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Technology and Innovation Report 2015

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In the 2015 Technology and Innovation Report subtitled ‘Fostering Innovation Policies for Industrial Development’ addresses the urgency of building productive capacities and promoting sustainable industrialization in development. It analyzes the crucial role of technological learning and innovation capacity, and helps to address some of the questions that policymakers face when seeking to forge new paths to secure a prosperous future for their people. The report argues that sustainable industrialization is not solely limited to environmental sustainability, but refers to efforts that are technology-led, productivity enhancing and poverty-reducing. It is based on the understanding that no industrial policy is complete without an accompanying innovation policy.

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Fostering Innovation Policies
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U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T


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EMBARGO
The contents of this Report must not be


quoted or summarized in the print,
broadcast or electronic media before


16 December 2015, 11:30 hours GMT


Layout and printed at United Nations, Geneva
1526746 (E) – December 2015 – 4,087


UNCTAD/TIR/2015


United Nations publication
Sales No. E.15.II.D.3


ISBN 978-92-1-112889-5




Fostering Innovation Policies
for Industrial Development


TECHNOLOGY
AND INNOVATION


REPORT 2015


U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T


New York and Geneva, 2015




ii TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


NOTE


The terms country/economy as used in this Report also refer, as appropriate, to territories or areas; the designations
employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of
the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authori-
ties, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. In addition, the designations of country groups are
intended solely for statistical or analytical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage of
development reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The major country groupings used
in this Report follow the classification of the United Nations Statistical Office. Details of the classification are provided
in Annex I of this Report.


The boundaries and names shown and designations used on the maps presented in this publication do not imply of-
ficial endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


Symbols which may have been used in the tables denote the following:


• Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported. Rows in tables are omitted in those
cases where no data are available for any of the elements in the row.


• A dash (–) indicates that the item is equal to zero or its value is negligible.


• A blank in a table indicates that the item is not applicable, unless otherwise indicated.


• A slash (/) between dates representing years (e.g., 1994/95) indicates a financial year.


• Use of a dash (–) between dates representing years (e.g. 1994–1995) signifies the full period involved, including the
beginning and end years.


• Reference to “dollars” ($) means United States dollars, unless otherwise indicated.


• Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add to totals because of rounding.


The material contained in this study may be freely quoted with appropriate acknowledgement.


This publication has been edited externally.


UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION


UNCTAD/TIR/2015


Sales No. E.15.II.D.3


ISSN 2076-2917


ISBN 978-92-1-112889-5


e-ISBN 978-92-1-057306-1


Copyright © United Nations, 2015


All rights reserved. Printed in Switzerland




iii




PREFACE


PREFACE


Building productive capacities and promoting sustainable industrialization have an important role to play across the
spectrum of the integrated 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The Agenda recognizes that the notion of
sustainable industrialization is multi-faceted: it is not solely limited to environmental sustainability, but refers to efforts
that are technology-led, productivity enhancing and poverty-reducing. It is based on the understanding that no indus-
trial policy is complete without an accompanying innovation policy. Both are essential and complementary to shaping
developmental outcomes and creating prosperity for all.


The UNCTAD Technology and Innovation Report of 2015 addresses this urgent policy priority by analyzing the crucial
role of technological learning and innovation capacity. Promoting industrialization is a challenge throughout the world.
This report helps to address some of the questions that policymakers face when seeking to forge new paths to secure
a prosperous future for their people.


I encourage governments, policymakers and development partners to use this report as a resource as they seek to
formulate the most effective approaches to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.


BAN Ki-moon


Secretary General


United Nations




iv TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


The Technology and Innovation Report 2015 was prepared by a team comprising Padmashree Gehl Sampath (team
leader and main author), Donatus Ayitey and Mesut Saygili under the direction of Anne Miroux, Director of Division on
Technology and Logistics, UNCTAD.


This report would not have been possible without the support of national agencies that helped collect primary data
in Nigeria, Tanzania and Ethiopia. In Nigeria, the collaboration with Femi Olukesusi (Director and Professor, Policy
Engagement and ICT, NISER) and his colleagues at the Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISER)
is acknowledged for the questionnaire survey and collection of data. Similarly, in Tanzania, UNCTAD is grateful to col-
leagues at the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology who partnered to conduct a national workshop,
administer the questionnaire survey and conduct interviews. Hassan Mshinda (Director General, Commission for
Science and Technology, Tanzania), Omar Bakari (Coordinator, Commission for Science and Technology’s Cluster
Development Programme, Tanzania), Flora Tibuwana, and Festo Maro’s inputs are particularly acknowledged. In
Ethiopia, UNCTAD is grateful to support of Mr. Melkamsew Abate and Mr. Dessie Abeje, Ministry of Trade and Industry.


Comments and suggestions provided by the following experts during the Geneva Peer Review meeting to discuss the
outline and methodology are gratefully acknowledged: Bengt-Åke Lundvall (Professor, University of Alborg Denmark),
Helena Forsman (Professor in Business Management, University of Tampere, Finland), Mark Nicklas (Deputy Head,
European Commission’s Innovation Policy and Investment Unit), Christian Berggren (Professor, Industrial Manage-
ment, Linköping University, Sweden), Biswajit Dhar (Director General, Research and Information Allied Systems, New
Delhi), Conrad Von Igel Grisar (Executive Director, InnovaChile, Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitivi-
dad, Chile), Flávia Kickinger (Head, Innovation Department , BNDES , Brazil), Ato Eyasu Dessalegne (Director, S&T
Policy Research Directorate, MOST, Ethiopia), Omar Bakari (Coordinator, Commission for Science and Technology’s
Cluster Development Programme, Tanzania), Pedro Roffe (Senior Associate, ICTSD, Geneva, Switzerland) and Kan-
chana Wanichkorn (Director, Policy and Research Management, National Science Technology and Innovation Policy
Office, Thailand). Comments by the following experts on the first draft of the report during a Peer Review Meeting in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia are acknowledged: Prof. Judith Sutz (University of Monte Video), Prof. Susan Cozzens (Univer-
sity of Georgia Tech), Prof. K. J. Joseph (Centre for Development Studies, Trivandrum), Prof. Keun Lee (Seoul Techni-
cal University), Prof. Joanna Chataway (Rand Corporation), Bitrina Diyamett (Executive Director, STIPRO, Tanzania).


Country chapters benefited from comments provided by Banji Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (Director, Monitoring and Research,
UN-HABITAT, Nairobi, Kenya), and Femi Olokesusi (Director, Policy Engagement and ICT, Nigerian Institute of Social
and Economic Research, Nigeria) on the chapter on Nigeria; Hassan Mshinda (Director General, COSTECH), Omar
Bakari (COSTECH) and mr. Maduka Kessay, (President’s office and Deputy Executive Secretary of the Planning Com-
mission) on the chapter on Tanzania and Carl Daspect (Head of Trade and Economic Section, EU Delegation to
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa) and Taffere Tesfachew, Richard Kozul Wright and Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng (UNCTAD) on the
chapter on Ethiopia.


Comments from the following colleagues are also acknowledged: Angel Gonzalez-Sanz (Division on Technology and
Logistics), Torbjorn Fredriksson (Division on Technology and Logistics), Lisa Borgatti (Division for Africa, Least De-
veloped Countries and Special Programmes), Piergiuseppe Fortunato (Division on Globalization and Development
Strategies), and Axele Giroud and Fiorina Mugione (Division of Investment and Enterprise). Inputs from Tansug Ok
and Arun Jacob to the Tanzania chapter during the early stages of the preparation of the report are acknowledged.
Research assistance by Guiliano Loungo and secretarial assistance by Malou Pasinos in organizing the field missions
is also gratefully acknowledged.


The report was edited by Mark Bloch and Sophie Combette was responsible for the cover page. Nathalie Loriot was
responsible for the layout.




vLIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


AfDB African Development Bank
AMCOST African Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology
BIS Basic Industrialization Strategy


COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COSTECH Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology
CPA Consolidated Plan of Action


EAC East African Community


ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EPZ Export Processing Zone


EXIM Export-Import Bank
FB-PIDI Food and Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Industry Development Institute
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GTP Growth and Transformation Plan
GURT Government of the United Republic of Tanzania
ICT Information and Communication Technology


IDB Inter-American Development Bank
IIDS Integrated Industrial Development Strategy
ILO International Labour Organization
IPR Intellectual Property Right


LDC Least Developed Country
MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MoST Ministry of Science and Technology
MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise
NBS National Bureau of Statistics


NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NIP National Industrial Policy


NRDP National Research and Development Policy
NSGRP National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction
NV Nigeria Vision
PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PPP Public Private Partnership


R&D Research and Development
SADC Southern African Development Community
SEZ Special Economic Zone


SIDP Sustainable Industrial Development Policy
SME Small And Medium-Sized Enterprise
STI Science, Technology and Innovation


TCCIA Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture


TDV Tanzania Development Vision
TeCAT Technology Capability Accumulation and Transfer


WDI World Development Indicators




vi TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


CONTENTS


Note ...............................................................................................................................................................ii
Preface ......................................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................iv
List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................... v
Contents .......................................................................................................................................................vi
Overview .................................................................................................................................................... xiii


CHAPTER I INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY ................................ 3


A. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................................3


B. SCENE SETTING: THE NEED TO COORDINATE INDUSTRIAL AND INNOVATION POLICY FRAME-
WORKS ..................................................................................................................................................................5


1. Shifting emphasis towards innovation in the global landscape ................................................................................ 5
2. Stagnating growth rates or growth rates in unproductive sectors .............................................................6
3. Synergies between industrial and innovation policies ...............................................................................7


C. NOTE ON THE CHOICE OF REGION AND COUNTRIES ...................................................................................9


D. METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................................................................9


E. DEFINITIONS ......................................................................................................................................................11


1. Industrial policy and industry ..................................................................................................................11
2. Innovation .............................................................................................................................................11
3. Science, technology and innovation policy ............................................................................................11


F. REPORT’S CONTRIBUTION AND STRUCTURE ..............................................................................................11


CHAPTER II LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................... 17


A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................17


B. TRIGGERS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT .................................................................................................18


1. Why focus on industrial development policies? ......................................................................................18
2. Creating a supportive environment for industry ......................................................................................19


a. Improving technical and technological efficiency in firms ................................................................... 19
b. Promoting enterprise/ business support ........................................................................................... 20
c. Supporting industrial organization .................................................................................................... 20
d. Promoting a broader economic development strategy...................................................................... 21


C. GOALS AND INCENTIVES IN INNOVATION POLICIES ...................................................................................21


1. Why focus on innovation policies? ..........................................................................................................21
2. Policy objectives of innovation policies ...................................................................................................21


a. Fostering technology absorption capacity ........................................................................................ 22
b. Creating an overall innovation ecosystem ................................................................................ 25




viiCONTENTS


D. POLICY OVERLAPS ............................................................................................................................................26


1. Overlapping domains of interventions in policy definition ........................................................................26
a. Stimulating demand ........................................................................................................................ 26
b. Finance and investment ................................................................................................................... 30
c. Accelerate technological learning through an enabling environment ................................................. 30
d. Establishment of supporting institutions ........................................................................................... 32


E. WHAT MATTERS .................................................................................................................................................32


1. Identify and eliminate policy redundancies ..............................................................................................34
2. Promote policy coherence and competence ..........................................................................................34
3. Use resources carefully ..........................................................................................................................34
4. Develop capacity for proper policy evaluation and monitoring ................................................................35
5. Coordinate policymaking efforts and implementation with the local business environment more


closely in order to engage the private sector .................................................................................................... 35


F. CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................35


CHAPTER III COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY:
NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE ........................................................................... 39


A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................39


B. OVERALL TRENDS IN THE ECONOMY ............................................................................................................40


1. Underlying drivers of growth ...................................................................................................................40
2. Challenges for structural diversification: 1960s to the present day ..........................................................41


a. Nigeria’s national development plans ................................................................................................ 41
b. The 1998 National Industrial Policy ................................................................................................... 42
c. National vision statements: Nigeria Vision 2010 and 2020 ................................................................ 43
d. Nigeria’s National STI Policy ............................................................................................................. 43


C. INNOVATION AND INDUSTRY GROWTH: RESULTS OF THE FIELD SURVEY ..............................................44


1. Enterprise characteristics in the three surveyed sectors ........................................................................44
2. Survey results: Nature of innovation in the three sectors .........................................................................44


a. New process and product innovations ............................................................................................. 44
b. Collaborations and sources of technological information for firms ..................................................... 45


3. Survey results: Sectoral weaknesses, innovation constraints and industry performance .........................47
a. Failings in the general innovation environment .................................................................................. 47


i. Knowledge related issues ........................................................................................................... 47
ii. Physical infrastructure related issues ........................................................................................... 47


b. Competitiveness-related issues ........................................................................................................ 47
c. Policy impediments to learning and innovation ................................................................................. 48
d. Lack of collaborative linkages .......................................................................................................... 48


D. OUTSTANDING ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION .............................................................................................48


E. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................49




viii TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


CHAPTER IV HARNESSING STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA ................................................... 55


A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................55


B. CURRENT DYNAMICS AND STRUCTURAL GAPS IN THE ECONOMY .........................................................55


1. Sectoral trends.......................................................................................................................................56
2. The development of innovation and industrial development policies 1960s until the present day ............57


a. The first era of industrial development: 1960s to the 1980s .............................................................. 57
b. Second era of industrial development: The post-1986 period ........................................................... 58


3. The evolution of STI policy in the United Republic of Tanzania ................................................................59
a. Science and technology policy during the pre-1996 period .............................................................. 59
b. STI policies in the post-1996 period ................................................................................................. 59
c. Current STI context .......................................................................................................................... 61


C. INNOVATION CAPACITY AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: RESULTS OF THE FIELD SURVEY ............61


1. Sector snapshots ...................................................................................................................................62
2. Survey results: Innovation opportunities and performance ......................................................................62


a. Nature of innovation in the three sectors .......................................................................................... 62
b. Sources of technological information .............................................................................................. 63
c. Technological intensity of firm-level activities ..................................................................................... 63


3. Survey results: Sectoral weaknesses, innovation constraints and industry performance .........................65
a. Innovation constraints ...................................................................................................................... 65


i. Arduous regulatory frameworks ................................................................................................. 65
ii. Technology transfer and technology incubation issues ................................................................ 65
iii. Local business practices and support to SMEs ........................................................................... 66
iv. Finance ....................................................................................................................................... 67


v. Low/ expensive access to intermediate inputs of production ............................................................ 67
b. Key issues arising in policy coordination between industrial and innovation policy ............................ 68


i. Fragmented policy support apparatus ........................................................................................ 68
ii. Overlapping policy measures and incentives ............................................................................... 68
iii. Issues within the STI system ....................................................................................................... 68


E. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................69


CHAPTER V PROMOTING INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
IN ETHIOPIA ........................................................................................... 75


A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................75


B. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION CAPACITY IN ETHIOPIA ........................................76


1. Overall economic trends: 1970s until the present day ............................................................................77
2. Industrial development policy strategies and performance .....................................................................78


a. Industrial development policy focus from late 1950s -1980s............................................................. 78
b. Emphasis on industrial development in the economic reforms of the 1990s ..................................... 78
c. Industrial development strategies of the 2000s ................................................................................. 78
d. The Growth and Transformation Plan and post-2010 policies ........................................................... 79


i. Development of industrial zones ................................................................................................. 79
ii. Capacity building programmes ................................................................................................... 79
iii. University-industry linkages ......................................................................................................... 79
iv. Creation of a centralized innovation fund for R&D in 2006 ........................................................... 79




ixCONTENTS


3. Overview of Ethiopia’s science, technology and innovation policies .......................................................80
a. Science and technology policy focus, prior to 2008 ......................................................................... 80
b. Changes in innovation policy: 2008 and beyond............................................................................... 81


C. COORDINATING INDUSTRIAL AND INNOVATION POLICIES FOR FIRM-LEVEL SUPPORT: SURVEY
RESULTS ............................................................................................................................................................82


1. Sources of technological information .....................................................................................................82
a. The agricultural sector ...................................................................................................................... 82
b. The pharmaceutical sector ............................................................................................................... 83


2. Key impediments to upgrading production techniques and performance ..............................................83
a. Greater support to develop process and product technologies and innovation capacities


is needed ........................................................................................................................................ 84
b. The need to exploit emerging markets and build competitive industry strategies .............................. 84
c. The need to create forward and backward linkages ......................................................................... 85
d. The need to closely align industrial and innovation policies .............................................................. 85
e. Improving exports-import procedures and the general business environment ................................... 85
f. Promote access to finance .............................................................................................................. 85


D. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................85


CHAPTER VI PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES
BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES ..................... 93


A. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................93


B. GENERAL FINDINGS ..........................................................................................................................................94


1. Countries have elaborate industrial policy frameworks ............................................................................94
2. Countries have elaborate STI policy frameworks ....................................................................................95
3. Enterprise support policies are the weak link ..........................................................................................95


C. INDUSTRIAL POLICY-INNOVATION POLICY INTERFACE: WHAT MATTERS ...............................................96


1. Gaps in policymaking structures exist ....................................................................................................96
2. Policies suffer from inconsistencies and often, overall incoherence .........................................................97


a. Policy incoherence in the conceptualization of the two policy frameworks ........................................ 97
i. Incoherence as a result of ineffective or slow policy transitions .................................................... 97
ii. Incoherence due to institutional resistance and inertia ................................................................. 98
iii. Incoherence due to insufficient policy competence/ policy oversight ........................................... 98


b. Policy incoherence in the implementation process ......................................................................... 100
i. Coordination hurdles need to be tackled at the level of agencies and organizational structures. ... 102
ii. Policy changes should be accompanied by clear and enlarged budgets and staffing of


skilled employees to facilitate their implementation .................................................................... 103
iii. Develop common time frames and goals between STI and industrial policies ........................... 103
iv. Importance of high-level governance structure and coordination .............................................. 103
v. Best practices can only serve as a guideline ............................................................................. 103
vi. Contextualization is key to achieving results .............................................................................. 103
vii. Take stock of duplicated measures ........................................................................................... 103


3. Policy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure efficient use of existing resources ..................104
a. Conceptualize monitoring from the start of the policy process ........................................................ 104
b. Ensure monitoring and regular follow-up ........................................................................................ 104
c. Monitoring should be based on institutional memory ..................................................................... 105
d. Financial realities are crucial ........................................................................................................... 105


4. Coordinate policymaking, governmental interventions and the business environment more closely .....105


REFERENCES .........................................................................................................................................................109




x TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


List of boxes


Box 1.1: From S&T to STI policies ................................................................................................................... 7


Box 2.1: Industrial hubs, zones and parks ..................................................................................................... 32


Box 3.1: Scope and details of data collection in Nigeria ................................................................................. 39


Box 3.2: Chile’s industrial and innovation policy mixes: Experience and lessons from
another resource rich country ............................................................................................................ 50


Box 4.1: Data sources and field survey in the United Republic of Tanzania ...................................................... 55


Box 4.2: The knowledge infrastructure of the United Republic of Tanzania ...................................................... 60


Box 4.3: Benefiting from foreign partnerships: The case of Claphijo ................................................................. 64


Box 4.4: Pro-poor access to finance: Maxcom Africa ...................................................................................... 67


Box 5.1: Additional information on the field survey in Ethiopia .......................................................................... 76


Box 5.2: Policy emphasis of the national STI policy of 2012 ............................................................................ 81


Box 5.3: The coffee industry in Ethiopia: Building local technological capacity ................................................. 82


Box 5.4: Hilina Enriched Foods Processing Centre .......................................................................................... 83


Box 5.5: Sino-Ethiop Associate (Africa) Private Limited Company .................................................................... 84


Box 5.6: Food and Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Industry Development Institute ........................................ 87


Box 6.1: Five guiding principles in aligning the industrial policy-innovation policy interface: A recap ................. 96


Box 6.2: National agencies/parastatals with mandates to implement industrial and innovation policies .......... 100


List of figures


Figure 1.1: Distribution of world exports by technology intensity and by development status,
2000 and 2014 (in per cent) ................................................................................................................ 5


Figure 1.2: Distribution of medium-technology manufacturing exports by different country groups, 2000-2014
(in per cent) ......................................................................................................................................... 6


Figure 1.3: Distribution of high-technology manufacturing exports by different country groups, 2000-2014
(in per cent) ......................................................................................................................................... 6


Figure 2.1: Relationship between R&D expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) and exports of
medium- technology intensity ............................................................................................................ 23


Figure 2.2: Relationship between R&D expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) and technology
exports (high intensity) ....................................................................................................................... 23


Figure 2.3: Technological learning, technology flows and technological absorption:
Factors and feedback loops .............................................................................................................. 25


Figure 3.1: Real per capita GDP growth rate in Nigeria vis-a-vis other regions of the developing world,
1970-2014 (in per cent) ..................................................................................................................... 40


Figure 3.2: Product composition of Nigerian merchandise exports, 1995-2014 (in per cent) ............................... 49


Figure 4.1: Real per capita GDP growth rate in the United Republic of Tanzania vis-a-vis
other regions of the developing world, 1970-2014 (in per cent) ......................................................... 56


Figure 5.1: Real per capita GDP growth rate in Ethiopia vis-a-vis other regions of the
developing world, 1970-2014 (in per cent) ........................................................................................ 75


Figure 5.2: Trends in average real GDP growth rate and GDP per capita growth rate,
1970-2014 (in  per cent) .................................................................................................................... 77


Figure 6.1: Domestic credit to the private sector (as a percentage of GDP) in select countries and regions ....... 106




xi


List of tables


Table 1.1: Real GDP growth rate by region, 1980-2014 (in per cent) .................................................................... 7


Table 1.2: R&D expenditure as a share of GDP in selected countries ................................................................... 8


Table 2.1: Industrial development initiatives in Africa .......................................................................................... 27


Table 2.2: STI policy initiatives and strategies .................................................................................................... 28


Table 2.3: R&D technicians and scientific researchers in enterprise development ............................................... 31


Table 2.4: Industrial and innovation policies for development: Key alignment issues ........................................... 33


Table 3.1: Distribution of Nigeria’s GDP by sector, 1970 to 2013 (in per cent) .................................................... 41


Table 3.2: Distribution of firms carrying out new product and process developments ......................................... 45


Table 3.3: New processes and organizational systems of firms by sources ....................................................... 46


Table 3.4: Contribution of various factors to new product or process development ............................................ 46


Table 3.5: Factors preventing enterprises from developing technology and engaging in competition .................. 48


Table 4.1: Distribution of the United Republic of Tanzania’s GDP by sector, 1970 to 2013 (in per cent) .............. 57


Table 4.2: Distribution of firms carrying out new product and process developments ......................................... 63


Table 4.3: Contribution of various sources to new product or process development .......................................... 64


Table 4.4: Factors preventing Tanzanian enterprises from developing technology and becoming competitive .... 66


Table 4.5: Areas where government or other institution’s support is critical to devise new innovation strategies .....66


Table 4.6: Share of firms participated in government programs or received government assistance
during the last five years (in per cent) ................................................................................................. 67


Table 5.1: Trends in share of GDP value added by sector in Ethiopia, 1970 to 2013 (in per cent) ....................... 77


Table 5.2: Trends in number of projects and share of investment capital approved by sector during the
GTP implementation (2009/10 to 2011/12) ....................................................................................... 80


CONTENTS






xiii


OVERVIEW


I. INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES
HAVE BOTH REGAINED IMPORTANCE


Industrialization is by no means an easy process. This
report is set against the broader international context,
wherein a large number of countries have placed re-
newed emphasis on policy frameworks on industrial
policies and science, technology and innovation (STI or
innovation policies) to address the challenge of foster-
ing industrialization and closing the technology gap. This
report analyses an issue that is of high policy relevance,
namely: how can synergies between industrial and inno-
vation policy frameworks be harnessed to help countries
to leverage overall growth and transformation.


In the quest to promote a ‘great transformation’ of sec-
tors and the economy, industrial development and STI
policies overlap on the question of promoting techno-
logical learning and competence building. These over-
laps assume added importance for developing countries
as they often lead to a parallel narrative on technologi-
cal learning. In practice, this implies that the incentives
and instruments of both policies are often quite similar;
furthermore, they tend to lead to duplication of scarce
resource, inter-agency rivalries and less than satisfac-
tory outcomes when they are not accompanied by well-
coordinated policy processes.


A second reason why the overlap matters is that both
policies approach technological learning from different
perspectives. For example, while industrial development
strategies set overall economic targets, innovation poli-
cies provide the institutional infrastructure for learning,
as well as individual targets and supportive incentives
to firms. While industrial development strategies aim to
develop high-technology sectors, stimulate job growth
and eradicate poverty, priority sectors and the modus
operandi for such prioritization is usually set out in STI
frameworks. Similarly, the industrial development strat-
egy of a country may emphasize job growth, particularly
to facilitate recovery from the economic and financial
crisis of 2007-2008, but it is the STI framework that de-
termines how this job growth can be based on techno-
logical development, and how high-quality and sustain-
able jobs can be created. Despite these overlaps and
the complementary nature of both policy frameworks,
neither of them is redundant, and close coordination is
crucial to enforce developmental outcomes.


While there are some good examples of countries within
the developing world that have historically coordinated
their industrial development strategies with STI policy
objectives, there have also been an equal number of
countries that have not managed to do so. Friction has
long existed between the two sets of policies due to the
fact that consolidation of existing industry (which in many
countries is still traditional, or predominantly composed
of SMEs), or the promotion of innovation and industrial
development are seen as two separate issues.


II. COORDINATING THEIR IMPACT IS ESSENTIAL
FOR DEVELOPMENTAL OUTCOMES


Industrial development and innovation are not either/
or options. Industrial upgrading, whether in traditional
or new sectors, cannot be achieved without promoting
technological upgrading and innovation capacity. The in-
ability to acknowledge and foster this relationship has
been the undoing of several developing countries, and
has resulted in local industries being unable to enhance
productivity despite repeated industrial policy efforts,
mainly because there was no emphasis on technologi-
cal change at the firm level.


Coordinated frameworks on industrial development and
technology and innovation capacity need to be empha-
sized by all countries; a good start in this regard is to
understand the links that exist between the two policies
and how they impact key actors in the industrialization
process, namely, the state, the market, the private and
public sectors and domestic and foreign actors. The ex-
periences of East Asian countries and other emerging
economies illustrates that getting the right mix of inter-
ventions to foster the interaction between these actors is
critical for successful industrialization. Crucial questions
need to be reframed, and choices refined. For example,
it is not whether to foster public research or not, but
rather how much public research is needed to boost the
local private sector. Similarly, the concern is not whether
there should be foreign direct investment (FDI) or not,
but rather what is the right kind of FDI, and how can it
enhance technology absorption capacity.


Finding the appropriate balance and the ‘right’ combi-
nation of incentives is contingent on how the two poli-
cies interact, not just at the policy definition level, where
policy goals and targets are set, but also on the mix of
incentives contained in these policies, as appropriate to


OVERVIEW




xiv TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


the local context. This rests on how the policies are coor-
dinated, and more specifically with a focus on getting the
policy processes right. An innovation and industry-friendly
climate is therefore not about just specifying/ granting a
broad range of incentives, but has rather more to do with
identifying the activities, the beneficiaries that need sup-
port (i.e. the kind of firms and what they should be fo-
cusing on), and how such support can be coordinated
through existing agencies. Goal 9 of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development embodies this imperative for
coordinating industrial development with fostering inno-
vation. Making strides towards industrial development in
years to come will hinge upon identifying and promoting
these linkages between innovation and industrial policies
from a practical perspective, to avoid pitfalls and channel
opportunities for local economies.


In practice, therefore, a synergistic environment for
innovation-led industrial de-velopment rests on coordi-
nation of policy implementation at the macro-, meso-
and micro-levels. At the macro-level (i.e. at the level of
national oversight and policymaking), policy frameworks
on both industrial development and STI policy should be
articulated to provide a lean and cogent conceptualiza-
tion of common goals and objectives. The coordinated
implementation of these policy frameworks occurs at
meso-levels, i.e. when the policies are translated into
implementation through incentives, programmes and
agency mandates. The impact of these policies on firm-
level performance occurs at the grassroots level, and
is hence a micro-issue, which is affected by a range
of factors that impact day-to-day performance. With-
out coordination at all three levels, it would negatively
impact firm-level performance and vitiate the common
goal of promoting technology-led industrial growth, even
if countries have relevant policy frameworks on industrial
development and innovation in place.


In ensuring that the policy regimes are well coordinated
at the level of conceptualization, implementation and
practice, the following questions are of relevance:


(i) How does innovation policy fit into the broader
context of industrial development strategies of
countries in practice?


(ii) What are the most critical areas of coordina-
tion?


(iii) What lessons can be drawn from the experienc-
es of countries in promoting policy coordination
at the macro-, meso- and micro-levels for im-
proved firm-level performance, and can they be
understood and applied to other countries?


III. FIVE PRINCIPLES CAN GUIDE THE WAY
(i) This report identifies five broad alignment is-


sues that play a causative role in the overlaps,
namely:


(ii) The existing gaps in policy articulation and de-
sign;


(iii) A lack of policy coherence and policy compe-
tence in the implementation process;


(iv) The prevalence of competition between minis-
tries, agencies and duplication of efforts, which
result in resource constraints;


(v) Insufficient capacity to conduct policy evalua-
tion and monitoring; and


(vi) A lack of coordination between policymaking,
governmental interventions and business envi-
ronment.


It proposes five principles as guidelines to countries to
find the right balance between policy processes and
policy coordination. These principles are aimed at:


(i) Identifying and eliminating policy redundancies
in the policy conceptualization and policymak-
ing structure;


(ii) Promoting policy coherence and policy compe-
tence;


(iii) Using resources carefully;


(iv) Developing capacity for proper policy evaluation
and monitoring; and


(v) Coordinating the policymaking processes
closely vis-à-vis their impact on the business
and enterprise environment, and promoting pri-
vate sector engagement.


IV. COUNTRY FINDINGS REINFORCE THE
IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE POLICY
INTERFACE RIGHT


In the three African countries that are the focus of this
report, industrial and STI policy issues were examined
against the following questions:


(i) What are the historical, economic and systemic
factors that contribute to the way STI and in-
dustrial development policies evolve in coun-
tries over time (policy conceptualization and
policy history)?


(ii) How do these historical, economic and system-
ic factors impact on the way policies and institu-
tional support are structured in practice (policy
coordination and implementation)?




xv


(iii) How does this impact firm-level performance in
countries (policy impact on firms and sectors)?


The country studies are detailed investigations that
show how the institutionalized patterns of policy con-
ceptualization and policy implementation (in terms of
coordinating the various components of industrial devel-
opment, and aligning the instruments and mechanisms
to local requirements) are critical to ensure firm-level per-
formance.


1. Factors for country selection


The country selection was based on three sets of pa-
rameters:


(i) The developmental and institutional circum-
stance represented by the country: While Ni-
geria is a commodity-rich developing country;
Ethiopia is a least developed country (LDC)
with a resource-concentration in agriculture.
This is juxtaposed with the experience of the
United Republic of Tanzania, which is a mix of
resource-based activities and other sectors.
As a result, each of these countries serves
to illustrate a developmental challenge in the
realm of coordination of industrial and innova-
tion policies for developmental outcomes.


(ii) The ongoing policy transformation in industrial
and innovation policies: All the three countries
discussed in this report have national vision
documents, new industrial development strate-
gies and STI policies that embody the aspira-
tion of its leaders and policymakers to transform
their nation into ‘middle-income’ economies
within the next two to three decades.


(iii) Difficulties faced in channeling R&D expenditure
and GDP growth rates towards technological
learning: All three countries have experienced
relatively impressive GDP growth rates over the
past decade if not longer, and increased R&D
expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the
2000s. Despite this, they have faced difficulties
in focusing these investments into greater tech-
nological learning, particularly at the firm level,
as demonstrated by the lack of greater exports
of medium and higher technology products.


2. Asummaryofcountryfindings:Nigeria


Nigeria aspires to have a mature economy with a diversi-
fied industrial base, and to reduce reliance on oil-based
exports, which currently account for over 90 per cent of
its export earnings. Industry, the second largest sector


in Nigeria, accounted for about 26 per cent of GDP in
2013, but most of this was attributable to the oil sector:
out of $100 billion worth of merchandise goods exports
in 2013, fuels accounted for $94 billion. The reliance of
the economy on crude oil exports, which accounted for
about 70 per cent of total exports during the past four
decades, led to a shift away from industrial activities of a
productive nature, leading to low structural change, low
dynamism and over-dependence on a single commod-
ity. Key general, sectoral and firm-level findings based
on the empirical survey of 200 firms across three sectors
(agro-processing, ICTs and health and pharmaceuticals),
field interviews and a historical review of the country’s
economic development are summarized below.


a. Tracing policy conceptualization and policy history
from 1960s until the present day


An in-depth policy analysis shows that the failings of de-
velopment plans since the 1960s inhibited the adoption
of a comprehensive approach integrating technology ac-
quisition and training to industry. As a result of this, flailing
industrial productivity led to the gradual ineffectiveness
of a large number of public sector enterprises and local
firms. The S&T policy adopted in 1986 and which was
revised in 1997 and 2003 did not succeed in reversing the
shortcomings of the national innovation system because
technology was largely conceived in terms of generic ac-
quisition of hardware machinery and equipment, rather
than as a process of building technological absorption
capacity. To address this, Nigeria enacted the National
Industrial Policy of 1998 and simultaneously embarked
upon a system-wide review of its S&T framework in 2005
to shift the focus to building innovation capacity. As a re-
sult of the review process, a new STI policy framework
was launched in 2011 to harness, develop and utilize STI
to build a large, strong, diversified, sustainable and com-
petitive economy that guarantees a high standard of living
and quality of life to its citizens.


Along with the 1998 National Industrial Policy, Nigeria is
also guided by the Nigeria Vision 2020, which is currently
being implemented through the National Implementation
Plans. Nigeria Vision 2020 is a long-term strategy aimed
at transforming the Nigerian economy into one of the
top 20 economies by expanding the country’s economy
from $173 billion in 2009 to $900 billion by 2020 with
a per capita income of $4,000. The review finds that
past efforts in promoting industrial development in Nige-
ria failed largely due to a lack of focus on technological
learning at the plant, sectoral and industry level. Current
policy efforts seek to address this and integrate these
concerns, which is a very positive development.


OVERVIEW




xvi TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


b. Assessing challenges for policy coordination
and implementation


However, despite the recognition that industrial policy
and STI policy are com-plementary, survey results from
the three sectors show that firms continue to encounter
difficulties that affect their ability to perform; these ongo-
ing difficulties stem from policy coordination and imple-
mentation issues.


This can be attributed to two issues. Both the new STI
policy and the Nigerian industrial development strategy
and implementation plans are largely being implemented
within an institutional setting in which industrial develop-
ment and innovation capacity are considered as two con-
trasting goals. Furthermore, several older policy directives
aimed at changing underlying policy processes to pro-
mote collaboration and com-munication among the vari-
ous actors in the institutional support system have yet to
be considered. For example, there is an indication in the
new STI policy that the National Science and Technology
Act, CAP 276 of 1977 and the Federal Ministry of Science
and Technology Act No 1, 1980 would be reviewed, but
this review had not been carried out at the time of the
survey. The mandate of the National Office for Technology
Acquisition and Promotion, which was created in 1979,
also needs to be reviewed and given a mandate to ensure
better coordination and impact.


A second issue is that both policy frameworks, de-
spite their aims, have not yet addressed basic issues
of capacity building and infrastructure. That is, they still
remain largely concerned with articulating objectives
rather than addressing grass roots challenges. A lack of
investment into public utility services continues to hinder
the provision of good physical infrastructure for industrial
activities. Particularly, the lack of electricity and transport
infrastructure has been a hindrance to industrial produc-
tion since the 1970s, when the issue of power supply
was not well-integrated into the construction of large-
scale industrial plants.


c. Measuringpolicyimpactatthefirmlevel


The survey results show that despite the efforts to enact
the two policy frameworks, there is not much real im-
pact up until now on the way firms innovate, learn and
compete. The focus of their activities is in marketing and
distribution of products rather than innovative activities
that can help create new products and processes. The
survey also shows that Nigerian firms are engaged in
incremental learning activities, and often ranked their
products and processes as new to the local market, and
not to the region or the world.


Many of the firms interviewed were often unaware of the
national STI policy, or the incentives contained therein.
Companies were also unaware of new agencies that
were recently set up to assist them to compete, such as
the National Competitiveness Council. The survey also
showed that there was a low awareness of the kinds
of incentives that were available to promote firm-level
innovation, learning and competitiveness. Firms also
reported difficulties in benefitting from these schemes,
where available, due to the extensive bureaucratic pro-
cesses involved.


3. AsummaryofcountryFindings:United
Republic of Tanzania


The United Republic of Tanzania has recently emerged
as one of the best performing economies in Africa. This
is in marked contrast to the 1970s when the real per
capita GDP growth rate was only 0.5 per cent and which
further plummeted into negative growth rates (-0.7 per
cent) in the 1980s. However, in the past two decades,
the country’s economy experienced a steady rise with
real per capita GDP growth rates, which surged from
0.9 per cent in the 1990s to 4 per cent in 2000s and 4.1
percent in 2010-2014.


Despite these trends in overall growth pattern, industry has
contributed the least to GDP growth, lagging behind ser-
vices and agriculture since the 1980s. By way of contrast,
the services sector accounted for the largest share of GDP
in 2013, with a contribution of 47.3 per cent; the agriculture
and industry sectors accounted for 31.7 and 21 per cent of
GDP, respectively. The challenge therefore remains one of
fostering industrialization through technological change and
innovation. Relevant findings are summarized below based
on a three sector survey (agro-processing, ICTs and health
care and pharmaceuticals) of 144 firms, and analysis of the
policy regimes on industrial policy and STI since the 1960s.


a. Tracing policy conceptualization and policy history
from 1960s until the present day


The 1967 Arusha Declaration served as a beacon of
policy focus in the immediate post-independence pe-
riod, with implications for early industrial development
policies focusing primarily on state-led industrialization
through local, indigenous efforts. However, by the end
of the 1970s, failures to boost industrial capacity were
attributed to a low focus on technological capacity. This
not only led to the establishment of the Tanzania Com-
mission for Science and Technology in 1986, but also
the national S&T policy that was formulated in 1996.


However, the 1996 S&T policy suffered from certain
shortcomings, the most im-portant of which was insuf-




xvii


ficient focus on technological learning and innovation.
Sectoral objectives and strategies were also not fully
translated into policy actions and investments in knowl-
edge infrastructure were not realized as intended. This
led to a continued disconnect between industrial and
innovation policy frameworks in the country.


Additionally, since the 1980s, the United Republic of Tan-
zania also underwent a few re-orientations of its indus-
trial policy. The earlier import substitution policies were
replaced with a market-oriented approach in the late
1980s, along with trade liberalization of the economy.
Trade liberalization resulted in a large-scale exit of local
firms from the Tanzanian market due to a lack of institu-
tional support for industry and their inability to compete
with foreign firms. In an effort to revive the local industrial
sector, the government sought to promote an industrial
strategy focusing on high-technology sectors, as in the
East Asian economies. Lacking donor-support, this plan
was replaced with a National Strategy for Growth and
Poverty Reduction (NSGRP 2005-2010), which focused
primarily on poverty reduction. An integrated industrial
development strategy was also enacted since 2011,
along with the National Development Vision 2025. Cur-
rently, the United Republic of Tanzania is in the process
of implementing its second five-year plan to further
these objectives.


In order to achieve the targets set out in the industrial
development strategy, a revised national STI framework
was tabled in 2013, and is pending approval of the Cabi-
net.


b. Assessing policy coordination and implementation


Despite recent efforts to consolidate industrial perfor-
mance, there is a lot of policy incoherence in the design
and articulation of policies on the one hand, as well as
the implementation of policy mandates on the other. A
lack of connectedness among the industrial develop-
ment plans, sectoral strategies and the national S&T
policy, coupled with the absence of a plan to guide the
coordination of these policies, continue to hinder the
country’s development. There seems to be an urgent
need to implement the new STI Act, and also to coordi-
nate industrial development with technological change
and technology transfer. This is currently being consid-
ered a priority by the national planning commission for
the second five-year plan (set to be enacted sometime
in 2016).


The survey and interviews showed that the coordination
shortcoming related to the roll-out of these plans, strate-
gies and policies are in large part similar to what was ob-


served in the 1990s between the S&T policy, industrial
policy, finance, education, etc. As a result, although the
policy imperative is to boost local production capacity
or expand the industrial base, this is compromised by a
lack of institutional coordination. Meanwhile, despite the
new integrated industrial development policy of 2011,
a shortage of emphasis on technological learning, low
absorptive capacity and low emphasis on innovation
continue to hinder industrial development, particularly in
the manufacturing sector.


These shortcomings have, to a large extent, negatively
impacted industry. At the sectoral level, manufacturing
activities went into a steady decline since the 1990s and
accounted for 7.2 per cent of GDP in 2013, with the bulk
of industrial growth being accounted for by non-manu-
facturing sectors, such as mining and construction. The
manufacturing sector was characterized by the creation
of low-value added products for the domestic market
and export-oriented activities with little or no productiv-
ity growth.


c. Measuringpolicyimpactatthefirmlevel


Over 88 per cent of industry is comprised of micro-en-
terprises with less than five workers, which contributed
a third of the country’s GDP. Overall, most of the indus-
try is made up of informal, micro- and small-sized firms,
with a few medium and large-sized companies. Further,
the majority of the micro- and small-sized medium firms
operate in the services sector, while the rest are in agri-
culture and manufacturing.


The survey found that at the firm level, few businesses
were engaged in innovation activities. Most of the small-
scale firms were engaged in in-house operations rely-
ing on local and often self-sourced financing. Lack of
finance, in particular, has prevented firms from under-
taking technological development and innovation. Also,
firms focus on short-term activities on how to survive
and sell their products because of the uncertain inno-
vation and industrial environment in which they operate
and lack of support impedes their ability to innovate.


Survey data showed that a lack of policy coherence on
various aspects of industrial and STI policies, such as
levies imposed on imports of raw materials (as opposed
to an exemption of levies on final products) in some sec-
tors served as a disincentive to innovate or manufacture
locally.


