8.2


BRIC countries 0.0 -1.8 0.0 -7.5 0.0 -17.0 0.0 -38.0


Other developing countries 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -2.1 0.0 -4.5 0.0 -16.9


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs. BRIC = Brazil, Russia,
India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 0


annex C. Changes in exports From aFriCan Countries/regions and other main regions
to the u.s., Following sCenarios assuming revisions oF agoa eligibility by Countries


Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario III.A Scenario III.B Scenario III.C Scenario III.D


%
Millions of


USD
%


Millions of
USD


%
Millions of


USD
%


Millions of
USD


AGOA-eligible countries -1.9 -1,200.7 -1.9 -1,200.3 -1.9 -1,216.1 0.0 0.7


Nigeria* -2.0 -534.8 -2.0 -534.8 -2.0 -534.7 0.0 0.0


Senegal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of West Africa* -0.5 -18.8 -0.5 -18.8 -0.6 -19.5 0.0 0.0


Angola and the DRC 0.2 13.0 0.2 13.0 0.2 13.1 0.0 0.0


Rest of Central Africa* -1.0 -64.9 -1.0 -64.9 -1.0 -65.5 0.0 0.0


Ethiopia 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0


Malawi 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Mauritius* -9.2 -95.5 -9.3 -95.5 -9.4 -97.4 0.0 0.0


Mozambique 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0


Tanzania 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0


Uganda 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0


Zambia 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of East Africa* -6.1 -130.8 -6.0 -130.2 -6.1 -132.2 0.0 0.8


Botswana* -2.1 -8.6 -2.1 -8.6 -2.1 -8.7 0.0 0.0


South Africa* -2.4 -259.5 -2.4 -259.6 -2.4 -263.2 0.0 -0.1


Rest of SACU* -7.7 -103.4 -7.7 -103.4 -8.1 -108.8 0.0 0.0


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.1 27.5 0.1 27.5 0.5 158.8 0.0 -0.1


Madagascar 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.8 149.2 0.0 0.0


Zimbabwe 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


North Africa 0.1 26.6 0.1 26.6 0.0 9.4 0.0 -0.1


Non-African LDCs 0.1 18.3 0.2 71.4 12.1 4,380.3 0.1 53.0


Bangladesh 0.1 2.8 0.9 33.3 55.9 2,155.9 0.8 30.5


Cambodia 0.1 2.9 0.2 5.0 64.5 1,867.9 0.1 2.2


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 12.6 0.1 33.0 1.1 331.8 0.1 20.4


European Union 0.0 117.5 0.0 112.2 0.0 -107.1 0.0 -5.3


Rest of the world 0.0 801.8 0.0 761.6 -0.1 -2,665.2 0.0 -40.3


Rest of developed countries 0.0 114.0 0.0 112.2 0.0 -27.6 0.0 -1.9


BRIC countries 0.0 330.9 0.0 299.7 -0.3 -2,329.2 0.0 -31.2


Other developing countries 0.0 356.9 0.0 349.7 0.0 -308.6 0.0 -7.3


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs. BRIC = Brazil, Russia,
India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 1


annex d. average global ad valorem proteCtion FaCed by non-aFriCan ldCs on their
exports to the u.s., Current vs. aFter sCenarios, assuming revisions oF agoa-eligibility by


Countries (where Changes are implied For non-aFriCan ldCs) (pErcEnt)


2013 After Scenario III.B After Scenario III.C After Scenario III.D


Non-African LDCs 9.2 8.9 0.3 8.9


Afghanistan 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2


Bangladesh 10.8 10.6 0.4 10.6


Bhutan 1.2 0.8 0.5 0.8


Cambodia 9.0 8.3 0.1 8.3


Kiribati 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2


Laos 11.1 10.3 0.3 10.3


Myanmar 9.9 9.4 0.5 9.4


Nepal 6.2 6.0 0.4 6.0


Samoa 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.8


Solomon Islands 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1


Timor-Leste 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1


Tuvalu n/a n/a n/a n/a


Vanuatu 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2


Yemen 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Haiti 11.0 11.0 0.1 11.0
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MAcMapHS6v2 database.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 2


A
n


n
e


x
e


. c
h


A
n


g
e


s
in


e
x


P
o


r
ts


F
r


o
m


A
Fr


ic
A


n
c


o
u


n
tr


ie
s


/r
e


g
io


n
s


A
n


d
o


th
e


r
m


A
in


r
e


g
io


n
s


t
o


t
h


e
u


.s
.,


Fo
ll


o
w


in
g


s
c


e
n


A
r


io
s


A
s


s
u


m
in


g


r
e


vi
s


io
n


s
o


F
A


g
o


A
e


li
g


ib
il


it
y


b
y


c
o


u
n


tr
ie


s
c


o
m


PA
r


e
d


t
o


t
h


e
b


A
s


e
li


n
e


s
c


e
n


A
r


io
, 2


02
5


(p
E


r
c


E
n


t)


Sc
en


ar
io


II
I.A


Sc
en


ar
io


II
I.B


Sc
en


ar
io


II
I.C


Sc
en


ar
io


II
I.D


Agriculture and food


Mining and energy


Textile and wearing apparel


Other industry


Services


Agriculture and food


Mining and energy


Textile and wearing apparel


Other industry


Services


Agriculture and food


Mining and energy


Textile and wearing apparel


Other industry


Services


Agriculture and food


Mining and energy


Textile and wearing apparel


Other industry


Services


AG
OA


-e
lig


ib
le


c
ou


nt
rie


s
-2


.2
-1


.3
-3


6.
6


-3
.9


0.
2


-2
.1


-1
.3


-3
6.


6
-3


.9
0.


2
-2


.2
-1


.3
-3


7.
5


-3
.9


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Ni
ge


ria
*


-2
.2


-2
.1


0.
4


-0
.1


0.
3


-2
.2


-2
.1


-0
.4


-0
.1


0.
3


-2
.2


-2
.1


-2
.2


-0
.1


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Se
ne


ga
l


0.
0


0.
1


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


-1
.7


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Re
st


o
f W


es
t A


fri
ca


*
-0


.4
-0


.9
-1


1.
4


-1
.0


0.
0


-0
.4


-0
.9


-7
.2


1.
0


0.
0


-.
0.


4
-0


.9
-7


.2
-1


.0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
An


go
la


a
nd


th
e


DR
C


0.
0


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


15
.4


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Re
st


o
f C


en
tra


l A
fri


ca
*


-0
.2


-1
.3


-1
7.


9
0.


0
0.


1
-0


.2
-1


.3
-1


7.
8


0.
0


0.
1


-0
.2


-1
.3


-1
4.


5
-0


.1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Et


hi
op


ia
0.


1
0.


0
0,


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
M


al
aw


i
0.


1
0.


2
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
`0


.1
0.


2
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
-1


.6
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
M


au
rit


iu
s*


0.
0


0.
5


-5
8.


2
-1


.0
0.


7
0.


0
0.


5
-5


8.
2


-1
.0


0.
7


-0
.1


0.
5


-5
9.


0
-1


.2
0.


6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
M


oz
am


bi
qu


e
0.


0
0.


1
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Ta


nz
an


ia
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Ug


an
da


0.
1


0.
2


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
2


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
2


-1
.6


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Za
m


bi
a


0.
1


0.
1


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-1
.6


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Re
st


o
f E


as
t A


fri
ca


*
-1


.1
0.


4
-4


9.
7


-0
.7


0.
3


-0
.5


0.
4


-4
9.


7
-0


.6
0.


3
-0


.6
0.


4
-5


0.
3


-0
.7


0.
2


.0
.8


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Bo
ts


w
an


a*
-1


4.
2


0.
0


-6
2.


2
0.


2
0.


1
-1


4.
2


0.
0


-6
2.


2
0.


2
0.


1
-1


4.
2


0.
0


-6
2.


9
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
So


ut
h


Af
ric


a*
-1


4.
2


0.
2


-3
3.


5
-5


.0
0.


1
-1


4.
2


0.
2


-3
3.


5
-5


.0
0.


1
-1


4.
2


0.
2


-3
4.


7
-5


.1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Re


st
o


f S
AC


U*
-0


.9
0.


7
-2


5.
5


0.
5


0.
7


-0
.9


0.
7


-2
5.


5
0.


5
0.


7
-0


.9
0.


7
-2


6.
8


0.
5


0.
7


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Af
ric


an
n


on
-A


GO
A-


el
ig


ib
le


c
ou


nt
rie


s
0.


0
0.


2
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.5
0.


1
19


.0
-0


.1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
M


ad
ag


as
ca


r
0.


0
0.


2
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


2
0.


2
0.


0
-1


.3
-0


.9
99


.9
-2


.5
-1


.7
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
Zi


m
ba


bw
e


0.
1


0.
1


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-1
.6


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


No
rth


A
fri


ca
0.


0
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
No


n-
Af


ric
an


L
DC


s
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


6
0.


0
-1


.2
-0


.1
63


.8
0.


2
-1


.1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


5
0.


0
Ba


ng
la


de
sh


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
1


0.
1


17
.4


-0
.1


-3
.7


-5
.9


11
2.


8
10


.5
-4


.4
-0


.1
0.


1
-0


.1
17


.4
-0


.1
Ca


m
bo


di
a


0.
0


0.
2


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


4.
9


0.
0


-1
0.


4
-1


3.
6


82
.5


-7
.9


-1
0.


5
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
4.


9
0.


0
Re


st
o


f n
on


-A
fri


ca
n


LD
Cs


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
1


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


12
.5


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


Eu
ro


pe
an


U
ni


on
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
-1


.7
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Re


st
o


f t
he


w
or


ld
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Re


st
o


f d
ev


el
op


ed
c


ou
nt


rie
s


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


-1
.6


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


BR
IC


c
ou


nt
rie


s
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
Ot


he
r d


ev
el


op
in


g
co


un
tri


es
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
-1


.6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0


N
ot


e:
*


in
di


ca
te


s i
ni


tia
lly


A
G


O
A-


el
ig


ib
le


m
id


dl
e-


in
co


m
e


co
un


tr
ie


s o
r r


eg
io


ns
in


cl
us


iv
e


of
in


iti
al


ly
A


G
O


A-
el


ig
ib


le
M


IC
s.


BR
IC


=
B


ra
zil


, R
us


sia
, I


nd
ia


a
nd


C
hi


na
.


So
ur


ce
: A


ut
ho


rs’
c


al
cu


la
tio


ns
b


as
ed


o
n


th
e


M
IR


AG
E


m
od


el
.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 3


hs6 code hs6 label


721420 Bars & rods,i/nas,hr,hd or he,cntg indent,ribs,et


721590 Bars & rods, i/nas, not elsewhere specified


730410 Pipes, line, iron or steel, smls, of a kind use


730421 Drill pipe, of a kind used in drilling for oil or gas,
seamless, of iron (other than cast iron) or steel.


730429 Casing and tubing, of a kind used in drilling for
oil or gas, seamless, of iron (other than cast iron)
or steel.


730520 Casings,i/s,int/ext circ c sect,wld ext dia >40


730531 Tubes & pipe, i or s, longitudinally welded


730610 Pipe,line,i or s,welded,riveted or sim closed


730620 Casing/tubing,i or s,welded,riveted or sim clsd


730820 Towers and lattice masts, iron or steel


730890 Structures and parts of structures


842139 Filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus


843049 Boring or sinking machinery nes, not self-prope


843139 Parts of lifting, handling, loading or unloadin


843143 Parts of boring or sinking machinery


843149 Parts of cranes, work-trucks, shovels


870410 Dump trucks designed for off-highway use


880212 Helicopters of an unladen weight exceeding
2,000 kg


880230 Aircraft not elsewhere specified of an unladen
weight > 2,000 kg


880240 Aircraft not elsewhere specified of an unladen


880330 Aircraft parts not elsewhere specified


940330 Office furniture, wooden, not elsewhere specified


940360 Furniture, wooden, not elsewhere specified


940380 Furniture of oth materials,including cane,osier


970110 Paintings,drawings and pastels executed by
hand


Annex F. detAiled list oF the 1 Percent most sensitive u.s. imPorts (At hs-6 level) From
AgoA-eligible countries