In addition, firms reported receiving little in the way of
government support to participate in innovation and fi-
nance schemes. Firms also found that regulatory frame-
works were often very hard to navigate, and that this


OVERVIEW




xviii TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


contributed to a large informal sector characterized by
low technological capability and lack of investment in
R&D. Finally, shortcomings in the innovation environ-
ment affected firms to a large extent. Currently, firms
have little or no interactions with universities, public and
private research institutes and other intermediate organ-
izations. This hinders technological learning in both the
public and in the private sector.


4. Asummaryofcountryfindings:Ethiopia


Ethiopia has recorded impressive economic growth over
the past two and half decades. The real per capita GDP
growth rate rose from -1.4 per cent in the 1980s to 2.3
per cent in the 1990s, peaking at 6.7 per cent between
2010 and 2014. Ethiopia’s current challenge remains
one of diversifying its economic base, and strengthen-
ing its economic performance. The bulk of the Ethio-
pia’s GDP value added has come from the primary sec-
tor comprising agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing,
which jointly accounted for 45.5 per cent of the GDP
value added in 2013. At the sectoral level, the key chal-
lenge is one of increasing the share of GDP value added
from industry, which has not only been less than agricul-
ture and services over time but its share of contribution
has also declined in the past four decades from 16.2 per
cent in 1973 to 11.1 per cent in 2013.


General findings, as well as sectoral and firm-level find-
ings, are summarized below based on a survey of two
sectors (agro-processing and pharmaceuticals) and a
historical review of the industrial and innovation policy
frameworks.


a. Tracing policy conceptualization and policy history
from 1960s until the present day


Detailed policy analysis shows that Ethiopia’s recent
economic success has been shaped by the country’s
developmental plans over the past two decades, the
most relevant of which is the Growth and Transforma-
tion Plan (GTP). This five-year economic master plan
was launched in 2010 and aimed at achieving 11-15 per
cent annual GDP growth and large-scale investments
in industrial and agricultural sectors by 2015. A second
phase of the GTP, the GTP II, is due to be launched in
2016 to cement and build on current achievements.


Along with the GTP 2010-2015, Ethiopia also sought
to revive and resuscitate Ethiopia’s S&T policy frame-
work. The STI framework was fragmented since its crea-
tion, which despite the formulation of the first national
S&T policy of 1993, and the re-establishment in 1994
of the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission
as an autonomous public institution was not entirely


addressed. A fundamental weakness of the 1993 S&T
policy (which was later amended in 2006 and 2010) was
that it was narrowly focused on S&T without any em-
phasis on innovation capacity. Furthermore, the policy
envisaged no coordination with industrial development
at the sectoral and plant levels. A revised policy of 2012
now seeks to focus attention on innovation and technol-
ogy transfer, in conjunction with the creation of a central-
ized innovation fund for R&D activities, which was estab-
lished with the aim of committing at least 1.5 per cent of
the GDP annually to applied research.


The GTP 2010-2015 and the STI policy are well coordi-
nated in their goals, and the GTP reinforces the issue of
building capacity in the local context by placing empha-
sis on the development of universities, research insti-
tutes, technical and vocational education and training in-
stitutions. Programmes have been defined that promote
these linkages namely: (a) the development of industrial
zones; (b) capacity building programmes; (c) university-
industry linkages; and (d) the creation of a centralized
R&D and innovation fund.


b. Assessing policy coordination and implementation


The share of investment in manufacturing activities has
been impressive, wherein Ethiopia approved 1,211 pro-
jects for the manufacturing sector in 2011/12, which
accounted for 31 per cent of the share of total invest-
ment capital over this period. The central challenge now
is to ensure policy coherence and coordination between
industrial and innovation policies at the implementation
level, which still remains weak. Particularly, there needs
to be a greater emphasis on the provision of a com-
mon STI infrastructure, technology-transfer venues and
information sharing of relevance to promote the industry,
especially to engage in high technological intensity ac-
tivities.


Policy coordination and implementation is still less than
satisfactory because the institutional apparatus in the
country remains weak and fragmented in this regard.
The survey and analysis found that a large number of
intermediary agencies such as those that can help in-
dustry acquire and upgrade technologically are missing,
or just being set up. A good case is that of the Food and
Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Industry Development
Institute, which has recently been set up to promote
such linkages recently.


c. Measuringpolicyimpactatthefirmlevel


The limitations of policy coordination and implemen-
tation are felt at the firm level, as the survey findings
show. The results show that at the firm level, there




xix


is a lot of capacity in Ethiopia’s agro-processing ac-
tivities beyond coffee production, e.g. several firms are
engaged in leather activities, but these activities are
dominated by SMEs. The survey also found that firms
face significant difficulties in diversifying into technology-
intensive activities, especially those that can contribute
to value-additions.


The difficulties faced by firms are partly due to a lack
of adequate institutional support to develop technology
and innovation capacity as a whole. As a result, most
companies (even those in the agro-processing sec-
tor) continue to focus on domestic market opportuni-
ties, and only a few have ventured into markets beyond
Ethiopia. The survey also found that firms rely heavily on
not so up-to-date equipment and machinery, but some
are acquiring new knowledge through the acquisition of
new machinery and equipment, even though the lack
of technological absorptive capacity hinders their ability
to innovate. Promoting technology transfer, access to
finance, joint ventures for production and value-addition
remain really important to firms.


V. WHAT MATTERS IN PRACTICE:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS


The difficulties in coordinating policy objectives, imple-
mentation and impact, as faced by the three countries
in the report, are not isolated issues. A large number
of countries in the developing world are faced by the
same kinds of issues. Some general findings stand out
in this regard. Firstly, although there have been laudable
efforts in defining policies, simple infrastructure issues
that have impeded industrial development over a period
of decades have not been resolved. This should be the
first area of focus. Secondly, countries continue to face
difficulties in coordinating implementation – a develop-
ment that can be traced back to the lack of policy co-
herence. This is not to say that ministries and agencies
have not been well intentioned. In fact, the survey found
that despite their best intentions and efforts, firms were
not benefiting from these efforts due to a lack of policy
coordination. This reinforces the need to get the policy
processes right. Other more specific results on the inter-
face of industrial-innovation policy are presented below,
with accompanying recommendations.


1. Thereareseveralgapsinthepolicymaking
structure


In all three countries, as is the case with a large num-
ber of other African countries that are also reviewed in
the report, national STI policies either evolved much later
(at least two decades after the industrial development


policies were enacted), or evolved in parallel with little or
no coordination with established industrial development
frameworks.


The report finds that within countries, a predominant is-
sue is where industrial policy is placed, and how it is
articulated. In the case of a large number of develop-
ing countries, policies for industrial development are not
usually articulated as industrial policies, but rather as in-
dustrial development strategies, or as national visions,
or as part of recurring national developmental plans
aimed at facilitating overall development and economic
transition.


If countries enact national visions that include indus-
trial policy objectives (which is the case not only in
Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanza-
nia, but also true for a large number of other African
countries), it needs to be borne in mind that such
national vision statements generally have a broader
scope than just promoting industry, and often tackle
issues of poverty, youth, environment, employment
and urbanization. In several countries, industrial de-
velopment objectives are embedded in their national
development plans, and are often recurrent on a term-
by-term basis.


Therefore, although such visions or strategies encap-
sulate the main industrial objectives or goals, there is a
need to have clear roadmaps to achieve these visions,
with accompanying targets, so that these can be linked
to a policy implementation mechanism on the one hand,
and to STI and other policies (covering areas such as
trade, investment, and development) on the other.


Another reason for the gaps in policymaking is that a
large number of industrial development strategies are
one-dimensional: they target overall industrial develop-
ment and an increase in per capita GDP growth rates,
or a rise of specific sectors. The focus should instead
be on closing the productivity gap, i.e. how to ensure
greater returns from productive activities. This leads to
gaps in policymaking, including a neglect of:


• Technological and technical support systems re-
quired for the growth of sectors;


• Links between the human skills requirements of
the various sectors with enhanced performance
projections;


• A clear articulation of how the higher GDP
spending on R&D will form part of public sector
assistance to technological upgrading, e.g. the
establishment of common industry services, tech-
nological incubation, industrial research labs, etc.


OVERVIEW




xx TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


2. Policiessufferfrominconsistenciesandoften,
overallincoherence


A key issue that stands out is that sophisticated poli-
cies are not sufficient. While industrial development
strategies in the selected countries recognize the im-
portance of technology-led growth, and whereas all
STI frameworks recognize the importance of coordinat-
ing with industrial policy, the same historical patterns
of lack of coordination between innovation and indus-
trial policy frameworks persist. Countries have tried to
tackle these issues by providing for common goals or
missions in the two policy frameworks, but policy inco-
herence often occurs at the stage of policy articulation,
and is also often deeply rooted in policy implementa-
tion processes.


The country chapters help to illustrate the main finding
of the analytical framework, namely that it is crucial that
policy processes are clearly laid out. Specifically, the
findings show that even elaborate policy frameworks on
STI policy and industrial development need to be ac-
companied by policy consistency and coherence at the
levels of:


(a) Policy conceptualization and design;


(b) Policy implementation and coordination


A number of reasons explain the existence of policy in-
coherence and inconsistencies. The country chapters
show that they could be the result of ineffective policy
transitions (where countries embark on changes in pol-
icy, but remain incomplete and lose momentum as a
result of changing political leadership at different levels
of governance), institutional inertia and resistance, or a
lack of policy competence to foresee and avoid over-
laps. A second form of policy incoherence is when the
frameworks are overarching but not accompanied by a
concrete implementation plan. However, in many other
cases, policy frameworks are accompanied by imple-
mentation mechanisms, but several shortcomings have
prevented them (to a different extent in the three coun-
tries) from achieving an impact. A key issue (already
raised in the previous point) is that in the absence of
stocktaking and attempts to streamline the institutional
apparatus, many public sector agencies have mandates
to implement the policies. When the policy framework is
not completely consistent or accompanied by clear im-
plementation mechanisms, the country analyses show
that there is no clarity at the policy implementation stage
as to which of the existing agencies should implement
the mandates contained in the policy framework and
how they should be implemented.


a. Policy incoherence in conceptualization can be a
resultofineffectiveorslowpolicytransitions


Moving towards an innovation policy is a challeng-
ing coordination task, and not just one of providing a
regulatory framework. In reality, although a wide variety
of policies emphasize ‘innovation’, field investigations
show that while some policies seek to fundamentally
chart new ground, in some other instances, the policies
often make reference to ‘innovation’ but are not com-
prehensive enough to tackle the difficulties of fostering
innovation. Furthermore, there are difficulties imposed
by the fact that policy processes are not followed
through, and maintained during and after political tran-
sitions in countries.


The same difficulty holds true for industrial develop-
ment policies. Sudden policy shifts that do not promote
a coherent notion of industrialization as a continuous
process lead to policy inconsistency and incoherence
simply because they do not offer a consistent and reli-
able level of support to the process of industry trans-
formation.


b. Policy incoherence can be due to institutional
resistance and inertia


The field interviews and surveys shed light on the fact
that policy and institutional history matters. Historical
analyses of the evolution of policies and implementa-
tion mechanisms conducted in the chapters shows that
agencies implementing these mandates operate within
weak, unaccountable implementation processes. Such
inter-agency rivalries exacerbate policy coordination is-
sues and have led to a large-scale neglect of the private
sector. In almost all countries surveyed, private sector
enterprises considered that existing policy frameworks
and the actions of implementing agencies operated at
a distance from them, making little attempt to liaise and
understand the constraints they faced or tried to alle-
viate them. Such institutionally embedded habits and
practices often offer severe resistance to newer more
collaborative modes of interaction. Policies on industrial
development, if they are to be coherent with innovation
policies, should seek to address the operative mandates
of agencies to promote a change in mindset.


c. Policyincoherencecanbeduetoinsufficientpolicy
competence / policy foresight


Another set of coordination issues arise from the fact
that both industrial development and innovation poli-
cies often identified targets and objectives that were
impacted upon by other policies differently. For exam-




xxi


ple, in Ethiopia, the STI policy aims to ‘develop, promote
and commercialize useful indigenous knowledge and
technologies’. To promote this, there would normally be
a need to assess whether the sui generis system cre-
ated by the Ethiopian 2006 Proclamation on Access to
Genetic Resources and Community Knowledge, and
Community Rights could help protect useful indigenous
knowledge and technologies. In other words, the IPR
protection has to be integral part of the indigenous
knowledge commercialization process. But what ap-
pears to be missing in the objectives are strategies to
create STI policy awareness at all levels of government,
including the Cabinet and Parliament, as well as to build
an innovation culture among businesses, the youth and
society at large. Similarly, one of the projects under the
GTP is the establishment of industrial parks, but these
are expected to act as hubs for FDI, and to leverage
technology transfer of the kind outlined in the country’s
STI policy. This once again calls for coordination of poli-
cy implementation on a strategic basis between the min-
istries, as well as agencies implementing the mandates
on industrial development, investment and STI. But of-
ten the lack of policy competence, as well as a lack of
incentives on part of the agency employees leads to very
minimalistic interpretations of these mandates.


d. Recommendationstoimprovepolicycoherence
in conceptualization and design


Assessing the successes and difficulties faced by the
countries in this report, the following recommendations
are suggested to avoid this kind of policy incoherence:


• Policy vision, mission and objectives should be
closely aligned: The review of ongoing initiatives
at the African level, as well as the country chap-
ters lend strength to the conclusion that a close
alignment of industrial development and innova-
tion policies is still an elusive goal in countries.
Oftentimes, even the targets or objectives for STI
mentioned in industrial policy are not the same as
the objectives of the STI policy itself (see previous
point), thereby promoting policy incoherence and
leading to confusion.


• Emphasis should be placed on developing lo-
cal linkages and unlocking learning potential: Al-
though STI policies clearly lay down the broader
vision to build capacity, fostering an innovation
ecosystem calls for emphasis on the creation of
an innovation and entrepreneurship culture with
concrete links to industrial development. It is nec-
essary to promote entrepreneurial programmes,
align academic curriculum with entrepreneurial


needs, and introduce entrepreneurship classes
at schools and institutions of higher learning to
enable the effective application of new technolo-
gies and innovation for industrial development.
The GTP in Ethiopia, for instance, has at least two
such projects on building capacity.


• While enacting new policies, there is a need to
clearly link them with existing initiatives and agen-
cy mandates: The country chapters found that
although national policymakers are aware of the
need to review existing policies and agency man-
dates, change is usually slow, leading to policy
ineffectiveness, as in the case of Nigeria. Making
this happen alongside the policymaking/revision
process is critical for at least for two reasons:
Firstly, previous policies often have agency man-
dates that call for review in the light of the new
policy, to ensure that the institutional framework
embodies the changes in a dynamic and efficient
way. Secondly, reviewing policy mandates is very
important to ensure that national resources, par-
ticularly financial resources and human skills, are
used efficiently.


e. Recommendationstoimprovepolicycoherenceinin
the implementation process


The recommendations in this regard include:


• Coordination hurdles need to be tackled at the
level of agencies and organizational structures
in order to avoid overlapping mandates between
newly created agencies and existing agencies,
and how they interact with the private sector. Du-
plicated measures should be taken stock of, and
efforts should be made to eliminate such duplica-
tion over time.


• Policy changes should be accompanied by ap-
propriately funded and transparent budgets and
staffing of skilled employees to facilitate their im-
plementation.


• Schedules and critical milestones to be achieved
jointly by the STI and industrial policies should be
clearly defined ahead of the process, and also
framed in a manner that addresses national needs
and industry characteristics.


• A high-level governance structure and coordina-
tion matters, especially at the ministerial level.
More efforts should be made to ensure such in-
teraction.


• Best practices from other countries can only serve
as a guideline; the right combination of innova-


OVERVIEW




xxii TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


tion and industrial policies is a personal choice of
countries.


• The focus should be on contextualization in order
to achieve results.


3. Policymonitoringandevaluationmechanisms
arerequiredtoensureefficientuseofexisting
resources


Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms are rel-
evant from a variety of per-spectives. They not only
enhance coordination efforts but also point to the lack
of funding of various initiatives as part of the stocktak-
ing process. They also ensure that funding issues are
taken into consideration and reviewed over time to
evaluate: (a) where is the current funding being used?
(b) What are the funding gaps to implement the goals
of industrial and STI policies? (c) How can the gap
be financed? (d) What are the best ways to share risk
and partner with industry to effect transformation? (e)
How to best allocate existing resources, and into what
agencies? (f) Can agencies be streamlined and better
defined? These are some of the issues that should
form a core part of the monitoring and evaluation ex-
ercise.


Monitoring and evaluation exercises aimed at ensur-
ing that existing resources and agency strengths are
put to good use will play a pivotal role in policy ef-
fectiveness.


In support of this point, the surveys and interviews
showed that most funding given to agencies support-
ing innovation is often spent on recurring expenses
related to staff maintenance and running costs, with
little or no reserve for innovation support infrastruc-
ture. In the United Republic of Tanzania, for example,
about 95.1 per cent of the sums allocated to agricul-
tural R&D goes into staff salaries or operating expens-
es, leaving only 4.9 per cent for capital investments in
2011. Similarly, staff salaries and operating expenses
account for about 83.4 per cent and 71.8 per cent of
agricultural R&D in Nigeria and Ethiopia, respectively.1
Similarly, supporting staff account for about 29.3 per
cent (2010), 33.6 per cent (2007) and 37.9 per cent
(2010) of the R&D expenditure in the United Republic
of Tanzania, Nigeria and Ethiopia, respectively. By way
of comparison, the share of support staff in relation to
R&D personnel is smaller in other developed coun-
tries, e.g. Germany (16.8 per cent in 2011) and Japan
(16.2 per cent in 2011), as well as in other developing
countries with highly sophisticated R&D system, e.g.
Hong Kong, China (5.5 per cent in 2010).2


a. Recommendationstoensureefficientuseofexisting
resources


In order to address these issues, the following recom-
mendations could be con-sidered:


• There is a need to integrate monitoring and evalu-
ation from the start of the policy process.


• There is a need to ensure monitoring and regular
follow-up, along with open assessments of budg-
ets and assistance offered by various agencies.


• Monitoring and evaluation should be based on in-
stitutional memory of why and how coordination
failed, because looking inwards to assess and
apply the learning of the country’s own past as
to why policies failed or what factors vitiated the
policy processes helps to promote successful co-
ordination.


• The resources earmarked to support the imple-
mentation of relevant policies will largely deter-
mine the effectiveness of the policy in question.
Hence, policies should be accompanied by re-
source allocations that are on par with the activi-
ties envisaged.


4. Policymaking,governmentinterventions
andthebusinessenvironmentshouldbe
coordinatedmoreclosely


An important finding of this report is that policy is often
reality-incoherent. That is, as opposed to the practi-
cal structure of the local industry, which is often over-
whelmingly comprised of SMEs and the informal sector,
industrial policy and innovation policy elaborate sectors
of importance that are entirely high-tech, or require an
institutional infrastructure that is very far-fetched from
the on-the-ground realities that firms face in their day-
to-day existence. A number of the local firms are oper-
ating on the fringes of technological development even
in the so-called high technology sectors. For example,
in the ICT sector, many companies simply offer call
management or ICT services to users (as opposed to
any production or process improvements), in the phar-
maceutical sectors, many companies only distribute
already packaged medicines, or engage in traditional
medicine-based preparations of low-technological na-
ture.


It is important to bring the private sector into the policy fo-
cus and the realm of policy discourse in the countries. The
STI and industry policy frameworks should be adequately
accompanied by both business and industry support or-
ganizations, which provide incentives for local firms such
as R&D grants, R&D loans, tax credits and governmental




xxiii


procurement, all of which have met with much success in
other developing countries. In fact, one of the key issues
that were raised in the country studies related to the way
the question of finance was addressed.


Countries, such as Thailand, have used policy mecha-
nisms like government procurement as an incentive for in-
novation.3 Incentives such as these could be considered
in all the three countries there were policy implementation
gaps on the question of innovation finance.


***


African countries are at a defining point of stocktaking,
particularly as they transition into an era of new develop-
ment goals. It is becoming widely acknowledged that
sustainable development rests more broadly on stable
industrial development of a kind that can deliver better
livelihoods to the people and eradicate poverty, as sev-


eral goals of the recently adopted 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development emphasize. In particular, Goal 9
encapsulates the dual objectives of promoting inclusive
and sustainable industrialization and fostering innova-
tion.


Almost all countries in the African region, and more
widely in the developing world, including the three coun-
tries that were studied in depth for this report, are cur-
rently at a policy and developmental stage where indus-
trial development through technological change should
be a central, if not the most important, priority. Not only
is there a policy transition towards that end, the field sur-
veys were testimonies to the extent of political commit-
ment to enacting elaborate industrial policy frameworks,
and revising their S&T policies towards policies dedi-
cated to innovation. But the private sector in the African
region (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa) is in dire need
of greater support, and enterprise policies are currently
the weak link.


OVERVIEW




xxiv TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


NOTES


1. ASTI website (http://www.asti.cgiar.org/countries) accessed on 27 April 2015.


2. UNESCO Institute for Statistics database (http://data.uis.unesco.org/) accessed on 27 April 2015. Full time equivalent (FTE)
figures were used.


3. See UNCTAD, Promoting Innovation Policies for Industrial Development in Thailand, Forthcoming.




1INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY






CHAPTER I: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY 3


A. INTRODUCTION
Industrial development or industrialization
is a process whereby labour and resources
gradually shift from agriculture to manufac-
turing, leading to a steady rise in produc-
tivity rents and overall economic develop-
ment. A key purpose of industrial policy is
to promote this process of structural trans-
formation by targeting economic activities,
sectors and technologies with growth and
development potential.1 It has come to be
accepted in countries as both an instru-
ment of growth and transformation, and as
a lever to promote innovation capacity and
inclusive social prosperity.


In practice, industrial policy is an umbrella
framework of a rather broad nature. It can
comprise interventions that impact indus-
trial development, but also include policies
affecting science, technology and innova-
tion (STI), foreign direct investment (FDI),
intellectual property rights (IPR) and trade
(Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009). Given this
wide scope, there are potential areas of rel-
ative overlap between industrial policy and
several other national policies. One of the
largest overlaps of this nature is between
industrial development and STI policies, as
the former aim to promote a ‘great trans-
formation’ by facilitating capabilities for
knowledge accumulation within firms and
sectors. As a result, the incentives and in-
struments of both policies are often quite
similar and aimed at facilitating technologi-
cal learning and innovation.


Although industrial policies are not entirely
new to developing countries, such policy
overlaps matter; making it critical to resolve
these overlaps in order to align industrial
and innovation policies in such a way that
they are mutually supportive. There are sev-
eral reasons why this is important. The first
reason can be traced back to the justifica-


tion of industrial policy itself. Industrial poli-
cies seek to catalyse institutional change
by addressing existing shortcomings in
information or coordination. But when im-
plemented in conjunction with other con-
travening incentives or policy interventions,
it may not only fail to achieve this objec-
tive, but may often even lead to misuse of
scarce resources, hence focusing attention
on better coordination.


The second reason is that the accumula-
tion of capabilities for knowledge creation
relies on skills and technical abilities, which
is not an easy process. There is a range of
other supportive institutional infrastructure
that play a role in the way skills and tech-
nical competence are used to create new
products and processes by local firms. Such
supportive infrastructure is critical in enabling
the development of capabilities through link-
ages between various actors, thus shaping
how firms respond to learning opportunities,
benefit from collaborations, and enhance
technical efficiency of production. No unique
set of policy prescriptions exist that can be
shared, but the experiences of some East
Asian countries or industrialized countries of-
fer some clues on how this can be achieved.
A key lesson in this regard is that comple-
mentary, reinforced incentives between in-
dustrial and innovation policy frameworks
are very effective in promoting industrial up-
grading (see Aiginger, 2014; Amsden, 2001).


The third reason is that while there are some
good examples of developing countries that
have historically coordinated their industrial
development strategies with STI policy ob-
jectives, there are also an equal number that
appear not have managed to do so. They
have approached industrialization and tech-
nological change as two different elements in
the developmental process. In practice, this
has led to a dual narrative on industrial devel-
opment strategies and STI policies.


CHAPTER I
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND INNOVATION POLICY




4 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


This report aims to approach the linkag-
es between innovation and industrial pol-
icies from a practical perspective in order
to highlight the pitfalls and the opportu-
nities for developing countries. The 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development
aims to achieve sustainable and inclu-
sive industrial development; to this end,
eliminating policy overlaps will be key to
achieving these goals. Fundamentally, at
a broader level, it seems almost intuitive
to assume that STI/ innovation policies
are an integral complement to industrial
policies/ national industrial development
strategies, and achieving sustainable in-
dustrialization calls for both frameworks
to be coordinated very closely. At the
same time, coordination is not an iso-
lated ‘policy-related’ goal, its impact is
felt by, and a critical element in, the per-
formance of all firms, as the aggregate
productivity of an industrial sector is the
sum total of the productivity of the indi-
vidual firms represented in this sector.


A synergistic environment for innovation-
led industrial development rests on co-
ordination of policy implementation at
three different levels, macro-, meso- and
micro. At the macro level, i.e. at the level
of national foresight and policymaking, it
should be noted that policy frameworks
on both industrial development and STI
policy should be articulated to provide
a lean and cogent conceptualization of
common goals and objectives. The co-
ordinated implementation of these policy
frameworks occurs at meso-levels, i.e.
when the policies are converted into
implementation through incentives, pro-
grammes and agency mandates. Their
impact, however, on firm-level perfor-
mance is often an issue that occurs at
the ground/ grassroots level, i.e. it is a
micro-issue that is affected by a range
of factors that impact day-to-day per-
formance. Even if relevant policy frame-
works on industrial development and
innovation are in place, without coordi-
nation at all three levels, they may not be
well coordinated at meso-levels, thereby
negatively impacting on firm-level per-


formance and vitiating the common goal
of promoting technology-led industrial
growth.


Institutional environments and factors that
vitiate coordinated policymaking are often
path dependent: they depend on the man-
ner in which countries evolve, implying that
what is observable today may draw upon
history, and that such factors are ‘embed-
ded’ in the underlying systemic context
of the economy (Evans, 1995). The ways
in which policies interact and how sys-
tems engage in problem solving are often
shaped by historical, cultural and social
parameters. This report therefore seeks to
bring new light on how historical factors
shape coordination between industrial de-
velopment and innovation policies within
countries.


The following key questions will be consid-
ered in the course of this report:


(i) What are the historical, economic
and systemic factors that con-
tribute to the way STI and indus-
trial development policies evolve in
countries over time (policy concep-
tualization and policy history)?


(ii) How do these historical, economic
and systemic factors impact on
the way policies and institutional
support are structured in practice
(policy implementation)?


(iii) How does this impact firm-level
performance in countries (policy
impact on firms and sectors)?


In order to thoroughly investigate these
questions, the report studies the experi-
ences of three African countries in pro-
moting learning, knowledge accumulation
and industrial development. The country
studies presented in this report bring to
light the extent to which institutionalized
patterns of policy conceptualization and
policy implementation (in terms of coor-
dinating the various components of in-
dustrial development, and aligning the
instruments and mechanisms to local
requirements) are critical to ensure firm-
level performance.




CHAPTER I: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY 5


B. SCENE SETTING:
THE NEED TO
COORDINATE
INDUSTRIAL AND
INNOVATION POLICY
FRAMEWORKS


The proliferation of newer industrial policies
and strategies focusing on leveraging inno-
vation need to be well coordinated with STI
policy frameworks. There are a least three
reasons that lend strength to such an as-
sertion, and relate to:


(i) A greater emphasis towards inno-
vation and innovation rents in the
global landscape;


(ii) Stagnating growth rates, or growth
rates based mainly on an expan-
sion of unproductive sectors; and


(iii) A refocus on industrial policy as an
instrument to leverage change.


1. Shifting emphasis towards
innovation in the global landscape


Although economists continue to face dif-
ficulties in measuring technological capac-
ity accurately, a consensus exists that in-
novativeness, along with the capacity to
capture related rents, are only to be found
in handful of countries worldwide (Archi-


bugi and Michie, 2002; UNCTAD, 2012).
Figure 1.1 helps to illustrate this clearly as
it captures the role that is being played by
various regions and country groupings in
different product categories. For example,
Asian developing countries accounted for
almost half (48.9  per cent) of total global
exports of high technology intensity prod-
ucts in 2014. This, along with the growing
knowledge component of global economic
activity, conveyed through terms such as
the ‘knowledge economy’ and the ‘growing
technological divide’, has meant that coun-
tries with little or no technological compe-
tence will inevitably face difficulties in pro-
moting economic development.


In the current global context, the inability
to promote technological change has re-
sulted in capacity lags within countries.
This manifests itself through differences in
intersectoral and inter-industry productivity,
and the microeconomic allocation of future
resources to R&D and innovation efforts
(Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009). Figures 1.2
and 1.3 help to show these capacity lags
between different regions. The figures show
the different shares of exports in medium
and high-technology intensity manufac-
tures, which are mainly attributable to the
differences in knowledge accumulation ca-
pabilities.


Figure 1.1: Distribution of world exports by technology intensity and by development status,
2000and2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (accessed on 15 July 2015).




7.4


11.3
3.4




6.5
1.7


1.6


1.1


1.6
0.4 0.5


41.5 33.1


68.2
54.4


54.3
43.6


79.0
64.3 65.1


47.1


9.1
9.8


3.4


3.2


1.4


1.1


0.6


1.0 0.2


0.3


11.1
11.0


7.0


6.6
5.1


3.0


4.8


5.1 4.0


3.2


30.9 34.8


18.1
29.3


37.6
50.7


14.6
28.1 30.4


48.9


0%


10%


20%


30%


40%


50%


60%


70%


80%


90%


100%


2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014 2000 2014


Primary
products


Resource-
based


manufactures


Low
technology


manufactures


Medium
technology


manufactures


High
technology


manufactures


Developing
countries: Asia
Developing
countries: America
Developing
countries: Africa
Developed
countries
All other countries




6 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


2. Stagnating growth rates
or growth rates in
unproductive sectors


To a certain extent, these capacity lags in
promoting innovation are also linked to the
sectoral composition of exports of coun-
tries. GDP growth rates among a number
of developing countries have been rising in
recent years, and a steady trend has been
observed in a large number of countries in
the African region since the 1990s. Table
1.1 below presents growth rates in three
regions of the developing world. Howev-
er, regions specializing in sectors that are
productivity enhancing have experienced


a more sustained rise in real growth rates,
for example, countries in Asia who have
expanded their manufacturing sectors. At
the same time, specialization in natural or
low-value added sectors (IDB, 2010) has
impeded productivity enhancing growth,
and made countries more susceptible to
changes in demand for these products in
other countries.


This is especially the case in the African re-
gion, where several countries experienced
rapid growth in the 2000s, up until 2008,
largely because of increasing demand for
commodities or products with low-value
added content (such as agro-products).


Figure 1.2: Distribution of medium-technology manufacturing exports by different country
groups,2000-2014(in percent)


Figure 1.3: Distribution of high-technology manufacturing exports by different country
groups,2000-2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 20 Oct 2015).


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 20 Oct 2015).




0.0


10.0


20.0


30.0


40.0


50.0


60.0


70.0


80.0


90.0


Developed
countries


Developing
countries: Africa


Developing
countries: America


Developing
countries: Asia


All other countries




0.0


10.0


20.0


30.0


40.0


50.0


60.0


70.0


Developed
countries


Developing
countries: Africa


Developing
countries: America


Developing
countries: Asia


All other countries




CHAPTER I: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY 7


Box 1.1: From S&T to STI policies


Most developing countries embarked upon S&T policies from the 1960s onwards as they were seen as
appropriate instruments to build local technology capacity for industrial development. With the exception
of a few countries, particularly the East Asian economies and other developing countries, e.g. China, India,
Brazil, most developing countries did not integrate S&T policies within their industrial development/national
development plans. This shortcoming, in combination with existing institutional weaknesses, led to a low
focus on innovation.


While the predominant focus of such policies was on acquiring technologies, the lack of capabilities in
terms of technical skills, creativity and innovativeness that can be created only through learning activities
(through training and learning-by-doing) remained. This meant that the mastery of new technologies re-
mained a major challenge. In addition, in order to become competitive, developing countries enterprises
needed to nurture the capacity to creatively adapt and innovate, rather than merely rely on importing
technologies from elsewhere.


Newer STI policy frameworks in countries seek to address these challenges through incentives for col-
laborative learning, networking and R&D within national innovation systems.
Source: UNCTAD.


1980-89 1990-99 2000-08 2009-14(1)


Developed countries 3.2 2.5 2.2 1.5
Developing countries 3.6 4.9 6.3 5.3
 Developingcountries:Africa 2.2 2.4 5.7 3.5
 Developingcountries:America 1.7 3.2 3.8 3.4
 Developingcountries:Asia 5.4 6.4 7.4 6.2
Least developed countries 2.5 3.2 7.4 4.8
 Leastdevelopedcountries:Asia 3.2 4.8 6.7 5.6
 Leastdevelopedcountries:Africa(2) 2.2 2.3 7.6 4.4


Table1.1: RealGDPgrowthratebyregion,1980-2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 19 October 2015).
(1) 2014 figures are estimates.
(2) Includes Haiti.


GDP growth rates in the African region were
therefore more vulnerable and depend-
ent on the expansion of economic activity
in other countries, particularly in emerging
economies. As a result, in the aftermath of
the global economic downturn of 2007-
2008, growth rates in most regions in the
developing world have returned to normal-
cy at a faster pace than in Africa (see ta-
ble 1.1 below). The slow recovery of African
economies showcases the dependence of
their recovery on global markets and, more
recently, markets in emerging economies,
which are equally important trading part-
ners and export destinations for the African
region (see UNCTAD, 2010, 2013).


Other data and existing analysis reinforce
the conclusion that growth patterns that
are not based on technical change or on
diversification do not promote the process


of continuous change along specific tech-
nological trajectories, or promote the move-
ment into new sectors and activities that
embody new technological paradigms (see
Hidalgo et al, 2007).


3. Synergies between industrial
and innovation policies


These two trends have forced a rethink on
how countries can harness international
trade to play a powerful role in reducing pov-
erty and promoting development, through
national policies that “promote a develop-
ment-driven approach to trade rather than
a trade-driven approach to development”
(UNCTAD, 2004, p. 67; emphasis added).


Particularly, the growing technological divides
and continuing challenges in building capa-
bilities have led to a remarkable shift from sci-
ence or S&T policies to STI policy frameworks




8 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


in a large number of developing countries
over the past two decades (see box 1.1).


These policies seek to place a greater
emphasis on innovation, national R&D
spending and knowledge expansion (see
table  2.2, chapter II). For example, it was
estimated that by 2010 there were up to
40 ministries overseeing various STI-related
activities across various countries in Africa
(UNESCO, 2010). African countries with rel-
atively fairly advanced innovation structures
include South Africa, Tunisia and Mauritius,
all of whom started to develop national in-
novative initiatives and plans in the 1990s.


Recognizing the importance of R&D spend-
ing in boosting economic performance, the
Eighth Assembly of the African Union Sum-
mit (29-30 January 2007, Addis Abeba),
called for increasing R&D spending in Afri-
can countries to 1 per cent of total GDP by
2010. Recent figures show that some coun-
tries have managed to increase R&D invest-
ments, but that others are not reaching this
objective (see NEPAD, 2010; table 1.2).


Country Name Year(1) Share(percent)


Ethiopia 2010 0.25


Tanzania, United Rep. 2010 0.52


Nigeria 2007 0.22


Brazil 2011 1.21


China 2012 1.98


Ghana 2010 0.38


India 2011 0.81


Kenya 2010 0.98


Korea, Rep. 2011 4.04


Russian Federation 2012 1.12


SouthAfrica 2010 0.76


Thailand 2009 0.25


Uganda 2010 0.56


World 2011 2.13


Sub-SaharanAfrica 2007 0.58


Table 1.2: R&D expenditure as a share
of GDP in selected countries


In parallel, industrial policies/ national indus-
trial development strategies and visions and
plans, envisage that economic development
will be achieved by placing a greater empha-
sis on technological learning (see table 2.1,
chapter II). Such industrial development poli-
cies/strategies also play a determining role
in how the state and the private sector can
collaborate to remove barriers and promote
productivity growth and technological up-
grading within and across sectors (see also
Rodrik, 2004, Chang, 2011, Stiglitz, 2014).


Industrial and innovation policies are often
synergistic in the goals they seek to achieve:
technology-led industrial development.
However, in practice, success in harnessing
synergies between these two policy frame-
works for tangible results depends less on
policy emphasis and more on the policy pro-
cesses that are put in place to ensure the
accurate implementation and coordination
of policy incentives. These policy processes
will determine whether a set of industrial
and innovation policy interventions will suc-
ceed or not (Rodrik, 2004; 2014; Aiginger,
2014; Aiginger and Böheim, 2015). In order
to prevent policy conflict, or fragmentation
of implementation efforts, several options
have been suggested to promote this kind
of policy coordination, including that coun-
tries’ consider an integrated complementary
industrial-innovation policy framework to en-
sure cohesion (see Mazzucato, 2013).


In ensuring that the policy regimes are well
coordinated at the level of conceptualiza-
tion, implementation and practice, the fol-
lowing questions are of relevance:


(i) How does innovation policy fit into
the broader context of industrial
development strategies of coun-
tries in practice?


(ii) What are the most critical areas of
coordination?


(iii) What lessons can be drawn from
the experiences of countries in pro-
moting policy coordination at the
macro-, meso- and micro-levels for
improved firm-level performance,
and can they be understood and
applied to other countries?


Source: UNCTAD Calculations based on WDI Data-
base (accessed on 7 May 2015).


(1) Latest available year




CHAPTER I: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY 9


These questions, along with a review of
the historical, economic and systemic fac-
tors that contribute to the evolution and the
coordination of the two policy frameworks
within countries are considered at length in
this report.


C. NOTE ON THE
CHOICE OF REGION
AND COUNTRIES


All regions of the developing world are
currently coping with the issues of policy
choices and policy coordination highlighted
in this report. This report focuses exclu-
sively on the African region where industrial
development through technological change
has become more pressing than ever be-
fore (UNCTAD, 2015). The recent economic
performance of African countries is an em-
bodiment of hope for the region. Not only
must growth be sustained but more pro-
ductive growth also needs to be promot-
ed to retain these encouraging economic
trends (See Rodrik, 2014).


The country selection criteria were based
on three sets of parameters:


(i) The developmental and institution-
al circumstance represented by the
country:


While Nigeria is a developing country with
a natural commodity (oil), Ethiopia is a least
developed country (LDC) with a resource-
concentration in agriculture. This is juxta-
posed with the experience of the United
Republic of Tanzania – which is an LDC
with a mix of resource-based commodites
and other sectoral activities. As a result,
each of these countries serves to illustrate
a developmental challenge in the realm of
coordination of industrial and innovation
policies for developmental outcomes.


(ii) The ongoing policy transformation
in industrial and innovation policies:


All the three countries discussed in this re-
port have national vision documents, new
industrial development strategies and STI
policies that embody the aspiration of its
leaders and policymakers to transform their


nation into ‘middle-income’ economies
within the next two to three decades.


(iii) Difficulties faced in channeling R&D
expenditure and GDP growth rates
towards technological learning:


All three countries have experienced rela-
tively impressive GDP growth rates over the
past decade, if not longer, and increased
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
in the 2000s. Despite this, they have faced
difficulties in focusing these investments
into greater technological learning, particu-
larly at the firm-level, as demonstrated by
the lack of greater exports of medium- and
high-technology products (see figures  2.1
and 2.2, and chapter II).


D. METHODOLOGY


A questionnaire designed by UNCTAD for this
report was administered to firms and organi-
zations in all three countries. The country sur-
veys were designed to capture the interaction
between innovation policies and industrial de-
velopment strategies in recent decades; the
surveys also seek to identify whether these
policies impacted on addressing institutional
and policy gaps or coordination structures,
or systemic behavioural incentives (existing
habits, practices, informal norms), and if this
impact was felt by the firms (in terms of im-
proved performance) at the level of the firm
and the industry as a whole. The data col-
lection was accompanied by extensive field
interviews with key stakeholders, along with
detailed reviews of the historical evolution of
relevant policy frameworks on the industrial
development and innovation policies in these
three countries.


(i) Technological intensity and sector
coverage:


Different sectors need different kinds of
technological skills, and often vary in inten-
sity. By definition, low-technology intensive
sectors do not call for much technologi-
cal know-how, as opposed to sectors that
are medium- or high-technology intensive
which call for a wider, more versatile set of
skills and know-how that are sector and
industry specific. In order to capture these




10 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


differences, three sectors were chosen to
understand how firms learn and compete
in sectors, which embody different levels of
technological skills and know-how; these
sectors comprise agro-processing (as an
example of a low technology intensive sec-
tor); pharmaceuticals and health care, and
the ICT sector, which embody both medium
and high-technological intensity activities.


(ii) Firm size and coverage:


The national surveys tried to cover firms of
all sizes, as represented in the economy
of that particular country. Firms were clas-
sified as small, medium and large based
on standard classification. Firms employ-
ing less than 10 persons are regarded as
micro-enterprises, while firms employing
10-49 and 50-199 persons are classified
as small- and medium-scale enterprises,
respectively. Those employing more than
199 are considered to be large-scale firms
(Lall et al 1994, Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 1997a).


(iii) Focus of country-based work:


A variety of methodological tools was used
to address the three basic lines of inquiries
in this report, namely mechanisms under-
lying policy formulation and design, policy
coordination during implementation, and
policy impact on the firms.


For the first-level inquiry on the histori-
cal, economic and systemic factors that
contribute to the way STI and industrial
development policies are introduced in
countries over time, extensive secondary
and national level analysis was used to ex-
amine policy changes since the 1960s, in
addition to policy documents from national
archives. Survey interviews focused on elic-
iting historical experiences of a wide range
of national stakeholders to understand how
policy priorities were chosen, and the rami-
fications of these processes on economic
performance of firms and sectors over time.


For the second-level inquiry on what factors
determined and prevented the emergence
of coordinated policy implementation and
supporting institutional infrastructure, policy
documents, survey questions and face-to-
face interviews were used.


To understand how these factors impact
firm-level performance in countries, i.e. the
policy impact on firms and sectors, survey
questionnaire and interviews with firms and
other stakeholders were used as the main
sources of information for the analysis.


The questionnaire was designed to capture
the nature of innovation and the intensity of
technological activities at the firm-level (i.e.
to determine whether it consisted of pro-
cess and product innovation, whether it
was incremental, adaptive or R&D-based,
and what forms of technological inputs
went into production, marketing and feed-
back mechanisms). The survey question-
naire contained detailed questions on the
activities of the companies, e.g. distribution,
supplying, service provider and innovator,
sources of innovation, nature of interaction,
etc. It also sought to map the common ven-
ues of learning that local firms tapped into,
existing modes of collaboration, general in-
dustry characteristics (capacity utilization,
R&D capacity, export and import issues,
etc.), the extent of public sector support,
and policy incentives and institutional vari-
ables that impact firm-level performance.
Questions in the survey also focused on is-
sues related to the general performance of
the relevant industrial sector and how that
affected activity at the individual enterprise
level.


(iv) Additional data sources:


The analysis contained in each of the chap-
ters also relies on secondary national and
international databases. National income
and broad sectoral output figures are taken
from UNCTADstat database, while detailed
sectoral statistics are obtained from na-
tional sources. ILO LABORSTA database
is used for sectoral employment figures.
UNCTADstat and Comtrade are the two
main sources of aggregate figures men-
tioned in this report. National aggregate FDI
figures were obtained from UNCTADstat,
sectoral FDI flows in the world and develop-
ing countries were calculated using UNC-
TAD World Investment Report 2014 data-
base. Structural statistics on physical and
knowledge infrastructure are drawn from




CHAPTER I: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY 11


the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Business’,
World Bank WDI, UNESCO database and
the WIPO database.


E. DEFINITIONS
The terms industry, industrial policy, STI poli-
cies and innovation are multifaceted in na-
ture, and are used in several ways in theory
and practice. For the purposes of this report,
they are defined in the following ways.


1. Industrial policy and industry


The term ‘industrial policy’ has undergone
several different iterations over the past
century, if not longer, and continues to
evolve over time. Broadly denoting poli-
cies that promote economic restructur-
ing (Rodrik, 2004), the term is used often
synonymously with ‘industrialization’ policy
or industrial development policy/strategy,
which refers to the process of promoting
industrial output in an economy (Lall, 1990,
Warwick, 2013). In this report, the terms
‘industrial policy’ or ‘industrial development
policies’ are interchangeable.


For purposes of the analysis, industrial pol-
icy is defined as the sum total of govern-
mental actions undertaken to orientate and
control the structural transformation pro-
cess of an economy. Within this perspec-
tive, the analysis of production processes is
the focus of investigation and review. This
is consistent with the literature on the topic,
where one of the accepted definitions is
that industrial policy is “any type of inter-
vention or government policy that attempts
to improve the business environment or
to alter the structure of economic activity”
(Naudé, 2010). This broad definition of in-
dustrial policies covers all policy interven-
tions that affect the performance of all sec-
tors of the economy (see Cimoli, Dosi and
Stiglitz, 2009).


The term ‘industry’, as used in this report,
is broad and in keeping with the evolution-
ary nature of the concept, and is used to
denote manufacturing, utilities, construc-
tion and mining, i.e. all industrial activities.
This is in keeping with the way the sector


is defined and computed by most national
statistical offices in the African region.


2. Innovation


Innovation is often confused to mean inven-
tions, or the result of ‘state of the art’ R&D.
This report employs a broader definition of
innovation that is applicable to develop-
ment. Innovation is considered the abil-
ity to develop new products/ processes/
organizational forms, which although may
not be new to the world at large, is new
to the local firm and the local context. This
definition draws from Schumpeter’s original
works (1934, 1942), and is considered to
be most relevant in the study of incremental
learning and innovation capacity building in
dynamic contexts (see Lundvall, 1993; Nel-
son, 1987).


3. Science, technology and
innovation policy


The term ‘innovation policy frameworks’
(a term often used synonymously with STI
policy frameworks or STI policies) refers to
a purposive policy framework that is put in
place to foster knowledge creation, adop-
tion and distribution within a country, with
an explicit focus on interactive learning
among firms, public and private organiza-
tions that support innovation processes
(Oyeyinka and Gehl Sampath, 2009).


F. REPORT’S
CONTRIBUTION AND
STRUCTURE


The report has embarked on what is nor-
mally a difficult exercise, namely, the col-
lection of primary data based on a semi-
structured questionnaire from firms in three
African countries. This exercise is important
because official data on firm-level activities
is not always possible to obtain in several
African countries, including those under
consideration in this report. Other data that
is often easily available in other countries,
such as employment at the firm-level, R&D
investment, total annual sales, etc. were
not available given many of the sectoral
firms under study were small and medium-




12 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


sized enterprises or firms operating on the
fringes of the informal sector.


As a result, the report brings to light new
data and information, albeit of a descriptive
nature, on how policies impact on firm-level
behaviour in countries, and what factors
matter in connecting policy to economic
results. It lends evidence to the challenges
and opportunities that countries face when
coordinating innovation and industrial poli-
cies and incentives aimed at better support-
ing their enterprise sector. Many findings in
the report are not entirely contextual – they
are equally applicable to other countries in
the African region, as well as more generally
to other developing countries – and these
are highlighted in chapter VI.


This report is structured as follows. Chapter
II begins by elaborating the synergies and
potential overlaps between innovation and
industrial policy frameworks. It proposes


a set of guiding principles that could help
countries to align these policy frameworks
to promote sustainable industrialization.


In chapters III to V of the report, the innova-
tion and industrial policies, their day-to-day
implementation and impact on the industrial
sector of three African countries are exam-
ined. Chapter VI of the report combines the
in-depth insights from the country-level in-
vestigations, with the principles highlighted
in chapter II based on the analytical frame-
work and the overall review of industrial
policy and innovation policy frameworks in
the African region. On this basis, chapter VI
presents detailed findings on what matters
in the industrial policy-innovation policy in-
terface. The report concludes with relevant
policy recommendations on what countries
could do to promote innovation-led indus-
trial development in an efficient and con-
certed manner.




CHAPTER I: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION POLICY 13


NOTES


1. See Amsden (1989), Amsden and Chu (2003), Johnson (1986 and 1999) and other recent works
on industrial policy and economic catch-up, such as Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz (2009) and Naudé
(2010).






2
LINKAGES BETWEEN


INNOVATION
POLICIES AND


INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT






CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 17


CHAPTER II
LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION


POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT


A. INTRODUCTION
Interventions to support the growth of in-
dustry across sectors and promoting learn-
ing and innovation can be complex and
take varied forms. The production of knowl-
edge entails negative externalities due to its
non-rivalrous and non-exclusive nature; this
occurs as no individual or firm has the in-
centive to produce knowledge since it can
be shared at marginal costs and is difficult
to exclude. Market mechanisms, financial
flows, transfer agreements, production
processes all embody some level of nega-
tive externalities due to the complexities of
trading information, or designing contracts
with incomplete or asymmetric informa-
tion. But at the same time, knowledge pro-
duction and sharing also embody positive
externalities that benefit society at large.
Society benefits from the creation of new
knowledge, and in addition, if collaboration
within the private sector were to take place
it would lead to a positive externality for
learning and innovation for a large number
of actors, which has added benefits for so-
ciety over longer periods of time.


Ideally, governments need to take into ac-
count these positive externalities and pro-
vide an enabling environment for knowledge
based-learning, in order to replicate the suc-
cess of one or a few firms or sectors on an
economy-wide scale (Stiglitz, 2014). Policies
that address the replication of positive exter-
nalities of this kind are often more complex
to design and implement than those that
simply address negative externalities, thus
explaining the difficulties that governments
often experience when promoting innova-
tion-led industrial development.


The fundamental purpose of industrial
policy is to deal with market failures of all
these kinds that impede industrial devel-
opment; these failures not only concern
labour allocation, credit institutions and


the availability of goods, but also relate to
knowledge accumulation and dissemina-
tion and new knowledge creation (see for
example, Rodrik, 2007). In this endeavour,
it also deals with several aspects of STI
policy through incentives and instruments.
Available policy instruments for industrial
and STI policies are often applicable in both
cases, and policy experience shows that
they can be provided under either regimes.
Examples include common industrial in-
frastructure for firms and sectors, industry
parks, special economic zones (SEZs) and
enterprise support.


Despite these overlaps and the comple-
mentary nature of both policy frameworks,
neither of them is redundant, and close
coordination is crucial to enforce develop-
mental outcomes. For example, while in-
dustrial development strategies set overall
economic targets, innovation policies pro-
vide the institutional infrastructure for learn-
ing, individual targets and supportive incen-
tives to firms. While industrial development
strategies aim to develop high-technology
sectors, stimulate job growth and eradicate
poverty, the sectors that will be prioritized
and the modus operandi for such prioriti-
zation is usually set out in STI frameworks.
While the emphasis of industrial develop-
ment strategy of a given country may be
on job growth or to facilitate recovery from
a recent economic and financial crisis, the
STI framework determines how this job
growth can be based on technological de-
velopment and on how high-quality and
sustainable jobs can be created.


However, these linkages are not always au-
tomatically evident as they rely on a syn-
chronization of policy goals and outcomes,
as well as the calibration of well-established
policy and institutional implementation
mechanisms. This chapter therefore ad-
dresses the analytical framework and rela-




18 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


tive roles of each of these two policies and
their common areas of overlap. It then pro-
poses a set of principles to coordinate and
promote the role of policies, which together
represent an engine for growth, as well
as help create a learning base for indus-
try growth and expansion, as opposed to
advocating for governmental interventions
that simply seek to correct market failures
(Stiglitz, 2014).


B. TRIGGERS OF
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT


Industrial development depends on four
critical factors: (i) skills development; (ii)
technological change; (iii) industrial organi-
zation; and (iv) the ability to create a good
business environment (UNIDO, 2013).
Within these broader contours, national
industrial policies are adjusted to accom-
modate several local, contextual or national
concerns. The following goals of the Action
Plan for the Accelerated Industrial Develop-
ment of Africa summarize the key concerns
of industrial policy as:


(i) Accelerating industrial growth by
promoting infrastructural changes;


(ii) Developing human capital and re-
source mobilization for industrial
development;


(iii) Fostering STI policies; and


(iv) Developing a sound legal and insti-
tutional environment.


Similar industrial development goals are
espoused in several regional and national
policies and strategies across countries
and regions globally.2


1. Why focus on industrial
development policies?


The justification for industrial policies is con-
troversial due to differing views on the role
of governments and free markets within
countries, and more recently, the world
economy. A discussion on industrial poli-
cies invariably begins by questioning the
need for such policies; indeed, one of the


questions that are often asked is whether
industrial policies or industrial development
policies are needed in the first place.


Such policies are generally justified on the
basis of two types of failures in information
and coordination. Information failures arise
when entrepreneurs need to access infor-
mation on what in-demand products can
be produced at relatively low costs in order
to facilitate the move into newer produc-
tion activities or sectors. The information
needed to facilitate this includes accessing
technological information and other firm-
level inputs, which would lead to the profit-
able production of products and increasing
market access. In practice, however, these
many forms of information failures occur
on a routine basis in developing countries;
this impedes the ability of firms to access
the information they need to diversify and
profit from new economic activities, hence
justifying governmental intervention (See
also Lin and Chang, 2009). Coordination
failures occur as a result of the difficulties
that countries periodically face in coordi-
nating the range of investments needed to
promote large-scale industrial activities or
projects. These investments are not sim-
ply of a financial nature but also concern
human skills, technology, or plant-specific
technological inputs – all key requirements
if new sectors are to expand or grow. Given
that developing countries face constraints
generated by both types of market failures,
industrial policies can serve as appropriate
policy interventions to address these short-
comings.


Over the past half a century or so, industrial
policy has been interpreted in various ways
and shaped by different schools of thought.
Aside from the two forms of failures, several
other economic explanations have been
advanced, particularly those based on Mar-
shallian economics and the need to derive
economies of scale, as well as explanations
based on the need to increase productiv-
ity, especially labour productivity (see also
UNCTAD, 2014). From the 1960s and up
until the 1980s, industrial development
strategies and policies were simultaneously
understood as import substitution strate-




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 19


gies that promoted an inward-looking, na-
tional economic development agenda (see
for example, Dervis and Page, 1984). Over
time, however, policy experiences of coun-
tries showed that governmental failures also
often occur as governments are not clear
about what is required to address indus-
trial growth in their local contexts. Policies
tend to become more effectively formulated
over time, owing to policy experience and
learning in countries, and despite varied
levels of governmental failure, the role of
the government remains fundamental be-
cause “…[i]ndustrial restructuring rarely
takes place without significant governmen-
tal assistance” (Rodrik, 2004). Hence, the
choice is not between one or another ac-
tion, but rather revolves around how a gov-
ernment can complement market forces to
achieve particular outcomes (Rodrik, 2004;
Moudud, 2010, 2011).


2. Creating a supportive
environment for industry


The government’s role in industrial policy
is to promote the accumulation of physi-
cal and human capital investments and to
transform these investments into industrial
learning activities by eliminating information
and coordination failures (see Nelson and
Pack, 1999; Lall and Teubal, 1998). Coun-
tries have adopted different approaches in
implementing industrial policies or a broad-
er industrial development strategy aimed
at creating a supportive environment for
industry. In Europe, for example, national
industrial policies place more emphasis
on some aspects than on other. Coun-
tries such as Sweden, Finland and Norway
have relied on policies to build an extensive
knowledge structure through technologi-
cal progress, while concurrently employ-
ing other policies (see for example, Bairoch
and Kozul Wright, 1996; Chang and Kozul-
Wright, 1994; Chang, 2007), while others
employed horizontal policies aimed at over-
all competitiveness (e.g. Germany), others
still had a sectoral focus (e.g. France) (see
Aiginger and Böheim, 2015).


Similarly, countries in the developing world
have experienced their fair share of diver-


gences. For example, East Asian econo-
mies/countries concentrated on building a
strong technology capacity and networks,
as in the case of Japan (Fabiani, 2004),
whereas Latin American countries used
incentives to control or use direct foreign
investment to promote technology transfer.


But on the whole, four different areas of in-
tervention seem fundamental to the indus-
trial policy/ industrial development strategy
type of endeavour, namely: (i) improving
technical and technological efficiency in
firms; (ii) promoting enterprise/ business
support; (iii) supporting industrial organiza-
tion; and (iv) promoting a broader economic
development strategy. These are briefly dis-
cussed below.


a. Improvingtechnicaland
technologicalefficiencyinfirms


Entrepreneurship and diversifying produc-
tion structures is a risky undertaking any-
where, but particularly so for firms in de-
veloping country contexts. The risks taken
are different from those when engaged in
R&D, and more specifically relate to the
lack of information on what new products
or processes could be produced given their
technological capacity and existing market
demand; how the inputs could be sourced;
what forms of assistance is available to or-
ganize production efficiently; and how mar-
kets could be accessed. As a result, such
risks play a critical role in decisions because
if firms fail in their efforts, they alone bear
the costs of this failure; even through their
success is highly important from a social
perspective.


A core focus of industrial policy has been to
target support infrastructure for the devel-
opment of new products or new process-
es. Laying the foundations for improving
technical efficiency or adherence to quality
standards involves indispensable factors,
such as:


(i) Ensuring the availability of scien-
tific skills for R&D, as well as for
production. These include tertiary
education, vocational training and
skills creation for industry support.




20 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


(ii) Promoting production standards:
These comprise requirements and
specifications that firms need to
achieve at all levels of the produc-
tion process (i.e. plant and ma-
chinery specifications, output qual-
ity requirements, and marketing
and delivery standards), as well as
other different standards that firms
need to comply with in order to be
able to capture export markets.


b. Promotingenterprise/business
support


Industrial activity, particularly in resource-
constrained contexts, calls for coordinated
investments in large-scale projects, im-
proved infrastructure, networking and other
forms of business support (Macmillan and
Rodrik, 2011). The provision of these wider
systemic components are not necessar-
ily in the interest of individual firms, but are
essential in promoting the emergence of a
competitive, collaborative business envi-
ronment. These include the:


(i) Provision of finance instruments;


(ii) Promotion of enterprise develop-
ment schemes, including SMEs,
larger companies and state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) that undertake
the risks of production in new tech-
nological domains;


(iii) Creation of public utilities, such as
uninterrupted access to electricity,
physical or knowledge infrastruc-
ture;


(iv) Policy instruments that promote
an entrepreneurial culture, improve
the business environment by fos-
tering private sector partnerships
and business incubation.


Direct government involvement in private
sector training needs can take the form of
support schemes, such as locally organized
capacity building and training workshops
and sponsorship support for entrepreneurs
to attend international seminars and con-
ferences. In addition, training opportunities
can be provided at government research


centres, public universities, technology
centers and intellectual property offices.


c. Supportingindustrialorganization


Concentration of industrial activity often as-
sists in the transition from low value-added
activities to higher skill and technology in-
tensive production (Rodrik, 1988; Mckor-
mick, 1999). Facilitating specialization and
creating scale effects of industrial produc-
tion can be achieved through industrial
clusters, industry parks, and the creation of
industrial zones/ or creation of SEZs.


Industrial and exports processing zones
have largely been policy-oriented initiatives
by governments aimed at: (i) assembling
the necessary infrastructure for enterprise
development; (ii) provide incentives to both
local and foreign investors; (iii) simplifying
administrative procedures by establishing
one stop-shop administrative offices; (iv)
attracting FDI; (v) ensuring technological
and knowledge spill-overs and learning
among enterprises; (vi) facilitating speciali-
zation and scale effects; and (vii) driving
nationwide industrialization processes and
accelerating economic growth and devel-
opment (Amirahmadi and Wu 1995; McIn-
tyre, Narula, and Trevino 1996; Johansson,
Helena, and Nilsson 1997, Madani 1999).
SEZs or EPZs can comprise a range of
specific export-led incentives for firms,
including tax holidays, access to tax-free
remittances, government grants and spe-
cial loans facilities. SEZs are an important
industrial policy tool but the results have
been mixed across different developing
countries. While countries such as China,
the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Sin-
gapore have been very successful, SEZs
in sub-Saharan Africa are still facing chal-
lenges in creating employment and trade
opportunities.


The key challenge in this regard is in cre-
ating linkages and spillovers, whereby the
stronger linkages between the various ac-
tors based in a clustering area, industry
park or SEZ are supported by a suitable
business environment helps to promote
knowledge and network spillovers.




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 21


d. Promotingabroadereconomic
developmentstrategy


Industrial development policies are often
articulated and coordinated in such a way
that their overall focus is on per capita GDP
growth, as this variable is used to capture
industrialization. This is based on the con-
ventional understanding that industry value-
added, as achieved by a gradual increase
in manufacturing exports, have a positive
correlation with real GDP per capita growth.
However, these policies are also seen as
crucial for broader economic development
of countries seeking to link industrial devel-
opment and associated income growth to a
better distribution of employment opportu-
nities and social outcomes.


It is therefore imperative that industrial pol-
icy is closely linked not just to higher per
capita GDP ambitions, but also to policies
that can improve the local business envi-
ronment, as well as wage and labour poli-
cies and policies aimed at promoting social
inclusion.


C. GOALS AND
INCENTIVES IN
INNOVATION
POLICIES


Depsite the four broad areas of focus of in-
dustrial policy discussed above, increasing
industrial productivity relies on the acquisi-
tion and mastery of a range of technologi-
cal domains (Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003). As
mentioned in chapter I, innovation policies
are premised on the realization that simply
supplying science or technology inputs (such
as scientists or engineers) is not sufficient to
enable such mastery; it is therefore neces-
sary to support the emergence of a broader
innovation ecosystem that supports linkages
and collaborative networks amongst various
actors. Accordingly, the underlying empha-
sis is not just on providing skills, knowledge
infrastructure on greater R&D inputs, but
also on facilitating the process of how these
factors interact and result in greater techni-
cal efficiency in production processes at the
firm-level.


1. Why focus on innovation
policies?


Innovation policies, in the same manner
as industrial policies, are also justified on
grounds that coordination failures continue
to persist within countries, which often do
not allow the emergence of an enabling in-
novation environment. Economic historians
and policy analysts studying the catch-up
experiences of countries single out the lack
of policy focus on innovation within indus-
try, and the failure to promote technological
capabilities, as major obstacles to competi-
tiveness and growth in developing coun-
tries (see Chang, 2001; Lall et al., 1994).


Coordination externalities in providing an
enabling innovation environment are to be
expected given the wide range of factors
that are usually required to promote inno-
vation capacity and the time lag between
when investments are made and the time
when they can be expected to have an im-
pact on promoting innovation. For exam-
ple, investments in secondary and tertiary
education facilities take a decade or two to
result in superior human skills. The creation
of R&D centres of excellence, or knowl-
edge-based clusters for innovative firms,
especially in high-technology sectors, also
require investments to be made at least a
decade before they bear fruit. These time
lags makes it difficult for policymakers to
foresee the technological outcomes of
certain investments and plan/allocate re-
sources, and to ensure continuity and con-
sistency in efforts as required to achieve
these longer-term outcomes. A focus on in-
novation policy is therefore emphasized as
a guiding framework to enable such longer-
term investments.


2. Policy objectives of innovation
policies


The objectives of innovation policies are
often defined broadly and not clearly ar-
ticulated within one policy document, but
within an umbrella framework of numer-
ous policies on, among others, education,
R&D, S&T and IPRs. Formulated as an ar-
ray of policy initiatives aimed at promoting




22 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


innovation and firm-specific learning, in-
novation policies seek to identify systemic
failures. The latter failures are understood
as being broader than just market failures
and relate to why systems do not function
holistically, and which missing incentives
could be deployed to alleviate the difficul-
ties in searching, acquiring, using and trad-
ing with information. Systemic failures also
deal with a wide range of aspects, includ-
ing interactions, collaborations and the role
of non-economic actors in promoting in-
novation, and aligning industry technology
needs with national development priorities.
Broadly speaking, innovation policies seek
to address these shortcomings by:


(i) Fostering the technology absorp-
tion capacity of firms and other
actors in the innovation system to
increase their ability to benefit from
knowledge flows; and


(ii) Creating an overall innovation sys-
tem by eliminating many of the sys-
temic failures and promoting inter-
active learning.


a. Fosteringtechnologyabsorption
capacity


The first objective of innovation policy is to
foster greater technology absorption capac-
ity within the local ecosystem. Technology
absorption capacity refers to the intrinsic
ability of firms (and other organizations) to
absorb existing knowledge and technolo-
gies to adapt or create new knowledge.
These processes of incremental learning are
fundamental to enhancing the efficiency and
competitiveness of their business opera-
tions, and to promote technological change
within firms, sectors and systems. Different
kinds of learning help to build competences
that play a role in how firms are able to adapt
simple technologies (which may be relatively
easier), or even progress to adapting so-
phisticated technologies, which may require
other competences, including R&D.


The ability of firms in developing countries
to transition through these stages and carry
out more R&D-intensive activities depends
on both endogenous and exogenous fac-


tors. Endogenous factors relate to the firm
or the system itself and includes elements
such as: the skills base; finance opportuni-
ties; collaboration venues; knowledge flows;
in-house technological learning capabilities (in
terms of number of skilled workers); training
and retraining opportunities for workers; and
mobility between university-industry. If chan-
neled appropriately, exogenous factors regu-
larly enhance the ability of firms to learn. Such
factors include trade or technology licensing
opportunities available from local and foreign
sources; international quality standards that
local firms may have to adhere to; opportuni-
ties to integrate global value chains interalia
by producing value-added products; and
benefits from technological spillovers arising
from FDI. Both sets of factors impinge upon
the ability of firms to engage in technological
learning and production.


Building and sustaining technological ab-
sorption capacity therefore depends on
strengthening all factors that jointly assist
in the exercise. Existing data on how firms
learn and channel technological informa-
tion into production lends strength to the
conclusion that firms engage in R&D when
learning competences are well developed,
and in the presence of other factors, such
as skilled labour, a well-functioning system
of public research, firm-level capacity to
engage in production of medium- or high-
technology intensive products, local and
export demand for such production activi-
ties, and the availability of finance.


Therefore, it does not depend directly on
how large national R&D investments are, but
rather how the increased R&D spending is
channeled into strengthening the systemic
factors that promote technology absorption,
such as public research capacity, univer-
sity education (especially tertiary education),
centres of excellence, and specific R&D in-
centives to increase university-industry col-
laboration, etc. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the
relationship between the share of GDP that
is invested into R&D and the ability of coun-
tries to export, in order to illustrate this.


Figure 2.1 captures this relationship for
medium technology-intensive exports (that




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 23


is, products that call for medium-technol-
ogy intensity), whereas figure 2.2 focuses
on high-technology exports of countries.
These two categories are presented here
because product and processes that are
either medium- or high-technology inten-
sive call for some level of R&D expertise
within firms. Figure 2.1 shows that although
several countries are spending higher


amounts of GDP as R&D, this spending
does not translate into greater amount of
exports of medium-technology intensive
products. The same is true in figure 2.2,
helping to make the point that R&D invest-
ments results in greater technology-based
exports only in the presence of absorption
capabilities, which are shaped through a
range of endogenous factors.


Figure2.1: RelationshipbetweenR&Dexpenditure(asapercentageofGDP)andexportsof
medium- technology intensity3


Figure2.2: RelationshipbetweenR&Dexpenditure(asapercentageofGDP)andtechnology
exports(highintensity)4


Gambia


Lesotho


Madagascar


Congo, Dem. Rep.


Burundi


Ethiopia


Mozambique


Burkina Faso


Nigeria


Ghana


Mali


Seychelles


Uganda


Zambia


Senegal


Mauritius


Kenya


Tanzania


Gabon


Botswana


South Africa


y = 15.3x + 1.8


0.0


5.0


10.0


15.0


20.0


25.0


30.0


0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0


m
ed


iu
m


te
ch


no
lo


gy
e


xp
or


ts
(p


er
c


en
t o


f m
ec


ha
nd


is
e


ex
po


rt
s


)


share of R&D expenditure in GDP (per cent)




Gambia


Lesotho


Madagascar


Congo, Dem. Rep.


Burundi


Ethiopia
Mozambique


Burkina Faso
Nigeria


Ghana
Mali


Seychelles


Uganda


Zambia


Senegal


Mauritius


Kenya


Tanzania


Gabon
Botswana


South Africa


y = 1.7x + 1.2


0.0


1.0


2.0


3.0


4.0


5.0


6.0


7.0


0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0


hi
gh


te
ch


no
lo


gy
e


xp
or


ts
(p


er
c


en
t o


f m
er


ch
an


di
se


e
xp


or
ts


)


share of R&D expenditure in GDP (per cent)


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (trade figures, accessed on 20 October 2015) and
World Bank World Development Indicators (R&D figures, accessed on 20 October 2015).


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (trade figures, accessed on 20 October 2015) and
World Bank World Development Indicators (R&D figures, accessed on 20 October 2015).




24 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


Factors that shape technology absorp-
tion capacity are often contingent on de-
velopmental contexts. Researchers (see
for example, World Bank, 2011) consider
that low technological absorption capac-
ity can be traced back to, inter alia:


(i) Weaknesses in the process of
skills creation:


On the supply-side, formal education cur-
ricula and training programmes are often
not aligned with industry technology needs,
creating a mismatch between what firms
actually need and what graduates possess
in terms of knowledge and qualifications.
Such a misalignment can occur for two rea-
sons: a gradual erosion of university stand-
ards, or lack of curriculum updates due to
resource constraints, or a disconnect be-
tween university and industry. On the de-
mand side, there could be a general lack
of interest in skills development within firms,
as a result of their focus on low-technology
intensive production activities. These devel-
opments hinder the pace of technology ab-
sorption and competitiveness of firms.


(ii) Lack of technological emphasis
in trade:


Even though firms import machinery and
other business equipment, workers are of-
ten unsure how they should be operated
or maintained due a lack of interaction with
technology experts, suppliers and chain in-
termediaries. Paucity of additional training
beyond what is provided in the user manu-
als renders the mastery and application
of machinery and equipment difficult and
costly over time. Skilled personnel are often
hired from advanced countries to help with
the basic installation of imported machin-
ery and equipment, and are called upon for
help when equipment malfunctions. When
this happens firms incur additional costs for
the upkeep of equipment, instead of focus-
ing on mastering new technology, thereby
losing business competitiveness.


(iii) Lack of industry-research collab-
orations and linkages:


The technology absorption capacity of
firms can be greatly enhanced when they


conduct joint R&D projects with domes-
tic and international research organiza-
tions.


(iv) Barriers to trade and FDI:


Lack of quality physical infrastructure
makes the movement of goods and trade
difficult, especially the movement of bulky
machinery and equipment. Barriers to
FDI inflows also influence technological
absorption capcity, including: (i) the high
cost of doing business; (ii) market uncer-
tainties; (iii) the cost of acquiring business
licences; and (iv) permits and scarcity of
skilled labour.


To address these weaknesses, many
developing countries have sought to
strengthen education, as well as techni-
cal and vocational training institutions as
part of their technical skills development
process. In this context, it is critical to
tap into all sources of relevant knowledge
that may be held by specialists or institu-
tions, particularly among those that can
share tacit know-how, such as technol-
ogy experts brought in by firms to help
install new machinery, equipment and
train local staff. For early stage-innova-
tors or start-ups, trade and learning from
capital goods could be crucial, as could
gaining additional information on IPR or
patents, as well as customer feedbacks
(see figure 2.3 below). For growth-stage
and maturity-stage innovators, R&D,
technology licensing, research collabo-
rations, technology transfer and sourc-
ing of and learning from highly skilled
technology experts could be important.
Finally, since weaknesses in industry-
research linkages could be attributed to
weak or divergent research orientations,
greater alignment between research in-
stitutions and applied and industrial re-
search would help to make research
more relevant, but would contribute to
enhanced university-industry linkages.
Other measures include facilitating the
inflow of appropriate technologies and
addressing infrastructural constraints to
trade.




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 25


b. Creatinganoverallinnovation
ecosystem


Creating an overall innovation ecosystem
calls for the development of wide-ranging
and dynamic relationships between innova-
tion actors and related entities and support-
ing structures. Traditionally, countries have
sought to promote innovation ecosystems
which encompass and link all supply-side
actors, e.g. knowledge institutions and
demand-side actors, such as industry and
supporting actors, such as the government,
other financiers and global actors.


In general, the success of STI policies in
providing an enabling environment de-
pends upon a range of parameters, in-
cluding:


(i) High-level policy governance:


The absence of high-level policy govern-
ance has often led to misalignment and
lack of clarity or poor interpretation of
policy objectives at different levels of the
governance structure. Also, there are in-
stances where the roles of coordinating
agencies overlap and duplication of ef-
forts can lead to a waste of resources.
Ensuring horizontal and vertical policy co-


ordination and implementation is closely
linked with the governance structure and
function of a regulatory framework. Many
countries have therefore moved to estab-
lish high-level policy governance to help
deal with past policy coordination weak-
nesses.


(ii) Simplifying administrative pro-
cesses:


Common problems include bureaucratic
hurdles faced by firms in obtaining docu-
ments, resistance to change, lack of
computer know-how, and general lack of
desire to adopt simpler processes, e.g.
e-governance. To fix these administrative
drawbacks, some countries have started
migrating to cost-effective e-solutions
that generate less paper work.


(iii) Creating and strengthening link-
ages among innovation actors:


Many countries have sought to enhance
linkages between industry and academia
through collaborative research and spin-
offs. Emphasis has also been placed on
the importance of aligning academic pro-
grammes with industry needs as formal
and informal networks


Figure2.3: Technologicallearning,technologyflowsandtechnologicalabsorption:
Factors and feedback loops




Start-ups
Trade in capital goods,


skills creation and
learning,






Early-stage
innovators


Learning from IPR
data, customer


feedbacks, etc.
exports/imports, etc.
serv serse


Maturity -stage
Innovators


Technology transfer
and learning, licensing,
skilled labour, R&D, etc.






Growth-stage
innovators


R&D, tech licensing,
research collaborations,


exports/imports, etc.




incentives, etc.


Source: UNCTAD.




26 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


are increasingly being viewed as part of the
solution. Other relevant actors advocate for
interactive learning, citing the usefulness of
feedback between suppliers of raw mate-
rial, producers of the products and users of
the product.


D. POLICY OVERLAPS
Policy overlaps between industrial and in-
novation policies frameworks arise as a re-
sult of:


(i) The parallel emphasis on issues of
technological change and techni-
cal efficiency in policy definition
and conceptualization;


(ii) Overlaps and confusion in the poli-
cymaking structure, existing agen-
cies and mandates, poor business
emphasis and business knowledge
in policy processes; and


(iii) A lack of effective performance
measures that could take stock
and remedy missing coordina-
tion.


This section discusses the key overlapping
functions of the two policy frameworks that
are essential for industrial development,
and is followed by an enumeration of the
coordination issues resulting from such
overlaps, and presents a set of principles
for extracting synergistic results.


1. Overlapping domains of
interventions in policy definition


Tables 2.1 and 2.2 contain a review of re-
gional and national initiatives on industrial
policy and STI policies in Africa. The review
shows that there are a plethora of current
initiatives. This is a welcome development
and these initiatives often elaborate similar
objectives. The synergistic impact of these
various initiatives will only be felt if they are
implemented in a coordinated manner in
their respective national contexts. However,
slight contradictions exist in the way goals,
objectives or the policy implementation ap-
paratus are defined. These relate to the
following important areas: stimulating de-
mand; innovation finance and investment


promotion; technological learning; and
provision of supportive industry infrastruc-
ture. These will subsequently be discussed
under separate headings. The tables also
show that there are often important time
lags between the definition of industrial poli-
cies/ strategies and STI frameworks, which
often explain the lack of coordination.


a. Stimulatingdemand


A first area of overlap between the two poli-
cy frameworks is that both seek to address
the question of demand from the two fun-
damental stakeholders within any economy,
namely the potential users of innovation in
the economy, e.g. local firms and enterpris-
es, and the potential users of new products/
services, e.g. consumers. Demand can be
stimulated when the government cham-
pions and makes a direct investment into
certain sectors and technologies. To cham-
pion new sectors, industrial development
schemes have typically often include direct
state involvement, in the form of SOEs that
seek to pioneer local production capacity
in particular sectors. Over time, to ensure
the efficiency of SOEs, countries such as
Japan have often adopted state schemes
aimed at improving functions at all levels of
enterprises. In many other countries, privat-
ization of existing SOEs (at a later stage of
development) has also been a way to help
promote enterprise development. Engag-
ing in joint ventures and PPPs with some
level of state participation could be a means
to enhance enterprise development, and
have been used by many of today’s emerg-
ing economies.


Many African industrial development
strategies provide incentives for state-
sponsored investment which replicate the
experiences of a number of developing
countries in a variety of sectors (see Maz-
zucato, 2013), e.g. in the pharmaceutical
sector. In Uganda, for example, a large
public pharmaceutical company has been
set up through a PPP between Quality
Chemicals (Uganda) and Cipla Pharma-
ceuticals (India), with the help of state in-
vestment (see UNCTAD, 2010).




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 27


Pan-Africaninitiatives


The Conference of African Ministers of Industry (CAMI) was initiated in 1971 to provide a platform for
industrial policy dialogue.


The Lagos Plan of Action (1980-2000) was fashioned to promote industrial development in Africa.


The Abuja Treaty of 1991 was designed to harmonize the regional economic and social policies and
promote regional production structures and infrastructural development.


The Cairo Agenda of 1995 was launched to enhance industrial competitiveness of Africa through economic
diversification.


The 2001 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Productive Capacity Initiative
(APCI) were adopted in 2004 as part of the African-wide sustainable industrial development strategy.


The African Union Conference of Minsters of Industry in 2007 drafted an Action Plan for the Accelerated
Industrial Development of Africa.


SubregionalInitiatives


COMESA
The COMESA common industrial policy aimed at promoting manufacturing activities among Member States
was presented and discussed during the 34th Meeting of the Inter-Governmental Committee (March 2015,
Addis Ababa Ethiopia).


EAC


The East African Community Industrialization Policy, 2012-2032 is aimed at the structural transformation
of the manufacturing sector through high-value addition and product diversification, based on comparative
and competitive advantages of the region. EAC Member States are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, the United
Republic of Tanzania and Uganda.


ECOWAS The West African Common Industrial Policy was adopted in 2010 by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government with an implementation vision up to 2030.


SADC


The SADC Industrial Policy Framework was adopted by the SADC Committee of Ministers of Trade (CMT)
in June 2009 to promote the Industrial Upgrading and Modernisation among Member States (Angola,
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.


NationalInitiatives(selectedcountries)


Angola Angola has enacted a National Development Strategy aimed at, among others, the building of a national knowledge economy.


Egypt Egypt’s Industrial Development Strategy Industry: The Engine of Growth (2005-2025) was crafted in 2004 with the goal of transforming Egypt into a major manufacturing centre by 2025.


Eritrea Eritrea with the support of UNIDO started working on an Integrated Industrial Policy for Sustainable Indus-trial Development and Competitiveness in 2004.


Ethiopia


Ethiopia adopted its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), 2010/11-2014/15 to: (a) build an economy
with a modern and productive agricultural sector and enhance the capacity of the technology and industrial
sector to assume a leading role in the economy; (b) sustain economic development and secure social
justice; and (c) increase the per capita income of citizens to match the level of those in middle-income
countries.


Gabon Gabon’s 2011 Industrial Policy is aimed at turning Gabon into an emerging economy by promoting ‘Green Gabon’, ‘Industrial Gabon’ and ‘Service-Industry Gabon’.


Gambia
The Government of Gambia since 2010 has sought to formulate a National Industrial Policy (NIP) to estab-
lish conditions required by the private sector to maximize gainful employment at ever increasing levels of
productivity within the framework of a sustainable environment, social justice and equity.


Ghana Ghana launched its National Industrial Policy (NIP) in June 2011. The NIP is aimed at facilitating the coun-try’s industrialization agenda.


Lesotho
Lesotho adopted a National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2012/13-2016/17 as part of the National
Vision 2020 developed in 2001. The Plan is aimed at promoting a medium-term implementation strategy
for, among others, MSMEs and the manufacturing sector.


Liberia Liberia launched its ‘Industry for Liberia’s Future’ in 2011 to accelerate the development of a thriving and competitive industrial sector, so as to become a middle-income country by 2030.


Madagascar
Madagascar issued its Industrial Policy Letter (2007-2012) to transform the country from a (predominantly)
subsistence economy into a dynamic industrial economy that is strongly integrated into the global economy
and to achieve socioeconomic development.


Mauritius Mauritius launched its Strategic Plan for Industry, 2010-2013 to promote the manufacturing sectors, particularly small and medium-sized businesses.


Morocco
The Government of Morocco in 2014 launched a new Strategy (2014-2020), which is principally aimed
at ‘increasing the cadence of the Moroccan Industrialization’. The government also set up an Industrial
Development Fund with a budget of $ 2.5 billion.


Table2.1: IndustrialdevelopmentinitiativesinAfrica




28 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


Namibia


Namibia launched its industrial policy in 2012. A supplementary document, the Industrial Policy Implemen-
tation and Strategic Framework details the targets, strategies and action plans on industrialization during
the Fourth National Development Plan (NDP4) period, starting in the fiscal year 2012/13. Namibia aims to
become a high-income industrialized country by 2030.


Nigeria Nigeria launched its Industrial Revolution Plan in January 2014 with the goal of adding about NGN 5 trillion (or $ 25 billion) to annual manufacturing revenues in the next three to five years.


Rwanda Rwanda launched its Industrial Master Plan, 2009-2020, in December 2009 in order to achieve global competitiveness.


Senegal


Senegal launched its Politique de Redéploiement Industriel (PRI), or Industrial Redeployment Policy, in
2005 with the aim of redistributing industrial facilities (currently concentrated in the Dakar region) across
the country; re-orient the productive base towards promising sectors; and strengthen managerial capaci-
ties required to promote highly productive competitive industries (Cissé et al., 2014).


South Africa South Africa’s Industrial Policy Action Plan Economic, 2013/14-2015/16 is aimed at preventing industrial decline and supporting the growth and diversification of South Africa’s manufacturing sector.


Swaziland Swaziland has, since 2012, sought to formulate industrial policy for Swaziland to promote the development and growth of the manufacturing sector.5


Tanzania, United
Republic of


The United Republic of Tanzania adopted its Integrated Industrial Development Strategy 2025 in December
2011. The goal is to promote agriculture-led and resource-based industrialization.


Uganda


Uganda crafted its National Industrial Sector Strategic Plan, 2010/11-2014/15 in 2009 to follow through
with the implementation of the objectives of the 2008 National Industrial Policy Framework for Uganda’s
Transformation and Competitiveness. The policy vision is to build the industrial sector into a modern, com-
petitive and dynamic sector fully integrated into the domestic, regional and global economies.


Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s Industrial Development Policy (2012–2016) seeks to maximize revenue deliverables from the exploitation of natural resources through the enhancement of investment in industrial sector.


Source: UNCTAD.


Table 2.2: STI policy initiatives and strategies


Pan-Africaninitiatives


The first African Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology (AMCOST) under the auspices of AU
and NEPAD was held in November 2003 in Johannesburg, South Africa. AMCOST is a Specialized Technical
Committee of the African Union that promotes pan-African STI policies and programmes. Ordinary meet-
ings of the AMCOST are held once every two years, with the provision for extraordinary meetings when
necessary.


The Second African Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology (AMCOST2) was held in Dakar,
Senegal, from 27 to 30 September 2005. At this meeting, the delegates adopted the Africa’s Science and
Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA). The CPA articulates the Africa’s commitment to develop-
ing and applying STIs to enable Africa to harness and apply STI for poverty eradication and sustainable
development.


The Extraordinary Conference of the African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST)
was held in Cairo, Egypt, from 20-24 November 2006. Delegates deliberated on STI issues, including a
proposal to establish an African Presidents’ Committee for Science and Technology, as well as a proposal
for the African Strategy for Technology Transfer and Acquisition of Domestic Technological Capabilities.