hs6 code hs6 label


30350 Frozen herrings (excl. livers and roes)


30374 Frozen herrings (excl. livers and roes)


100510 Maize seed


110290 Other cereal flour, not elsewhere specified


151329 Palm kernel or babassu oil (excl. crude)


151590 Other fixed vegetable fats and fractions, not
elsewhere specified


170199 Cane or beet sugar, in solid form, not
elsewhere specified


210111 Extracts, essences and concentrates of coffee


220830 Whiskeys


230910 Dog or cat food, put up for retail sale


252329 Portland cement (excl. white)


271312 Calcined petroleum coke


300420 Medicaments of other antibiotics, for retail


330300 Perfumes and toilet waters


330410 Lip make-up preparations


330499 Beauty, make-up, skin-care (incl. suntan), not
elsewhere specified


330520 Preparations for permanent waving or straighten


330590 Preparations for use on the hair, not elsewhere
specified


520942 Denim, with >=85% cotton, >200g/m2


600199 Pile fabrics of textile materials, not elsewhere
specified, knitted


630900 Worn clothing and other worn articles


631010 Used or new rags, worn out scrap twine, cordage


681599 Articles of stone or of other mineral substance


710231 Diamonds non-industrial unworked or simply
sawn


710239 Diamonds non-industrial not elsewhere specified


721391 Bars and rods of iron/non-alloy steel, hot-rolled,
in irregulary wound coils, of circular cross-sec-
tion <14 mm in diameter


Source: Authors’ calculations based on MAcMapHS6v2 database.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 4


annex g. Changes in exports From aFriCan Countries/regions and other main regions to
the u.s., Following sCenarios assuming revisions oF the struCture oF agoa Compared to


the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario I Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


%
Millions of


USD
%


Millions of
USD


%
Millions of


USD


AGOA-eligible countries -2.1 -1,340.6 -0.2 -99.0 -1.0 -645.6


Nigeria* -2.0 -534.8 0.6 161.2 0.9 244.9


Senegal 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -3.2 -1.5 -3.7


Rest of West Africa* -0.6 -19.8 -10.5 -365.4 -10.0 -348.1


Angola and the DRC 0.2 13.2 0.4 30.5 1.5 109.0


Rest of Central Africa* -1.0 -64.9 0.4 25.0 0.6 39.6


Ethiopia -0.1 -0.7 -1.1 -12.1 -0.6 -7.1


Malawi -1.7 -11.4 1.2 7.8 10.6 70.9


Mauritius* -9.2 -95.4 0.6 6.3 5.4 55.3


Mozambique -0.7 -1.1 4.3 6.6 1.7 2.6


Tanzania -0.2 -1.3 0.8 4.6 -1.6 -9.8


Uganda -0.2 -1.1 0.4 2.4 -2.3 -12.2


Zambia 0.1 0.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8


Rest of East Africa* -6.1 -130.8 0.8 18.1 2.9 62.7


Botswana* -2.0 -8.5 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -5.5


South Africa* -2.3 -256.3 0.3 29.4 -6.7 -726.0


Rest of SACU* -17.1 -228.1 -0.6 -8.1 -8.3 -110.9


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.1 28.1 0.6 187.6 0.0 6.7


Madagascar 0.1 0.9 18.7 157.8 17.7 149.5


Zimbabwe 0.1 0.1 4.8 8.0 14.0 23.4


North Africa 0.1 27.1 0.1 21.5 -0.5 -166.2


Non-African LDCs 0.1 22.0 0.0 9.2 0.0 5.6


Bangladesh 0.1 3.9 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.5


Cambodia 0.1 4.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -1.0


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 14.1 0.0 9.4 0.0 5.1


European Union 0.0 124.6 0.0 260.8 0.1 327.9


Rest of the world 0.0 904.3 0.0 975.6 0.1 1,251.6


Rest of developed countries 0.0 118.0 0.0 221.4 0.0 132.6


BRIC countries 0.0 412.3 0.0 355.0 0.1 626.9


Other developing countries 0.0 374.0 0.0 399.3 0.1 492.1


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 5


annex h. Changes in exports From initially agoa-eligible Countries/regions to the u.s.,
Following sCenarios assuming a return to the u.s. gsp, by seCtor, 2025 (pErcEnt)


Ag
ric


ul
tu


re
a


nd


fo
od


Ce
re


al
a


nd
g


ra
in


s


Ve
ge


ta
bl


e
fru


it
an


d
nu


ts


Pl
an


t b
as


ed
fi


be
rs



(in


cl
ud


in
g


co
tto


n)


Ot
he


r c
ro


ps


Li
ve


a
ni


m
al


s,
a


ni
m


al


an
d


w
oo


l p
ro


du
ct


s


M
ilk


a
nd


d
ai


ry


pr
od


uc
ts


Su
ga


r


M
ea


t p
ro


du
ct


s


Ot
he


r f
oo


d
pr


od
uc


ts


M
in


in
g


an
d


en
er


gy


Cr
ud


e
an


d
pr


oc
es


se
d


oi
l


Ot
he


r e
ne


rg
y


AGOA-eligible countries -2.0 -0.1 -3.7 0.3 0.2 -1.6 -10.2 0.2 -60.7 -4.8 -1.3 -1.5 0.5


Nigeria* -2.2 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 -0.2 95.9 0.3 -63.7 0.1 -2.1 -2.1 0.5


Senegal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.1


Rest of West Africa* -0.4 -1.7 -1.1 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -64.6 0.0 0.0 -0.6 -0.9 -1.0 0.3


Angola and the DRC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1


Rest of Central Africa* -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.3 -1.5 -80.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.3 -1.3 0.9


Ethiopia 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0


Malawi 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0


Mauritius* 0.0 0.3 -0.8 0.0 -0.6 -3.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7


Mozambique 0.0 0.0 -2.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2


Tanzania 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0


Uganda 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3


Zambia 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3


Rest of East Africa* -1.1 0.3 -3.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -29.9 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7


Botswana* -14.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.7 0.0 0.0 -74.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7