The Third Ordinary Session of the African Ministerial Conference on Science and Technology (AMCOST III)
was held in Mombasa, Kenya on 12-16 November 2007. Deliberations focused on a draft, consolidated
framework on the protection of traditional knowledge, intellectual property, individual and community rights.


The Fifth Ordinary Session of the African Ministerial Conference on Science & Technology (AMCOST V)
took place on 12-15 November 2012 in Brazzaville, Congo. The session focused on the strategies and the
implementation of Africa’s Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA).


The Ministerial Forum on Science, Technology and Innovation took place in Rabat, Morocco from 14-17
October 2014. The forum was organized by the African Development Bank, following the first STI ministe-
rial conference, which was hosted by the Government of Kenya in 2012. The forum was designed to raise
political awareness of S&T in Africa and promote youth employment, human capital development and
inclusive growth.


Subregionalinitiatives


COMESA


The Bureau of the Council of the COMESA Ministers responsible for STI inaugurated the COMESA Innova-
tion Council on 8 April 2013, in Kampala, Uganda to enhance S&T in the region.6 The COMESA Innovation
Council is tasked with providing advice to member states on existing new knowledge and innovations and
best means of introducing them in the region.


EAC
The EAC produced its Development Strategy, 2011/12-2015/16, to strengthen efforts to develop regional
industrial R&D, technology and innovation systems. The strategy specifically seeks to invest in higher
education and training, technology development and innovation in the EAC region.




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 29


ECOWAS


The Second Conference of ECOWAS Ministers for Science and Technology was held on 24 March 2012 in
Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire adopted the ECOWAS policy on S&T (ECOPOST) and related action plan. The
Commission also plans to create a Directorate for STI to play a key role in the socio-economic development
of the region.7


SADC


SADC ministers responsible for STI approved the SADC Science, Technology and Innovation Strategic Plan
2015-2020 in June 2014 in Maputo, Mozambique. The plan is aimed at promoting the development of STI
in the region through regional coordination, institutional development, policy harmonization and resource
mobilization. The policy also seeks to promote transfer and mastery of STI within the region.8


Nationalinitiatives(selectedcountries)


Angola


The Angola National Policy for Science, Technology and Innovation was adopted following the passing of
a Presidential Decree No. 201/11 in 2011. This STI policy was developed to complement the country’s
development strategy, and is aimed at building a knowledge society, combat poverty and improve quality
of life.


Botswana The National Policy on Research, Science, Technology and Innovation was launched in 2011.9


Burundi The National Policy on Scientific Research and Technological Innovation was drafted in 2011,
10 but the


policy was revised and launched, along with its implementation framework, in August 2014.11


Cameroon The National Policy for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies was launched in September 2007.12


Egypt
Egypt launched the Decade for Science and Technology 2007/16 Strategy and introduced the Develop-
ing Scientific Research Plan 2007/16 (OECD, 2014). There is also the national ICT Strategy covering the
period between 2012 and 2017.13


Ethiopia
Ethiopia launched its National STI Policy in 2012 to alleviate poverty and transform Ethiopia into a middle-
income country by 2023. The National STI plans seek to develop capabilities in the country so as to
enable rapid learning, adaptation and utilization of effective foreign technologies by 2022/2023.


Ghana


The National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy was drafted in 2009 and adopted in 2010.
The STI policy along with its Vision 2020 aims to: (a) transform the country into a middle-income country;
(b) create endogenous S&T capacities that are appropriate to national needs, priorities and resources; and
(c) create an S&T culture to address the country’s sociocultural and economic problems. The policy also
specifically aims to combat global warming by increasing the use of renewable energies and allocating
minimum of 1 per cent of GDP to support the S&T sector.


Kenya
The National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy and Strategy were launched in March 2008.14
Science, Technology and Innovation Act (2013), Draft National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy
(2012).


Lesotho Lesotho’s Science & Technology Policy (2006-2011) was implemented in 2006.15


Malawi


The Government of Malawi passed the Science and Technology Act (2003) and later established the
National Commission for Science and Technology (NCST) to promote, support, coordinate and regulate the
development and application of science, technology and innovation in order to create wealth and improve
the way of life of the people.16


Mauritius Mauritius has a Draft National Policy and Strategy on Science, Technology and Innovation (2014-2025).


Mozambique
Mozambique approved its STI Strategy in 2006. The strategy aims to: (a) promote STI in industry and
public sector, promote technology transfer; (b) stimulate the use of ICT for good governance and service
delivery and for the diffusion of knowledge; and (c) support human resource development in STI.


Namibia


A National Research Science and Technology Policy was formulated in 1999 and the subsequent enabling
act was adopted in 2004.17 The Ministry of ICT drafted the Information Technology Policy for Namibia in
2008.18 A Draft Innovation Framework Policy (2011) has been tabled for final implementation. (see UNU-
MERIT, 2015)


Nigeria The National STI policy of 2011 was reviewed and the revised policy was launched in 2012.


Rwanda The National STI policy (2006) was revised in October 2014 but has yet to be approved by the Cabinet.


South Africa


The ICT R&D Strategy for South Africa was finalized in 2007 and is being implemented under the auspices
of the Information Society and Development Plan (ISAD) Plan of South Africa. The National Research and
Development Strategy was published in August 2002, and the Department of Science and Technology
published the Ten-Year Innovation Plan (2008-2018) in 2007.19


Tanzania, United
Republic of


The STI policy was reviewed between 2008 and 2013. A new revised policy is expected to be imple-
mented in early 2016.


Uganda
The Cabinet approved its first national STI (NSTI) policy in 2009. The government launch in 2012 of the
National STI Plan 2012/2013 - 2017/2018 was aimed at supporting the implementation of the 2009
NSTI policy.


Zambia
Zambia adopted the National Policy on S&T in 1996 (Daka and Toivanen, 2014). The 1996 Science and
Technology Policy was reviewed in 2008, and the process of drafting a new national S&T policy also
began in 2008.20


Zimbabwe Zimbabwe’s STI Policy was launched in 2012.


Source: UNCTAD, based on UNU-MERIT (2015) and national sources.




30 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


Another way is for the government to simply
list specific sectors as priorities and identify
a range of incentives for their promotion;
this sends a signal to both consumers and
companies that the sectors or specific sets
of technologies are supported. Such instru-
ments do not directly involve governmental
entrepreneurship (through SOEs) and are
elaborated to stimulate demand in both in-
dustrial and innovation policy frameworks,
but particularly often figure in innovation
frameworks. These include R&D grants and
loans, industry grants, prizes, tax credits
and government procurement. Govern-
ment procurement is acknowledged to be
an essential tool for stimulating new tech-
nological knowledge, particularly in certain
sectors of the economy (see Georghiou,
2014). Procurement also serves as a tool
to stimulate innovation in two important
ways, namely: to foster innovation in key
growth sectors (such as pharmaceuticals
and health care); and to foster innovation in
particular sectors of the economy that are
critical for sustainable development (e.g. re-
newable energy). SEZs (see section b) are
yet another mechanism to facilitate firm-
level activities based on export demand.


b. Financeandinvestment


A second area of overlap is in the area of
finance and investment promotion. Finance
is often the single most crippling bottle-
neck to firm-level activities, and access to
innovation finance is a major problem for
firms of all sizes in developing countries,
particularly in Africa. Industrial policy incen-
tives, such as duty-free importation of capi-
tal goods and raw materials for selected
products, exports tax exemptions, as well
as exemptions from levies imposed on ex-
ports have been the hallmarks of import-
substitution policies in the past. Different
schemes exist that enable entrepreneurs
with limited resources to start businesses,
including: Government loans with flex-
ible repayment plans; loan guarantee pro-
grammes for firms; and trade credits that
allow enterprises making bulk purchases
to pay in one, two or three months’ time.
Examples of agencies that are sometimes


established under industrial policies are the
National Competitiveness Councils, which
deal with enterprise financing. Other policy
instruments to address finance bottlenecks
include mid-term loans for industry, as well
as microcredit schemes (either directly
through banks or as facilitated through gov-
ernmental programmes).


However, since most government-spon-
sored enterprise support schemes either
have a direct or indirect impact on firm-level
R&D and production activities, they overlap
with innovation policies, which also often fo-
cus on financing schemes, both through di-
rect and indirect instrumentalities. Incentives
such as R&D grants, credits or subsidies
often perform the dual role of stimulating de-
mand and attenuating finance bottlenecks.


c. Acceleratetechnologicallearning
throughanenablingenvironment


Another fundamental concern that is com-
mon to both policy frameworks is techno-
logical learning. A review of country-level
policy frameworks shows a concomitant
focus on promoting skills creation and busi-
ness and technical advisory services.


From a normative perspective, however,
there are (or ought to be) differences in the
focus of skills creation in the two policies per
se. While industrial policy theoretically aims
to create skills infrastructure for the develop-
ment of new products or processes, par-
ticularly those aimed at improving technical
efficiency or adherence to quality standards,
the supply of engineers and scientists have
long been the focus of S&T policies (see
King, 1991). In some ways, the focus of
industrial policy is to balance the supply of
skilled scientific personnel, while at the same
time taking into consideration the supply
side of the equation, i.e. the kinds of knowl-
edge and skills that are required at the firm/
enterprise level to increase the technical ef-
ficiency of production. At the enterprise level,
it is important to have access to skilled per-
sonnel capable of dealing with day-to-day
enterprise operational needs, and promoting
routine learning-by-doing activities, such as
design, prototyping and reverse engineering.




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 31


Such technical expertise is often distinct from
the scientific research capacity to be found in
laboratories. While both kinds of capabilities
are essential for the creation of new products
or processes, there are key differences in the
domains in which they operate.


While R&D technicians possess applied scien-
tific skills that are useful for industry, scientific
researchers mostly carry out research (basic
or industrial) in laboratory settings. R&D tech-
nicians support scientific researchers with the
practical training skills they acquired in the
course of an apprenticeship, vocational edu-
cation, on-the-job training or interaction with
industry. R&D technicians also operate at the
product development and testing stages in the
manufacturing sector. Scientific researchers
in academic or R&D labs apply advanced re-
search skills acquired during university studies,
centres of excellence and specialized research
environments. These differences are elabo-
rated in table 2.3, and promoting learning at
the industry level calls for both kinds of skills
development.


In other words, in addition to the supply of
scientists and engineers, a range of other
technical and business advisory services are
needed to channel such skills to plant-level
R&D, production and industrial competitive-
ness. In order to enable this, business ad-
visory services are usually aimed at the ac-
quisition of improved and innovative skills to


improve enterprise-level performance (see
Turner, 2011), or technical advisory services
focus on providing advice and coaching on
specific innovation related skills and activi-
ties. This technical advice can relate to: spe-
cific in-house R&D activities; access to and
exploiting technical knowledge; ICTs; techni-
cal information; meeting national and inter-
national quality standards; and other quality-
related matters.


In practice, however, the distinction between
the two policy frameworks is blurred, par-
ticularly with respect to which policy incen-
tive is provided by which policy. The supply
of scientists and engineers, business advi-
sory services and technical advisory services
are often neglected; or provided for in both
frameworks. In addition, services, such as
advice on specific in-house R&D activities, in-
formation on technical issues, and assistance
in implementing specific international stand-
ards, are also often either neglected, or pro-
vided for in both frameworks, with low levels
of coordination between the agencies offering
the incentives.


Other overlapping incentives relate to the
provision of knowledge infrastructure, such
as increased R&D, centres of excellence,
technology centres, which can either in-
volve setting up new public research institu-
tions and/or restructuring existing facilities
to help cater for industry needs.


Requirements R&D technicians Scientificresearchers


What they are? – Possess applied scientific skills
– Support scientific activities


– Possess basic research skills
– Lecture/ teach in science departments and


academia


How are they
qualified?


– Apprenticeship
– Vocational training
– College education


– Masters/ PhD degrees
– advanced research skills


How they work? – Develop products
– Test for quality, health safety, standard


protocols, etc
– design, research and prototype at the plant


level


– Conduct basic/ applied research in labs
– Can be involved in product, process


development


Where they work? – Work in enterprises
– Manufacturing activities


– Academic institutions
– Research centres
– Technology Laboratories
– R&D laboratories of firms


Length of training -Can be acquired in less than two years
-Bachelor degree


– Masters or PhD degree
– Several years of experience and continuous


learning


Source: UNCTAD.


Table2.3: R&Dtechniciansandscientificresearchersinenterprisedevelopment




32 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


d. Establishmentofsupporting
institutions


This refers to the so-called “intermediate or-
ganizations”, such as business incubator
units, technology incubators, S&T parks, SEZs
or industrial parks, which all seek to promote
the development of physical and knowledge
infrastructure and the creation and strength-
ening of institutional linkages (box 2.1).


Both policy frameworks contain specific
incentives covering industry parks, SEZs,
EPZs, in addition to incentives for instru-
ments that promote collaboration, e.g.
grants to ensure that public research in-
stitutes work alongside firms, or university
patenting to create incentives for industry-
oriented research, and industry park or sci-
ence park programmes. Other incentives
that could facilitate feedback between sup-
pliers of raw material, producers of the prod-
ucts and users of the product for interactive
learning and further innovations are also
mentioned in both policy frameworks, but
often without the relevant feedback loops.


E. WHAT MATTERS


At a practical level, the manufacturing im-
perative that serves as the basis for indus-
trial development strategies and plans will
depend on how well these two policies are
coordinated. Evidence and debate seems
to be converging on a few essential factors.
One of these factors is that industrial policy,
or any intervention aimed at economic and
industrial restructuring cannot function as
as standalone framework if it is to succeed
in promoting technological learning, or lead
to sectoral change, diversification and so-
cial inclusion. Industrial policy needs to be
closely calibrated with other policies, es-
pecially innovation policy. In fact, in recent
times, scholarship has emphasized the
need for innovation-oriented industrial poli-
cies, or a systemic innovation and industrial
policy to guide development as a singular
entity (Mazzucato, 2013; Aiginger, 2012).


A second, related result is that if indus-
trial policy is to result in these outcomes, it


Box 2.1: Industrial hubs, zones and parks


Industrial policies or strategies usually seek to promote instruments of agglomeration of firms, such
as clustering. To faciliate this, incentives are provided to house suppliers, manufacturers and ser-
vice providers, along with universities or centres of excellence performing research in the same or
relevant areas. Clustering initiatives are centered on the idea of linkages and spillovers, whereby
the stronger linkages between the various actors based in a clustering area, as supported by a
suitable business environment, helps to promote knowledge and network spillovers, and promote
economies of scale and scope.


SEZs or EPZs provide a one-stop shop for a range of specific export-led incentives for firms, in-
cluding permits and licences, access to tax-free remittances, government grants and special loans
facilities. In some countries, firms located in and exporting out of SEZs/EPZs are entitled to certain
tax remittances as well. Despite their relevance as an industrial policy tool, the results are rather
mixed across different developing countries. Countries, such as China, Republic of Korea, Malay-
sia, Mauritius and Singapore, have successfully established SEZs, whereas others, particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa, are still facing challenges in creating employment and trade from their SEZs.


Similarly, industrial parks can assist firms to move from low to higher value-added activities, mainly
due to the absence of specific industry infrastructure, such as those for technology incubation, or
specific large-scale investments that cannot be made by individual firms. Examples include sec-
tors where heavy public investments are needed for infrastructure industries (e.g. steel, cement),
but also other sectors requiring particular kinds of knowledge or other physical investments. In the
case of pharmaceutical sector, firms usually tend to benefit from a common active pharmaceutical
ingredients (API) park, or common bioequivalence facility to assist local firms to test and comply
with production standards. In many other cases, industrial parks often perform the basic, yet criti-
cal, function of providing industrial premises where a dependable basic infrastructure is available,
e.g. uninterrupted power supply, warehousing facilities, and water for industrial activities.


Source: UNCTAD.




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 33


should focus on getting the policy processes
right (Rodrik, 2004). Alignment issues arise
because STI policies (or earlier S&T policies)
were often conceived much later, or inde-
pendently of other industrial development
strategies. This leads to to two separate sets
of institutions, overlapping agencies with
similar mandates and policy processes that
often do not communicate with each other
or collaborate. These alignment issues need
to be resolved to ensure that industrial and
innovation policies are well-calibrated and
synergistic in two ways. Firstly, policies need
to be implemented in a coordinated way.
Secondly, policies need to be evaluated on
the basis of their impact on firm-level and


industry performance. Despite concerted ef-
forts enterprise growth and expansion has
remained a far more elusive goal for many
countries because connecting the impact of
policy on practice is difficult to measure. This
is especially the case because a large num-
ber of systemic factors shape the impact of
industrial and innovation policies on the firms
that policy processes may not capture and
fix, especially if the success of policies is not
directly measured through firm-level perfor-
mance at the ground level.


Thirdly and most importantly, an innovation
and industry friendly climate is not about
specifying the kinds of financing incentives,


Industrial policy gaps Innovation policy gaps
Gaps in policy articulation and planning


Gaps in policy definition (no focus on linking to distribution,
investment, etc)
Industrial policy delinked from innovation policy/ technological
learning
Policies not clearly linked to roadmaps or implementation
strategies
Difficulties due to slow policy transitions
Narrowly focused on the development of certain sectors to the
neglect of others


Policies often not clearly articulated to focus on innovation
Not aligned to industries’ needs/ industrial strategies and
national plans
Excessive supply-side focused on S&T
Lack of focus on technological absorption


Lack of policy coherence and policy competence
Lack of micro-, meso-, and macro-policy linkages
Incidence of overlapping mandates and jurisdictions among
agencies
Little or no articulation of regional or local priorities and
contexts
Poor planning
Prevalence of standalone approaches with competing agency
mandates
Lack of proper implementation mechanisms
Low or no provision for revisions based on feedback and/ or
policy failure
Human resource gaps leading to less than satisfactory policy
outcomes


Weak coordination structures
Incomplete/ competing agency mandates
Unsustainable/ad hoc measures
Low financing to implement programmes
Lack of clear roadmaps for coordination
Neglect of issues of institutional resistance and inertia
Lack of policy competence to foresee overlaps
Lack of investments in scientific and knowledge infrastructure


Resource use, resource constrains and duplication
Inter-agency rivalry and competition for scarce resources due
to overlapping mandates
Unrealistic programmes with small or no budgets
Lack of focus on market-driven opportunities
Low consideration of funding in policy articulation
Neglect of financial realities driven by ambitious projects
Lack of focus on project/ programme success


Inter-agency rivalry and competition for scarce resources due
to overlapping mandates
Low consideration of funding in policy articulation
Excessive focus on funding basic R&D as against funding
industry R&D
Lack of effective innovation financing strategies
Duplication of incentives (with those already contained in
industrial policy)


Insufficientcapacitytoconductmonitoringandevaluation
Neglect and failure to learn from past institutional failures and
successes
Lack of skilled personal to conduct proper policy evaluations
Lack of proper data and policy performance indicators
Lack of good monitoring mechanisms
Lack of regular follow-up


Neglect and failure to learn from past institutional failures and
successes
Lack of skilled personal to conduct proper policy evaluations
Absence of good data
Lack of proper data and policy performance indicators
Lack of good monitoring mechanisms
Lack of regular follow-up


Lack of coordination between policymaking, governmental interventions and business environment
Policies are often not geared to local sectoral realities
Industry policy frameworks not accompanied by industry and
business support organizations
Neglect of the needs of the private sector


STI policy frameworks not accompanied by industry and busi-
ness support organizations
Low focus on real firm-level hurdles and needs.
Low focus on collaborative linkages and interactive learning


Table 2.4: Industrial and innovation policies for development: Key alignment issues


Source: UNCTAD.




34 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


but rather about identifying the activities, the
beneficiaries in need of support (i.e. the kind
of firms and what they should be focusing
on), and how this support can be accessed
by deserving firms (Foray, 2015; Aghion et
al, 2012; Aiginger and Böheim, 2015).


The table below presents key alignment
issues between industrial and innovation
policies in a schematic form.


Some principles offer a good basis to syn-
ergize the two policy frameworks, and
these are discussed here.


1. Identifyandeliminatepolicy
redundancies


As shown in table 2.4, some industrial and
innovation policy gaps also relate to weak-
nesses in the policymaking structure (UNC-
TAD, 2003). The latter encompasses the in-
stitutional and departmental set-up, as well
as rules and processes for policymaking
and coordination (see Bianchi and Labo-
ry, 2008). Common weaknesses include:
overlapping jurisdictions; industrial policy
delinked from innovation policy; institutional
weaknesses; unsustainable or ad hoc pol-
icy measures; budget constraints; lack of
political will; and policy continuity. Getting
the policy processes right calls for open-
ing channels of communication between
relevant agencies, actors, coordination and
review of existing political support to imple-
ment policies, and change parameters as
needed (Robinson, 2010).


These review mechanisms to elimitate pol-
icy redundancies in definition, design and
process is largely explained by the rela-
tive success of industrial policies over the
past five decades in countries/economies,
such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan,
China, as compared to countries, such as
Argentina in Latin America and countries,
such as Ghana and Zambia in Africa (Rob-
inson 2010).


2. Promotepolicycoherenceand
competence


At the national level, industrial and inno-
vation policies are more effective when: (i)
there is policy complementarity (Fukasaku


et al., 2005); (ii) when they are accom-
panied by clear and adequately funded
budgets; and (iii) skilled employees that
can implement the policies. Common in-
dustrial and innovation policy gaps at the
national level are often due to the absence
of micro-macro policy linkages, little or no
articulation of an overall development vi-
sion in both policies (or inversely, the lack of
implementable developmental vision), or a
lack of proper coordination between policy
incentives leading to a proliferation of stan-
dalone approaches.


Weaknesses in industrial and innovation
policies are explained by the absence of
policy competence (Meyer-Stamer, 2009).
They can also fail when local priorities are
neglected due to: (i) low or no policy learn-
ing; (ii) low or no policy revisions based on
feedback and policy failure; (iii) low ability
to assess lessons learnt; and (iv) human
resource and technology gaps. Lack of
policy competence also leads to poor im-
plementation of even well-meaning policies
in an industry friendly way, such as flex-
ibilities of the national IPR regimes. Failure
to follow through on investments in scien-
tific and knowledge infrastructure develop-
ment, unrealistic and unsustainable ad hoc
programmes, or added transaction costs
for local firms engaging in learning and in-
novation can also result in a lack of policy
competence. As elaborated in the previous
section, the lack of policy coherence is a
critical issue, which often occurs in policy
definition, implementation and task alloca-
tion and agency mandates in all the opera-
tive domains of both policies. Elimination of
these redundancies in actual practice will
be critical to ensure the effective implemen-
tation of the two policy frameworks.


3. Useresourcescarefully


In developing countries in particular, older
policies often tend to be replaced by newer
ones in an effort to address development.
However, the mandates of existing agen-
cies or newly created agencies are often
not redefined in an appropriate manner, and
nor is there a clear delineation of budget-
ing and performance monitoring measures




CHAPTER II : LINKAGES BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 35


(see next point). This not only creates inter-
agency rivalries and competition for scarce
resources, which goes against the funda-
mental objectives of both industrial and in-
novation policies (given that both intend to
increase collaborative linkages and provide
an enabling environment), but also leads to
a duplication of scarce resources, resulting
in the ineffectiveness of programmes, pro-
jects and incentive mechanisms.


4. Developcapacityforproperpolicy
evaluationandmonitoring


Industrial and innovation policies fail when
there is lack of capacity to conduct prop-
er policy evaluation and monitoring. Poor
choice of monitoring indicators, timelines
and evaluation techniques can compromise
results and affect policy implementation.
Deficiencies in information and data gath-
ering processes can also affect industrial
policy evaluation and monitoring. Lack of
resources also impacts proper policy moni-
toring and evaluation.


5. Coordinatepolicymakingefforts
andimplementationwiththelocal
businessenvironmentmoreclosely
inordertoengagetheprivatesector


Finally, it is the institutionalized patterns of
policymaking, governmental intervention
and business-government relations that
shape the process of industrial adjustment.
In other words, what matters is not the iden-
tification of sectors of importance, or tools/
mechanism for industrial organization (such
as clustering, SEZs, or industry and science
parks), but rather to recognize the relation-
ship between policymaking (i.e. historically
institutionalized patterns) that shape the
way in which the policies are implemented


(the informal rules of the game) and the way
business, and especially local businesses,
react to it. Most of all, policymaking still
tends, in large parts, to take place without
paying much attention to the needs of the
private sector. Changing the industrial and
innovation performance of countries calls
for a review of what went wrong (in terms of
policy implementation, review and monitor-
ing), and how these lapses can be avoided.
Going ahead, engaging the private sector
through policy action will be critical for over-
all industrial performance.


F. CHAPTER SUMMARY


This chapter has derived an analytical
framework to assess industrial develop-
ment and innovation policy frameworks,
with the aim of showing the important areas
of overlap between the two policies. Such
overlapping, often contradictory, policy in-
centives lead to confusion in agency man-
dates, institutional redundancy and waste
of scarce resources in developing countries.
The chapter also shows that the overlaps
and lack of implementation coordination is,
in large part, caused by several historical,
institutional constraints faced by countries.
As shown in tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4, STI
policies have often evolved independently
and much later than industrial development
policies, leading to difficulties in getting the
policy processes right. In order to address
these issues, the chapter derives a set of
five principles that can assist countries to
align the two policies, and minimize the
negative impact of non-complementary
linkages on industry and sectoral growth in
their economies.




36 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


NOTES


1.


1. The same aims are applicable across countries. The European Union’s industrial policy, for exam-
ple, envisages:
(a) Speeding up the adjustment of industry to the need of structural changes;
(b) Encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and the development of undertakings
throughout the Union, particularly small and medium-sized undertakings;
(c) Encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between undertakings; and
(d) Fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and
technological development. See Article 173 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU),
the Europe 2020 strategy, and ‘An industrial policy for the globalization era’. Available at: http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.9.1.html


2. As today’s R&D spending can only stimulate future exports, the figure plots the R&D share of a
country on its exports five years later. Latest available R&D figures for the years 2004-2008 and
export figures for the years 2009-2013 have been used, when available, to prepare this figure.


3. As today’s R&D spending can only stimulate future exports, the figure plots the R&D share of a
country on its exports five years later. Latest available R&D figures for the years 2004-2008 and
export figures for the years 2009-2013 have been used, when available, to prepare this figure.


4. http://www.trademarksa.org/news/swaziland-commerce-ministry-wants-develop-industrial-policy


5. http://www.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=659:innovation-council-
inaugurated&catid=5:latest-news&Itemid=41


6. http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=086&lang=en&annee=2012


7. http://www.acgt.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/SADC-regional-cooperation-and-the-ex-
pectations-required-from-member-states_Anneline-Morgan.pdf


8. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/sti-policy/country-studies/
botswana/


9. https://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=news-doc-by-id-print&docid=9090&


10. https://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=news-doc-by-id-print&docid=9090&


11. https://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=news-doc-by-id-print&docid=9090&


12. Egypt Ministry of Communications and Information Technology National ICT Strategy: 2012-2017
http://mcit.gov.eg/Upcont/Documents/ICT%20Strategy%202012-2017.pdf


13. IST- Africa http://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=ictpolicies


14. UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/science-technology/sti-policy/coun-
try-studies/ and IST-Africa http://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=ictpolicies


15. Malawi National Commission for Science and Technology. http://www.ncst.mw/welcome-to-ncst/


16. Namibia National Commission on Research, Science and Technology. http://www.ncrst.na/about-
us/Programme-Policies/47/


17. IST- Africa http://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=ictpolicies


18. IST- Africa http://www.ist-africa.org/home/default.asp?page=ictpolicies


19. New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) http://www.nepad.org/system/files/032_
DAY5_Presentation_on_STI_12_07_2012.pdf




3COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE






CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 39


CHAPTER III
COORDINATING INNOVATION AND


INDUSTRIAL POLICY:
NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE


A. INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is currently home to about a quarter
of the population of sub-Saharan Africa and
faces developmental challenges in ensuring
that GDP growth translates into prosperity
for all. Rising growth rates reflect the dyna-
mism of the local economy, which is being
increasingly acknowledged for its relatively
open investment climate and improving in-
frastructure, both physical and institutional.
In 2014, Nigeria conducted an exercise to
rebase its GDP that resulted in the country
being proclaimed the largest economy in
Africa, surpassing South Africa by a wide
margin.1 Despite these new optimistic fig-
ures, Nigeria aspires to have a mature
economy with a diversified industrial base,
and to reduce reliance oil-based exports,
which currently account for over 90  per
cent of its export earnings.2


This chapter seeks to analyse the industrial
development of Nigeria from a historical
perspective, and will critically assess the
role of innovation and technological learn-
ing in promoting Nigerian industry. The
analysis is timely and highly relevant, par-
ticularly in the context of recent debates in
Nigeria on the need for a more diversified
economy, as well as the need to build on
recent successes in industry. The analysis
is also important from yet another perspec-


tive: an ever-widening divide has grown
between the rich and the poor, as reflected
in the growth of poverty levels from 24 per
cent in 1980 to 66 per cent in 2010.3 This
raises very important questions of how in-
dustrial development can be made more
equitable in Nigeria.


In accordance with the methodological
structure outlined in chapter I, this chapter
is based on a country-based field survey
conducted for this report, which is clarified
in box 3.1 below.


Section B presents an analysis of the un-
derlying drivers of growth in the economy,
tracing the challenges in structural diver-
sification from the 1960s until now. The
section then moves on to present the
main policy and institutional framework in
Nigeria for technology and innovation-led
industry development, and assesses mile-
stones in the development of both sets of
policies over time. An analysis based on
field survey results presents the day-to-
day constraints currently faced by Nige-
rian firms, and how these are explained by
limitations of the policy environment is pre-
sented in section C. Section D links these
results to the overall challenge of promot-
ing industry led growth in Nigeria, particu-
larly from the perspective of resource-rich
developing countries.


Box 3.1: Scope and details of data collection in Nigeria


In 2013, an UNCTAD questionnaire was administered to elicit information from 245 firms in order
to collect primary data on factors that affect industrial development and innovation capacity at the
firm and sectoral level. Of the total of 245 firms, 200 questionnaires were retrieved. The firms were
selected to represent specific industrial sectors, namely: ICTs, pharmaceuticals and health care
and agro/food processing. A large number of interviews and surveys took place around Lagos
and Ibadan, as well in other areas where there was a concentration of SMEs operating in these
sectors. Firm size was chosen based on the overall profile of the sectors, in order to maintain
representativeness.


Source: UNCTAD.




40 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


B. OVERALL TRENDS IN
THE ECONOMY


The Nigerian economy has followed a rath-
er complex trajectory since independence,
accounted for in part by its over-reliance on
oil-based exports and the premature open-
ness of its economy. After independence in
1960, Nigeria’s economy went through a
period of appreciable growth, recording real
GDP growth of 3.1 per cent annually in the
first decade. The economy grew by 6.2 per
cent between 1970 and 1978, according
to data released by the Nigerian Bureau of
Statistics. Growth rates have continued to
be high since then, particularly when com-
pared with other African economies. Be-
tween 1990 and 2014, the annual real per
capita growth rate was 3.3 per cent, out-
stripping growth rates of most other African
developing countries over the same peri-
od.4 Nigeria’s growth rate rose in the 2000s
(2000-2014) and peaked at 4.6  per cent,
which is about double the average growth
rate of most other African developing coun-
tries for the same period (figure 3.1). 5


1. Underlying drivers of growth


Industry, the second largest sector in Ni-
geria, accounted for about 26 per cent of
GDP in 2013 (table 3.1). However, most of


this was attributable to the oil sector: with
mining and utilities accounting for 13.7 per
cent of the national income. The reliance of
the economy on crude oil exports, which
accounted for about 70  per cent of total
exports during the past four decades, led
to a shift away from industrial activities of a
productive nature, leading to low structural
change, low dynamism and over-depend-
ence on a single commodity.


This reliance on oil-based primary exports,
which began in the 1970s also resulted in a
dramatic shrinking of its agricultural sector
over time. Statistics show that the agricultural
sector, which accounted for about 27.1 per
cent of GDP in 1970, shrank by almost one
fifth (21 per cent) by 2000. Since the beginning
of the new millennium, Nigeria’s democratic
government has attempted to secure overall
macroeconomic stability and has managed to
stabilize and reinstate some of the gains made
in the agricultural sector. In 2004, the Nigerian
government also enacted a National Econom-
ic Empowerment and Development Strategy
(NEEDS), which is a medium-term develop-
ment framework aimed at re-engineering
growth and productivity. Some of the policy
measures under this initiative have helped to
stabilize some of the gains made in the agri-
cultural sector (see Briggs, 2007).


Figure 3.1: Real per capita GDP growth rate in Nigeria vis-a-vis other regions
ofthedevelopingworld,1970-2014(in percent)



-2.0


-1.0


0.0


1.0


2.0


3.0


4.0


5.0


6.0


7.0


1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2014


pe
r c


en
t




Nigeria


All countries


Developing
countries: Africa


Developing countries


Developing
countries: America


Developing
countries: Asia


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (accessed on 20 October 2015).
Note: 2014 figures are estimates.




CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 41


In comparison with these two sectors, the
services sector in the country’s largest sec-
tor, accounting for 53 per cent of the total
GDP as of 2013. This is quite similar to oth-
er developing countries in Africa where the
services sector on average captures 46 per
cent of GDP.6 However, it should be noted
that the relative increase in share of services
is due to the rebased figures, which show a
26 per cent increase in services’ share (ac-
cording to 2012 data) to 53 per cent (fol-
lowing new data released after the rebasing
exercise). What accounts for this difference
is still unclear and may need to be re-as-
sessed.


The employment effects of the three main
sectors of the economy are rather telling.
On the whole, despite its variable contribu-
tions to overall GDP over the past four dec-
ades, agriculture remains the largest source
of income for Nigerian households and
accounted for about 49  per cent of total
employment in 2007.7 The services sector
is the second largest in terms of employ-
ment opportunities, accounting for about
43 per cent of total employment in 2007.8
Industry, on the other hand, accounted for
only 7.5  per cent of total employment in
the country. Out of this, manufacturing ac-
counted for 5.6 per cent, mining stood at
0.5  per cent, utilities at 0.7  per cent and
construction at 1.6 per cent.9


2. Challenges for structural
diversification: 1960s to the
present day


While Nigeria went through a period of in-
dustrialization in the 1960s and the 1970s,


it experienced negative growth rates in the
1980s as a result of political instability and
civil unrest. Several studies note that the
introduction of the Structural Adjustment
Programme (SAP) in 1986 initially reversed
the lagging growth, and led to an annual
GDP growth rate of 4  per cent between
1988 and 1997 (see for example, Agboli
and Ukaegbu 2006; Brautigam, 1997).
However, over the longer term the country
underwent some degree of de-industrializa-
tion. This section will describe the under-
lying causes for these changes and place
Nigeria’s policy development on innovation
and industrial development in a historical
perspective by tracing the various policies
that were introduced from the 1960s up un-
til the present day.


a. Nigeria’snationaldevelopment
plans


Nigeria’s earliest strategy for industrializa-
tion can be traced back to the Nigerian
National Development Plan of 1962-68,
which laid out a plan of import-substitution
for industrialization. Although the plan itself
sought to invest in some large-scale indus-
trial infrastructure (such as a development
bank and large-scale energy infrastructure),
studies note that a focus on local industrial
capacity and acquisition of technologies
only emerged in the second National De-
velopment Plan of 1970-74 (Chete et al,
2014). This second plan recognized the
need to promote technology acquisition to
boost industrial activity. The government in-
vested in large-scale iron and steel plants,
petrochemical companies (in Eleme), fer-
tilizer plants (in the Onu and Kaduna re-


Sectors/ Years 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013


Agriculture,hunting,
forestry,fishing 27.1 18.8 17.4 23.2 24.6 27.0 21.3 25.6 23.9 21.0


Industry 19.3 24.8 28.5 18.2 25.8 25.1 29.9 23.7 25.3 26.0


Mining & utilities 5.0 7.9 12.0 7.9 17.2 18.0 18.7 14.9 15.9 13.7


Manufacturing 4.4 6.5 6.5 6.6 5.0 5.4 7.8 6.2 6.6 9.0


Construction 9.9 10.4 10.0 3.8 3.6 1.7 3.3 2.6 2.9 3.3


Services 53.6 56.4 54.1 58.6 49.6 47.9 48.8 50.7 50.8 53.0


Table3.1: DistributionofNigeria’sGDPbysector,1970to2013(in percent)


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 24 September 2015).




42 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


gions), oil refineries (in Port Harcourt, Warri
and Kaduna regions) (see Oyeyinka, 2014).


However, Nigeria discovered oil during the
second National Development Plan, which
resulted in a lower emphasis on industrial
development over time, as a result of the
expansion of the oil sector. The third Na-
tional Development Plan of 1975-80 envis-
aged greater public sector investment in
industry, particularly heavy industries, and
was implemented at a time when oil ex-
ports from the country were at an all-time
high. Also around this time, the investments
made in large-scale public sector industries
in the first and the second national plans
became unprofitable, partly due to the slow
follow-up on these projects after the dis-
covery of oil (Oyeyinka, 2014).


The failure of these public sector enter-
prises was accompanied by the acknowl-
edgement that Nigeria’s national develop-
mental plans had not focused sufficiently
on technological acquisition and creation
of skills, and particularly on the managerial
and implementation capabilities required
at the plant level in large-scale industries.
In an effort to rectify this lack of focus and
support ailing public sector enterprises,
some efforts were made to acquire mana-
gerial expertise from other countries and to
send Nigerian nationals to public sector en-
terprises abroad to gather tacit know-how.
However, these initiatives also failed since
there was no capacity for technology ab-
sorption within the country.10


b. The1998NationalIndustrialPolicy


The 1998 National Industrial Policy was
launched to resuscitate the country’s indus-
trial sector and formed part of the new na-
tional political agenda. The industrial policy
of 1998 was aimed at structurally diversi-
fying the national economy by promoting
new sectoral activities, increasing the man-
ufacturing value-added of products, as well
as the use of greater local inputs to diversify
the industrial base and promote exports. It
also aimed at increasing the ability of pri-
vate sector firms to participate in industrial
activity. The policy was augmented by the


National Industrial Master Plan, which pro-
vided the trajectory for the development of
major industrial sectors.


The industrial policy framework contained
several incentives aimed at encouraging in-
dustrial exports, some of which have yet to
be implemented. The incentives included,
among others, export credit guarantees,11
export expansion schemes,12 export price
adjustment,13 and subsidies for the use of
local raw materials in export production.14 In
an effort to address this, the Federal Ministry
of Commerce and Tourism offered several
other incentives, such as the manufacturing-
in-bond scheme, which aimed to assist po-
tential exporters of manufactured products
to import raw materials free of duty for the
production of exportable products, and a
supplementary allowance for companies
that pioneered new products for exports.


Despite these efforts, little change occurred
in productivity growth. For example, data
from the Nigerian National Bureau of Statis-
tics shows that the manufacturing sector’s
contribution to GDP was 5 per cent as of
1999, and that its share continued to fluctu-
ate between 3.9 and 4.1 per cent between
2006 and 2010. By the end of the 1990s, a
single commodity accounted for the major-
ity of exports and the share of manufactur-
ing and construction declined, with mining
and utilities capturing an even larger share
of GDP over this period, accounting for half
of the GDP in 2000. These developments
signalled the onset of the Dutch disease,
and growth in the natural resource sectors
began to hinder the development of the
manufacturing sector, and in Nigeria’s case,
the growth of the services sector as well.


Around this time the Nigerian government
established a number of institutions to
stimulate the industrial sector, particularly
manufacturing, as a subsector of industry,
to reverse or at least mitigate the impact of
the growth of the natural resource sectors
on the development of the manufacturing
and services sectors. Prominent institu-
tions that emerged alongside existing line
agencies included the Nigerian Bank of In-
dustry, Nigeria Export-Import Bank, Nigeria




CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 43


Export Promotion Council, Nigerian Invest-
ment Promotion Council and the Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Agency.
Some of these agencies emerged to sup-
port ongoing changes in the industrial sec-
tor. For example, the Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Agency was cre-
ated in the early 2000s to nurture SMEs,
the largest group in the industrial sector.
The government also put in place an up-
dated Industrial Development Plan in 2014
(see next section).


c. Nationalvisionstatements:Nigeria
Vision2010and2020


Along with the industrial policy of 1998, Nige-
ria also adopted the Vision 2010, the purpose
of which was to provide an overall national
vision for development. The Vision 2010 re-
port aimed to transform Nigeria into an Afri-
can economic powerhouse, with a significant
presence in the global economy by 2010.
Vision 2010 set out specific annual GDP
growth rate targets for the economy: The
country was expected to achieve a growth
rate of 9 per cent between 2001 and 2005
and 10 per cent between 2006 and 2010.


To reinforce the goals of the Vision 2010 re-
port, the government more recently adopt-
ed the Nigeria Vision 20:2020 (hereafter
NV 20:2020), which is a long-term strategy
aimed at transforming the Nigerian econ-
omy into one of the top 20 global econo-
mies by 2020. The Vision 20:2020 aims at a
growth expansion of the Nigerian economy
from $173bn in 2009 to $900bn by 2020
(with a per capita income of $4,000). The
key policy milestones to achieve this transi-
tion NV 20:2020 included:


(i) Maintaining an average annual
GDP growth rate of 13.8 per cent;


(ii) Reducing national inflation to a sin-
gle digit figure (see NPC, 2010);


(iii) Increasing the contribution of the
manufacturing sector from 4 to
12 per cent of GDP during 2010-
2013.15


The NV 20:2020 is now being implement-
ed through a series of medium-term plans


(called National Implementation Plans or
NIPs), the first of which was developed for
the period of 2010-2013. The second and
third NIPs of 2014-2017 and 2018-2020,
respectively, have also been formulated. In
order to complement the first NIP, the Ni-
gerian government introduced the Transfor-
mation Agenda (TA) 2011-2015.


Most recently, the Federal Ministry of Indus-
try, Trade, and Investment with inputs from
other government agencies and the private
sector introduced an Industrial Revolution
Plan in January 2014. The Plan also recog-
nizes the importance of coordinating indus-
try development with trade and investment
regimes.


d. Nigeria’sNationalSTIPolicy


The failure of the Third National Develop-
ment Plan led to an analysis of the causes
behind stagnating industrial production.
One of the main failings of the first three
development plans is widely considered to
be due to the lack of a comprehensive ap-
proach integrating technology acquisition
and training in the day-to-day workings of
public sector enterprises.


To address this, Nigeria adopted a S&T Pol-
icy in 1986 to address the difficulties faced
by public sector firms, focusing mainly on
technology acquisition and technology
transfer issues. The policy was, however,
not very effective in promoting technologi-
cal know-how, particularly in Nigeria’s ail-
ing public sector enterprises. A system-
atic analysis of these failed projects, as
reflected in studies (see Imevbore, 2001;
Oyeyinka, 1997b) showed that in almost all
cases, there was a lack of conceptualiza-
tion of the process of technology capabil-
ity and a missing focus on technological
learning amongst enterprises beyond the
generic acquisition of hardware machinery
and equipment.


The 1986 S&T Policy was revisited in 1997
and again in 2003, through policy reviews
that tried to place greater emphasis on
coordination of the country’s S&T system;
set sectoral priorities, tackle the question
of funding of S&T activities and empha-




44 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


size upon collaboration in order to make it
more effective. The 2003 policy review was
based on the premise that Nigeria needed
a policy framework that allowed for more
systemic interaction to promote science
and technology at the same time as inno-
vation capacity.


In 2005, Nigeria embarked upon a system-
wide review of its S&T framework along
with UNESCO following the widely held
view that the 2003 policy review was not
comprehensive enough, particularly in cre-
ating a focus on innovation capacity. At the
end of the 2005 review, Nigeria adopted a
new national STI policy framework in 2011.
The earlier 2003 document, as noted in the
preamble of the national STI policy of 2011,
is now considered to form a compendium
of the main subsectoral policies at the core
of the STI policy framework.


The mission of the national STI policy of
2011, as contained in Article 2.3, is to assist
in “[e]volving a nation that harnesses, devel-
ops and utilizes STI to build a large, strong,
diversified, sustainable and competitive
economy that guarantees a high standard of
living and quality of life to its citizens.” The
STI policy vision is in line with that contained
in the Nigeria Vision 2020, namely to have
a large, strong, diversified, sustainable and
competitive economy by 2020. The specific
objectives of the policy are rather elaborate,
and include the creation of innovative enter-
prises, promote interactive learning, provide
better funding, and provide an overarching
institutional framework for STI.


C. INNOVATION AND
INDUSTRY GROWTH:
RESULTS OF THE
FIELD SURVEY


1. Enterprise characteristics in the
three surveyed sectors


Apart from varying technological intensity
(see chapter I), there were some other rea-
sons for choosing the three sectors for the
survey. Firstly, both ICTs and pharmaceuti-
cals are priority sectors in Nigeria, whereas


the agro-processing sector is currently rec-
ognized to be one of the most successful
economic sectors. Secondly, in order to be
able to use the survey to gauge the impact
of Nigeria’s policy changes over the past
two decades, companies established in
the 1990s and early 2000s were chosen (to
the extent possible) to understand the im-
pact of institutional support (and changes
therein) on industrial performance, R&D and
innovation.


Thirdly, the survey sought to cover compa-
nies of all sizes in order to capture differ-
ences between firm size and performance.
According to government estimates, as of
2010, there were about 17.3 million MS-
MEs, contributing about 46.5  per cent of
the country’s GDP (NBS, 2010). In the firms
surveyed, as of 2012, 22  per cent of the
companies employed 1-9 staff (micro en-
terprises), 50  per cent of the companies
employed 10-49 employees (small scale),
15  per cent of the companies employed
50-199 people (medium-scale), and 12 per
cent were large-scale companies employ-
ing over 199 personnel on a full-time ba-
sis.16


2. Survey results: Nature of
innovation in the three sectors


Given that firms engage in different kinds of
learning activities, the questions targeted
the number of product or process activities
that the firms are engaged in, and whether
these products and processes are new to
the local firm (indicating routine learning),
the local market (indicating incremental in-
novations, local adaptations), the regional
or global market (indicating potential inno-
vation inputs into new industrial products
and processes). Other questions were di-
rected at understanding the nature of firm-
level learning.


a. Newprocessandproduct
innovations


Survey results show that the propensity of
firms to engage in new product or process
development depended on the technologi-
cal intensity of the three sectors surveyed
(table 3.2). The highest share of firms en-




CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 45


gaging in product development was in the
sector that called for the lowest techno-
logical capacity (agro-processing), 84.1 per
cent of the firms were reported to engage in
such activities; the percentage decreased
in the case of health care and pharmaceuti-
cals as well as ICTs (to 51 and 62 per cent,
respectively). In the case of process inno-
vations (which refer to creation/adoption of
new processes), both agro-processing and
ICT firms reported higher innovation rates
when compared to health care and phar-
maceuticals (50  per cent as opposed to
over 80 per cent in the former two sectors).


To understand the nature of these innova-
tions, the firms were asked to rate the nov-
elty of their innovative efforts. As table 3.2
shows, a large number of firms surveyed
admitted that their new process/product in-
novations were new to the firms, and that
only 21  per cent of these firms admitted
that their products were new to the local
market. These survey results show that
firms tended to produce products/process-
es that were new to the firm or local market
in low technology sectors, thus reflecting
the low level of technology intensity within
firms.


The survey also studied the nature of the
activities undertaken within the firms that
led to new product/process development.
While 30 per cent of the firms admitted to
conducting some form of R&D, 65 per cent
of the companies only focused on produc-
tion and marketing, while 22  per cent re-
ported that they were engaged in product
development, and that 12 per cent were en-
gaged in testing and laboratory services.17


Firms in ICTs and pharmaceuticals reported
a very small amount of contract manufac-
turing (2.6  per cent of their total activity).
The survey results show that a majority of
the firms were engaged in marketing and
distributing products, rather than creating
new products/processes.


b. Collaborationsandsourcesof
technologicalinformationforfirms


There are several ways to determine inno-
vation capacity at the enterprise level. First
and foremost among these is the propen-
sity to engage in R&D. Others include de-
termining the sources of technological in-
formation/learning in the firms, or the nature
of plant machinery and equipment that was
used in the competitive industrial activity.


Health care/
pharmaceuticals


Agro-
processing ICT Other Overall


Numberoffirms(1) 52 79 44 25 200
Product
development(2)


23/45 58/69 18/29 17/18 116/161


Share(3)(%) 51.1 84.1 62.1 94.4 72.0
Process
development(4)


22/44 53/64 24/27 17/18 116/153


Share(5)(%) 50.0 82.8 88.8 94.4 75.8
Products new to(6)


Firm 13/45 (28.8%) 21/46 (45.7%) 12/23 (52.2%) 9/10 (90%) 55/124 (44.4%)
Local market 2/45 (4.4%) 14/46 (30.4%) 8/23 (34.8%) – 24/114 (21.1%)
Regional market – – – – –
Global market – – – – –


Table3.2: Distributionoffirmscarryingoutnewproductandprocessdevelopments


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on Nigeria Field Survey, 2013.
Note: The category ‘other’ in this and all other tables in this chapter indicates firms that participated in the


survey, but could not be strictly classified under one or another category. For example, firms that
engaged in agro-processing and nutraceuticals, or companies that provided ICT services, such as
access to the internet.


(1) Number of firms that participated in the survey.
(2) Firms that carried out product development out of the total number of firms responding to this question.
(3) Share of firms that carried out product development out of the total number of firms responding to this question.
(4) Number of firms that carried out process development out of the total number of firms responding to this question
(5) Share of firms that carried out process development out of the total number of firms responding to this question.
(6) Number of firms that indicated product or process is new out of the total number of firms responding to this question.




46 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


The survey looked at all of these aspects
to understand the sources of technological
learning.


A majority of the firms surveyed reported
that they relied on their own efforts to re-
main competitive (table 3.3). While the high-
est rated factor was in-house R&D, inter-
views showed that the understanding of
what constituted R&D at the firm-level was
very different (see explanation in the next
section). In addition to their own efforts,
firms cited other important factors, includ-
ing the support provided by intermediary
organizations, collaborations with industry
associations and ‘others’. The category
‘others’ was elaborated as copying and
reverse engineering, a practice undertaken
by a large number of the surveyed firms.
Figures in the table below are ranked in
order of importance between 0 (not impor-


tant) and 2 (extremely important).The sur-
vey questionnaire sought to understand the
contribution of various sources of technol-
ogy to new product/process development
at the firm-level. Figures in table 3.4 below
are ranked in order of importance between
0 (not important) and 5 (extremely impor-
tant). Skilled manpower was rated as the
most important factor in new product/pro-
cess development, followed by the quality
of local infrastructure services, availability of
venture capital, participation in local SMEs
schemes, transfer of personnel between lo-
cal firms/R&D institutions (for training) and
so on.


On the whole, the survey showed that the
majority of firm-level activity is still focused
on sourcing spare parts and assembling
them to produce products of relatively low
technological intensity but as confirmed


Technology sources Health care/ pharma
Agro-


processing ICT Other Overall


In-house R&D 1.37 1.34 1.68 1.10 1.37
Support from intermediary
organization 0.47 1.29 1.55 1.00 1.08


Collaboration(1) 0.53 1.29 1.48 1.00 1.07


Others 0.37 1.11 1.53 1.00 1.00


Licensed(2) 0.47 1.18 1.13 1.00 0.95


Adaptedfromcompetitors 0.45 1.09 1.23 0.75 0.88


Table3.3: Newprocessesandorganizationalsystemsoffirmsbysources


Table 3.4: Contribution of various factors to new product or process development


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on Nigeria Field Survey, 2013.
Note: Figures only include firms that reported new process development. Figures represent the mean of


rankings between 0 (not important) and 2 (extremely important).
(1) Within industry association.
(2) From technology supplier.


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on Nigeria Field Survey, 2013.
Note: Figures represent the mean of rankings between 0 (not important) and 5 (extremely important).


Health
care/


pharma
Agro-


processing ICT Other Overall


Scientific/skilledmanpower 3.43 2.72 3.42 3.68 3.31
Quality of local infrastructure services 2.98 2.71 2.36 3.42 2.87
Availabilityofventurecapital 3.28 2.62 2.32 2.95 2.79
Participation in local SMI development schemes 2.67 2.06 2.29 3.16 2.54
Intellectual property protection 2.98 2.28 1.88 2.74 2.47
TransferofpersonneltolocalfirmsorR&Dinstitutions
(fortraining) 2.56 1.97 2.03 2.84 2.35


Participationinjointgovernment/firmtechnology
transfer coordination councils 2.34 2.10 2.14 2.74 2.33


R&D collaboration with local institutions focused on
R&D 2.72 1.69 2.03 2.05 2.12


Collaboration with local universities on R&D 2.50 1.56 2.20 2.21 2.12
Government incentives for innovation 2.23 1.86 1.81 2.37 2.07




CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 47


by face-to-face interviews, respondents
viewed and reported the sourcing and as-
sembling of these spare parts as R&D. A
large number of the surveyed firms were
concerned about how to source spare
parts and equipment for the day-to-day
functioning of the enterprises, which also
led to low utilization rates (see next section).


3. Survey results: Sectoral
weaknesses, innovation
constraints and industry
performance


The survey also focused on understanding
innovation constraints and industry perfor-
mance issues that affected the activities of
the firms. The results are presented here in
four separate categories: (a) failings in the
general innovation environment; (b) issues
of competitiveness; (c) policy impediments
to learning; and (d) the lack of collaborative
linkages.


a. Failingsinthegeneralinnovation
environment


Surveyed firms identified several difficulties
related to learning. One of the largest prob-
lems they faced was the lack of support to
engage in technological learning within the
national innovation system.


i. Knowledgerelatedissues


A major prerequisite for successful innova-
tion is the competence of available human
capital. Amongst the firms interviewed, only
6.9 per cent of staff had obtained a PhD,
while 25.1  per cent of staff had either a
Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees. Most other
employees did not have a higher academic
qualification. As a result, a large number of
the firms reported to be limited by a lack of
skilled personnel.


As captured in the next section, firms also
identified the issue of weak linkages be-
tween SMEs and large firms and knowl-
edge centres.


ii. Physical infrastructure related issues


The number of telephone lines rose signifi-
cantly from a mere 750,000 lines in 2001 to
over 171.9 million in September 2013; over


the same period, teledensity increased from
less than 5  per cent in 2001 to 86.6  per
cent. However, the ubiquitous lack of effi-
cient physical infrastructure, such as elec-
tricity for industrial purposes continues to
be a drag on to the economy (see next sec-
tion).


b. Competitiveness-relatedissues


The survey found that Nigerian companies
continue to face many of the same innova-
tion infrastructure deficiencies that local en-
terprises faced in the 1970s and the 1980s.
For example, prior to 2001, most Nigerians
lacked access to telephones as a result of
outdated technologies and the inability of
NITEL Plc (the then public monopoly re-
sponsible for the provision of phone lines)
to make much needed investments in rel-
evant technologies. Similarly, a lack of in-
vestment into other public utility services
continues to hinder the provision of good
physical infrastructure for industrial activi-
ties, for example electricity. Electricity has
been a hindrance to industrial production
since the 1970s; a period when power sup-
ply was not well-integrated into the con-
struction of large-scale industrial plants.


The survey also shows that a major con-
cern of companies continues to be how to
source spare parts and equipment for the
day-to-day functioning of the enterprises,
or how to maintain production cycles de-
spite the daily occurrence of infrastructure
deficiencies.


As a result, capital utilization remains low
owing to difficulties related to infrastructure,
high (and fluctuating) input and raw material
prices, and a lack of access to local and re-
gional markets. The survey also found that
local companies still find it very difficult to
gain a foothold in local markets, even when
they invest in quality products. Respond-
ents considered that the policy regime does
not facilitate differentiated product pricing
based on quality. Another issue that was
repeatedly raised by the interviewees was
that local customers often opted to buy
foreign goods dumped in the market over
locally produced goods.




48 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


c. Policyimpedimentstolearningand
innovation


Several of the firms interviewed were una-
ware of the 2011 National STI Policy, and
were therefore unable to profit from the pol-
icy and incentives contained in this policy
in any meaningful manner. Survey respond-
ents also noted that they were unfamiliar
with some of the new policy agencies, such
as the National Competitiveness Council,
which was established in 2013. Other fac-
tors identified by surveyed firms as impedi-
ments to technological learning and tech-
nology-based industrial development are
presented in table 3.5 below.


d. Lackofcollaborativelinkages


Innovation processes rely on the robust
interactions of actors both within and out-
side firms, particularly as these processes
act as positive feedback loops to product
and process development activities. Sur-
vey results show that while firms reported
that they are engaged in new products and
processes (table 3.3 above), existing weak
linkages, low educational qualifications and
low levels of government support or invest-
ment to promote collaborative partnerships
meant that they were not very innovative.


While most firms acknowledged low levels
of collaboration as an issue that needed to
be resolved, a few companies reported that


Table 3.5: Factors preventing enterprises from developing technology and engaging in
competition


Health care
& pharma-
ceuticals


Agro-
processing ICT Other Overall


Local duties and levies 4.03 4.21 4.09 4.50 4.21
Officialcorruption 4.19 4.15 4.01 4.25 4.15
Customs procedures and EXIM policy 4.16 3.98 3.76 4.50 4.10
Restrictions in licensing arrangements 4.26 3.92 3.76 4.00 3.99
Regulations, including industrial and innovation
policy 4.11 3.92 3.71 3.80 3.88


Patentofficedelaysandotherrestrictionson
testing 4.00 3.96 3.82 3.71 3.87


Others 4.14 3.80 3.63 - 3.86
Municipal regulations 3.92 3.79 3.59 3.93 3.81
Accesstoland(1) 3.65 3.85 3.70 4.00 3.80
Local duties and levies 4.03 4.21 4.09 4.50 4.21


they were engaged in formal and informal
collaborations facilitated by personal net-
works. Notably, survey results show that
informal contacts account for 40 per cent
of ongoing interactive collaborations. Sur-
vey respondents also cited the poor co-
ordination among agencies competing for
relevance as a critical issue.


D. OUTSTANDING
ISSUES FOR
CONSIDERATION


Nigeria’s transformation into an economy
of the kind projected in the Nigerian Vi-
sion 2020, as well as the Nigerian National
STI Policy framework will depend on how
and to what extent the country is able to
provide an institutional framework that
promotes technology-led industrial devel-
opment. Nigeria’s challenges are different
from the other two countries (Ethiopia and
the United Republic of Tanzania) in this re-
port, in large part because of its depend-
ency on its resource-richness, low levels of
technological capabilities, and is faced with
a continuing economic boom owing to the
rising demand for commodities.18


In 2014, fuels accounted for $92 billion
of the $98 billion’s worth of merchandise
goods that were exported by Nigeria. This
large share of fuel-based exports estab-


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on Nigeria Field Survey, 2013.
Note: Figures represent the mean of rankings between 1 (no impact) to 5 (prohibitive impact on learning).
(1) Registration cost and procedures.




CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 49


lishes Nigeria as one of the countries with
the least diversified merchandise exports.19
Secondly, despite overall growth, Nigeria’s
institutional infrastructure is largely unable to
promote systemic and sectoral coordination,
which is extremely important to promote
economic activity of a productive nature.


Nigeria has as a result seen a gradual but sig-
nificant shift of labour and productive resourc-
es away from agriculture and manufacturing
to resource-based sectors that have very little
or no domestic technological components.
This is well-illustrated in figure 3.2, which
shows that the composition of Nigeria’s ex-
ports has only marginally changed over the
past two decades. Fuels remained the main
source of export revenues and account for
more than 90  per cent share in total mer-
chandise exports throughout the period from
1995 to 2014. The share of food and live ani-
mals product group fell from about 3 to 2 per
cent during the same period, while the share
of crude materials and inedible products in-
creased slightly over the past decade.20


Merchandise exports have not played a
significant role in the acceleration of eco-
nomic growth during the period from 2000
to 2014. While real annual economic growth
rate switched from -0.4 per cent in 1990s to
4.6 per cent between 2000 and 2014, this
has had minimal impact on real export growth
between these two periods. Revival of eco-
nomic growth, and thus domestic demand,


on the other hand, led to a surge in Nigerian
imports since the beginning of 2000s.


Under these circumstances, promoting de-
velopment through productivity-enhancing
growth is not an easy task despite Nigeria’s
abundant labour and natural resource en-
dowments (Otsuka, 2012; IDB, 2010).


Box 3.2 below provides the example of
Chile, which moved from resource-rich base
to a more structurally diversified economy.
Chile’s move to a more diversified produc-
tion structure is useful in the context of iden-
tifying some policy-based good practices.


E. CONCLUDING
REMARKS


As one of the most dynamic countries in Af-
rica, and having recorded the fastest growth
rate out of all African countries in 2012, Ni-
geria is touted to become a new entrant into
the club of emerging developing countries in
the near future (UNCTAD, 2012). According
to the new rebased figures, manufacturing
activity is on the rise (at 8 per cent in 2013),
and a range of new policy instruments have
been put in place to help the economy be-
come more competitive at both the regional
and international level.


However, the primary challenge faced by
Nigeria is that of moving from planning to
implementation, particularly through coor-
dinating its efforts to boost industry perfor-


Figure3.2: ProductcompositionofNigerianmerchandiseexports,1995-2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (accessed on 20 October 2015).




0.0


10.0


20.0


30.0


40.0


50.0


60.0


70.0


80.0


90.0


100.0


19
95


19
96


19
97


19
98


19
99


20
00


20
01


20
02


20
03


20
04


20
05


20
06


20
07


20
08


20
09


20
10


20
11


20
12


20
13


20
14


Food and live animals


Beverages and
tobacco
Crude materials,
inedible, except fuels
Mineral fuels,
lubricants etc
Animal and vegetable
oils etc
Chemicals and
related products
Manufactured goods


Machinery and
transport equipment
Miscellaneous
manufactured articles




50 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


Box 3.2: Chile’s industrial and innovation policy mixes: Experience and lessons from
another resource rich country


Chile, much like Nigeria, is a resource-rich country, with copper accounting for 60 per cent of exports
and 20 per cent of GDP in 2010 (The Economist, 2013). Data show that the real GDP per capita of
Chile more than tripled from $ 3,230 in 1970 to $ 9,771 in 2013, making the country one of the best
economic performers in Latin America over this period. The country has had its share of successes
and challenges over three distinct industrial and innovation policy regimes. The first period covered
the state-led import substitution strategy that was pursued prior to 1973; the second, the market-led
or economic liberalization policies adopted from 1973 to 1990 following a change in government; and
the third, the export-led economic development strategy and reforms which began in the 1990s. Since
2010, Chile has embarked on a long-term economic policy strategy that seeks to consolidate previous
economic successes through technological learning and innovation by 2030. Chile’s industrial and in-
novation policy and economic performance and lessons learned are summarized below.


1. State-led import substitution strategy prior to 1973


The industrial policy mix during this period included the protection of infant industries through a high tariff
system and import control, and the nationalization of copper mining and private manufacturing firms.
The role of the state was not limited to creating an enabling environment for industry; instead, it took
on the role of an ‘entrepreneur’ and became directly involved in mining and manufacturing activities.
Whereas direct government involvement under the state-led import substitution strategy failed in several
developing countries, Chile’s experience delivered mixed outcomes. Data show that the annual real
GDP growth rate declined from 9 per cent in 1971 to -5.6 per cent in 1973, and the annual growth rate
per capita dropped from 7 per cent to -7.2 per cent over the period between 1971 and 1973.
Key lessons: A key lesson learned is that, the state’s direct involvement in economic activities yielded
positive results and contributed to increasing the country’s annual per capita growth rate to 7 per cent
in 1971. The difficulty was that the growth was not sustainable due to fluctuating export prices, falling
export earnings and failure to rectify the country’s balance of payment problems (Sapelli, 2003). Another
lesson is that, the industrial development strategy that was pursued was not coordinated with techno-
logical learning and innovation schemes, thereby limiting its positive impact.


2. The economic liberalization policy mixes from 1973 to 1990


Chile launched its liberalization process with an industrial policy strategy involving the reinstitution and re-
turn of nationalized firms to the private sector. This led to the withdrawal of the government from its prior
direct involvement in manufacturing and production of economic goods. The state’s role was limited to
creating an enabling business environment for the private sector through the removal of high tariffs, as
well as credit and import controls. The state also created supporting institutions, such as ProChile, to
promote exports and help exporters to discover niche markets, and the Service de Cooperation Tec-
nica (SERCOTEC) to provide financial support to SMEs. A very important development at the time was
the effort to promote innovation: Fundación Chile was created in 1976 with the mandate to promote
technology transfer and innovation and add value to the country’s vast natural resources. It is credited
with the creation of over 60 new companies using new technologies to enhance their competitiveness.
Capacitación y Empleo (SENCE) was also created in 1976 under the Ministry of Labour and Insurance
with the mandate to train and offer labour-related services. Real GDP per capita rose from $ 3,114 in
1973 to $ 4,016 in 1990 when the country returned to democratic rule and expanded its market-based
strategy with wider application of new technologies and innovation.


Key lessons: The main lesson is that Chile began to emphasize technological learning and innovation
in industrial development earlier than other resource-rich countries such as Nigeria. The creation of Fun-
dación Chile in 1976 to promote technology transfer and innovation to add value to the country’s natural
resources attest to that effort. Fundación Chile was associated with the creation of the salmon industry
in Chile, which ranked as the world’s second largest exporter in 2006.
Private sector-led economic growth and development became more sustainable with the increasing
application of new technologies and innovation.


3. The export-led economic development strategy from 1990 to date


Chile’s challenges in diversifying private sector activities became the policy focus in this period. Looking
to consolidate its previous economic successes through enhanced institutional support, InnovaChile




CHAPTER III : COORDINATING INNOVATION AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: NIGERIA’S EXPERIENCE 51


Box 3.2: Chile’s industrial and innovation policy mixes: Experience and lessons from
another resource rich country (cont.)


was set up in 2004 with the mandate to subsidize innovation activities of firms and other research institu-
tions. The following year, the National Innovation Council for Competitiveness (CNIC) was established
by presidential decree in 2005. CNIC was also given the directive to subsidize innovation activities in
the country. CNIC largely focuses on the research institutions and universities (Agosin et al., 2010). In-
novaChile provides grants for companies and other research institutions based on project proposals.
Besides project grants, and also offers advisory and technical services to companies and other stake-
holders in order to foster an innovation and entrepreneurship culture within the country.


Since 2010, Chile also embarked on a global connection programme and provided incentives for a
thousand highly innovative entrepreneurs to launch start-ups in Chile. The objective is to provide a learn-
ing opportunity for local companies through networking. The government has also sought to encourage
local companies to interact and adapt technological best practices from centres of excellence outside
Chile. By 2030, the Government of Chile intends to make Chile an innovation hub in Latin America and
boost the competitiveness of local companies and the national economy at large (InnovaChile, 2010).
The rise in Chile’s real GDP per capita from $4,016 in 1990 to $ 9,771 in 2013 can partly be attributed
to the policy mixes pursued by the government.


Key lessons: Current government initiatives reflect the state’s commitment to promote innovation, en-
trepreneurship and the competitiveness of Chilean companies in areas beyond traditional technologi-
cal learning channels, such as FDI and technological acquisition. Employing unconventional innovation
schemes, such as ‘accelerator and network’ programmes for high-tech start-ups in Chile, and also
sponsoring local counterparts to tap into the global knowledge bases are cutting-edge initiatives.


Source: UNCTAD.


mance, so that the economic growth can
be channeled into sustainable develop-
ment. A majority of firms, and particularly
SMEs, need specific incentives to improve
their performance, speed-up access to fi-
nance and promote market penetration for
their products.


A first step in this direction is coordinat-
ing the industrial policy framework with STI
policy. This has already been accomplished
in theory by identifying the same objectives
in the two policy frameworks. The challenge
that now remains is to implement this in
practice by linking the wide range of policy
agencies and incentives to promote techno-
logical learning. For this to happen, efforts
need to be made to resolve the conflicting
objectives of several agencies, set the fund-
ing and targets of individual agencies, and
articulate the different incentives for the per-
formance of agencies involved in promoting
innovation-based industrial performance.


The survey conducted for this chapter, as
substantiated by secondary data sources
and national reports, shows that Nigeria’s in-
stitutional infrastructure continues to remain


to structurally weak; it is therefore critical to
address these limitations in the immediate
future. Nigeria has a lot of technology infra-
structure, including R&D institutions, dedi-
cated R&D complexes (such as the SHEST-
CO complex), quality assurance and testing,
and technology incubation, some of which
are being further strengthened. Despite this,
the survey shows that coordination between
these agencies needs to be improved, and
also that basic infrastructure needs to be
strengthened to enable companies to per-
form more efficiently. However, the coun-
try’s development objectives are currently
compromised by poor coordination among
agencies competing for relevance, lack of
collaborative linkages, together with the
paucity of scientific and technical personnel
with the requisite understanding of the S&T
system. Clarifying the roles and responsibili-
ties, and increasing budgets of these agen-
cies will help to improve the quality of assis-
tance they render to the private sector.


A comparative perspective of these findings
can be found in the concluding chapter of
this report (chapter VI).




52 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


NOTES


1. Data released from the Nigerian statistics office estimate the value of the country’s economy at
around $509 billion for 2013, which is nearly twice as high as what was estimated earlier. This
outdoes the South African GDP of $315 billion for the same year.


2. The African Economic Outlook 2013 estimates that oil sector contributes to 8.0 per cent of the
average annual growth rate of the country, as opposed to the -0.35 per cent of the non-oil sector
(AfDB, OECD, UNDP and UNECA, 2013, p. 264).


3. World Bank Database, based on a USD 1 per day poverty estimate. Similarly, unemployment has
also been on the rise, going up from 6.4 per cent in 1980 to 21 per cent in 2010 (See AfDB, OECD,
UNDP and UNECA, 2013, p. 264; Njoku and Ihugba, 2011, p. 3).


4. UNCTADstat (accessed on 24 September 2015).


5. UNCTADstat (accessed on 24 September 2015).


6. UNCTADstat (accessed on 25 June 2014).


7. ILO LABORSTA database (accessed on 25 June 2014).


8. Ibid.


9. ILO LABORSTA database (accessed on 20 October 2014). These figures differ slightly from those
provided by the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics.


10. For examples of large scale projects that failed in Nigeria, see Poynter (1982), Poynter (1986),
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (1998), among others.


11. Granted by the Central Bank of Nigeria and NEXIM to assist banks to bear the risks in export busi-
ness and thereby facilitate export financing and export volumes.


12. Granted by the Nigeria Export Promotion Council in 2005 to encourage companies to engage in
export business rather than domestic business, especially exported who have exported $ 50,000
worth of semi-manufactured or manufactured products.


13. Granted by the Nigerian Export Promotion Council as a form of export subsidy to compensate ex-
porters of products whose foreign prices had become relatively unattractive due to factors beyond
the exporters’ control.


14. Granted by the Nigerian Export Promotion Council to encourage exporters to use local raw materi-
als. This has not yet been implemented.


15. In addition to these, there are several incremental milestones listed out in the policy framework for
the accomplishment of these goals. For example, it is stipulated that capacity utilization is raised
from 54.7 per cent in 2008 to 65 per cent by 2013 (National Planning Commission of Nigeria,
2010).


16. UNCTAD primary survey data on total employment of firms.


17. Many firms were engaged in more than one of these activities that is, production and marketing,
or production and product development, hence some of the categories do not add up to 100 per
cent.


18. Existing data shows that from 2004 onwards, emerging economies are the main drivers of the
resource-boom in African countries, having surpassed the developed world in their demand for
natural resources (see UNCTAD, 2012).


19. In 2012, Nigeria scored 0.775 in UNCTAD’s export concentration index. Although this score is
very high, it is smaller than the country’s score in late 1990s and early 2000s. See UNCTAD Stat
Database (accessed on 10 July 2014).


20. Exports of food and live animals fluctuated over the course of past two decades in Nigeria’s mer-
chandise exports, in part due to changes in global food and commodity prices.




4
HARNESSING STI


POLICY FOR
INDUSTRIAL


DEVELOPMENT
IN THE


UNITED REPUBLIC
OF TANZANIA







CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 55


CHAPTER IV
HARNESSING STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC


OF TANZANIA


a. INTRODUCTION
The Arusha Declaration of 1967 marks the
start of state-led industrialization efforts in
the post-independent United Republic of
Tanzania, and embodies the national am-
bition that the government set out with: to
reduce the country’s heavy dependence on
agriculture and steer it towards becoming
an industry-led economy. Since then, the
United Republic of Tanzania has enacted
a wide range of industrial development
strategies and national plans to promote
economic development, job growth and
poverty alleviation and continues to strive
to promote industrialization. Although there
has been stable economic growth between
2000 and 2014, the economy continues to
rely heavily on agriculture and low value-
added manufacturing. Sustaining future
GDP growth rates, therefore, remains a
challenge (see figure 4.1).  


This chapter is based on a case study of
three sectors in the United Republic of Tan-


zania (agro- processing, pharmaceuticals and
health care and ICTs). It aims to understand the
causes why little structural change has taken
place and explain the country’s lackluster in-
dustrial performance, and the role of policy in
the process. The chapter addresses three key
questions related to the interface between in-
novation policy and industrial development. A
field survey was conducted for this chapter in
collaboration with the Tanzania Commission
for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry
and Agriculture (TCCIA) to identify policy chal-
lenges for innovation capacity and industrial
development (see box 4.1).


B. CURRENT DYNAMICS
AND STRUCTURAL
GAPS IN THE
ECONOMY


The challenges faced by the United Repub-
lic of Tanzania in promoting industrial growth
can be traced back to the 1960s. This sec-


Box4.1: DatasourcesandfieldsurveyintheUnitedRepublicofTanzania


A primary survey using semi-structured questionnaires was conducted by UNCTAD, in collabora-
tion with COSTECH and TCCIA, to understand the underlying drivers of innovation and industrial
performance in the United Republic of Tanzania in 2013/2014. COSTECH and TCCIA chose the
firms to be surveyed, based on the overall structure of the private sector. Randomized selection
techniques were used for the survey.


In addition to the survey, in October 2013 UNCTAD also conducted field interviews and industry
visits in the United Republic of Tanzania, in partnership with the COSTECH and the TCCIA, in order
to gather information by consulting stakeholders. In addition, a one-day workshop was organized
by UNCTAD in collaboration with COSTECH to elicit responses on the key issues in harnessing
innovation policies for industrial development in the country, with a wide variety of stakeholders,
including national agencies, enterprises and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).


COSTECH was established in 1986 as a forum that coordinates key scientific and technological
institutions. It serves in an advisory role to the government on science and technology (S&T) related
issues and their application to bolster socioeconomic development in the United Republic of Tan-
zania. TCCIA was established in 1988 and currently has 21 regional offices and 90 district centres
across the country.


Source: UNCTAD.




56 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


tion presents brief sectoral trends, and pre-
sents the difficulties faced by the economy
from the 1960s up until the present day.


1. Sectoral trends


The United Republic of Tanzania is showing
signs of overall economic growth, as de-
picted in figure 4.1, although this is not at-
tributable directly to an expansion of manu-
facturing. The services sector is the largest
economic activity in the country, accounting
for 43.9 per cent of national income in 2013
(table 4.1). This is followed by agriculture,
which, accounts for about 33.5 per cent of
GDP and 76 per cent of the labour force as
of 2013, making it the most important sec-
tor in the economy.1 Viewed in retrospect,
data show that the sector’s share in nation-
al income increased over the past four dec-
ades. Despite this, unproductive agriculture
remains one of the main challenges in the
country’s development up until now, along
with an over-reliance on extractive sectors
and low value-added manufacturing (UNI-
DO and GURT, 2012).


According to available data, the industrial
sector currently contributes the least to
GDP when compared to services and ag-
riculture, but has been capturing an ever-


increasing share of GDP over the past two
and a half decades. This industrial sector
growth is mainly accounted for by non-
manufacturing sectors, such as mining
and construction. Rapid urbanization and
increased government investment in public
infrastructure have boosted the growth of
the construction sector (UNIDO and GURT,
2012). In comparison, the manufacturing
sector has witnessed a declining share in in-
dustrial activity over the past four decades,
similar to the trajectory followed by many
other LDCs, but this has become particu-
larly noticeable since the 1980s (see table
4.1). Industrial subsectors, as a result, are
also rather weak in terms of employment.
Mining and utilities, which jointly account for
a total of 5.8 per cent of national income,
for example, barely provides 0.7 per cent of
the total national employment.


The data presented in table 4.1 has some
variations when compared to data recently
released by the Tanzania National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS), which revised its nation-
al accounts statistics in October 2014 by
rebasing the series to 2007. According to
the new series, the services sector remains
the largest with 47.3 per cent share of GDP
in 2013, followed by agriculture (31.7  per


Figure 4.1: Real per capita GDP growth rate in the United Republic of Tanzania vis-a-vis
otherregionsofthedevelopingworld,1970-2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (accessed on 30 October 2015).
Note: 2014 figures are estimates.



-2.0


-1.0


0.0


1.0


2.0


3.0


4.0


5.0


6.0


7.0


1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2014


pe
r c


en
t




Tanzania


All countries


Developing
countries: Africa
Developing countries


Developing
countries: America
Developing
countries: Asia




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 57


Table 4.1: Distribution of the United Republic of Tanzania’s GDP by sector, 1970 to 2013
(in percent)


Sectors/ Years 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013


Agriculture,hunting,
forestry,fishing 17.6 17.7 21.5 27.6 29.8 34.0 31.6 30.0 32.0 33.5


Industry 19.0 17.9 16.6 13.0 16.5 16.8 17.2 20.7 20.8 22.6


Mining & utilities 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.8 3.9 3.8 4.9 5.9 5.8


Manufacturing 12.0 12.4 11.8 9.3 9.9 8.6 8.1 7.5 7.3 7.2


Construction 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.4 4.8 4.3 5.3 8.3 7.6 9.7


Services 63.4 64.4 61.9 59.4 53.7 49.2 51.2 49.3 47.2 43.9


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 24 September 2015).


cent) and industry (21 per cent). The manu-
facturing sector accounts for 6.9 per cent
of national income (NBS Tanzania, 2014).


2. The development of innovation
and industrial development
policies 1960s until the present
day


The United Republic of Tanzania’s policy
experience in industrial development and
STI policies can be broken down into two
specific periods. The first distinct period
between 1961 and 1980 was characterized
by industrial strategies focusing on state-
led import substitution. The deployment of
World Bank and IMF-sponsored structural
adjustment policies during the mid-1980s
ushered in a new era in development poli-
cies based on export-led and private sec-
tor-driven development principles; these
continue to form the basis for the country’s
industrial strategies up until the present day.


a. Thefirsteraofindustrial
development:1960stothe1980s


During the early years of independence, the
United Republic of Tanzania encouraged in-
vestment by private foreign capital (through
the 1963 Foreign Investment Protection
Act), official development assistance and
export expansion (Helleiner, 1976; Wangwe,
et al., 2014). During these formative years,
the industrial sector remained rudimentary,
dominated by foreign-owned companies and
largely comprised of agro-processing and low
value-added manufacturing (Gray, 2013).


The Arusha Declaration of 1967 marked a
significant turning point in the country’s de-


velopment policies, as it defined a develop-
mental vision for the country and the gov-
ernment’s role in achieving more concrete
outcomes. Within 24 hours of its adoption,
all private commercial banks were national-
ized and efforts were made to nationalize
all national production initiatives (Nyerere,
1977).


In the period immediately thereafter (i.e.
during the second five-year plan, 1969-
1974), efforts were made to nationalize ex-
isting industries and establish new industrial
parastatals. The parastatals and national-
ized industries enjoyed subsidies, donor
support, heavy state investment and tariff
protection, which combined led to expan-
sion and growth in the initial years. How-
ever, chronic underutilization of capacity,
a steep drop in productivity and mounting
state subsidy costs soon began to dampen
industrial growth in the 1970s (Gray, 2013).


To address this problem, the government
formulated a long-term industrial develop-
ment strategy (the Basic Industrialization
Strategy of 1975-95 [BIS]). The BIS articu-
lated ambitious goals in terms of industrial
growth and employment generation, and
for the first time recognized to some extent
the need for technical and technological in-
puts in the industrialization process.2


By the end of the 1970s, the implementa-
tion of BIS was disrupted due to adverse
external and internal developments (Wang-
we & Rweyemamu, 2004) when the country
entered a period of economic crisis. Caused
by increased fiscal and trade deficits, spiral-
ing inflation, reduced donor support due to




58 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


policy disagreements and an acute short-
age of imported goods resulting from for-
eign exchange shortages, the crisis exerted
pressure on the government to consider
alternative proposals on economic and in-
dustrial policies from international agencies
during the 1980s.


b. Seconderaofindustrial
development:Thepost-1986period


In 1986, the United Republic of Tanzania
introduced trade liberalization measures
through a structural adjustment programme
under the auspices of the World Bank and
a stand-by agreement with the IMF. As a
result of many of these reforms, particu-
larly those related to tariffs and abolition of
governmental subsidies, industrial growth
continued to plummet during the economic
reform and liberalization phase (UNIDO,
2012). Moreover, reforms failed to increase
technological capabilities due to limited
technological learning, particularly among
public enterprises (Wangwe, et al., 2014).


During this period, the strategy for indus-
trial development remained somewhat un-
clear, as the government was kept busy
with emergency structural reforms, mostly
to meet conditions set by international
agencies. As part of the liberalization pack-
age, foreign ownership restrictions in the
manufacturing sector were lifted. This had
several negative effects: struggling local en-
terprises could not survive the competition
from foreign firms, and the few better per-
forming state-led manufacturing firms were
bought up by foreign buyers.  By the end
of the 1990s, the national enterprise sector
had dwindled down to a small percentage
of what it used to be, and a large number
of local firms had either shut down or were
forced to move into the informal sector (see
also, ILO, UNIDO and UNDP, 2002).


In order to address these adverse impacts
on the industry, a longer-term strategy
known as the Sustainable Industrial Devel-
opment Policy (SIDP) of 1996-2020 was
implemented. This policy was based on
market-led private sector development,
and defined the government’s role as that
of providing an enabling environment. De-


spite its market-led approach, the SIDP en-
visaged that the government could invest
directly in specific industries of critical im-
portance.3


In the spirit of this new reform agenda, the
Tanzania Development Vision 2025 (TDV)
was formulated in 1999. The TDV envisages
that the country would become a middle-
income country following its transforma-
tion into a semi-industrialized economy by
2025. The ambitious targets set out in the
TDV are premised on the recognition that
the industrial sector will play a central role
in the country’s new development agenda.
However, since a clear policy framework
of implementation did not accompany the
TDV, there has been a lack of clarity on how
these goals would be translated into reality.


Around the same time, the Tanzania Mini-
Tiger Plan 2020 (TMTP) was introduced in
2005 to promote diversification of the local
economy.4 The TMTP aimed at replicating
the success of Asian tigers by promoting
some specific innovation policy measures,
e.g. Special Economic Zones (SEZs), to
establish an export-oriented manufacturing
intensive through, among others, an expan-
sion into technology-intensive sectors.


Despite the government’s enthusiasm, the
plan failed to garner support from the donor
community.5 Instead, donors convinced the
government to adopt the National Strategy
for Growth and Poverty Reduction (NSGRP
2005-2010), which focused primarily on
poverty reduction (UNIDO, 2012).6


The NSGRP emphasized sectoral strate-
gies that include promoting agriculture and
resource-based products, as opposed to
the earlier vision for a more diversified in-
dustrial growth. But at the same time, the
five-year plans were reintroduced to pro-
mote the TDV 2025 targets with the recog-
nition that there is a need for a clear road
map, and this time with some of the ear-
lier emphasis on industrial empowerment.
Out of the ten priority investment projects
of the first five-year development plan
(2011-2016), three projects focus on the
industrial sector, namely: (i) Development of




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 59


SEZs, especially for electronic goods, farm
machinery, integrated textile industry and
agro-processing and mineral processing;
(ii) Large scale fertilizer production; and (iii)
the coal and steel industry. Tanzania is cur-
rently in the process of enacting the second
development plan (2016-2021).