South Africa* -14.2 0.0 -4.8 0.0 -1.8 -0.1 -48.2 0.2 -46.1 -11.2 0.2 0.2 0.4


Rest of SACU* -0.4 0.0 -6.4 0.0 1.0 0.4 -76.2 1.2 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.8 4.7


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
The red cells indicate significant changes in exports by sector for AGOA-eligible countries as a whole.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 6


annex h (continUEd). Changes in exports From initially agoa-eligible Countries/regions to the
u.s., Following sCenarios assuming a return to the u.s. gsp, by seCtor, 2025 (pErcEnt)


M
in


in
g


M
in


er
al


a
nd


m
et


al


pr
od


uc
ts


Te
xt


ile
a


nd
w


ea
rin


g
ap


pa
re


l


Ot
he


r i
nd


us
tr


y


Fo
re


st
ry


Fi
sh


in
g


Le
at


he
r p


ro
du


ct
s


Ch
em


ic
al


p
ro


du
ct


s


Ot
he


r m
an


uf
ac


tu
re



pr


od
uc


ts


Se
rv


ic
es


Tr
an


sp
or


t s
er


vi
ce


s


Ot
he


r S
er


vi
ce


s


AGOA-eligible countries 0.1 0.4 -51.2 -3.9 0.1 0.1 -8.8 -0.5 -4.9 0.2 0.2 0.2


Nigeria* 0.0 0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 -6.2 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3


Senegal 0.0 0.0 -5.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0


Rest of West Africa* 0.0 0.0 -18.7 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -17.9 0.0 -1.8 0.0 0.1 0.0


Angola and the DRC 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -44.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of Central Africa* 0.0 0.1 -20.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -48.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1


Ethiopia 0.0 -0.5 -15.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Malawi 0.0 0.9 -55.2 1.0 0.0 0.4 -32.9 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.7


Mauritius* 0.3 -2.3 -58.2 -1.0 0.0 0.2 -21.8 0.1 -1.0 0.7 0.6 0.8


Mozambique 0.0 0.0 -25.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0


Tanzania 0.0 0.1 -21.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 -7.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0


Uganda 0.0 0.1 -19.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1


Zambia 0.0 0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of East Africa* 0.1 0.2 -49.7 -0.7 0.4 0.1 -4.9 0.3 -0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3


Botswana* 0.0 0.0 -62.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1


South Africa* 0.1 0.2 -33.5 -5.0 0.2 0.1 -10.1 -1.0 -6.0 0.2 0.1 0.2


Rest of SACU* 0.4 1.7 -56.2 1.4 0.0 0.0 -4.8 1.3 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.4


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
The red cells indicate significant changes in exports by sector for AGOA-eligible countries as a whole.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 7


annex i. Changes in total exports by Country/region, Following sCenarios assuming
revisions to the struCture oF agoa Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario I Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


%
Millions of


USD
%


Millions of
USD


%
Millions of


USD


AGOA-eligible countries -0.1 -0.4 1.6 6.9 5.1 21.7


Nigeria* 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.7 3.6 3.5


Senegal 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.1 5.8 0.2


Rest of West Africa* 0.0 0.0 6.3 2.8 8.2 3.6


Angola and the DRC 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 2.6 0.8


Rest of Central Africa* 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 6.0 1.7


Ethiopia 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.1 4.5 0.3


Malawi -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 14.1 0.3


Mauritius* -0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.4 0.5


Mozambique 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.4 6.7 0.4


Tanzania 0.0 0.0 3.7 0.3 15.7 1.1


Uganda 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 5.3 0.2


Zambia 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 12.9 0.7


Rest of East Africa* -0.3 -0.1 2.3 0.6 8.3 2.2


Botswana* -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


South Africa* -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4 4.4 5.8


Rest of SACU* -0.7 -0.1 0.6 0.1 2.4 0.3


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.0 7.9


Madagascar 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.1 2.4 0.1


Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 11.7 0.3


North Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 7.5


Non-African LDCs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


United States 0.0 -0.3 0.1 1.1 0.0 0.6


European Union 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.1 -0.1 -3.9


Rest of the world 0.0 0.3 0.0 -101 0.0 -4.0


Rest of developed countries 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.6


BRIC countries 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -1.5


Other developing countries 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -1.9


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 8


annex J. Changes in real inCome by Country/region, Following sCenarios assuming
revisions to the struCture oF agoa Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario I Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


%
Millions of


USD
%


Millions of
USD


%
Millions of


USD


AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 -33.4 0.1 81.8 0.3 316.6


Nigeria* -0.1 -15.3 -0.3 -35.7 -0.4 -50.9


Senegal 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.2 0.2 3.1


Rest of West Africa* 0.0 -0.6 0.8 89.0 0.8 88.3


Angola and the DRC 0.0 0.3 0.0 -1.2 -0.2 -10.3


Rest of Central Africa* 0.0 -1.5 0.0 -2.2 -0.2 -10.0


Ethiopia 0.0 0.0 0.2 5.5 0.2 4.4


Malawi -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.3 -0.6 -2.7


Mauritius* -0.2 -2.5 0.0 0.0 -0.9 -9.8


Mozambique 0.0 0.1 -0.3 -3.9 -0.3 -3.6


Tanzania 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 7.7


Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.3 4.1


Zambia 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.9 0.1 1.0


Rest of East Africa* 0.0 -3.0 0.1 8.4 -0.1 -15.6


Botswana* 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -2.9


South Africa* 0.0 -6.3 0.0 16.3 0.8 298.1


Rest of SACU* -0.4 -4.6 0.3 4.0 1.4 15.9


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.87 0.0 26.6


Madagascar 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.2 0.3 2.7


Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 -1.1 -3.1


North Africa 0.0 0.2 0.0 -1.9 0.0 27.0


Non-African LDCs 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.1


Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.8


Cambodia 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.9


United States 0.0 7.5 0.0 24.5 0.0 29.5


European Union 0.0 2.1 0.0 -26.4 0.0 -75.8


Rest of the world 0.0 14.1 0.0 -45.7 0.0 -146.5


Rest of developed countries 0.0 0.6 0.0 -4.6 0.0 -10.4


BRIC countries 0.0 9.8 0.0 -20.3 0.0 -63.3


Other developing countries 0.0 3.8 0.0 -20.9 0.0 -72.8


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


4 9


annex k. Changes in tariFF revenues by Country/region, Following sCenarios assuming
revisions oF the struCture oF agoa Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025 (pErcEnt)