In addition, the new Integrated Industrial
Development Strategy 2025 (IIDS) was en-
acted in 2011. The IIDS aims to guide the
process of resource-based industrializa-
tion through instruments, such as indus-
trial cluster development, PPPs and SEZs
(Government of Tanzania, 2011b). This
is somewhat in contrast with studies that
have stressed that resource-based indus-
trialization has hindered the growth of the
country’s productive capacities in manufac-
turing, and that the focus should not be on
resource-based sectors (see for example,
UNIDO, 2012, Wangwe, 2013).


3. The evolution of STI policy in
the United Republic of Tanzania


The difficulties faced in achieving industri-
alization despite several industrial develop-
ment strategies led to a rethink on the role of
technological capacity. Particularly, the more
recent industrial development strategies
were linked by the realization that STI policy
is important, and that the lack of technologi-
cal capacity was responsible for the weak
performance of the local industrial sector.
These are discussed here at length to trace
the linkages in policy articulation and design.


a. Scienceandtechnologypolicy
duringthepre-1996period


Early industrial policies in the United Re-
public of Tanzania focused primarily on
state-led industrialization and offered little
incentives and attention to certain aspects
of STI policies. Noting that the lack of tech-
nological focus was impeding the ability of
enterprises to process intermediate goods
for production efficiently, one of the goals of
BIS (1975-1995) was to increase scientific,
technical and technological knowledge by
expanding the training of industrial workers
and to establish centres for industrial ser-
vices and technology (Kapunda, 2014).


Although the BIS could not be implemented
fully, it paved the way for the establishment
of important public institutions between
1979 and 1982, including the Tanzania
Industrial and Research Organization (TIR-
DO), the Tanzanian Engineering and Manu-
facturing Design Organization (TEMDO)
and the Centre for Agriculture Mechaniza-
tion and Rural Technology (CAMARTEC). It
also led to the National Science and Tech-
nology Policy of 1985, which provided the
impetus for establishment of the COSTECH
in 1986 (see box 4.1), and laid the founda-
tions for the establishment of a Centre for
Development and Transfer of Technology
(CDTT) within COSTECH, which became
fully operational in 1994. This guided the
establishment of the S&T infrastructure un-
til the Sustainable Industrial Development
Policy Framework was put in place in 1996.


b. STIpoliciesinthepost-1996period
The country’s S&T policy subsequently un-
derwent several changes as a result of the
shift to the market-oriented approach to
industrialization adopted in the 1990s: the
latter emphasized leveraging the private
sector for innovation and FDI promotion
much more than building indigenous learn-
ing. This changed with the Sustainable In-
dustrial Development Policy of 1996-2020,
which as discussed in the previous section,
aimed to promote ‘indigenous entrepre-
neurial base through orienting the educa-
tion policy and strategy to emphasize tech-
nical education, including strengthening of
vocational training institutions and entrepre-
neurship development’ (p. 13-14).


As a result, it provided incentives, such as
IPRs and access to credit and recognized
the importance of developing, consolidat-
ing and strengthening scientific research,
technology learning and R&D as contrib-
uting elements in the eventual success of
industrial sector.7


Within the broader policy direction of the
SIDP, a revised national S&T policy was
enacted in 1996. Although the new policy
set the target of increasing the allocation
of funds for scientific R&D to 1 per cent of
GDP by 2000, half of this target (0.52 per




60 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


cent) was reached as of 2010.8 The 1996
S&T policy identified specific sectoral ob-
jectives and strategies to promote the dis-
semination of innovation and technology,
but also continued the focus on agriculture
as a priority sector. Several education and
training policies were put in place to im-
prove public access to education and in-
creasing productivity.


The 1996 S&T policy suffered from other
shortcomings, inter alia:


(i) The sectoral objectives and strat-
egies were not fully translated into
policy actions and targets that
could be acted upon, as a result of
which investments in the country’s
knowledge infrastructure were not
realized (see box 4.2).


(ii) Lack of coordination of the S&T
policy with other ministries, particu-
larly the Ministry of Industry and the
Ministry for Education, resulted in
limiting the impact of the policy on
building human skills and strength-
ening the research system.9


Despite the gravity of these issues, it was
not possible to address them in a compre-
hensive way, at least not up until 2005, as
the first National Strategy for Growth and
Poverty Reduction (NSGPR, 2000-2005)
did not manage to adequately integrate STI
issues to national development and poverty
reduction (Tema & Mlawa, 2009).


But along with the second NSGPR of 2005
and the new industrial development strate-
gy 2025, there has been a fresh impetus on
innovation promotion. The current strategy
places an emphasis on resource-led indus-
trialization, job creation and poverty eradi-
cation. The following changes stand out on
targets and policy actions that related to
the promotion of innovation:


(i) STI promotion has been recog-
nized as a core priority. The new
Five-Year Development Plan (2011-
2016) also spells out certain policy
actions to link academic research
outputs with productive sectors.


(ii) Industrial cluster development is
recognized as the main instrument
for promoting industrial innovation
in the new industrial strategy.


(iii) The industrial strategy 2025 also
recommends upgrading the Na-
tional Development Corporation
(NDC) as an autonomous venture
capital fund.


(iv) The 2010 National Research and
Development Policy (NRDP) that
was enacted to provide an ena-
bling research environment for the
promotion of STI emphasizes: in-
novation and commercialization of
research results; the need for pri-
ority setting of a national research
agenda; and seeks to harmonize


Box 4.2: The knowledge infrastructure of the United Republic of Tanzania


The unavailability of skilled labour is one of the country’s enduring challenges. While the net enrol-
ment rate in primary education was at 97.6 per cent as of 2008, there was a drastic decline in the
same year for secondary education (35 per cent), and tertiary education was a meagre 3.9 per
cent.10


These declines from primary to tertiary education are drastic, particularly given that the United Re-
public of Tanzania allocates a significant share of its national income on public education, amount-
ing to 6.2 per cent of its total GDP in 2010. The country’s public spending on education exceeds
the sums spent on education spending in many other countries worldwide (the world average is
4.9 per cent in 2009). However, it has not translated sufficiently into improvements in education
attainment and human capital levels.11


This low education attainment levels has not made it possible to train and make available sufficient
numbers of R&D personnel. In 2010, the country has about 69 researchers and 16 technicians per
million inhabitants – a low number even when compared to other LDCs.12


Source: UNCTAD.




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 61


the roles of different ministries and
institutions that deal with research
matters. The NRDP also proposes
the creation of a consolidated Na-
tional Research Fund.


c. CurrentSTIcontext


Presently, COSTECH is a central actor to
promote STI in the country, acting under the
Ministry for Communication, Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation. In addition, it also
houses the centre for technology transfer
(CDTT). The Government of the United Re-
public of Tanzania also introduced certain
financial measures, such as fee waiver for
R&D activities, tax incentives for properties
of R&D facilities, licensing of technology
and innovation and revised the Finance Act
in order to incentivize innovation, particu-
larly in low-cost technologies, products and
services.


The National Planning Commission has a
mandate to advise the President on devel-
opment planning policy and strategy also
plays a major role in the implementation of
innovation-related policies. However, in or-
der to promote the coordination of STI ef-
forts and to revisit national priorities in the
light of the Vision 2025 document and the
IIDS 2025, a revised National STI Frame-
work is currently being prepared and pend-
ing Cabinet approval. This revised policy
framework is being prepared in conjunction
with an ongoing reform of the national sys-
tem of innovation.


The draft proposed policy framework could
broaden the definition of COSTECH by
adding ‘innovation’ to the agency’s title and
mandate. If the changes are adopted, the
new Commission would be called Tanzania
Commission for Science, Technology and
Innovation (TCSTI), and would become the
government’s principal advisory organ on
STI issues.


The draft STI Act proposes the establish-
ment of a Centre for Innovation and Tech-
nology Transfer and a National Fund for
the Advancement of STI (or a national fund
on innovation) to provide loans or grants
to research activities, including innovation


projects. Although there have been discus-
sions on such a fund, its structure, man-
agement and agency affiliation have yet to
be decided.


C. INNOVATION
CAPACITY AND
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT:
RESULTS OF THE
FIELD SURVEY


Two important aspects of the country’s in-
dustry are of relevance to understand the
survey results. The first aspect relates to the
nature of its private sector, which has long
been noted for its polarized structure, with
only a small number of firms that have an
export-orientation and a large informal sec-
tor producing low-value added products for
the domestic market with little productivity
(ILO, UNIDO and UNDP, 2002). More re-
cent figures show that the informal sector
has expanded and now accounts for about
48  per cent of the economy (see Osoro,
2009; ESAURP, 2012).


According to estimates, about 88 per cent
of the country’s private sector firms are
classified as micro-enterprises with less
than 5 workers, contributing to an estimat-
ed one-third of GDP.13 A recent survey pegs
the total number of MSMEs at over 3 million
(Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2012). The
same study also suggests that a minority of
these enterprises are of medium size, given
that only 3.9  per cent of the businesses
are formally registered under the Business
Registration and Licensing Agency. In sum,
the bulk of the economy is comprised of in-
formal, micro- and small-sized firms with a
few medium and large companies.


The sectoral spread of the enterprises is
also uneven, given that a majority of MS-
MEs (85.5  per cent) operate in services,
while 0.4  per cent and 13.6  per cent are
active in agriculture and manufacturing, re-
spectively (Ministry of Trade and Industry,
2012). In manufacturing, 91 per cent of the
manufacturing firms are privately owned,
and 97 per cent of total number of manu-




62 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


facturing firms employ fewer than ten em-
ployees (UNIDO and GURT, 2012).14


These broad patterns were also captured
by the survey, which covered a total of
144  firms, 50 of which belonged to the
health care and pharmaceuticals sector, 54
to the agro-processing sector and 28 to the
ICTs sector. Of the 114 companies that pro-
vided employment figures, 60 firms in the
entire sample can be classified as micro-
enterprises (employing less than 10  em-
ployees), 38 are small-scale enterprises and
16 were medium- and large-scale compa-
nies, of which seven were in the pharma-
ceuticals and health care sector.


The second aspect of relevance to under-
stand the survey results is that at least two
of these three sectors have experienced
significant growth rates over the past dec-
ade in the national context.15 This was par-
ticularly striking in the agro-processing sec-
tors, which registered a cumulative increase
of 358  per cent over the period between
1985 and 2012.16


1. Sector snapshots


The agro-processing sector in the United
Republic of Tanzania is built on local agri-
cultural produce, such as processed cash-
ews, coffee and dairy products. Over time,
it has expanded to include not only tradi-
tional agricultural varieties, but also cash
crops, such as cotton, coffee, cashew
nuts and pyrethrum (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka
and Gehl Sampath, 2007). It is fairly low-
scale, with a large number of companies
employing less than five employees, or also
often simply in-house operations run by
women or entrepreneurs relying on local,
often self-sourced financing. They mostly
undertake self-learning to acquire skills,
and show a strong entrepreneurial culture
of high achievement under conditions of
limited opportunities. The only exceptions
to these are some large-scale enterprises
with sophisticated technological machinery
used for processing. In the dairy business,
there are few large milk producers and pro-
cessors. Little cooperation exists between
SMEs, except through cooperatives.


The pharmaceutical sector contains key
companies engaged in the production of
certain important pharmaceutical products.
A handful of pharmaceutical companies
produce about 30 per cent of all over-the-
counter and prescription medicines. The
survey therefore also covered several small-
and medium-sized companies producing
herbal food and traditional medicines based
on local traditional medicinal knowledge.


In the ICTs sector, there are no hardware
producers in the country and it was difficult
to identify firms that are active in software
development. The sample therefore in-
cluded ICT product accessories suppliers,
local Internet companies and distribution
companies.


2. Survey results: Innovation
opportunities and performance


As detailed in chapter I, the survey ques-
tionnaire sought to understand the underly-
ing nature of innovative activity by capturing
many aspects of the way firms’ perceived
their products, including whether they
thought it as new to the firm itself, the lo-
cal market, the region or the world. It then
sought to ascertain the source of these
technologies, and the basis for technologi-
cal upgrading.


a. Natureofinnovationinthethree
sectors


A large number of the companies surveyed
were engaged in distribution, marketing and
supplying, but about half of those active in
pharmaceuticals and ICTs reported hav-
ing engaged in new process and product
development-related activities (table  4.2).
However, most of the respondents noted
that their products are new either to the lo-
cal firm or to the local market, which points
to the incremental nature of the process
and product innovation patterns.


On the whole, less than a quarter of the
firms in the three sectors were engaged
in innovation activities that could result in
products or processes that are new out-
side Tanzania’s national market, and this
percentage is even less in the case of the




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 63


global market. In pharmaceuticals and
health care, about 12 per cent of the firms
reported that they were engaged in devel-
oping products that are new to the world.
But the interviews covering these compa-
nies showed that many of these products
included traditional medicine, herbal food
and pharmaceutical drugs.


b. Sourcesoftechnological
information


The United Republic of Tanzania has an ex-
tensive S&T infrastructure for R&D in most
sectors of the economy. Current statistics
show that the R&D system consists of 62
research institutes covering agriculture, live-
stock and forestry (28), industry (4), medical
(11), wildlife and fisheries, as well as some
private sector research institutions.


Many of these public sector research insti-
tutions are tasked with providing extension
services for agriculture, which are important
for firms engaging in agro-processing. The
country also has several technology incu-
bation centres focusing on different aspects
of relevance to the three sectors surveyed.
For example, COSTECH hosts the Dar
es Salaam Incubation Centre established
through a partnership with InfoDEV on In-
formation and Technology. The Engineer-


Health care and
Pharmaceuticals


Agro-
processing ICT Overall


Number of Firms(1) 50 66 28 144
Product Development(2) 12/19 19/39 9/15 40/73
Share(%) 63.2 48.7 60.0 54.8
Process Development(3) 10/19 14/32 7/14 31/65
Share(%) 52.6 43.8 50.0 47.7
New products are new to
(percent):
Firm 48.0 68.3 47.4 57.6
Local market 52.0 36.6 47.4 43.5
Regional market 12.0 19.5 26.3 18.8
Global market 12.0 7.3 0.0 7.1


Table4.2: Distributionoffirmscarryingoutnewproductandprocessdevelopments


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on Tanzania Field Survey, 2014.
Note: Figure may add up to more than 100 per cent as new product could be new to the firm, local mar-


ket, regional market or global market at the same time.
Figures only include firms that reported new product development.
(1) Number of firms that participated in the survey.
(2) Number of firms that carried out product development out of the total number of firms responding to this


question.
(3) Number of firms that carried out process development out of the total number of firms responding to this


question


ing and Manufacturing Design Organization
has a similar partnership focused on agri-
business and the Small Industries Develop-
ment Organization has mixed incubators in
several regions, including in Dar e Salaam.


However, the survey found that two sourc-
es of innovation, namely adaptation and
collaboration with industry associations,
were important activities at the firm-level,
underscoring the importance of incremen-
tal, adaptation-driven innovation processes
within firms. Support from intermediary
organizations (such as the technology in-
cubation centres) was quoted as the third
important source, above technological
know-how transfer, which was ranked as
the fourth source.


c. Technologicalintensityof
firm-levelactivities


In order to understand the constraints that
account for the low-technology intensity of
firms in the country, survey respondents
were asked to rank the contributions of
various sources to firm-level innovation ac-
tivity (see table 4.3). The figures presented
in this table represent the average rankings
of these factors by surveyed firms (rang-
ing from 1 if it was least important to 5 as
most important). Hence, any mean ranking




64 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


above 3 implies that the source was rated
as highly important, or below 2 implies that
it was rated as not so important.


Most firms surveyed and interviewed ac-
knowledged that the lack of human skills
was debilitating and rated the contribu-
tion of scientific and skilled manpower to
be highly important, with a mean ranking
of 3.53. This was followed by the quality
of local infrastructure as the second most
important factor influencing new product/
process development, followed by funding
constraints and government incentives. The
firms surveyed also noted the relevance of
IPR protection, which often hinders the
availability of knowledge. This, coupled with
the fact that technology transfer initiatives


Health
care and
pharma-
ceuticals


Agropro-
cessing ICT Overall


Scientific/skilledmanpower 3.17 3.49 4.16 3.53


Qualify of local infrastructure services 3.62 3.59 3.08 3.52


Availabilityofventurecapital 3.15 3.14 3.00 3.12


Government incentives for innovation 2.85 3.27 2.93 3.09


Intellectual property protection 3.04 2.97 3.25 3.04


Local R&D institutes for R&D collaboration 3.17 2.69 2.67 2.85


Local universities for R&D collaboration 2.69 2.85 2.86 2.80


Participationingovernment-firmtechnologytransfer
coordination councils 2.77 2.50 3.45 2.75


Participation in local SMI development schemes 2.63 2.76 2.67 2.70


TransferofpersonneltolocalfirmsorR&Dinstitutions
for training 2.48 2.59 3.23 2.66


Table 4.3: Contribution of various sources to new product or process development


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on field survey, 2014.
Note: Figures represent the mean of rankings between 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important).


are not well-supported in the current policy
framework, was cited as a major problem
by several interviewees. The interviewed
firms also felt that local R&D institutes and
universities were not very helpful to build-
ing technological capacity, since they were
engaged in basic research and teaching,
as opposed to applied research that could
have direct bearing on firm-level activities.
Firms also often noted that public sector
research results should be made more rel-
evant to industry.


As can also be seen in table  4.3, inter-
sectoral variations are captured. For ex-
ample, the ICTs sector is more technologi-
cally intensive as firms require some level
of technological capabilities to survive. This


Box4.3: Benefitingfromforeignpartnerships:ThecaseofClaphijo


Claphijo represents a good example of South-South cooperation at the SME level. It is a family
owned company that has since 2002 produced dried fruits and vegetables, such as dried mango,
pineapple and banana. The method of sun drying as opposed to using electricity-operated ma-
chines is a more cost-effective method. With the help of some cooperation initiatives, the company
developed its drying facility in four phases: It first received support in the form of machinery and
know-how from a German partner, then the Department of Chemical and Process Engineering of
the University of Dar-es-Salaam, followed by the Tanzania Traditional Energy Development Organi-
zation (TATEDO). It also received support from the Government of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.
Claphijo, which was initially producing 200 kilograms of dried fruits and vegetables per year, started
manufacturing 5-7 tons after the third expansion phase. The fourth phase is expected to include
the installation of an electric dryer in the facilities.


Source: UNCTAD.




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 65


i. Arduousregulatoryframeworks


In all the three sectors studied, firms report-
ed difficulties in regulatory environments,
partly due to the inability of policymakers to
foresee and target technological growth in
industrial development. These were related
to extremely stringent regulations or a lack
of regulations in key areas. An example of
stringent regulation that could hinder learn-
ing is the country’s data protection regime
in the pharmaceutical sector. The rapidly
changing ICT sector is an example where
there are often grey areas in terms of regu-
lation that inhibit entrepreneurship and abil-
ity to perform, such as spectrum allocation
regulation, including regulation for licensing,
which is needed to benefit from TV white
spaces for Internet access.


Indeed, survey results indicate the high rel-
evance of excessive and restrictive regula-
tions on the firms in all three sectors (see
table 4.4).17 Licensing restrictions and regu-
lations at the municipal level are the second
and third most important factors impact-
ing on firm-level activities. According to the
survey, other regulatory practices, such as
Customs procedures and EXIM regulations
were also rated as being detrimental to pro-
moting innovation in the current context.


ii. Technology transfer and technology
incubation issues


There is a pressing need to pursue tech-
nology transfer systematically through ex-
isting and new national venues. Survey re-
spondents stressed the need to have better
technology transfer and technology licens-
ing information and support services. They
ranked the issue of promoting enabling
rules and agencies to promote technology
transfer as highly important (4.14) in efforts
to support the introduction of innovation ef-
forts in their companies ( table 4.5). Given
the large share of MSMEs, companies in
this category were worst affected by the
absence of services that could help them
engage in routine technological upgrading.
The survey results also show that address-
ing loopholes in current patent system and
speeding up the patent applications pro-


explains the higher ranking (all factors are
rated above 2.5, but some factors, such as
skilled manpower is rated as extremely im-
portant for new product/ process develop-
ment) in this sector.


There are, however, some successful cases
where companies have managed to rely
on collaboration in order to succeed (see
box 4.3).


3. Survey results: Sectoral
weaknesses, innovation
constraints and industry
performance


The survey and field interviews found that
a large number of the local companies of-
ten operated on the fringes of the local
economy and were struggling to techno-
logically upgrade and remain competitive.
The survey responses also indicated that
the country’s innovation system is still
quite fragmented, as discussed at length
below.


a. Innovationconstraints


A first innovation constraint is at the
formalization stages itself. While sev-
eral studies have found a direct link be-
tween formalization of firms and overall
economic growth, Tanzanian firms often
find it very hard to navigate the regula-
tory frameworks to register themselves.
Secondly, there are a large number of in-
centives for industrial development that
often do not function well and are difficult
to make use of. Hence, the survey and
interviews showed that in the absence
of clear assistance, grants, subsidies or
other such support structures, firms were
not often prepared or willing to undertake
the difficult process of registration, least
it led to a lengthy process with multiple
fees, affecting profitability further. A third
set of issues raised by interviewees was
that the innovation framework was not
very well coordinated and did not facili-
tate interactive learning and collaboration.
This has resulted in local firms not inter-
acting beneficially with universities, public
and private research institutes and other
intermediate organizations.




66 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


Health care and
pharmaceuticals


Agropro-
cessing ICT Overall


Local duties and levies 3.54 3.57 3.38 3.52


Restrictions in licensing arrangements 3.41 3.41 3.76 3.51


Municipal regulations 3.48 3.59 3.39 3.51


Accesstofinance 3.18 3.95 3.15 3.49


Accesstoland(1) 3.32 3.62 3.00 3.42


Customs procedures and EXIM poliy 3.41 3.52 3.13 3.39


Officialcorruption 3.27 3.30 3.08 3.25


Regulations 3.27 3.25 3.00 3.23


Patentofficedelaysandrestrictionsonanimal
testing 3.22 2.60 2.86 2.86


TransferofpersonneltolocalfirmsorR&D
institutions for training 2.48 2.59 3.23 2.66


Health care and
pharmaceuticals


Agropro-
cessing ICT Overall


Improve Customs procedures and EXIM policy 4.21 4.19 4.15 4.19


Enable rules and agencies to promote
technology transfer 4.23 4.00 4.25 4.14


DealwithloopholesinthePatentAmendment
Bill 4.30 3.80 4.13 4.04


Create a more enabling R&D environment 3.96 3.87 4.18 3.96


Accesstoland(1) 3.91 3.97 3.90 3.94


Improve speed of processing patent
application 3.65 3.70 4.20 3.77


Table 4.4: Factors preventing Tanzanian enterprises from developing technology and
becoming competitive


Table4.5: Areaswheregovernmentorotherinstitution’ssupportiscriticaltodevise
new innovation strategies


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on Tanzania Field Survey, 2014.
Note: Figures represent the mean of rankings between 1 (not important) to 5 (extremely important).
(1) Registration cost and procedures.


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on field survey, 2014.
Note: Figures represent the mean of rankings between 1 (weak effect) to 5 (very strong effect).
(1) Registration cost and procedures.


cedures were other important areas where
government can make a difference (with a
rating of 4.04 and 3.77, respectively).


iii. Local business practices and support to
SMEs


Given the uncertain innovation and indus-
trial environment in which they operate, lo-
cal businesses are used to having a short-
term focus on how to survive and sell their
products. There is a severe lack of support
to smaller firms, which impedes their abil-
ity to perform. There is not only a need to
assist in providing/initiating good business
models for cooperation, but also to help in
improving the negotiating position of local


entrepreneurs in their dealings with multina-
tional companies (MNCs) operating within
the United Republic of Tanzania.


Lax implementation of the policy frame-
works both on industrial policy and STI,
particularly, with respect to processing
governmental schemes to support indus-
try needs to be addressed. For example, in
incubator projects, the share of returns al-
located to a local incubator may be too low.


To underscore this point, table 4.6 contains
a summary of how many firms surveyed
participated in government programmes or
received governmental assistance. The fig-
ure remains below 40 per cent for each of




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 67


the three sectors, and in some instances,
e.g. the ICT sector, less than 20 per cent of
the firms reported having received govern-
mental assistance.


Survey respondents also rated corruption
as an important cause of low-technology
development and innovation in the coun-
try (see table 4.4). Most companies inter-
viewed during the field survey also noted
that access or personal connections to pol-
icymakers is often useful to make headway.


iv. Finance


Access to finance for entrepreneurs is a key
constraint for firms in all three sectors. It is
among the main factors preventing compa-
nies from engaging in technological devel-
opment and innovation (table 4.4).18 There
are also few local banks and a shortage of
sophisticated financial products/ schemes
for innovation. For example, there are four
Kenyan banks in the country, but no large
local bank to offer credits to start-ups and
small enterprises. Most firms suffer from not
having sufficient start-up financing, and re-
ported to be often unable to operate within
a medium-term or longer-term timescale
without financial security (interviews). There


are, however, some private sector initiatives
to facilitate pro-poor access to finance in
the market by using new ICTs (see box 4.4).


Local tax structures, survey respondents
noted, are also an impediment and need to
be made more conducive for effective func-
tioning of companies (table 4.4). The survey
interviews showed that local companies
can now benefit from loopholes in tax regu-
lation to perpetuate their tax-exempt status,
for example by changing their international
partners every few years. The tax climate
also seems to account for a large amount
to promote and support a culture of innova-
tion and entrepreneurship is therefore key
to future success.


v. Low/expensiveaccesstointermediate
inputs of production


Another relevant factor to low competitive-
ness raised by several companies are the
heavy duties paid on intermediate inputs
required for production.19 For example, an
important issue for the Tanzanian dairy sec-
tor in general is the cost of packaging. Bot-
tles are bought from Kenya because they
are not available locally, and transported by
road to Dar-es-Salaam. In addition to the


Health care and
pharmaceuticals


Agro-
processing ICT Overall


Participating in government sponsored R&D
programmes 36.0 30.6 27.8 31.6


Received government assistance for R&D 34.3 28.3 15.0 27.7


Table4.6: Shareoffirmsparticipatedingovernmentprogramsorreceivedgovernment
assistanceduringthelastfiveyears(in percent)


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on field survey, 2014.


Box4.4: Pro-pooraccesstofinance:MaxcomAfrica


Maxcom is an ICT company that integrates mobile money operators, such as M-PESA, to facili-
tate point-of-sale payments for customers that do not have bank accounts. Its services consist of
integrating mobile money operators, integrating bank services and providing payment gateways. It
is among the companies that operate under COSTECH’s Dar Teknohama Business Incubator. The
company has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Technology, Science
and Higher Education to facilitate the payment of bills and distribution of mobile money. Maxcom
started providing these services in early 2010 and it is now operating in the United Republic of Tan-
zania, Rwanda and Burundi. Maxcom offers its ‘MaxMalipo’ services through a network of 6,500
agents located across all regions of the United Republic of Tanzania.


Maxcom fills a vacuum in pro-poor financial resources and public revenue collection. The fact that the
government has supported Maxcom’s business model has played an important role in its success.


Source: Field interviews, UNCTAD.




68 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


high price for the imported bottles, Cus-
toms levies are costly and customs for-
malities time consuming. These constraints
often hinders companies from expanding
production into related sectors, for exam-
ple, some of the diary companies surveyed
said they were unable to engage in the pro-
duction of butter because they were unable
to procure reasonably good packaging ma-
terials locally.


b. Keyissuesarisinginpolicy
coordinationbetweenindustrial
andinnovationpolicy


The survey and field interviews shed light
on the numerous opportunities and the dif-
ficulties to harness innovation towards in-
dustrial development. A first set of issues
relate to the difficulties within the STI policy
framework itself. The second deals with
establishing smooth coordination between
STI policy and the country’s industrial de-
velopment strategy, as discussed below.


i. Fragmentedpolicysupportapparatus


Survey and interviews found that inad-
equate coordination in the formulation and
implementation of the innovation-related
policies among relevant actors had drastic
consequences. Ministries often tend to ig-
nore policies from other ministries in the de-
velopment of their own policies, despite the
underlying principle of inclusivity. This results
in the absence of linkages between policies,
leading to difficulties in efforts to harmonize
the implementation of these different poli-
cies.


The National Strategy for Growth and Pov-
erty Reduction and the Industrial Develop-
ment Strategy 2025 both have laid out the
broad contours of STI policy. The Ministry
of Communication, Science and Technol-
ogy is responsible for policy formulation
on scientific research and technology de-
velopment. The Ministry of Industry has the
overall responsibility for the IIDS 2025, but
is expected to operate in collaboration with
other ministries involved in the national Pov-
erty Reduction Strategy, e.g. the Ministries
for Trade, Education, Agriculture, Health,
Environment and Labour. However, it is


often not clear which Ministries deals with
which issues and how collaboration can be
established.


The National Planning Commission (NPC),
which has responsibility for a wide range of
policy areas and a mandate to advise the
President on development planning policy
and strategy, also plays a major role in the
implementation of STI-related policies. The
NPC is currently formulating the second
five-year plan, with the intention of address-
ing some of these linkages, particularly
those between innovation policy and indus-
trial development.


ii. Overlappingpolicymeasuresand
incentives


In line with their respective mandates, gov-
ernmental agencies operating within these
various ministries bear the responsibility for
implementation of these policies. However,
as survey results show, there still remain a
large number of industry measures and in-
centives that the industry could better avail
of, if these are implemented and coordinat-
ed effectively. For example, the heavy costs
and levies on imports of intermediaries, the
lack of business models to partner with
larger MNCs operating within the country
and heavy regulatory restrictions for com-
pliance in various industries are issues that
Tanzanian companies have to face on a
daily basis. Addressing these will help the
local industry regain profitability.


iii. IssueswithintheSTIsystem


What has clearly stood out in the survey was
that, as of the early 2000s, there has been
a gradual shift in the way the Government
of the United Republic of Tanzania has ap-
proached STI policies; this is particularly ev-
ident from the gradual but steady focus on
innovation issues. However, despite some
improvements, inter-linkages between R&D
activities in the public sector and the private
sector remain weak.


In the current context, it remains imperative
to identify existing initiatives and determine
how these can be strengthened to improve
weak systemic coordination among various
institutions and other actors responsible




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 69


for supporting innovation in the country.
Moreover, a shortage of funding for agen-
cies tasked with STI-related activities, par-
ticularly COSTECH activities, has also un-
dermined the performance of the country’s
institutional structure for S&T, and this need
to be further addressed.


There has also been a proliferation of ini-
tiatives without much thought paid to con-
sistency or effectiveness. For example, the
NRDP of 2010 calls for a research fund
to be set up. This however, has not been
done. The draft proposed STI Act also in-
cludes a National Innovation Fund. It there-
fore remains an urgent imperative to clarify
how and in which ways each of the initia-
tives should work and how they will be co-
ordinated and monitored.


E. CONCLUDING
REMARKS


STI and industrial development frameworks
in the United Republic of Tanzania have not
evolved in an entirely synergistic manner.
Therefore, although there are a lot of positive
developments in the current context, several
institutional factors continue to impede co-
ordination. Many of these difficulties can be
traced back to the several changes that the
country’s industrial policy has undergone over
the past decades, and the way in which the
STI policies have evolved alongside.


In the present context, the following need to
be urgently addressed. Firstly, the country’s
industrial policy framework emphasizes
resource-based industrialization, but there
is no clarity on what this means, and how it
can be achieved. Furthermore, it stands in
stark contrast to reality, wherein resource-
dependence has dampened the devel-
opment of productive capacities in many
manufacturing industries and prevented a
suitable diversification of the country’s in-
dustrial base. A clear elaboration of this
strategy is an important next step, as is the
need to clearly link it to the upcoming five-
year plan.


Secondly, the country’s industrial develop-
ment policies, despite some improvements,


have failed to improve its physical and
knowledge infrastructure, which urgently
need to be addressed.


Thirdly, a lack of focus on innovation capac-
ity and linkages and a lack of systematic
approaches even within the national S&T
policy have hampered the country’s capac-
ity for technology adoption and innovation,
thereby affecting its international competi-
tiveness and growth rates. The focus on in-
novation should therefore be strengthened
in the new STI policy, especially with a fo-
cus on SMEs.


Fourthly, gaps and lack of connectedness
among existing industrial development
plans, sectoral strategies and the national
S&T policy, coupled with a road map on how
these policies ought to be coordinated has
made it difficult to ensure developmental
outcomes. New efforts in the upcoming five-
year plan should be aimed at clarifying this,
setting out a clear road map linking industrial
expansion with the new STI policy, outlining
policy processes that can facilitate this.


While addressing these issues, the follow-
ing aspects call for attention.


(i) The economic development of the
United Republic of Tanzania relies
significantly on MSMEs, including
in the informal sector. Both the STI
policy and the industrial develop-
ment strategy need to bear in mind
the needs of these firms if targets
set in policy documents or strate-
gies are to be realistic and attain-
able. Currently, within the policy
context of the IIDS 2025 and the
NSGPR, there is a significant po-
tential to strengthen innovation at
a macro, industrial level since they
aim to improve the overall business
climate and provide overarching
incentives. Addressing the weak
support provided to SMEs or mi-
cro-enterprises in the two strate-
gies is also needed.


(ii) SMEs require additional policy
support for technological learn-
ing, innovation capacity and overall




70 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


competences to master and excel
in business practices. Within the
current policy framework, there is
no significant attempt to strength-
en the link between local research
and innovation and the needs of
the local firms. For example, the
implementation of the NRDP has
not been very successful because
the current developmental plan
has no budget allocation for most
of the proposed policy actions
in NRDP. The Industrial Strategy
2025 also lacks a comprehensive
national framework for technology
diffusion and knowledge transfer to
local industries.


(iii) SMEs also need more support in
another direction namely, by im-
proving the regulatory framework.
The government needs to overhaul
its regulatory system and simplify
its procedures in order to promote
local production. Particularly, the
government should revise its exist-
ing practices so as to encourage
entrepreneurship in its technology
intensive sectors.


(iv) The lack of donor support to devel-
opment programmes has impeded
implementation of the country’s
industrial development plans and


STI policies. Donor support pro-
grammes account for a major por-
tion of the government’s budget but
it comes with certain conditions,
including prioritizing interventions
in social sectors and improving
public governance (UNIDO, 2012).
Excess emphasis on policies de-
signed to limit the role of govern-
ment in the economy has been
hindering development impact of
aid programmes. In terms of donor
funding, therefore, the government
needs to establish a partnership
that focuses on the country’s spe-
cific national priorities.


(v) Although there are several laudable
targets in the policies for industrial
development and the Tanzanian Vi-
sion, these are not matched with
adequate implementation strate-
gies and funding for the institutional
operationalization of these targets.
Monitoring of policy effectiveness
is also particularly weak. Ensuring
the success of the current five-year
plans for sustainable industrial de-
velopment rests on coherent policy
coordination and implementation,
especially of the kind that is based
on the industry needs for innova-
tion-led growth.




CHAPTER IV : STI POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA 71


NOTES


1. UNCTADstat. ILO data ends in 2006 for agricultural employment, where it accounted for 75 per
cent of the total share.


2. BIS promoted the establishment of medium and small-scale industries in the regions, districts and
villages, which lead to establishment of Small industry Development Organization (SIDO).


3. Government of Tanzania (1996). Sustainable Industrial Development Policy – SIDP 1996-2020. Dar
e Salaam, Ministry of Industries and Trade of Tanzania.


4. Japan Development Institute (http://www.jditokyo.com/en/projects-3.html)


5. In 2005, 20 per cent of the budgeted public expenditure was financed through donor support and
80 per cent of the total amount spent on development was funded through donor projects (Law-
son, Booth, Msuya, Wangwe, & Williamson, 2005).


6. The government also updated the Sustainable Industrial Development Policy (SIDP) 1996-2020 to
match the new development framework outlined in the FYDP and LTPP.


7. Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (1996). The National Science and Technology
Policy for Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education.


8. World Bank’s WDI database; 2010 is the most recent year for which data is available.


9. The Government of Tanzania 2010 National Research and Development Policy, as prepared by
Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology.


10. World Bank WDI Database (accessed on 22 July 2014)


11. Ibid.


12. UNESCO Database (accessed on 22 July 2014)


13. Data as per the note prepared by TCCIA and COSTECH for UNCTAD, 2014 (on file with UNCTAD).


14. UNIDO and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (2012).


15. UNCTAD calculations based on NBS Quarterly Production of Industrial Commodities: 2004-2012
(National Bureau of Statistics- United Republic of Tanzania, 2013).


16. UNCTAD calculations based on NBS Quarterly Production of Industrial Commodities: 2004-2012
(National Bureau of Statistics- United Republic of Tanzania, 2013).


17. The survey conducted by Wangwe, et al. (2014) also finds that manufacturers consider the mul-
tiplicity of taxes at both local and national level as impediments on their development along with
excessive regulations.


18. According to Wangwe, et al. (2014), high credit interest rates and elaborate credit procedures are
among the main challenges inhibiting the development of Tanzanian firms.


19. Wangwe, et al. (2014) estimates that firms import about 70 per cent of their inputs from abroad.






5
PROMOTING


INNOVATION POLICIES
FOR INDUSTRIAL


DEVELOPMENT
IN ETHIOPIA






CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 75


CHAPTER V
PROMOTING INNOVATION POLICIES
FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT


IN ETHIOPIA


A. INTRODUCTION
Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan
(GTP) of 2010-2015 (hereafter referred to
as GTP I) is an ambitious policy document
aimed at creating an enabling business en-
vironment and nurturing the growth of the
country’s industrial sector (MoFED Ethio-
pia, 2010). These goals are a follow-up of
Ethiopia’s developmental plans over the
past two decades, where the country has
heavily invested in infrastructural develop-
ment, expansion of exports and increased
expenditure to enhance pro-poor growth
(AfDB, 2010). In order to ensure continu-
ity, the GTP I envisages a range of policy
measures and incentives, including tax holi-
days, duty-free capital goods imports and
the creation of industrial cluster zones. It
also sets out several targets for productivity
growth, capacity utilization in industry and


exports earnings across various sectors,
and seeks to link economic growth with
poverty reduction and other development
targets. Ethiopia was expected to invest
over $75 billion to implement GTP I, which
it hoped would achieve double digit (11-
15 per cent) annual GDP growth between
2010 and 2015 (MoFED Ethiopia, 2010).


The GTP II (2015-2020) is expected to con-
tinue these efforts.


Ethiopia has previously undergone sev-
eral important policy shifts in its industrial
growth and transformation. These shifts
have often been rather radical and have al-
tered the nature of institutional support to
industry. Starting out with a policy empha-
sis on building capacity in the private sector
in the 1960s, Ethiopia moved to a state-led
development strategy in the period be-
tween 1974 and 1991.


Figure 5.1: Real per capita GDP growth rate in Ethiopia vis-a-vis other regions of the
developingworld,1970-2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on UNCTADstat (accessed on 20 October 2015).
Note: 2014 figures are estimates. Ethiopia’s 1990-1999 growth average covers the period between 1992


and 1999 due to break in the data in 1991.



-2.0


-1.0


0.0


1.0


2.0


3.0


4.0


5.0


6.0


7.0


8.0


1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2014


pe
r c


en
t




Ethiopia


All countries


Developing
countries: Africa


Developing countries


Developing
countries: America


Developing
countries: Asia




76 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


The Ethiopian government began imple-
menting industrial development policies,
which emphasized private sector-led in-
dustrial growth and exports promotion after
1991 (Gebreeyesus 2013). The objective
of these policies was to increase export-
earnings and create a well-diversified in-
dustrial-base. On the positive side, growth
rates have improved drastically, from a real
GDP growth rate of -6.7 per cent in 1991 to
13.6 per cent by 2004 and 7.6 per cent in
2014 (see figure 5.1).


Ethiopia subsequently launched important
policy initiatives to promote industrial and
socioeconomic development to consoli-
date its positive economic performance of
the 1990s. Among these policy initiatives is
a new national STI policy,1 which is being
implemented alongside GTP I to facilitate
the emergence of innovation capacity.


Despite these positive trends, ensuring
productivity-enhancing growth still remains
a fundamental challenge, and although
Ethiopia experienced a sustained increase
in GDP growth rates, this was not accom-
panied by structural change (see table 5.1).
Ethiopia’s export structure is also highly
concentrated around coffee exports, which
account for over a third of its export rev-
enues and also poses some risks to overall
diversification into other sectoral activities.


This chapter seeks to analyse the role that
innovation could play in Ethiopia’s efforts to
industrialize and diversify its economy, and
is informed by a primary study conducted


Box5.1: AdditionalinformationonthefieldsurveyinEthiopia


UNCTAD conducted a primary data survey of enterprises and stakeholder institutions in Ethiopia in
2013 and 2014, which included on-site visits and interviews with 44 stakeholders, including 29 en-
terprises and 15 agencies. The agencies interviewed in this field survey included: the Directorate
of Chemical Industry, Ministry of Industry; Agricultural Transformation Agency; Ethiopian Coffee
Processing Association; Food, Medicine and Health Care Administration and Control Authority;
Addis Ababa University - Research and Technology Transfer Directorate; Addis Ababa Science and
Technology University; and Pharmaceuticals Supply and Fund Agency. In addition to these face-to-
face interviews, semi-structured questionnaires were administered to randomly chosen enterprises
active in agro-processing (15 firms) and pharmaceutical (14 firms).


In addition to survey findings and face-to-face interviews, country reports and documents, articles
and other archived accounts of Ethiopia’s development have informed the analysis.


Source: UNCTAD.


by UNCTAD in Ethiopia, which included a
questionnaire survey similar to what was
conducted in the other two countries pre-
sented in this report, but only of two sec-
tors: the agro-processing and pharmaceu-
tical industry (see also box 5.1).


B. REVIEW OF
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT
AND INNOVATION
CAPACITY IN ETHIOPIA


Industrial policy interventions aimed at build-
ing the Ethiopia’s industrial base have been
underway since 1960s, but it was not until
the 1990s that Ethiopia began to record im-
pressive economic progress. The economic
reforms of the 1990s are credited with the in-
dustrial progress and sustained real growth
rates seen in Ethiopia (see figure 5.2).


For example, while the average real GDP
growth rate initially declined from 2.0  per
cent in 1970/80 to 1.4 per cent in 1981/91,
it increased to 10.7  per cent in 2003/14
(see figure 5.2).2 At the same time the av-
erage real GDP per capita growth rate de-
clined from -0.2 per cent in 1970-1980 to
-1.8  per cent in 1981/91, but increased
to 2  per cent in 1992/2002 and reached
7.8 per cent in 2003/14.