Scenario I Scenario IV.A Scenario IV.B


AGOA-eligible countries -0.3 -6.0 -17.4


Nigeria* -0.3 -9.6 -20.4


Senegal 0.0 -5.4 -14.7


Rest of West Africa* -0.1 -5.4 -13.9


Angola and the DRC 0.0 -8.3 -28.2


Rest of Central Africa* -0.1 -3.5 -36.9


Ethiopia 0.0 -3.2 -15.6


Malawi -0.5 -2.1 -59.5


Mauritius* -1.3 -0.2 -23.8


Mozambique 0.0 -57.1 -59.4


Tanzania 0.0 -10.3 -38.3


Uganda -0.1 -10.9 -28.3


Zambia 0.0 -1.1 -68.1


Rest of East Africa* -0.3 -2.8 -17.8


Botswana* -0.8 -0.1 2.8


South Africa* -0.3 -0.2 5.0


Rest of SACU* -4.3 -0.3 3.0


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 0.0 -5.4


Madagascar 0.0 3.8 -4.2


Zimbabwe 0.0 -1.3 -79.2


North Africa 0.0 0.0 -4.8


Non-African LDCs 0.0 0.0 0.0


Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 -0.1


Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 0.0 0.0


United States 0.5 -0.1 -0.1


European Union 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of the world 0.0 0.0 -0.1


Rest of developed countries 0.0 0.0 0.0


BRIC countries 0.0 0.0 -0.1


Other developing countries 0.0 0.0 -0.1


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 0


annex l. Changes in total exports by Country/region, Following sCenarios assuming a
diFFerent trading environment Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario V.A Scenario V.B


%
Millions of


USD
%


Millions of
USD


AGOA-eligible countries 3.9 16.7 7.4 31.5


Nigeria* 2.3 2.2 4.1 3.9


Senegal 4.7 0.2 7.3 0.3


Rest of West Africa* 8.6 3.8 10.6 4.7


Angola and the DRC 1.1 0.3 3.1 1.0


Rest of Central Africa* 2.6 0.7 8.0 2.3


Ethiopia 2.4 0.2 6.1 0.4


Malawi 5.9 0.1 19.4 0.4


Mauritius* 3.8 0.3 11.6 1.0


Mozambique 7.4 0.4 8.2 0.5


Tanzania 6.4 0.4 18.1 1.3


Uganda 0.8 0.0 5.1 0.2


Zambia 0.0 0.0 12.7 0.7


Rest of East Africa* 3.6 1.0 9.7 2.6


Botswana* 6.9 0.6 6.8 0.6


South Africa* 1.7 2.2 5.7 7.5


Rest of SACU* 30.6 3.8 30.9 3.9


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 0.0 3.0 7.8


Madagascar 1.2 0.1 3.5 0.2


Zimbabwe 3.5 0.1 14.6 0.3


North Africa 0.0 -0.1 2.9 7.3


Non-African LDCs -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4


Bangladesh -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1


Cambodia -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0


Rest of non-African LDCs -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3


United States 2.0 39.8 2.1 40.5


European Union 2.3 64.4 2.2 61.1


Rest of the world -0.1 -13.5 -0.1 -16.4


Rest of developed countries -0.1 -2.7 -0.1 -3.1


BRIC countries -0.1 -5.4 -0.2 -6.5


Other developing countries -0.1 -5.4 -0.1 -6.8


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-
eligible MICs. BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 1


a
n


n
e


x
m


. C
h


a
n


g
e


s
in


e
x


p
o


r
ts


b
y


o
r


ig
in


a
n


d
d


e
s


ti
n


a
ti


o
n


F
o


ll
o


w
in


g
s


C
e


n
a


r
io


iv
.a


C
o


m
p


a
r


e
d


t
o


t
h


e
b


a
s


e
li


n
e


s
C


e
n


a
r


io
, 2


02
5


(b
il


li
o


n
s


o
f


d
o


ll
A


r
s


)


AGOA-eligible


countries


Nigeria


Senegal


Rest of West Africa


Angola and the DRC


Rest of Central Africa


Ethiopia


Malawi


Mauritius


Mozambique


Tanzania


Uganda


Zambia


Rest of East Africa


Botswana


South Africa


Rest of SACU


African non AGOA-


eligible countries


Madagascar


Zimbabwe


North Africa


United States


European Union


Rest of the world


AG
OA


-e
lig


ib
le


c
ou


nt
rie


s
8.


2
3.


3
0.


1
2.


0
-0


.1
-0


.2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


5
0.


3
0.


0
-0


.1
0.


2
1.


0
-2


.6
3.


9
-0


.1
0.


0
0.


1
-0


.1
-2


.0
15


.8
-5


.3


Ni
ge


ria
*


1.
1


0.
0


1.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
4


0.
5


Se
ne


ga
l


0.
2


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Re
st


o
f W


es
t A


fri
ca


*
4.


5
3.


4
0.


1
10


.
0.


0
-0


.1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.4
0.


7
-0


.3


An
go


la
a


nd
th


e
DR


C
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1


Re
st


o
f C


en
tra


l A
fri


ca
*


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
5


0.
1


Et
hi


op
ia


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
1


-0
.1


M
al


aw
i


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
2


0.
0


M
au


rit
iu


s*
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.1
0.


7
-0


.2


M
oz


am
bi


qu
e


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


Ta
nz


an
ia


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


Ug
an


da
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0


Za
m


bi
a


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


-0
.1


Re
st


o
f E


as
t A


fri
ca


*
0.


6
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


5
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


1


Bo
ts


w
an


a*
-0


.4
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.4
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.1
1.


6
-0


.4


So
ut


h
Af


ric
a*


4.
8


-0
.2


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
2


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
6


-0
.1


0.
0


-0
.1


-0
.1


1.
0


3.
7


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.7


1.
3


-3
.1


Re
st


o
f S


AC
U*


-3
.0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
0


-2
.4


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.7


8.
6


-1
.1


Af
ric


an
n


on
-A


GO
A


el
ig


ib
le



co


un
tr


ie
s


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
4


-0
.2


M
ad


ag
as


ca
r


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


.0
.2


-0
.1


Zi
m


ba
bw


e
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
-0


.1


No
rth


A
fri


ca
-0


.1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.1


Un
ite


d
St


at
es


0.
2


-0
.4


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
1


0.
4


0.
4


-0
.2


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.2


50
.9


-1
1.


1


Eu
ro


pe
an


U
ni


on
12


.0
1.


0
0.


3
2.


5
0.


7
1.


2
0.


3
0.


1
0.


4
0.


2
0.


2
0.


1
0.


1
0.


0
0.


9
0.


4
4.


3
1.


1
-0


.1
0.


0
-0


.9
52


.7
0.


0


Re
st


o
f t


he
w


or
ld


-0
.2


-2
.1


-0
.1


-0
.5


-0
.3


-0
.2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


-0
.3


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.6


0.
3


2.
7


0.
9


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-8
.4


-6
.8


1.
4


N
ot


e:
*


in
di


ca
te


s i
ni


tia
lly


A
G


O
A-


el
ig


ib
le


m
id


dl
e-


in
co


m
e


co
un


tr
ie


s o
r r


eg
io


ns
in


cl
us


iv
e


of
in


iti
al


ly
A


G
O


A-
el


ig
ib


le
M


IC
s.


B
R


IC
=


B
ra


zil
, R


us
sia


, I
nd


ia
a


nd
C


hi
na


.
So


ur
ce


: A
ut


ho
rs’


c
al


cu
la


tio
ns


b
as


ed
o


n
th


e
M


IR
AG


E
m


od
el


.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 2


a
n


n
e


x
n


. C
h


a
n


g
e


s
in


e
x


p
o


r
ts


b
y


o
r


ig
in


a
n


d
d


e
s


ti
n


a
ti


o
n


F
o


ll
o


w
in


g
s


C
e


n
a


r
io


iv
.b


C
o


m
p


a
r


e
d


t
o


t
h


e
b


a
s


e
li


n
e


s
C


e
n


a
r


io
, 2


02
5


(b
il


li
o


n
s


o
f


d
o


ll
A


r
s


)


AGOA-eligible


countries


Nigeria


Senegal


Rest of West Africa


Angola and the DRC


Rest of Central Africa


Ethiopia


Malawi


Mauritius


Mozambique


Tanzania


Uganda


Zambia


Rest of East Africa


Botswana


South Africa


Rest of SACU


African non AGOA-


eligible countries


Madagascar


Zimbabwe


North Africa


United States


European Union


Rest of the world


AG
OA


-e
lig


ib
le


c
ou


nt
rie


s
23


.4
6.


5
0.


1
3.


0
1.


2
2.


3
0.


4
0.


4
1.


1
0.


5
1.


4
0.


2
0.


9
2.


9
0.


9
-1


.7
3.


7
3.


8
0.


0
0.


5
3.


3
-2


.2
13


.8
-7


.6


Ni
ge


ria
*


2.
1


0.
0


0.
9


0.
0


0.
8


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
3


0.
6


0.
7


Se
ne


ga
l


0.
2


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


Re
st


o
f W


es
t A


fri
ca


*
4.


9
3.


2
0.


0
0.


9
0.


1
0.


4
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


3
0.


0
0.


0
0.


3
-0


.4
0.


8
-0


.8


An
go


la
a


nd
th


e
DR


C
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


1
0.


2
0.


4


Re
st


o
f C


en
tra


l A
fri


ca
*


0.
9


0.
2


0.
0


0.
1


0.
5


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
1


0.
8


0.
2


Et
hi


op
ia


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


-0
.1


M
al


aw
i


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


M
au


rit
iu


s*
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.1
1.


1
-0


.2


M
oz


am
bi


qu
e


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


Ta
nz


an
ia


1.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
6


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


Ug
an


da
0.


3
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0


Za
m


bi
a


0.
5


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
3


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


Re
st


o
f E


as
t A


fri
ca


*
1.


3
0.


2
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


6
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0
0.


5
0.


0
0.


0
0.


5
0.


1
0.


3
0.


4


Bo
ts


w
an


a*
-0


.4
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.4
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
-0


.1
1.


6
-0


.4


So
ut


h
Af


ric
a*


14
.6


2.
9


0.
0


0.
9


0.
7


0.
6


0.
2


0.
3


1.
0


0.
5


0.
4


0.
1


0.
8


1.
8


0.
8


3.
5


1.
9


0.
0


0.
5


1.
4


-1
.3


-1
.4


-6
.4


Re
st


o
f S


AC
U*


-2
.6


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.2


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


-2
.4


-2
.4


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


-0
.7


8.
3


-1
.2


Af
ric


an
n


on
-A


GO
A


el
ig


ib
le



co


un
tr


ie
s


3.
0


0.
7


0.
1


0.
9


0.
1


0.
3


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
4


0.
1


5.
9


0.
0


0.
0


5.
9


-0
.1


-0
.4


-0
.6


M
ad


ag
as


ca
r


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
1


0.
1


-0
.1


Zi
m


ba
bw


e
0.


2
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0


No
rth


A
fri


ca
2.


8
0.


7
0.


1
0.


9
0.


1
0.


3
0.


1
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


0
0.


2
0.


0
0.


4
0.


0
5.


9
0.


0
0.


0
5.


9
-0


.2
-0


.7
-0


.5


Un
ite


d
St


at
es


2.
2


-0
.2


0.
0


0.
4


0.
1


0.
0


0.
1


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
0


0.
2


0.
1


1.
0


0.
4


-0
.4


0.
0


0.
0


-0
.4


50
.6


-1
2.


0


Eu
ro


pe
an


U
ni


on
9.


2
-0


.3
0.


2
1.


9
0.


2
0.


1
0.


2
0.


0
0.


2
0.


2
0.


1
0.


2
0.


0
0.


9
0.


4
4.


3
1.


1
-0


.8
0.