As in the case of much of Africa, the finan-
cial crisis of 2007/08 had a negative impact
on Ethiopia’s annual growth (see UNCTAD,
2009 and 2010). Real GDP fell from 13.6 per




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 77


cent in 2004 to 8.8  per cent in 2009. Al-
though recovery has been slow in the period
following the financial crisis, annual real GDP
growth rates of 12.6 per cent in 2010 and
10.4 per cent in 2013 has turned the country
one of the fastest growing economies in Af-
rica. Real per capita GDP rose steadily from
$146 in 2004 to $303 in 2014, partly due
to a rise in exports earnings of coffee; the
latter rose from $223.6 million in 2003/04 to
$524.5 million in 2007/08.


1. Overall economic trends:
1970s until the present day


Since the 1970s, the bulk of the country’s
GDP value added has come from the pri-
mary sector which comprises agriculture,
hunting, forestry and fishing and accounted
for 55.8 per cent of the GDP value added in


Figure 5.2: Trends in average real GDP growth rate and GDP per capita growth rate,
1970-2014(in percent)


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 20 October 2015).
Note: 2014 figures are estimates.




2.0
1.4


5.1


10.7


-0.2


-1.8


2.0


7.8


-4.0


-2.0


0.0


2.0


4.0


6.0


8.0


10.0


12.0


1970-1980 1981-1991 1992-2002 2003-2014


Gr
ow


th
ra


te
s


Real GDP
growth rates


Real GDP per
capita growth
rates


Expon. (Real
GDP growth
rates)


1970 (see table 5.1). This rose to 58.4 per
cent in 1995 then fell to 45.5  per cent in
2013. Industry’s share of GDP value add-
ed has declined since the early 1970s; its
share stood at 14.4 per cent in 1970 but
fell to 11.1 per cent in 1973. Within this, the
manufacturing share of GDP value added
decreased from 8.9  per cent in 1970 to
5.5 per cent in 1995, and then to 3.9 per
cent in 2013.


The share of services value-added has in-
creased over time, particularly in the post-
1995 period, rising sharply to 43.5 per cent
by 2013. This rise has largely been driven
by the growth of the wholesale and retail
activities. The rise in health, education, san-
itation, recreational, financial intermedia-
tion, real estate, public administration and
defence services also appeared to have


Table 5.1: Trends in share of GDP value added by sector in Ethiopia, 1970 to 2013
(in percent)


Source: UNCTADstat (accessed on 24 September 2015).


Sectors/ Years 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013


Agriculture,hunting,
forestry,fishing 55.8 47.5 50.8 43.3 41.1 58.4 47.8 45.2 45.3 45.5


Industry 14.4 16.8 15.5 16.7 16.4 10.4 12.4 13.1 10.4 11.1


Mining & utilities 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.7 1.9 2.6 2.6 1.9 2.3


Manufacturing 8.9 11.2 10.8 11.2 11.1 5.5 5.8 5.1 4.2 3.9


Construction 4.6 4.6 3.8 4.5 3.6 3.0 4.0 5.4 4.3 4.9


Services 29.8 35.8 33.7 40.0 42.5 31.2 39.8 41.7 44.3 43.5




78 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


contributed to the growth in GDP value
added by the services sector in the post-
1995 period. Many of these investments
were facilitated by aid inflows and remit-
tances.


2. Industrial development policy
strategies and performance


The earliest efforts to foster industrial devel-
opment in Ethiopia can be traced back to
the late 1950s. Since then, there have been
several important shifts that have been in-
strumental in shaping the performance of
local industry. Ethiopia’s industrial policy
evolved over three distinct periods: the pe-
riod before 1974, the period during the Der-
gue regime (1975-91) and the post-1992
period, when the country embarked upon
export-led industrialization (Gebreeyesus,
2013). This section presents an overview
of these policies and analyzes their impacts
on the economy.


a. Industrialdevelopmentpolicy
focusfromlate1950s-1980s


The policy strategies of the first and sec-
ond development plans (1957-1961 and
1962-1973) were focused on laying the
foundation for agricultural-led industrial
development through import substitution.
A key industrial policy component during
the period was the introduction of a decree
in 1963 to attract foreign capital into the
country.3 The main focus was on importing
intermediate products to produce finished
goods in the agricultural and low-technol-
ogy intensive sectors. However, the rise of
production capacities was impeded by the
lack of forward and backward intra-industry
linkages, and a disconnect between agri-
culture and other economic sectors (Ar-
egawi, 2005).


From 1974 onwards, there was a marked
change in emphasis with more state coordi-
nation, which continued until 1991. During
this period, Ethiopia’s import-substitution
industrialization strategies were state-led
and overseen by a newly created central
authority: the National Council for Central
Planning. The latter institution engaged in
the budget negotiation process with the


Ministry of Finance, in contrast to an ear-
lier approach of minimal intervention by the
Planning Commission.


By the end of the 1980s, the policy goal of
curbing imports of finished products and in-
termediate capital goods to help local firms
to access markets was implicitly defeated
because local firms were mismanaged,
and had low-capacity utilization and were
uncompetitive. Many of these problems
could be traced back to the prior low em-
phasis on technological upgrading. Faced
with the need to import finished goods and
manufacturing inputs, and constrained by
scarce foreign earnings, Ethiopia’s external
debt stocks (as a percentage of gross na-
tional income) increased rapidly, reaching
25.4  per cent in 1981 and then 69.5  per
cent in 1989 (World Bank WDI indicators,
2014).


b. Emphasisonindustrial
developmentintheeconomic
reformsofthe1990s


In an effort to address the shortcomings of
earlier decades, the overall approach and
implementation apparatus of industrial de-
velopment interventions from the 1990s on-
wards were dramatically different from earli-
er interventions between the 1960s and the
1980s. The economic reforms introduced
in the 1990s placed a primary focus on
private sector-led industrial development
and structural reforms along with macro-
economic stabilization and structural trans-
formation. A number of industrial policy
interventions were implemented, including
measures to privatize public enterprises,
the liberalization of foreign exchange (which
was pegged at 2.07 units to the US dollar
from mid-1970s to the 1980s), trade pro-
motion and enhanced domestic resource
mobilization (AfDB, 2002).


c. Industrialdevelopmentstrategies
ofthe2000s


In the 2000s, the Sustainable Develop-
ment and Poverty Reduction Programme
(SDPRP) of 2002 -2005 focused on mar-
ket-led industrial development. Under the
SDPRP, the industrial policy emphasis was




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 79


mainly aimed at achieving poverty reduc-
tion through an agricultural-led industri-
alization process, which promoted (IMF,
2004): (i) technical progress in agriculture
(by supporting grants to farmers) and agro-
processing; (ii) diversification of agricultural
outputs; and (iii) greater market interaction.


The SDPRP was followed by the Plan for
Accelerated and Sustained Development to
End Poverty (PASDEP) in 2006-2010. Un-
der the PASDEP, the government tried to
use some of the leverage it had with pri-
vate sector companies to push forward its
agenda for industrial development. It also
tried to promote technological and techni-
cal progress in agriculture and rural devel-
opment.


During this time, a more private sector-ori-
ented approach was adopted and a busi-
ness process re-engineering initiative was
launched in 2004 to ensure institutional
support to private sector business activi-
ties. This approach resulted in the success-
ful streamlining of business process, e.g.
the number of days it takes to acquire a
trade and investments licence was reduced
from 35 days to 34 minutes and 25 days
to 2 days, respectively (see Assefa, 2009).


d. TheGrowthandTransformation
Planandpost-2010policies


Ethiopia’s GTP I (2010-2015) aimed to con-
solidate the gains made under PASDEP,
and more particularly to ensure continued
stability and sustainable, rapid and equita-
ble growth. GTP I set national targets that
should be reached by 2015, these includ-
ed: 11-15  per cent annual GDP growth;
large-scale investments in industrial and
agricultural sectors; and the provision of
industry-specific incentives, such as duty-
free capital goods import for, among others,
pharmaceutical and agro-processing in-
dustries. To achieve these national targets,
several programmes were defined, these
included: (i) the development of industrial
zones; (ii) capacity building programmes;
(iii) university-industry linkages; and (iv) the
creation of a centralized R&D and innova-
tion fund. It is expected that each of these
programmes will be implemented through


tailor-made projects. They are discussed
briefly below.


i. Developmentofindustrialzones


The GTP I envisages the creation of sev-
eral industrial zones that will catalyze fur-
ther industrial growth. The first phase of the
Bole Lemi Industrial Development Zone has
been completed. Preparations are already
underway for the second phase of this in-
dustrial zone, as well as the development of
new sites. For the second phase, $250 mil-
lion has been sourced from the World Bank
to help complete the work (Yaregal Meskir,
Deputy Director General, Ethiopian Industri-
al Development Zones Corporation, 2014).


ii. Capacity building programmes


The capacity building programmes are being
implemented in collaboration with the Ger-
man government and intended to increase
the quality of education in Ethiopia. They are
also intended to create a technical educa-
tion stream that is more practice-oriented
(i.e. through university polytechnics), as well
as strengthen the current system for a higher
education at the Masters and PhD levels.


iii. University-industrylinkages


In recent years, greater emphasis has been
placed on creating and nurturing linkages
between universities, research institutes,
technical and vocational education and
training institutions and industries (see
the 2012 STI policy). These linkages were
aimed at strengthening earlier initiatives to
develop university-industry linkages, such
as the understanding reached between
the Faculty of Technology, Addis Ababa
University and the Ethiopian Manufacturing
Industries Association in 2006. This linkage,
for example, aimed to nurture closer col-
laboration between the university and the
manufacturing sector to promote technical
expertise (Etzkowitz and Roest, 2008).


iv. Creationofacentralizedinnovationfund
for R&D in 2006


In 2006, Ethiopia created a centralized in-
novation fund for R&D following a revision
of the 1993 S&T policy. This innovation fund




80 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


is financed principally through a tax of 1 per
cent of the annual profit of all productive
and service sectors.


To implement programmes under the GTP,
Ethiopia approved 1,433 projects in the
manufacturing sector in 2009/10 (table
5.2). The number of approved projects fell
slightly to 1,294 in 2010/11, and dropped
further to 1,211 in 2011/12, when it ac-
counted for 21.4 per cent of projects ap-
proved for all sectors, second only to pro-
jects approved for real estate, renting and
business activities.


The GTP proposes a systemic approach
to structure institutional support and un-
like previous plans, aims to ensure that the
public sector becomes more effective and
able to work closely with the private sector,
civil society organizations and development
partners.


3. Overview of Ethiopia’s science,
technology and innovation
policies


Ethiopia’s S&T policy framework has
evolved in a fragmented manner, and has
been somewhat disconnected from na-
tional industrial development strategies.


Table 5.2: Trends in number of projects and share of investment capital approved by sector
duringtheGTPimplementation(2009/10to2011/12)


Sector 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Percentage share
of total projects in


2011/12


Percentage share
of total investment
capital in 2011/12


Manufacturing 1,433 1,294 1,211 21.44 31.12


Agriculture,huntingand
forestry 1,342 907 435 7.7 15.92


Real estate, renting and
business activities 1,155 1,652 2,694 47.69 15.85


Hotel and restaurants 617 609 271 4.8 8.43


Education 181 143 57 1.01 0.32


Health and social work 99 87 52 0.92 1.92


Construction 942 947 747 13.22 20.38


Wholesale, retail trade and
repair services 154 158 22 0.39 0.22


Transport, storage and com-
munication 477 413 101 1.79 0.4


Fishing 8 1 2 0.04 0.02


Mining, and quarrying 9 17 9 0.16 0.11


Electricity, gas, steam and
water supply 4 7 2 0.04 4.88


Source: UNCTAD, reproduced from the National Bank of Ethiopia 2011/2012 Annual Report, p. 102.


Although national S&T structures were
initially created in the 1970s, the commis-
sions, which were charged with the over-
sight of these structures had to navigate
without the benefit of policy frameworks
to guide the interactions between vari-
ous segments of the S&T system. As a
result, efforts to integrate S&T objectives
with industrial development plans met
with little success, and led to difficulties
in adequately promoting and coordinating
effective support for the enterprise sector.


a. Scienceandtechnologypolicy
focus,priorto2008


Efforts to build a national S&T infrastruc-
ture and capability in Ethiopia began as
far back as 1975 with the establishment
of the Ethiopian National Science and
Technology Commission. The Commis-
sion set up research councils to oversee,
among others, the development of indus-
try and technology, natural sciences, nat-
ural resources, education and manpower,
S&T, and to create awareness about the
importance of S&T. However, as nation-
al reviews and interviews conducted for
this chapter reveal, the agencies gradu-
ally were ineffective in carrying out their




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 81


respective mandates, e.g. to carry out re-
search, as a result of which effectiveness
of policy apparatus and modes of inter-
agency coordination weakened over time.


In order to address this, the first national
S&T policy was initiated in 1991 after the
swearing-in of a new government (Johann
and Nelius, 2007). The new government
re-established the Ethiopian Science
and Technology Commission as an au-
tonomous public institution.4 In 1993, this
Commission prepared the first national
S&T policy, which has since then been
revised twice, first in 2006 and again in
2010 (UNESCO 2009). This new policy
focused more narrowly on capacity build-
ing in S&T.


The 2006 revision of the S&T policy once
again sought to commit at least 1.5 per
cent of GDP on an annual basis to build
capacity and deliver 1 per cent of the an-
nual profit of all productive and service
sectors to a centralized innovation fund
for R&D activities. However, little was
achieved under this policy framework in
terms of acquiring technologies for the
private sector or investing 1.5 per cent of
GDP on R&D.


b. Changesininnovationpolicy:
2008andbeyond


Noting the need to coordinate the policy
more coherently, the government created
a Ministry of Science and Technology
(MoST) in 2008.5 The vision of the MoST
was to “entrench the science, technology
and innovation capacities of Ethiopia for
rapid learning, adaptation and utilization
of effective foreign technologies by the
year 2022/23”. Its mission was to “cre-
ate a technology transfer framework that
enables the building of national capacities
in technological learning, adaptation and
utilization through searching, selecting
and importing effective foreign technolo-
gies in manufacturing and service provid-
ing enterprises”6.


In 2009/10, in coordination with the
launch of the country’s GTP I, new initia-
tives were set up to achieve the national
development goals. At the same time, the
STI policy was revised to align innovation
objectives with the vision of the GTP. The
new 2010-2025 national STI policy was
developed in 2010 and specifically based
on the GTP. The emphasis of this new
policy is summarized in box 5.2.


Box 5.2: Policy emphasis of the national STI policy of 2012


The new STI policy focuses on realizing seven policy objectives by 2025. These are to:


1. Create a general governance framework for coordinated and integrated STI capacity building;


2. Establish a framework for technology accumulation and transfer;


3. Develop adaptive research that is geared towards rapid technology transfer and adaptation;


4. Develop and commercialize traditional knowledge and technologies;


5. Define the national S&T landscape and to strengthen linkages among the different actors in the
national innovation system;


6. Ensure integrated implementation of STI activities with other socioeconomic development pro-
grammes and plans; and activities;


7. Institute support mechanisms to progressively increase private sector participation in financing
innovation.


Recognizing the need to build capability in the industrial sector, the policy seeks to promote imita-
tion and adoption of new technologies in the first ten years of policy implementation to ensure that,
by 2025, the country can have high technological intensity activities in its priority sectors.


The policy stipulates a rise in gross domestic spending on R&D (GERD/GDP) from 0.2 per cent in
2010 to 1.0 per cent in 2015, 1.5 per cent in 2020, and 2.0 per cent by 2025. R&D personnel per
10,000 labour force are also expected to rise from 0.46 in 10,000 in 2010 to one by 2015, five by
2020 and ultimately reach 18 per 10,000 by 2025.


Source: UNCTAD.




82 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


C. COORDINATING
INDUSTRIAL AND
INNOVATION
POLICIES FOR FIRM-
LEVEL SUPPORT:
SURVEY RESULTS


The two sectors chosen for the survey, the
agro-processing and pharmaceuticals sec-
tors, are singled out as relevant sectors
both in the GTP and 2012 STI policy. Using
the same questionnaire as in the two other
countries covered in this report, the Ethio-
pian survey sought to capture how policy
changes are impacting on institutional infra-
structure and firm-level performance.


1. Sources of technological
information


a. Theagriculturalsector


Agriculture accounted for 42  per cent of
GDP in 2014, and coffee remains the coun-
try’s main source of export revenue, gener-
ating between 25 and 30 per cent of total
export earnings in 2014 (Tefera and Tefera,
2014). The GTP also acknowledges the
specificities of the coffee sector, and seeks


to diversify agricultural exports into other
areas. It stresses that agricultural and rural
development is a central priority and fore-
sees the development of agro-processing
industry by 2015.


The GTP sets the following targets for
growth in capacity utilization of agro-pro-
cessing: it was expected to grow from
60 per cent in 2009/2010 to 65 and 70 per
cent in 2010/2011 and 2011/2012, respec-
tively, and then to 75 and 80  per cent in
2012/2013, respectively, and finally reach
90 per cent in 2014/2015. Likewise, agro-
processing export earnings were projected
to rise from $35.2 million in 2009/2010 to
$82 million and $144 million in 2010/2011
and 2011/2012, respectively, and then to
$150 million and $ 197 million in 2012/2013
and 2013/2014, respectively, finally rising to
$300 million in 2014/2015.7


Agro-processing firms interviewed in the sur-
vey rely on many sources for new knowledge,
technology and incremental innovations. The
survey found several sources for new knowl-
edge and incremental innovation in agro-pro-
cessing industry including: (i) hiring of manag-
ers and skilled employees, as well as suppliers
of equipment or components, (ii) partnerships


Box 5.3: The coffee industry in Ethiopia: Building local technological capacity


Ethiopia is home to some of the world’s finest coffee. In 2013, coffee accounted for 27 per cent of
the country’s exports earnings in 2013, and in the 2013/2014 season, coffee exports earnings alone
amounted to $841 million USD and similar projections are made for 2014/2015.8 Although coffee’s
share in export earnings has declined from 65 per cent in 1995, Ethiopia was the largest producer of
coffee in Africa in 2011/2012, and the world’s third largest producer of Arabica coffee beans.9


Given the enormous potential of the industry to overall economic growth and national development,
the Government of Ethiopia is committed to boosting coffee sector productivity and earnings through
new initiatives and increased application of new technologies.


First, the Ethiopian Fine Coffee Initiative10 was launched in 2004 with the objective to own and manage
specialty coffee varieties that originated and have been cultivated in Ethiopia. Trademarks were obtained
for an umbrella brand Ethiopian Fine Coffee and specific brands for Harar, Sidamo and Yirgacheffe.
Second, the seven-year Ethiopian coffee quality improvement project (2004-2011) sought to improve
access to technologies and facilities for quality improvement. The project was jointly implemented by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the International Trade Centre, with the support of
other stakeholders. In the course of this project eight laboratories were established in coffee producing
areas, new machinery was acquired and staff were trained to improve production techniques.


Agricultural cooperatives are considered to have positively impacted the businesses of about 5 million
Ethiopians since the 1990s,11 and particularly on the agro-processing sector. In the coffee sector, for
instance, cooperatives have helped members acquire machinery, such as tractors for mechanized
farming practices, and helped to develop skills and in the hiring of professional managers.


Source: UNCTAD, compiled from various sources.




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 83


Box 5.4: Hilina Enriched Foods Processing Centre


Established in 1998, Hilina produces a number of innovative food products, including vitamin A,
enriched sugar and iodized salt for UN agencies, NGOs and the general public, both at home and
abroad. The aim is to help combat the various forms of malnutrition and other micronutrient defi-
ciencies affecting children and other vulnerable groups.


The demand for Hilina’s products inside and outside Ethiopia has been the driving force for innova-
tion and technological upgrading. Hilina is one of many food processing companies in the country.
Others include Addis Mojo oil factory, Kokob flour & pasta factory, FAFA food share company and
NAS foods; all of these companies have the potential to innovate and expand.


Source: UNCTAD,basedonfieldinterviewwiththecompany.


and informal sources; (iii) transfer of technology
from parent firm; and (iv) universities and public
research institutes.


Some new initiatives have been launched
to build the competitiveness of the coffee
industry as described in box 5.3.


The survey found that Ethiopia’s agro-pro-
cessing sector has a capacity for expansion
beyond the production of coffee (see box 5.4);
several companies are now active in produc-
ing agricultural goods that are important for
the economy (such as leather products and
cut flowers) and essential for Ethiopia’s vi-
sion to achieve food security (including teff).
The leather products and the cut flower in-
dustry have received some level of foreign
direct investment in the past. However, given
that agro-processing subsectors, including
these are dominated by SMEs, there have
been some difficulties in diversifying the sec-
tor as a whole, despite the overall progress.
Surveyed companies expressed the need for
more targeted support to address their needs.
The survey also found that other agricultural
subsectors that could benefit from product-
specific extension services and programmes,
as is currently available in the case of coffee.
Companies producing leather products, for
example, could benefit from programmes that
help establish cooperative production and
stronger forward and backward linkages.


b. Thepharmaceuticalsector


There are 18 locally or foreign-owned eight-
een pharmaceutical companies in Ethiopia.12
The development of the local pharmaceuti-
cal industry was first recognized as a priority
in the GTP, which seeks to “enhance the ca-
pacity of existing and newly established phar-


maceutical industry to substitute imported
drugs, pharmaceutical materials and gener-
ate foreign currency earning by exporting the
pharmaceutical products”. Growth targets in
the pharmaceutical industry’s capacity utili-
zation have been set to reach 100 per cent
by 2012/2013, improving from 30  per cent
in 2009/2010 to 50 per cent in 2010/2011,
and then to 75 per cent in 2011/2012. The
GTP also seeks to increase foreign market
earnings of pharmaceutical product exports
from $1 million in 2009/2010 to $20 million by
2014/2015. These targets have yet to be met.


The pharmaceutical firms that were sur-
veyed were mostly engaged in pharmaceu-
tical production, including distribution and
marketing of imported products, production
of secondary material for pharmaceuticals,
such as hard-shell capsules, and the pro-
duction of medical devices and diagnos-
tics. Two local firms, Sino-Ethiop and Cadi-
la Pharmaceuticals, successfully obtained
PIC/S certification.13 The survey showed
that the main sources of technological in-
formation for local companies were: (i) the
firms’ own efforts; (ii) hiring of managers
and skilled employees as well as suppliers
of equipment or components; (iii) partner-
ships and informal sources; (iv) transfer of
technology from parent firm; and (v) univer-
sities and public research institutes.


2. Key impediments to upgrading
production techniques and
performance


The survey results on technological upgrad-
ing and the factors facilitating and hindering
firm-level competitiveness are summarized
under the following headings.




84 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


a. Greatersupporttodevelopprocess
andproducttechnologiesand
innovationcapacitiesisneeded


Companies stressed the need to have ad-
equate support to develop technology and
innovation capacity to help improve their
productive capacity as a whole. In the agro-
processing sector, the survey showed the
need to innovate and expand (see box 5.4).
In the pharmaceutical sector, the survey
showed that local manufacturers produce
only 90 of the 300 drugs on the national
essential drug list. Companies produc-
ing disposable syringes and other medical
supplies can only supply 20 per cent of the
country’s needs for these products.


Local companies have severe limitations as
a result of low technological capacity:


(i) Almost none of the local companies
are able to produce pharmaceutical
products that meet WHO prequalifi-
cation standards, as a result of dif-
ficulties in upgrading their products
and processes (WHO cGMP).


(ii) Local pharmaceutical firms only
produce 5 per cent of all the inter-
mediate products being used, al-
though there are some outstanding
examples of such production (see
box 5.5). The rest are imported to
facilitate local production of phar-
maceuticals, which drives up the
costs of drugs produced.


(iii) Lack of skills hinders the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to en-
gage in reverse engineering and
learning activities.


(iv) Most importantly, there is no lo-
cal capacity to produce active
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs),
which are essential in promoting
local production capacity in the
pharmaceutical sector.


The survey also showed that training new
staff is also quite a low priority in the current
context, as companies only spend between
0.5 and 5 per cent of the total payroll to meet
the training needs of their personnel. The
survey also found that there were insufficient
numbers of public sector agencies/centres of
excellence to conduct applied research of the
kind that can feed into the local pharmaceuti-
cal sector to help them develop skills, such as
those needed in reverse engineering. Firms
also pointed out that there was the huge hu-
man resource gap, which made it difficult to
meet industry development targets, and a
need to have more university graduates with
relevant training coming into the industry.


On the whole, the survey and the field in-
terviews show that lack of access to and
sharing of R&D facilities continue to hinder
the ability of local firms to take advantage
of opportunities both within Ethiopia and in
other in emerging markets. A total of 33 per
cent of the firms in both sectors indicated
that they had benefited greatly from access
to and sharing of R&D facilities.


b. Theneedtoexploitemerging
marketsandbuildcompetitive
industrystrategies


The survey showed that firms continued to
focus on domestic market opportunities;
however, a few companies, particularly cof-


Box5.5: Sino-EthiopAssociate(Africa)PrivateLimitedCompany


Sino-Ethiop Associate (Africa) Private Limited Company is an Ethiopia-Chinese joint venture com-
pany established in March 2001. Ethiopia has a 30 per cent stake in the joint venture. The company
manufactures and markets hard gelatin capsules for the local market and exports to other African
countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, South Africa, Sudan, Zambia and
Zimbabwe. It also produces medical devices and packaging materials. Of its total production, com-
pany executives estimate that about 70 per cent of production is sold in the local market, while
30 per cent is exported.


Sino-Ethiop has an annual production capacity of 1.2 billion capsules. Despite this capacity, the
company is not able to meet the increasing demand for their products and is planning to expand.


Source: UNCTAD, based on field interviews with the company.




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 85


fee producers, have ventured into markets
beyond Ethiopia. Among exporting firms,
most acknowledged that export demand
has helped to shape their innovation strate-
gies. However, agro-processing companies
that did not have a particular market niche
for their products overseas found it difficult
to export their products or consider new
technological breakthroughs in their pro-
duction, including producers of Teff, a wide-
ly grown crop in Ethiopia. Industrial policy
instruments may be appropriate to enable
agro-processing companies to produce
and export their products, in part to prevent
extreme dependence on coffee exports.


c. Theneedtocreateforwardand
backwardlinkages


To a certain extent, surveyed firms ac-
knowledged that the largest impediment
was perhaps the lack of forward linkages
(with other sectors and production chains
that could help the upgrading processes)
and backward linkages (with the agricul-
tural outputs). Inefficiencies in backward
linkages often resulted in delays and stalled
productions, with associated costs for the
agro-processed goods; an effective solu-
tion to this problem, as frequently suggest-
ed in the interviews, was to establish and
empower agricultural cooperatives.


d. Theneedtocloselyalignindustrial
andinnovationpolicies


The survey pointed to several policy gaps
that needed to be urgently addressed in
three specific areas:


(i) Improved government’s support
and effort to promote technology
transfer and an enabling R&D en-
vironment;


(ii) Business-friendly Customs proce-
dures and export-import policies;
and


(iii) Easier access to land for business
purposes.


The survey also identified policy areas where
the government or other institutional sup-
port structures could be critical in formulat-
ing new strategies. Between 53 to 75 per


cent of enterprises interviewed pointed out
that it is important for government agencies
to promote technology transfer and cre-
ate a more enabling R&D environment and
access to land (ease registration cost and
procedures), and that this was extremely
critical to promote innovative capacity.


e. Improvingexports-import
proceduresandthegeneral
businessenvironment


The survey also showed that more can
be done to make current Customs proce-
dures more business-friendly. Analysis of
survey findings on policy constraints that
impact industry efforts to build technology
capabilities showed that a majority (53 per
cent) of those surveyed identified Customs
procedures and export-import policies as
having a severe negative impact on their
business operations. Also, the survey find-
ings showed that restrictions on licensing
arrangements, local duties, access to land
and municipal regulations do not impact
day-to-day business operations in a seri-
ous manner. Respondents emphasized
that curbing official corruption and other
regulations could promote innovation and
industrial development.


f. Promoteaccesstofinance


Lack of financial support was identified as
one of the main constraints on the ability of
enterprises to take advantage of opportu-
nities and innovate. Given the risky nature
of innovative activities, local firms reported
that obtaining domestic bank loans for in-
novative activities are not easy, and often
lead to interesting ventures being aban-
donned.


D. CONCLUDING
REMARKS


Despite the policy traction in the realm of
industrial and innovation policies, Ethiopia
still faces some constraints, which prevent
its industries from realizing its potential.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that
many of these shortcomings have serious
repercussions for achieving the goals set
out in the GTP. Although progress has been




86 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


achieved in both the pharmaceutical and
agro-processing sectors, the targets set
out in the GTP have not been met as the
analysis in the previous section has shown.


Building policy coherence and coordination
is a slow process, but at the same time, it is
important to note the key areas where fur-
ther action is required. The chapter points
to the following important constraints that
need to be addressed in the next GTP in
order to consolidate and extend the mo-
mentum achieved up until now. These are:


(i) Coordination between industrial and in-
novation policies:


Perhaps the most important finding of the
sectoral surveys was that the companies
would be best equipped to expand, tech-
nologically upgrade and compete if there
was more policy coherence and coordina-
tion at the implementation level between
the industrial policy vision and GTP targets
and the national STI policy. The survey re-
sults also lend strength to the conclusion
that more immediate action is required
to equip agencies, such as the Food and
Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Indus-
try Development Institute (FB-PIDI). These
agencies are crucial as they can help steer
firm-level performance in the right direction
by providing industry-relevant services (see
box 5.6)


(ii) Physical, trade and transport-related in-
frastructure costs:


Trade and transport-related infrastructure
are crucial for innovation and industrial
competitiveness. Ethiopia has seen an im-
provement in this area since 2007 but there
are still large gaps. Access to electricity
increased slightly from 23  per cent of the
population to 23.3 per cent between 2010
and 2012. Mobile cellular subscriptions (per
million people) rose from 5,391 in 2005 to
315,939 in 2014. Fixed broadband internet
subscribers (per million people) also rose
from 0.8 in 2005 to 4,883 in 2014. How-
ever, such infrastructure is still not readily
and easily accessible to firms at a low cost.


(iii) Knowledge infrastructure and skills de-
velopment:


Ethiopia is currently implementing its Ed-
ucation Sector Development Programme
IV (2009/10 to 2014/15). This programme
emphasizes the development of technical
and vocational education and training, as
well as the overall knowledge and human
resource infrastructural development in
the country. As of 2014, there were 31
public universities, 59 non-government
higher educational institutions and 29 col-
leges of teacher education in the coun-
try. Public R&D spending is also rising,
although not to the extent envisioned in
the GTP. According to the MOST, 0.6 per
cent of GDP was invested into R&D in
2014, and the number of researchers in
R&D (per million people) rose from 21 in
2005 to 42 in 2010 along with an increase
in the number of scientific and technical
journal articles from 88 in 2005 to 170
in 2011. Despite this, there is a need to
ensure that the increased R&D spending
is prioritized towards industry-relevant re-
search.


(iv) Collaboration and network for access
to new technologies and innovations for in-
dustrial development:


The National STI policy of Ethiopia is a
relatively new document; however, this
policy needs to be considered in the con-
text of the country’s experience over the
past three decades. Comparing the cur-
rent document with its predecessors, what
stands out is that several of the targets set
out in the current STI policy are similar to
those in the 1993 S&T policy. Among the
targets being implemented are a 1.5  per
cent investment of GDP into R&D, promo-
tion of technology transfer, strengthening
of public research institutes, and greater
collaborative networks. A helpful next step
would be to conduct a policy review to as-
sess previously encountered difficulties,
and to take steps to avoid the same prob-
lems in the future. Furthermore, there is an
urgent need to have new institutions that
interface research with product develop-
ment. A recent effort to bridge this gap is
the Food and Beverages and Pharmaceu-
ticals Industry Development Institute (see
box 5.6).




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 87


(v) Channeling knowledge flows, inter-
nal and external:


Business does not operate in a vacuum:
Company decisions are largely influenced
by opportunities within domestic markets.
This has to be complemented with greater
knowledge flows accruing from collabora-
tions with national and foreign firms and
governmental agencies in order to set up
a broader base for innovation and industrial
competiveness. Data show that the share
of enterprises with an internationally rec-
ognized quality certification (e.g. PIC, GMP
or ISO certification) increased from 4.2 per
cent in 2006 to 13.6 per cent in 2011. Like-
wise, the share of enterprises using tech-
nologies licensed from foreign companies
also rose up from 4.2 per cent in 2006 to
42.7 per cent in 2011. However, collabora-
tive linkages focusing on local learning and
local innovation content still need to be fos-
tered further.


(vi) Business environment and innova-
tion cost:


According to the World Bank’s study on
Doing Business (World Bank, 2014), the to-
tal tax rate as a percentage of profit is more
favourable to enterprises in Ethiopia where
the rate is 31.8 per cent compared to the
sub-Saharan African average of 46.2  per
cent. On the whole, Ethiopia has a better
‘ease of doing business’ and innovation en-
vironment for industrial development than
many other African countries. The improve-
ments in this regard should be coordinated
with R&D and skills development to foster
technological investment at the firm-level.


Box 5.6: Food and Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Industry Development Institute


The Ministry of Industry in Ethiopia set up the Food and Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Industry
Development Institute (FB-PIDI) to act as a one-stop shop to assist the food processing and the
pharmaceuticals sectors. The effective functioning of this institution is critical to boosting the capac-
ity of these two sectors, particularly with respect to upgrading production facilities, and to provide
advice and support on boosting capacity; FB-PIDI is also expected to provide research, laboratory
and testing services to the industry. This is a first initiative of its kind in Ethiopia, and its future suc-
cess and capacity will largely depend on the infrastructure and manpower it will benefit from. At the
time of the field investigation, the agency was limited by funding and weaknesses in human skills
and infrastructure that policymakers have acknowledged and which are expected to change soon.


Source: UNCTAD, based on field interview with the company.


(vii) Delays in delivery times and high
import-export cost:


Industry also pointed to delays in delivery
times hindering their ability to export or im-
port. While it takes less than one month to
export or import to East African countries,
such as Kenya and the United Republic of
Tanzania, it takes on the average one and
half months to do the same in Ethiopia.
The cost to import per container of inputs
in 2012 was around $2,660 in Ethiopia
compared to for example, $1,200 in India.
Exporters and importers need better condi-
tions in order to maximize gains from trade.


(viii) Promote overall export orientation:


The local industry is still inward looking and
its focus on learning opportunities, both in-
ternal and external, need to be promoted. In
this regard, the STI policy framework needs
to actively engage in promoting collabora-
tive networks in the country and outside.


(ix) Embed the implementation of the
STI policy in the GTP:


While the country has achieved laudable
successes by integrating the GTP and the
new STI policy, the implementation of STI
policy has not yet been embedded within
the broader GTP framework. This is high-
lighted in the difficulties faced by local firms
to invest in technological learning and navi-
gating through the industry development
and promotion landscape. Acquisition of
new knowledge is necessary but that may
not be sufficient for sustainable industrial
development if not complemented by inno-
vation and creativity within industries.




88 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


(x) Take local industry characteristics
into account:


Similar to the situation in the United Repub-
lic of Tanzania, the STI policy and the GTP
need to be revisited to better incorporate
local industry characteristics and ensure
that the day-to-day activities of local firms
are better integrated. Currently, although
recognized in the STI policy, there is a need
for clear institutional mechanisms to imple-
ment the various policy objectives, and to
promote technology transfer, access to fi-
nance, joint ventures for production, value-
addition in agro-processing beyond cof-
fee, mechanisms for policy feedback and
sector-based associations with enhanced
links to government bodies. Going forward,
there will be the need to interlink and apply


innovation focused industrial policies and
those of the industry focused innovation
policies to create synergies that could help
address the industrial development needs
of Ethiopia.


The second phase of the GTP should build
on the current momentum to introduce in-
novation focused industrial policies with a
focus on promoting strategic partnerships
and informal sources of technologies along
with intra-industry (knowledge flow within
industry) and inter-industry (knowledge flow
between industries) linkages. The role of uni-
versities and public research institutes will be
critical in this process. In addition, technolo-
gy licensing, technologies from joint venture
R&D arrangements and technologies for re-
verse engineering could be crucial.




CHAPTER V: INNOVATION POLICIES FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA 89


NOTES


1. Ethiopia STI policy draft, see: https://www.healthresearchweb.org/files/Ethiopia_National_S,T&I_
Policy_Draft.2006.pdf


2. Data for Eritrea are not reflected as of 1992 as it gained independence.


3. Ethiopia Investment Code (1963).


4. Proclamation No. 91/1994 on Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission Establishment.
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=175299


5. Proclamation No. 603/2008.


6. Ethiopia Ministry of Science and Technology website: http://www.most.gov.et/index.php/ministry/
about-the-ministry/mission-vision


7. Federal Republic of Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11 - 2014/15. Volume II: Policy
Matrix. Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2010, Addis Ababa.


8. Ethiopian Coffee Exports to Hit Record in 2015. http://ethioagp.org/ethiopian-coffee-exports-to-
hit-record-in-2015/


9. World’s Top 10 Coffee-Producing Countries in 2010-2011. Bloomberg News. http://www.bloomb-
erg.com/news/2011-08-19/world-s-top-10-coffee-producing-countries-in-2010-2011-table-.
html


10. The Coffee War: Ethiopia and the Starbucks Story. http://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.
jsp?id=2621


11. Great Programs in History: Agricultural Cooperatives in Ethiopia. http://www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/
FeatureGreatProjectsinHistoryAgriculturalCooperativesinEthiopia


12. These companies include: Addis Pharmaceutical Factory; Epharm; Cadila Pharmaceuticals; Rx Af-
rica; Fawes Pharmaceuticals;East Africa Pharmaceuticals; National Veterinary; Pharmacure; Sino
Ethiop; Asmi Industry; Fanus Med Tech; MOAB; ARFAB Engineering Medical Equipment Manufac-
turing; Access Bio.; Medsol Pharmaceuticals; Tulips Cosmetics & Pharmaceutical Manufacturing;
Julphar; and Samed.


13. The term PIC/S refers to the Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention and Pharmaceutical Inspec-
tion Cooperation Scheme. These two international instruments enable cooperation on matters
of promoting good manufacturing practices between countries and pharmaceutical inspection
authorities.






6
PARTNERING


FOR DEVELOPMENT:
HARNESSING THE


SYNERGIES BETWEEN
INNOVATION POLICIES


AND INDUSTRIAL
POLICIES






93CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


CHAPTER VI
PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT:


HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES
BETWEEN INNOVATION POLICIES


AND INDUSTRIAL POLICIES


A. INTRODUCTION
African countries have reached a defining
point where stocktaking is not only neces-
sary but also vital, particularly as they pre-
pare to address the new development goals
contained in 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. It is widely acknowledged
that sustainable development rests more
broadly on stable industrial development of
a kind that can deliver better livelihoods and
eradicate poverty, as reflected in several
goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development. Goal 9 of the SDGs encap-
sulates the dual objectives of promoting in-
clusive and sustainable industrialization and
fostering innovation. In this context, innova-
tion and industrial development are highly
relevant from an African perspective, and
are being extensively supported by newer
literature emerging on the topic. Important
results include:


(i) Innovation policies are relatively
new and often not well imple-
mented in a large number of
countries.


(ii) Innovation systems suffer from
many shortcomings, many of
which continue to affect their ef-
fectiveness.


(iii) In the past, the industrial develop-
ment experiences of African coun-
tries have been shaped by similar
concerns and strategies in the Af-
rican region (e.g. import substitu-
tion strategies, trade liberalization,
shift to export promotion, and less
emphasis has been placed on pro-
moting technological learning, etc.)
(Noman et al, 2012).


(iv) In the instances that industrial
development strategies have fo-
cused on technological change,
there have been several problems
related to proper coordination
(Noman et al, 2012; Cimoli, Dosi
and Stiglitz, 2009).


(v) Most sub-Saharan African firms are
family-owned and small-sized; this
hinders their financial resources and
capacity to acquire modern tech-
nologies. Moreover, scarcity of hu-
man resources, brain drain, weak
governance in technology transfer,
and a weak enabling environment
all serve as other main barriers for
innovation (UNECA, 2014).


(vi) Fostering firms through a sup-
portive policy environment will be
crucial to promoting sustainable in-
dustrial development in the region.


Starting with a detailed review of the indus-
trial development strategies and policies,
and the STI policies of a large number of
African countries, this report has pro-
posed an analytical framework to consider
the overlapping domains in the two policy
frameworks, along with a set of principles
that could help structure the interactions in
a complementary manner and help steer
industrial development through an inno-
vation-oriented industrial policy. Chapters
III-V of this report analyzed the linkages
between industrial and innovation policy
frameworks within countries by collecting
primary data collected through a purposive
survey designed to understand policy gaps
(in policy history, conceptualization and im-
plementation) and their impact on firm-level
performance.




94 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


An analysis of national experiences with
industrialization and the varied institutional
backgrounds of the three countries (Nige-
ria, the United Republic of Tanzania and
Ethiopia) shows that developing and im-
plementing policy processes that shape
the interaction of industrial development
and innovation policies right are not to be
under-estimated, particularly due to the
significant impact they have on firm-level
performance. The historical consideration
of the industrialization experiences allows
us to draw lessons from the past and apply
them to the present and the future.


The findings of these chapters highlight the
continuing challenges of fostering technol-
ogy-led industrial development in countries.
At a fundamental level, the analysis illus-
trates how experiences of industrialization
have had limited success in the countries
as a result of the lack of integration of tech-
nological learning and STI issues.


This final chapter presents key results from
a more general perspective, and in its final
part proceeds to evaluate the most critical
factors of the industrial policy-innovation
policy interface and to provide policy rec-
ommendations.


B. GENERAL FINDINGS
There are at least three general findings that
are of relevance from the foregoing chap-
ters of the report, and also help discuss the
results from a broader perspective. Almost
all countries in the African region, including
the three countries studied in this report,
are currently at a policy and developmental
stage where industrial development through
technological change is a central, if not the
most important, priority (See tables 2.1 and
2.2 of chapter II). Not only is there a policy
transition towards that end, i.e. the field
surveys reflect the political commitment
that exists with regard to enacting elabo-
rate industrial policy frameworks and revis-
ing S&T policies and re-orient them towards
policies dedicated to innovation, in terms of
STI policies. Thirdly, the private sector in the
African region (particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa) is in dire need of greater support.


1. Countries have elaborate
industrial policy frameworks


All three countries have significant experi-
ence in enacting industrial policy frame-
works. Starting out with import substitution
strategies in the 1960s and 1970s, the three
countries have progressively transitioned to
different kinds of export-oriented strategies
from the late 1980s onwards.


In the case of Nigeria, the National Indus-
trial Policy of 1998, is an elaborate policy
that was aimed at resuscitating the indus-
trial sector through structural diversification,
promotion of new sectoral activities, and in-
creasing the manufacturing value-added of
products and export promotion. Along with
that, in 2002, Nigeria also launched its Vi-
sion 2010 aimed at making Nigeria Africa’s
leading economy by 2010. Later in 2010,
Nigeria adopted its Vision 20:2020, which
is currently being implemented through
a series of medium-term plans: the first
of which was developed for the period of
2010-2013, and the second and third for
the periods of 2014-2017 and 2018-2020,
respectively. Likewise, Nigeria’s multifacet-
ed ‘Industrial Revolution Plan’ launched in
January 2014 seeks to provide a national
roadmap for industrialization.


In the United Republic of Tanzania, the
multipurpose industrial development pol-
icy (SIDP, 1996-2020) was formulated to
promote “indigenous entrepreneurial base
through orienting the education policy and
strategy to emphasize technical educa-
tion, including strengthening of vocational
training institutions and entrepreneurship
development” (p. 13-14). This was fol-
lowed with the Tanzania Development Vi-
sion (TDV) 2025, which was launched in
1999 to transform the country into a semi-
industrialized economy and attain middle-
income country status by 2025. To this end,
the country adopted the first National Strat-
egy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
(NSGRP I, 2005-2010), and the second
National Strategy for Growth and Reduc-
tion of Poverty (NSGRP II, 2010-2015) to
help achieve TDV 2025. Along with that, the
Integrated Industrial Development Strategy




95CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


2025 (IIDS) was enacted in 2011 to guide
the process of resource-based industriali-
zation with emphasis on industrial cluster
development, PPPs and SEZs.


Ethiopia’s overarching industrial develop-
ment strategy is Ethiopia’s Growth and
Transformation Plan (GTP I, 2010-2015),
which is aimed at achieving national targets,
such as 11-15 per cent annual GDP growth
and large-scale investments in the industrial
and agricultural sectors. The GTP I seeks to
emphasize programmes, such as develop-
ment of industrial zones, industry capacity
building and university-industry linkages to
help achieve these national targets. With
GTP I expiring in 2015, plans are in hand to
enact a second Growth and Transformation
Plan (GTP II), which build on the industrial
achievements and successes of GTP I.


2. Countries have elaborate STI
policy frameworks


In line with broader trends observed in the
developing world, as can be seen in chap-
ters I and II of this report, all three countries
have transitioned from S&T policies to STI
policy frameworks.


Nigeria’s 2011 STI policy is broad and
marks a substantial shift from its earlier em-
phasis on S&T policies. The policy mission
is fairly extensive with a focus on building
a nation that harnesses, develops and uti-
lizes STI to build a large, strong, diversified,
sustainable and competitive economy. The
general objective is to “build a strong sci-
ence, technology and innovation capability
and capacity needed to evolve a modern
economy” (page 1). These broader objec-
tives are linked to specific industry targets,
such as the production of solar cells, ICT
industry development and applications, as
well as the development and application of
nanotechnology, chemical technology and
biotechnology. All these sectoral priorities
are expected to feed into the existing in-
dustrial hub (Sheda Science and Technol-
ogy Complex/ SHESTCO).


Nigeria also emphasizes strategies to popu-
larize and inculcate STI culture and to main-
stream STI in development programmes


focused on women. One important devel-
opment is that the new policy is linked to
job creation, innovation and national devel-
opment at large.


In the case of Ethiopia, the STI policy of
2012 is the guiding framework, which envi-
sions creating a national technology trans-
fer and innovation framework to help build
capabilities that would enable rapid learn-
ing, adaptation and utilization of effective
foreign technologies by the year 2022/23.
The policy has seven important objectives
including the plan to “establish and imple-
ment a coordinated and integrated general,
governance framework for building STI ca-
pacity” (STI Policy, p. 4).


The United Republic of Tanzania is currently
in the process of enacting a new STI policy
framework, which envisions the promotion
of innovation and technology development,
transfer and commercialization.


3. Enterprise support policies are
the weak link


A third, significant result is that local firms
across the three countries are operating in
a highly constrained institutional environ-
ment, both in terms of industry and innova-
tion support. The field surveys shed light on
some aspects of the institutional environ-
ment and what the deficiencies are.


Firstly, a large number of the local firms
are MSMEs that often operate in the infor-
mal sector and on the fringes of the local
economy. The only exceptions to these are
a handful of large-scale firms, which are
able to acquire sophisticated technological
machinery for manufacturing purposes. De-
spite this, micro- and medium-sized firms
make large contributions to the economies
of the three countries surveyed. In Nigeria,
about 17.3 million MSMEs are estimated
to have contributed about 46.5 per cent of
the country’s GDP in 2010. In the United
Republic of Tanzania over a million MSMEs
are estimated to account for 95 per cent of
businesses; these firms generate 30-35 per
cent of GDP and are responsible for 40 per
cent of total employment in 2009.1 Similarly,
SMEs have accounted for 3.4 per cent of




96 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


GDP and over 52 per cent of the indus-
trial sector contribution in Ethiopia since
1993.2 Survey results confirm that for a
lot of these firms, small changes in the
institutional support structure would go a
long way to improve productivity and re-
main afloat.


Technological upgrading capacity and fi-
nancing remain two key obstacles to day-
to-day company operations. The survey
results show that firms operating in the
medium- and high-technology sectors
are often engaged in activities that are
far removed from production or process
improvements, product design or reverse
engineering activities, i.e. not engaged in
activities that can be classified as learning
or technological upgrading. For example,
many ICT companies in Nigeria and the
United Republic of Tanzania were provid-
ers of ICT services, including Internet pro-
viders and call centres.


Most importantly, survey results show
that STI policies have a rather limited ef-
fect on raising productivity and increasing
the upgrading and expansion of smaller
firms and the informal sector (see also
Benjamin and Mbaye, 2012). In the Unit-
ed Republic of Tanzania, for example, the
Tanzanian National Business Council has
acted as a forum for dialogue between the
private and public sectors, but this has
generated mixed results. There is strong
political will to use this council for policy
implementation (Page, 2014), but insuffi-
cient coordination in the current context
of policy framing and implementation has
resulted in a weak focus on local indus-
trial development.


C. INDUSTRIAL POLICY-
INNOVATION POLICY
INTERFACE: WHAT
MATTERS


Moving from the general findings to more
specific aspects, countries continue to
face several common constraints, many
of them due to historical path depend-
encies following the manner in which in-
stitutional frameworks have evolved, as
well as the alignment of industrial poli-
cies with innovation policies. These limi-
tations correspond to the issues high-
lighted by chapter II of this report that
elaborated on a set of five principles in
the industrial policy-innovation policy in-
terface (box 6.1).


1. Gaps in policymaking structures
exist


In all three countries, as is the case with a
large number of other African countries that
are also reviewed in the report (see chapter
II), national STI policies either evolved much
later (at least two decades after the indus-
trial development policies were enacted), or
evolved in parallel with little or no coordina-
tion with established industrial development
frameworks.


The report finds that within countries, a pre-
dominant issue is where industrial policy is
placed, and how it is articulated. In the case
of a large number of developing countries,
policies for industrial development are not
usually articulated as industrial policies, but
rather as industrial development strategies,
or as national visions, or as part of recur-
ring national developmental plans aimed at


Box 6.1: Five guiding principles in aligning the industrial policy-innovation policy
interface:Arecap


1. Identify and eliminate policy redundancies in the policy conceptualization and policy making
structure.


2. Promote policy coherence and policy competence.


3. Use resources carefully.


4. Develop capacity for proper policy evaluation and monitoring.


5. Coordinate the policymaking processes closely vis-à-vis their impact on the business and enter-
prise environment, and promote the engagement of the private sector.


Source: UNCTAD.




97CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


facilitating overall development and eco-
nomic transition.


If countries enact national visions that in-
clude industrial policy objectives (which is
the case not only in Ethiopia, Nigeria and
the United Republic of Tanzania, but also
true for a large number of other African
countries), it needs to be borne in mind that
such national vision statements generally
have a broader scope than just promoting
industry, and often tackle issues of poverty,
youth, environment, employment and ur-
banization. In several countries, industrial
development objectives are embedded in
their national development plans, and are
often recurrent on a term-by-term basis.


Therefore, although such visions or strate-
gies encapsulate the main industrial objec-
tives or goals, there is a need to have clear
roadmaps to achieve these visions, with ac-
companying targets, so that these can be
linked to a policy implementation mecha-
nism on the one hand, and to STI and other
policies (covering areas such as trade, in-
vestment, and development) on the other.


Another reason for the gaps in policymaking
is that a large number of industrial develop-
ment strategies are one-dimensional: they
target overall industrial development and an
increase in per capita GDP growth rates, or
a rise of specific sectors. The focus should
instead be on closing the productivity gap,
i.e. how to ensure greater returns from pro-
ductive activities. This leads to gaps in poli-
cymaking, including a neglect of:


(i) Technological and technical sup-
port systems required for the
growth of sectors;


(ii) Links between the human skills re-
quirements of the various sectors
with enhanced performance pro-
jections;


(iii) A clear articulation of how the high-
er GDP spending on R&D will form
part of public sector assistance to
technological upgrading, e.g. the
establishment of common industry
services, technological incubation,
industrial research labs, etc.


2. Policies suffer from
inconsistencies and often,
overall incoherence


A key issue that stands out is that sophis-
ticated policies are not sufficient. While in-
dustrial development strategies in the se-
lected countries recognize the importance
of technology-led growth, and whereas all
STI frameworks recognize the importance
of coordinating with industrial policy, the
same historical patterns of lack of coordi-
nation between innovation and industrial
policy frameworks persist. Countries have
tried to tackle these issues by providing
for common goals or missions in the two
policy frameworks, but policy incoherence
not only occurs at the stage of policy ar-
ticulation, and is also often deeply rooted in
policy implementation processes.


The country chapters help to illustrate the
main finding of the analytical framework,
namely that it is crucial that policy processes
are clearly laid out. Specifically, the findings
show that even elaborate policy frameworks
on STI policy and industrial development
need to be accompanied by policy consist-
ency and coherence at the levels of:


(a) Policy conceptualization and de-
sign;


(b) Policy implementation and coordi-
nation


a. Policyincoherenceinthe
conceptualizationofthetwopolicy
frameworks


A number of reasons explain the existence of
policy incoherence and inconsistencies. The
country chapters show that they could be the
result of ineffective policy transitions (where
countries embark on changes in policy, but
remain incomplete and lose momentum as a
result of changing political leadership at differ-
ent levels of governance), institutional inertia
and resistance, or a lack of policy compe-
tence to foresee and avoid overlaps.


i. Incoherenceasaresultofineffectiveor
slowpolicytransitions


Moving towards an innovation policy is a
challenging coordination task and involves




98 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


more than just providing a regulatory frame-
work. In reality, although a wide variety of
policies emphasize ‘innovation’, field investi-
gations found that while some policies seek
to fundamentally chart new ground, in other
instances the policies often make reference
to ‘innovation’, but are not comprehensive
enough to tackle the challenges of fostering
innovation. Furthermore, additional difficulties
arise when policy processes are not followed
through, or maintained through changes in
the political environments in countries.


The same difficulty holds true for policies
in industrial development. For instance, in
the case of the United Republic of Tanza-
nia, the Sustainable Industrial Development
Policy (SIDP) 1996-2020 reserved the right
of the government to invest in critical sec-
tors. As a part of this, the Tanzania Mini Ti-
ger Plan 2020 was launched in 2005. But as
of 2005, this was replaced by the National
Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction
2005-2010, and in 2011 followed by a new
Integrated Industrial Development Strategy
2025. It remains unclear what the link/conti-
nuity between the two industrialization strat-
egies are, particularly given that the philoso-
phies of the two strategies are very different.
As opposed to the 1996 Industrial Develop-
ment Policy, which sought to replicate the
successes of the East Asian economies by
investing in particular sectors, the new 2011
strategy advocates resource-based industri-
alization. These kinds of sudden shifts that
do not help foster industrialization as a con-
tinuous process lead to policy inconsistency
and incoherence simply because they do
not offer a consistent and reliable support to
the process of industrial transformation.


ii. Incoherence due to institutional
resistance and inertia


The field interviews and surveys in all three
countries shed light on the fact that policy
and institutional history matters. Historical
analyses of the evolution of policies and
implementation mechanisms conducted in
the chapters shows that agencies imple-
menting these mandates operate within
weak, unaccountable implementation pro-
cesses. Such inter-agency rivalries exac-


erbate policy coordination issues and have
led to a large-scale neglect of the private
sector. In almost all countries surveyed,
private sector enterprises considered that
existing policy frameworks and the actions
of implementing agencies operated at a
distance from them, making little attempt to
liaise and understand the constraints they
faced or tried to alleviate them. The field
investigations showed that entrenched in-
stitutional habits and practices were hard
to change, and explained why newer more
collaborative modes of interaction were not
emerging, despite policy mandates. Poli-
cies on industrial development, if they are to
be coherent with innovation policies, should
seek to address the operative mandates of
agencies to promote a change in mindset.


iii. Incoherenceduetoinsufficientpolicy
competence/policyoversight


Another set of coordination issues relate to
targets included in both industrial develop-
ment policies and innovation policies. These
are often designed, and intended to be im-
pacted upon by the policies differently. For
example, in Ethiopia, the STI policy aims to
“develop, promote and commercialize useful
indigenous knowledge and technologies”. To
promote this, an assessment would first be
needed on whether the sui generis system
created by the Ethiopian 2006 Proclamation
on Access to Genetic Resources and Com-
munity Knowledge and Community Rights
could help protect useful indigenous knowl-
edge and technologies. In other words, IPR
protection has to be integral part of the in-
digenous knowledge commercialization pro-
cess. But what seem to be missing in the
objectives are strategies to create STI policy
awareness at all levels of government includ-
ing the Cabinet and Parliament, as well as
strategies to build innovation culture among
businesses, the youth and society at large.
Similarly, one of the projects under the GTP
is the setting up of industrial parks, but these
are expected to perform the function of act-
ing as hubs of foreign direct investment and
to leverage technology transfer of the kind
outlined in the country’s STI policy. This once
again calls for a strategic approach to the co-




99CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


ordination of policy implementation between
the ministries and agencies involved in imple-
menting the mandates on industrial develop-
ment, investment and STI. However, the lack
of policy competence and incentives among
agency employees often leads to very mini-
malistic interpretations of these mandates.


Assessing the successes and difficulties
faced by the countries in this report, it is
advisable to implement the following rec-
ommendations in order to avoid policy in-
coherence that can arise in conceptualiza-
tion and design:


(i) Policy vision, mission and objectives
should be closely aligned. A review
of all the initiatives, as can be found
in tables 2.1 and 2.2 of chapter II and
the country chapters, lend strength
to the conclusion that a close align-
ment of industrial development and
innovation policies is often an elusive
goal in countries. Oftentimes, even
the missions, or the STI objectives
covered in industrial policy are not
the same as the objectives of the STI
policy itself (see previous point), lead-
ing to policy incoherence and con-
fusion. A case in point is the vision
and mission segments of Ethiopia’s
current innovation policy, which ap-
pear to focus on building the capa-
bilities to exploit foreign technologies
but do not seem to emphasize the
establishment of industry-friendly in-
novation system, as envisaged in the
policy. It is imperative for the policy
vision and mission to be aligned with
the policy objectives, which seem to
focus on building broader innovation
capabilities, including the develop-
ment and exploitation of local indig-
enous knowledge and technology.


(iii) Emphasis should be placed on de-
veloping local linkages and unlock-
ing learning potential: Although STI
policies clearly lay down the broader
vision to build capacity, fostering
an innovation ecosystem calls for
emphasis on the creation of inno-
vation and entrepreneurship culture


with express links to industrial de-
velopment. It is therefore necessary
to promote entrepreneurial pro-
grammes, align academic curricu-
lum with entrepreneurial needs, and
introduce entrepreneurship classes
at schools and institutions of higher
learning for the effective application
of new technologies and innovation
for industrial development.


(iv) While enacting new policies, there is
a need to clearly link them with exist-
ing initiatives and agency mandates:
As seen in the country chapters, poli-
cymakers are aware of the need to
review existing policies and agency
mandates, but change is usually
slow, leading to policy ineffectiveness.


(iii) There are two critical reasons why
this should occur in tandem with the
policymaking/revision process is criti-
cal for at least for two reasons: Firstly,
because previous policies often have
agency mandates that call for a re-
view as a new policy is introduced;
and secondly, to ensure that the in-
stitutional framework embodies the
changes in a dynamic and efficient
way. An example in this regard is Ni-
geria’s STI policy, which has rightly
underlined the need for the existing
institutional and legal framework to
be restructured in such a way as to
strengthen national innovation ca-
pacity as an essential first step for a
strong national innovation system.
However, the difficulty is that since
its inception in 2011, the policy has
been implemented within an institu-
tional setting that was created for a
different purpose. Furthermore, sev-
eral older policy directives that were
set out for review have yet to be
considered. For example, there is an
indication in the new STI policy that
the National Science and Technology
Act, CAP 276 of 1977 and the Feder-
al Ministry of Science and Technology
Act No 1, 1980 would be reviewed.
The mandate of the National Office
for Technology Acquisition and Pro-




100 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


motion, which was created in 1979,
also needs to be reviewed. Review-
ing these policies and others, includ-
ing the 1986 Federal Universities of
Technology Act and 1987 National
Science and Technology Fund Act,
will be critical to ensure that these two
Acts are in line with the objectives of
the current STI policy.


• Secondly, reviewing policy mandates
is very important in ensuring that na-
tional resources (financial and human
skills related) are used efficiently.


b. Policyincoherenceinthe
implementation process


A second form of policy incoherence is
when the frameworks are overarching but
not accompanied by a concrete imple-
mentation plan. However, in many other
cases, policy frameworks are accom-
panied by implementation mechanisms,
but several shortcomings have prevented


them (to a different extent in the three
countries) from achieving an impact. A key
issue (already raised in the previous point)
is that in the absence of stocktaking and
attempts to streamline the institutional
apparatus, many public sector agencies
have mandates to implement the policies
and related incentives, and this can lead
to duplication. When the policy framework
is not completely consistent or accompa-
nied by clear implementation mechanisms,
the country analyses show that there is no
clarity at the policy implementation stage
as to which of the existing agencies should
implement the mandates contained in the
policy framework and how they should be
implemented.


The situation is much more drastic than one
could imagine. Box 6.2 contains the nation-
al agencies with mandates to implement
the incentives within industrial development
policies and STI policies in each of the three
countries examined in this report.


Box 6.2: National agencies/parastatals with mandates to implement industrial and
innovation policies


1. National agencies/ parastatals in Nigeria:


In Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment (FMTI) was created to “formulate
and implement policies and programmes to attract investment, boost industrialization, increase
trade and exports and develop enterprises”. FMTI has 14 parastatals, namely the Abuja Securities
& Commodities Exchange; Bank of Industry (BOI); Consumer Protection Council; Corporate Affairs
Commission (CAC); Industrial Training Fund (ITF); Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria; Nigeria
Export Processing Zone Authority (NEPZA); Nigeria Export Promotion Council (NEPC); National
Automotive Council (NAC); National Sugar Development Council (NSDC); Oil & Gas Free Zone Au-
thority; Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON); Small & Medium Enterprises Development Agency
of Nigeria (SMEDAN); and the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC).


The Federal Ministry of Science and Technology in Nigeria has the following 17 parastatals, namely:
Energy Commission of Nigeria (ECN); Federal Institute of Industrial Research, Oshodi (FIIRO); Na-
tional Agency for Science and Engineering Infrastructure (NASENI), Abuja; National Biotechnology
Development Agency (NABDA); National Board for Technology Incubation (NBTI); National Centre
for Technology Management (NACETEM); National Institute of Leather Science and Technology
(NILEST), Zaria; National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP); National Re-
search Institute for Chemical Technology (NARICT), Zaria; National Space Research & Development
Agency (NARSDA); Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute (NBBRI); Nigerian Institute For
Trypanosomiasis And Onchocerciasis (NITR); Nigerian Natural Medicine Development Agency (NN-
MDA); Project Development Institute (PRODA), Enugu; Raw Materials Research and Development
Council (RMRDC), Abuja; Sheda Science and Technology Complex (SHESTCO), Abuja; and the
Nigerian Institute of Science Laboratory Technology (NISLT).


2. National agencies/ Parastatals in the United Republic of Tanzania:


The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) has two types of parastatals involved in supporting industries
and businesses. Industrial support organizations include: The National Development Corporation (NDC),




101CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


Box 6.2: National agencies/parastatals with mandates to implement industrial and
innovation policies (cont.)


which was established in 1962 to initiate, develop and guide the implementation of economically viable
projects in partnership with the private sector; the Tanzania Industrial Research Development Organization
(TIRDO), which was founded in 1979 to provide technical services to industries in the area of area of agro-
technology and industrial chemistry, food and microbiology, energy and environment, information technol-
ogy and instrumentation, leather and textile and materials science technology; the Tanzania Engineering
and Manufacturing Design Organization (TEMDO), which was established in 1980 to promote engineering
design, technology development and enhancement of the competitiveness of local manufacturing enter-
prises through provision of quality technical support services; the Centre for Agricultural Mechanization
and Rural Technology (CAMARTEC), which was created in 1989 to disseminate improved technologies
suitable for agricultural and rural development; The Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) which was
set up in 2006 to coordinate, facilitate and promote investments in the export processing zones; and lastly
the Small Industries Development Organization (SIDO), which was established in 1973 to develop the small
industry sector. Business support organizations under MIT include: the Tanzania Trade Development Au-
thority (TANTRADE), which was created in 1978 to spearhead Tanzania’s Export endeavours; the College
of Business Education (CBE) which was founded in 1965 to train highly competent and practice-oriented
professionals; the Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) which was established in 1977 to formulate stand-
ards and to undertake metrology quality control, testing and calibration and training.


The following organizations fall under the purview of the Ministry of Communication, Science and Tech-
nology (MST): the Dar es Salaam Institute of Technology (DIT); Mbeya University of Science &Technology
(MUST); Nelson Mandela African Institute of Science &Technology (NM-AIST); Tanzania Telecommunica-
tions Company Ltd (TTCL); Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission; Tanzania Commission for Science and
Technology (COSTECH); and The Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA). A number of
institutions active in the areas of in agriculture and livestock, industry and energy, natural resources, medi-
cine and public health, and universities and colleges are affiliated with MST.
3. National Agencies/ Parastatals in Ethiopia:


The Ministry of Industry oversees the following state institutions: The Privatization and Public Enterprises
Supervising Agency, established in 2004 to implement the privatization programme and provide guidance
and supervision to public enterprises; the Ethiopian Investment Agency, created in 1992 to promote private
investment, primarily foreign direct investment; the Leather industry Development Institute (LIDI), set up
in 2010 to facilitate the development and transfer of leather and leather products industries technologies
and to enable the industries become competitive and experience rapid development; the Metal industry
Development Institute, originally set up in 1973 but re-established in 2010 to facilitate the development and
transfer of metals and engineering industries technologies, and to enable industries become competitive
and beget rapid development; and the Ethiopia Kaizen Institute, established in 2011 to achieve greater
effectiveness in the utilization of resources, quality improvements and enhanced performance capacity.
Other parastatals under the Ministry of Industry include the: Textile Industry Development Institute; Food
and Beverages and Pharmaceuticals Industry Development Institute (FB-PIDI); Chemical and Construction
Input Industry Development Institute; and the Ethiopian Meat and Dairy Industry Development Institute.
The Ministry of Science and Technology has the following parastatals: The Science and Technology Infor-
mation Centre, founded in 2011 to oversee the collection, selection, analysis and dissemination of science
and technology information in Ethiopia; the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office, established in 2003 to
provide legal protection for intellectual property rights; the Ethiopian Conformity Assessment Enterprise, set
up in 2011 to conduct inspection, laboratory testing and certification services to the public and to industry;
the Ethiopian National Accreditation Office, created in 2011 and tasked to accredit the competence of
Conformity Assessment Bodies, including testing laboratories involved with food and associated products,
engineering and textiles; the Ethiopian Radiation Protection Authority, founded in 1993 to control and
regulate the import, export, use, transport, dispose of any source of radiation; the Ethiopian Standards
Agency, established in 2010 to oversee the development of standards, training and technical support
on implementation of standards and to contribute to the country’s economic and social development
through technology transfer; and the National Metrology Institute of Ethiopia, created in 2011 to oversee
the maintenance of Ethiopian National Measurement Standards and Certified Reference Materials and also
to provide calibration, training and consultancy services in the areas of metrology and scientific equipment.


Source: Compiled by UNCTAD through primary data and official agency websites.




102 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


The recommendations in this regard in-
clude:


i. Coordination hurdles need to be
tackledatthelevelofagenciesand
organizational structures.


Oftentimes, when the implementation
framework is not clear, newer agencies cre-
ated by the policy strategy tend to compete
or have overlapping mandates with existing
S&T agencies, leading to confusion among
private sector actors as to which schemes
are available and how they can be ac-
cessed. This is linked to the point made in
the previous section on the need to ensure
that existing initiatives maintain continuity
as well.


For example, in the case of Nigeria, STI in-
centive schemes include:


(i) Promoting cross-border collabora-
tion that enables STI transforma-
tion;


(ii) Motivating the youth to take up ca-
reers in S&T fields;


(iii) Providing technology support ser-
vices and other incentives;


(iv) Promoting public and private en-
terprises to invest at least 5  per
cent of their profits before tax to
the National Research and Innova-
tion Fund; and


(v) Providing funding and other incen-
tives for continuing education of
women in STI.


But as box 6.2 shows, there is a prolifera-
tion of agencies that are expected to imple-
ment many of these mandates, including
the Nigerian Competitiveness Council, the
Nigerian Investment Promotion Agency and
other S&T agencies. It is therefore critical to
set out the implementation of the incentives
associated with these policy processes at
the sectoral level as well as more generally;
this is particularly important as several other
agencies have sectoral mandates, e.g. the
Nigerian Natural Medicines Development
Agency (NNMDA), and the Nigerian Agency
for Biotechnology Development (NABDA),
which also perform various innovation-re-
lated activities. The survey also found that


it is unclear as to which of these agencies
has been tasked with the responsibilities
contained in the STI policy, and how perfor-
mance/innovation support is to be provided
in the absence of clear funding of these
agencies/policy programmes. As a result,
coordination amongst these agencies is
rather weak, and initiatives are often du-
plicated and accompanied by institutional
rivalries, thereby limiting their success. Ni-
geria’s STI policy was also not accompa-
nied by sectoral STI plans, although the
framework sets out elaborate strategies for
several sectors.


In a similar way, the Ethiopian STI policy,
given its focus on technology transfer to
create capacities for incremental innova-
tion, seeks to devise incentive schemes to
reward firms in the manufacturing and ser-
vices sectors firms that have shown high
performance gains through technology
transfer. Ethiopia also seeks to offer various
incentives to medium and large enterprises
to help adapt foreign technologies. In order
to facilitate this, the policy seeks to “estab-
lish and implement an appropriate national
Technology Capability Accumulation and
Transfer (TeCAT) system”.


To ensure the success of this policy tool, it is
imperative that it is accompanied by a clear
implementation mechanism. Currently, the
national STI policy aims to set up the TeCAT
system3 and provides for a set of strategies
on technology transfer,4 but there may be a
need to link these more clearly. The TeCAT
is not supported by concrete outcomes
that can help establish and monitor its func-
tioning, such as projections of the number
of firms to be supported to adopt new tech-
nologies, projected increase in medium- or
high-technology exports and estimated
productivity increase. In conceptualizing the
TeCAT system some of the other important
avenues of technology transfer have also
been left out; technology transfer could
include, for example, the encouragement
of joint ventures to promote technological
transfers and learning. However, the policy
does not align domestic regulations and in-
vestment incentives (including the current
minimum capital requirement of $60,000




103CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


for foreign partnerships), with the technol-
ogy (soft and hard) needs of industry.


ii. Policy changes should be accompanied
by clear and enlarged budgets and
staffingofskilledemployeestofacilitate
their implementation


In all the three countries, the country-level
investigations showed that national STI
policy offices are experiencing increasing
workloads, in part due to extended man-
dates, and faced significant challenges in
their funding, personnel and capacity to
coordinate the extremely difficult policy hur-
dles they currently have to overcome. All
country surveys showed that funding was
not only a major constraint within the inno-
vation system affecting the firms, but also
affected the ability of governmental agen-
cies to offer substantive innovation support.
Lack of funding thwarted the provision of
technology incubation, R&D services, test-
ing and quality assurance services, labora-
tory personnel, and even the provision of
human skills. In Ethiopia, newly established
institutes were not focused on R&D due to
shortages in funding, for example two uni-
versities (Addis Ababa S&T and the Adema
S&T) have yet to be endowed with their
own research labs and other scientific in-
frastructure (see also box 5.6, chapter V).


iii. Developcommontimeframesandgoals
betweenSTIandindustrialpolicies


A critical issue that is common in almost all
of the three countries is that a large num-
ber of initiatives that are relevant for STI are
located within the ministry responsible for
industrial development or in related agen-
cies. This calls for closer coordination over
the mid- to longer-term as the large number
of initiatives and incentives that tend to run
parallel in STI and industrial policy frame-
works are all equally important, particularly
those related to: (a) providing support to in-
dustry and businesses; (b) coordination of
implementation; (c) day-to-day difficulties in
interacting with industry; and (d) promoting
exports and exacerbating finance issues.
The country chapters strengthen these
findings further, and show that national S&T


plans, or regular evaluation plans that em-
phasize policy processes play a non-negli-
gible role in getting agencies, policymakers
and those benefitting from the policy incen-
tives to sit together and discuss relevant
implementation issues.


iv. Importanceofhigh-levelgovernance
structure and coordination


Mechanisms to foster high-level coordina-
tion are perhaps needed as it is often at
the ministerial level that coordination and
communication fails. At least two out of the
three countries surveyed in the report have
established committees that are tasked
with coordinating the implementation of
STI policy frameworks and coordinating
this with industrial development. The Prime
Minister/ President of the country should
normally chairs such committees to fa-
cilitate ministerial level engagement. This is
very important not only for effective policy
coordination but also for support and suc-
cessful implementation of the policy.


v. Bestpracticescanonlyserveasa
guideline


Although countries seek to emulate the
successful practices of other developing
countries (particularly East Asian econo-
mies) within policy frameworks (e.g. Ethio-
pia), country studies show that the policy
impact is dependent on the current capaci-
ties of the private and public sectors in the
countries concerned.


vi. Contextualizationiskeytoachieving
results


Policy frameworks or incentives tend to suc-
ceed better when they are contextualized
to local needs and local circumstances. For
example, a focus on SMEs, especially with
a specific emphasis on what can be done
to promote technological upgrading or ex-
pansion of firm size, remains important (see
section C.4).


vii. Takestockofduplicatedmeasures


The report found that in the case of finance,
or even industry support, a large number
of incentives for stimulating demand, direct




104 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


or indirect finance (such as R&D grants) or
industry support, are to be found in both
policy frameworks, but are not well imple-
mented or coordinated. In other cases, very
important policy incentives were often not
contained in either policy frameworks. It is
therefore important to take stock of existing
policy schemes before implementing them,
or during the course of implementing them,
to reinforce and manage scarce resources
usefully (also see next section).


3. Policy monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms to
ensure efficient use of existing
resources


Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mecha-
nisms are relevant from a variety of per-
spectives. They not only enhance coordi-
nation efforts but also point to the lack of
funding of various initiatives as part of the
stocktaking process. They also ensure that
funding issues are taken into considera-
tion and reviewed over time to evaluate: (a)
where is the current funding being used?
(b) What are the funding gaps to implement
the goals of industrial and STI policies? (c)
How can the gap be financed? (d) What
are the best ways to share risk and part-
ner with industry to effect transformation?
(e) How to best allocate existing resources,
and into what agencies? (f) Can agencies
be streamlined and better defined? These
are some of the issues that should form a
core part of the monitoring and evaluation
exercise.


Monitoring and evaluation exercises
aimed at ensuring that existing resources
and agency strengths are put to good use
will play a pivotal role in policy effective-
ness.


In support of this point, the surveys and in-
terviews showed that most funding given
to agencies supporting innovation is often
spent on recurring expenses related to staff
maintenance and running costs, with little
or no reserve for innovation support infra-
structure. In the United Republic of Tanza-
nia, for example, about 95.1 per cent of the
sums allocated to agricultural R&D goes


into staff salaries or operating expenses,
leaving only 4.9 per cent for capital invest-
ments in 2011. Similarly, staff salaries and
operating expenses account for about
83.4 per cent and 71.8 per cent of agricul-
tural R&D in Nigeria and Ethiopia, respec-
tively.5 Similarly, supporting staff account for
about 29.3 per cent (2010), 33.6 per cent
(2007) and 37.9 per cent (2010) of the R&D
expenditure in the United Republic of Tan-
zania, Nigeria and Ethiopia, respectively. By
way of comparison, the share of support
staff in relation to R&D personnel is smaller
in other developed countries, e.g. Germany
(16.8 per cent in 2011) and Japan (16.2 per
cent in 2011), as well as in other develop-
ing countries with highly sophisticated R&D
system, e.g. Hong Kong, China (5.5  per
cent in 2010).6


In order to address these issues, the follow-
ing recommendations could be considered:


a. Conceptualizemonitoringfromthe
startofthepolicyprocess


The report found that there is a concrete
link between policy formulation, articula-
tion of the monitoring process and clear
delineation of funding. When policy goals
are set, funding should be allocated ac-
cordingly, along with clear milestones for
implementation and reporting to the moni-
toring bodies.


b. Ensuremonitoringandregular
follow-up


The report found that countries are try-
ing to put in place monitoring mecha-
nisms. For example, in Ethiopia a commit-
tee chaired by the Prime Minister meets
every six months to review progress and
impediments and is comprised of the Na-
tional Science, Technology and Innovation
Council (NSTIC), the Ministry of Science
and Technology (MoST), other related min-
istries and the broader innovation support
and research system. Going forward, it
would be important to agree on the scope
and methodology of how these monitor-
ing systems will operate along with open
assessments of budgets and assistance
offered by various agencies




105CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


c. Monitoringshouldbebasedon
institutional memory


The historical trajectories of countries are
important. This point has been made time
and again in the context of innovation stud-
ies when emphasizing the relevance of
historical path-dependencies in the way
policies evolve. This report explores these
historical path-dependencies in the context
of industrial and innovation policies, trac-
ing the evolution of both frameworks from
1960s until the present day in the countries
under study.


Very importantly, the chapters show that a
lot of the issues related to policy failures and
poor institutional performance can be traced
back to past institutional failures. However,
although familiar challenges abound, the
interviews showed that few attempts have
been made to assess and apply the learn-
ing of the country’s own past as to why poli-
cies failed or what factors vitiated the policy
processes. This is fundamental to experi-
ment and derive successful coordination,
and should be made a critical component
of the monitoring and evaluation processes.
For example, some of the goals of Ethio-
pia’s current policy were already articulated
in the 1980s, but they were not achieved.
It would be important to assess the insti-
tutional reasons that hindered the policy in
the 1980s and 1990s and to examine how
to avoid repeating these errors in the future.
Similarly, in Nigeria, the 2011 STI policy was
informed by lessons drawn from the 1986
and 1997 S&T policies, as well as the 2003
policy. But the institutional memories of lack
of coordination need to be actively tackled
through regular interventions and the moni-
toring and evaluation process.


d. Financialrealitiesarecrucial


Policy effectiveness is largely decided by
the resources that are allocated to support
their implementation. The national STI and
industrial development policies are often
extremely ambitious, and seek to cover
ground without financial allocation required
for effectiveness. Foreign loans, domestic
budgets and aid are often not disbursed on


time and lead to delays or failures in the pol-
icy implementation process. For example,
in Ethiopia, despite numerous challenges,
the policy framework enjoyed widespread
political and general support and a heady
target of investing 0.6 per cent of the GDP
into R&D was achieved in 2014.7 However,
programmes risk not being implemented
in the absence of such continued financial
support and expanded programme budg-
ets.


4. Coordinate policymaking,
governmental interventions and
the business environment more
closely


An important finding of this report is that
policy is often out of synch with reality. That
is, as opposed to the practical structure of
local industry (often, in large part, mostly
comprised of SMEs and the informal sec-
tor), industrial and innovation policy elabo-
rate sectors of importance that are entirely
high-tech, or require an institutional infra-
structure that is very disconnected from the
on-the-ground realities that firms have to
face in their day-to-day activities. As sum-
marized in section B.3 of this chapter, even
in the so-called high-technology sectors, a
number of the local firms are operating on
the fringes of technological development. In
the ICTs sector, many companies simply act
as call centres or internet access to users
(as opposed to any production or process
improvements), while in the pharmaceutical
sectors, many companies only distribute
already packaged medicines or engage in
traditional medicine-based preparations of
low technological nature.


This is not to say that governments should
not seek to promote sectoral priorities in
high-technology sectors, such as space or
satellite technologies, or even pharmaceu-
ticals, electronics. But rather that industrial
and innovation policies should pick activi-
ties that are promising and capable of be-
ing upgraded technologically with realistic
prospects, as well as new sectors that




106 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


may be scaled up over time (Aiginger and
Böheim, 2015).


To achieve the former, it is important incor-
porate a private sector perspective in the
policy focus and the realm of policy dis-
course in the countries. The STI and indus-
try policy frameworks should be adequately
accompanied by both business and indus-
try support organizations, which provide in-
centives for local firms, such as R&D grants
and loans, tax credits and governmental
procurement, all of which have met with
much success in other developing coun-
tries. Business environments also need to
be supported through business facilitation
and enterprise incubation programmes.
Regulatory measures that help business
connect, interact and expand will be criti-
cal moving ahead, apart from enabling new
means of financing business. In fact, one of
the key issues that was raised in the coun-
try studies had to do with the way the is-
sue of finance was managed. As figure 6.1
shows, financing remains a key issue for
African countries, even in comparison with
other country or regional groupings.


Thailand is an example of a country that
uses policy mechanisms, such as govern-
ment procurement as incentive for innova-
tion.8 However, there were policy implemen-
tation gaps on the question of innovation


Figure6.1: Domesticcredittotheprivatesector(asapercentageofGDP)inselect
countries and regions




0


20


40


60


80


100


120


140


20002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013


Developed Countries


Developing Countries


Developing countries:
America
Developing countries:
Asia
Developing Countries:
Africa
LDCs: Africa


Tanzania


Nigeria


Ethiopia


Source: UNCTAD calculations based on WB WDI (accessed 20 October 2015)


finance in each of the three countries stud-
ied in this report.


In this regard, where there is a prevalence of
small and medium scale enterprises, mid-
term credit schemes for industry, guarantee
schemes or micro-credit schemes consti-
tute important external sources of finance
for firms. These policy instruments need
to be implemented to help SMEs meet the
minimum requirements by banks (in terms
of collaterals and sound business propos-
als) to access loans for innovative ventures.
In addition to these, governments could fa-
cilitate the access of firms to venture capital
and create an enabling environment for an-
gel investments in strategic sectors. In the
future, there may also be a need for newer
instruments such as guarantee funds, with
dedicated emphasis on venture capital, to
promote niche areas of innovative activities
within sectors.


***


It is becoming widely acknowledged that
sustainable development rests more broad-
ly on stable industrial development of a kind
that can deliver better livelihoods to the
people and eradicate poverty, as several
goals of the recently adopted 2030 Agenda
for Sustainable Development emphasize.
In particular, Goal 9 encapsulates the dual




107CHAPTER VI: PARTNERING FOR DEVELOPMENT: HARNESSING THE SYNERGIES


objectives of promoting inclusive and sus-
tainable industrialization and fostering in-
novation.


Almost all countries in the African region,
and more widely in the developing world,
including the three countries that were
studied in depth for this report, are cur-
rently at a policy and developmental stage
where industrial development through
technological change should be a central,
if not the most important, priority. Not only


is there a policy transition towards that
end, the field surveys were testimonies to
the extent of political commitment to en-
acting elaborate industrial policy frame-
works, and revising their S&T policies
towards policies dedicated to innovation.
Thirdly, the private sector in the African re-
gion (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa) is
in dire need of greater support, and that
enterprise policies are currently the weak
link.




108 TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION REPORT 2015


NOTES


1. http://www.tccia.com/tcciaweb/SMEtoolkit/introduction.htm


2. http://www.gdn.int/admin/uploads/editor/files/PPT_financing%20SME_FREDU.pdf


3. Ethiopia’s 2012 STI Policy, Article 2.3, p. 4.


4. The strategies are: (a) import effective and appropriate foreign technologies and create capa-
bilities of adaptation and utilization of these technologies in manufacturing and service providing
enterprises; (b)a system to search, select, adapt, utilize as well as dispose imported technologies
should be established and implemented; (c) establish and implement a system to use foreign
direct investment (FDI) and other ways of supporting technology transfer; (d) strengthen technol-
ogy transfer among and between various manufacturing and service providing enterprises; and (e)
strengthen wide use of intellectual propriety, standards and other related information in support of
technology transfer.


5. ASTI website (http://www.asti.cgiar.org/countries) accessed on 27 April 2015.


6. UNESCO Institute for Statistics database (http://data.uis.unesco.org/) accessed on 27 April 2015.
Full time equivalent (FTE) figures were used.


7. Ministry of Science and Technology (2014). Ethiopia National Science, Technology and Innovation
Policy, Addis Ababa.


8. See UNCTAD, Promoting Innovation Policies for Industrial Development in Thailand, forthcoming.




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