1
0.


0
0.


2
52


.4
0.


4


Re
st


o
f t


he
w


or
ld


-3
.4


-3
.5


-0
.2


-1
.4


-0
.9


-0
.7


-0
.4


-0
.1


-0
.3


-0
.3


-0
.3


-0
.1


-0
.3


-2
.0


0.
3


5.
5


1.
0


-1
.3


0.
1


-0
.1


-1
.2


-7
.4


-6
.6


1.
9


N
ot


e:
*


in
di


ca
te


s i
ni


tia
lly


A
G


O
A-


el
ig


ib
le


m
id


dl
e-


in
co


m
e


co
un


tr
ie


s o
r r


eg
io


ns
in


cl
us


iv
e


of
in


iti
al


ly
A


G
O


A-
el


ig
ib


le
M


IC
s.


BR
IC


=
B


ra
zil


, R
us


sia
, I


nd
ia


a
nd


C
hi


na
.


So
ur


ce
: A


ut
ho


rs’
c


al
cu


la
tio


ns
b


as
ed


o
n


th
e


M
IR


AG
E


m
od


el
.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 3


annex o. average ad valorem proteCtion FaCed by aFriCan Countries on
their exports to the eu, by main seCtor, 2013 (pErcEnt)


Global Agriculture Industry


Africa total 1.2 10.6 0.3


Angola 0.0 0.5 0.0


Benin 0.0 0.0 0.0


Botswana 1.7 81.9 0.0


Burkina Faso 9.3 14.8 0.0


Burundi 0.0 0.0 0.0


Cameroon 2.2 9.5 0.0


Cape Verde 0.2 0.5 0.2


Chad 0.0 0.0 0.0


Comoros 0.0 0.1 0.0


Rep. of the Congo 0.9 45.2 0.1


Côte d’Ivoire 2.1 3.6 0.1


Djibouti 0.0 0.0 0.0


Ethiopia 2.3 3.3 0.0


Gabon 0.0 13.3 0.0


Gambia 0.0 0.0 0.0


Ghana 0.3 0.5 0.0


Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0


Kenya 1.3 2.0 0.1


Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.0


Liberia 0.0 0.9 0.0


Malawi 10.4 11.8 0.0


Mauritania 0.1 13.0 0.0


Mozambique 1.1 22.7 0.0


Namibia 5.6 70.9 0.2


Niger 0.0 0.4 0.0


Nigeria 0.0 1.0 0.0


Global Agriculture Industry


Rwanda 0.0 0.1 0.0


São Tomé and
Príncipe


0.2 0.5 0.0


Senegal 0.0 0.0 0.0


Seychelles 0.2 4.8 0.1


Sierra leone 0.0 0.1 0.0


South Africa 1.7 9.8 0.9


Sudan 1.0 8.3 0.0


Swaziland 39.2 100.3 0.1


Tanzania 2.4 9.8 0.0


Togo 0.3 1.0 0.0


Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.0


Zambia 2.0 13.0 0.0


Algeria 0.1 7.2 0.1


Central African
Republic


0.0 0.0 0.0


DRC 0.1 9.6 0.2


Equatorial Guinea 00.0 0.1 0.0


Eritrea 0.2 0.7 0.0


Guinea-Bissau 0.0 0.0 0.0


Libya 0.4 4.9 0.4


Madagascar 1.3 3.8 0.0


Mali 0.0 0.0 0.0


Morocco 0.8 6.4 0.1


Somalia 0.0 0.0 0.0


Tunisia 2.1 38.3 0.1


Zimbabwe 4.8 11.1 0.0


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 4


annex p. Changes in exports From all Countries/regions to the eu,
Following sCenarios assuming a diFFerent trading environment Compared to the


baseline sCenario, 2025


Countries


Scenario V.A Scenario V.B


% Billions of USD % Billions of USD


AGOA-eligible countries 13.8 15.8 12.1 13.8


Nigeria* 2.7 0.4 4.0 0.6


Senegal 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0


Rest of West Africa* 3.9 0.7 4.4 0.8


Angola and the DRC 5.6 0.1 7.7 0.2


Rest of Central Africa* 6.1 0.5 9.3 0.8


Ethiopia 6.4 0.1 7.5 0.2


Malawi 57.7 0.2 67.1 0.3


Mauritius* 16.7 0.7 27.6 1.1


Mozambique 4.0 0.2 3.3 0.1


Tanzania 15.4 0.3 12.5 0.2


Uganda 0.1 0.0 -3.0 0.0


Zambia 19.7 0.1 20.0 0.1


Rest of East Africa* 3.2 0.2 4.9 0.3


Botswana* 24.9 1.6 24.3 1.6


South Africa* 3.2 1.3 -3.5 -1.4


Rest of SACU* 307.4 8.6 295.5 8.3


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.3 0.4 -0.3 -0.4


Madagascar 6.8 0.2 4.4 0.1


Zimbabwe 42.4 0.2 48.6 0.2


North Africa 0.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.7


Non-African LDCs -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 -0.4


Bangladesh -0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.0


Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0


Rest of non-African LDCs -0.9 -0.4 -0.9 -0.4


United States 11.3 50.9 11.2 50.6


Rest of the world -0.3 -6.4 -0.3 -6.2


Rest of developed countries -0.3 -1.6 -0.3 -1.7


BRIC countries -0.2 -2.0 -0.2 -1.7


Other developing countries -0.3 -2.8 -0.3 -2.8


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model.




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 5


annex Q. Changes in real inCome by Country/region, Following sCenarios assuming a
diFFerent trading environment Compared to the baseline sCenario, 2025


Scenario V.A Scenario V.B


Countries % Millions of USD % Millions of USD


AGOA-eligible countries 0.7 686.2 0.9 912.8


Nigeria* -0.3 -35.6 -0.4 -47.0


Senegal 0.1 1.4 0.2 2.6


Rest of West Africa* 1.2 136.3 1.2 136.5


Angola and the DRC -0.2 -9.8 -0.4 -16.9


Rest of Central Africa* 0.0 2.5 0.0 -1.1


Ethiopia 0.5 12.3 0.5 11.1


Malawi 1.0 4.5 0.3 1.6


Mauritius* 4.4 45.2 3.5 36.7


Mozambique -0.5 -6.9 -0.4 -6.3


Tanzania 0.2 6.1 0.5 13.7


Uganda -0.1 -1.2 0.2 3.3


Zambia 0.0 -0.4 0.1 1.5


Rest of East Africa* 0.0 5.9 -0.1 -12.5


Botswana* 9.0 118.0 8.7 114.0


South Africa* 0.4 153.5 1.1 423.5


Rest of SACU* 21.9 254.5 21.8 252.5


African non-AGOA-eligible countries 0.0 14.9 0.1 43.9


Madagascar 0.6 5.4 0.8 7.9


Zimbabwe 4.7 12.7 3.8 10.3


North Africa 0.0 -3.2 0.0 25.8


Non-African LDCs 0.0 -13.5 0.0 -13.0


Bangladesh 0.0 -1.2 0.0 -1.4


Cambodia -0.1 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6


Rest of non-African LDCs 0.0 -11.7 0.0 -10.9


United States 0.0 399.5 0.0 428.6


European Union 0.0 484.2 0.0 428.7


Rest of the world 0.0 -509.1 0.0 -610.5


Rest of developed countries 0.0 -83.7 0.0 -89.9


BRIC countries 0.0 -201.9 0.0 -244.7


Other developing countries 0.0 -223.6 0.0 -275.9


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs.
BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 6


Annex r. chAnges in tAriFF revenues by country/region, Following
scenArios v.A And v.b comPAred to the bAseline scenArio, 2025 (pErcEnt)


Scenario V.A Scenario V.B


AGOA-eligible countries -6.7 -18.5


Nigeria* -12.3 -22.9


Senegal -17.9 -27.4


Rest of West Africa* -10.1 -19.2


Angola and the DRC -14.0 -33.8


Rest of Central Africa* -12.5 -43.8


Ethiopia -2.0 -17.5


Malawi 4.3 -57.0


Mauritius* 7.2 -18.7


Mozambique -58.8 -61.9


Tanzania -10.8 -38.1


Uganda -14.1 -32.8


Zambia -1.6 -67.5


Rest of East Africa* -6.2 -20.5


Botswana* 36.5 39.9


South Africa* 6.4 10.7


Rest of SACU* 82.5 73.5


African non-AGOA-eligible countries -0.1 -5.5


Madagascar -5.2 -9.1


Zimbabwe 9.1 -76.5


North Africa -0.2 -4.9


Non-African LDCs -0.3 -0.3


Bangladesh -0.3 -0.3


Cambodia -0.3 -0.3


Rest of non-African LDCs -0.3 -0.4


United States -14.9 -15.0


European Union -16.3 -16.3


Rest of the world -0.3 -0.3


Rest of developed countries -0.2 -0.2


BRIC countries -0.4 -0.4


Other developing countries -0.2 -0.3


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible
MICs. BRIC = Brazil, Russia, India and China.


Source: Authors’ calculations based on the MIRAGE model




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 7


Annex s. sector cAtegorizAtions


# Sectors Categories


1 Cereal and grains Agriculture and food


2 Vegetable, fruit and nuts Agriculture and food


3 Plant based fibers (including cotton) Agriculture and food


4 Other crops Agriculture and food


5 Live animals, animal and wool products Agriculture and food


6 Milk and dairy products Agriculture and food


7 Sugar Agriculture and food


8 Meat products Agriculture and food


9 Other food products Agriculture and food


10 Crude and processed oil Mining and energy


11 Other energy Mining and energy


12 Mining Mining and energy


13 Mineral and metal products Mining and energy


14 Textile and wearing apparel products Textile and apparel


15 Forestry Other industry


16 Fishing Other industry


17 Leather products Other industry


18 Chemical products Other industry


19 Other manufactured products Other industry


20 Transport services Services


21 Other services Services




T h E A F r I CA N G r ow T h A N d o P P o r T U N I T Y ACT : A n E m p i r i c A l A n A ly s i s o f t h E p o s s i b i l i t i E s p o s t - 2 0 1 5


A f r i c A G r o w t h i n i t i At i v E At b r o o k i n G s
U n i t E d n At i o n s E c o n o m i c c o m m i s s i o n f o r A f r i c A


5 8


Annex t. country clAssiFicAtions


# Country/Region Africa vs. Non-Africa Broad category


1 Nigeria Africa AGOA-eligible countries


2 Senegal Africa AGOA-eligible countries


3 Rest of West Africa Africa AGOA-eligible countries*


4 Angola and the DRC Africa AGOA-eligible countries


5 Rest of Central Africa Africa AGOA-eligible countries*


6 Ethiopia Africa AGOA-eligible countries


7 Malawi Africa AGOA-eligible countries


8 Mauritius Africa AGOA-eligible countries


9 Mozambique Africa AGOA-eligible countries


10 Tanzania Africa AGOA-eligible countries


11 Uganda Africa AGOA-eligible countries


12 Zambia Africa AGOA-eligible countries


13 Rest of Eastern Africa Africa AGOA-eligible countries*


14 Botswana Africa AGOA-eligible countries


15 South Africa Africa AGOA-eligible countries


16 Rest of SACU Africa AGOA-eligible countries*


17 Madagascar Africa Non-AGOA-eligible countries


18 Zimbabwe Africa Non-AGOA-eligible countries


19 North Africa Africa Non-AGOA-eligible countries


20 Bangladesh Non-Africa Non-African LDCs


21 Cambodia Non-Africa Non-African LDCs


22 Rest of least-developed countries Non-Africa Non-African LDCs


23 United States Non-Africa United States


24 European Union Non-Africa European Union


25 Rest of developed countries Non-Africa Rest of the World


26 BRIC countries Non-Africa Rest of the World


27 Rest of developing countries Non-Africa Rest of the World


Note: * indicates initially AGOA-eligible middle-income countries or regions inclusive of initially AGOA-eligible MICs. BRIC = Brazil, Russia,
India and China.




1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
www.brookings.edu/africagrowth


Menelik II Ave., P.O. Box 3001
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
www.uneca.org




Login