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Review of Maritime Transport 2013

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The 2013 edition of the Review of Maritime Transport estimates global seaborne trade to have increased by 4.3 per cent, with the total reaching over 9 billion tons in 2012 for the first time ever. Driven in particular by growing domestic demand in China and increased intra-Asian and South-South trade, seaborne trade nevertheless remains subject to persistent downside risks facing the world economy and trade. Freight rates have remained low and volatile in the various market segments (container, liquid and dry bulk).The Review proposes a new paradigm for transit based on a conveyor-belt concept, which aims at achieving a continuous supply of transit transport services, supported by institutional frameworks and infrastructure. The argument proposed here is that a regular, reliable and secure transit system is the simple, straightforward goal to pursue in order to guarantee access for landlocked developing countries to global shipping networks on the basis of non-penalizing conditions. Given the review of the Almaty Programme of Action that is to take place in 2014, this proposal could be part of the actions within a new agenda for landlocked and transit developing countries

OF MARITIME
TRANSPORT


2013




REVIEW
OF MARITIME


TRANSPORT


2013


U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T


New York and Geneva, 2013




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013ii


NOTE


The Review of Maritime Transport is a recurrent publication prepared by the UNCTAD secretariat since 1968 with the aim of fostering
the transparency of maritime markets and analysing relevant developments. Any factual or editorial corrections that may prove
necessary, based on comments made by Governments, will be reflected in a corrigendum to be issued subsequently.


*


* *


Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Use of such a symbol indicates a
reference to a United Nations document.


*


* *


The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion
whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of
its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.


*


* *


Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted, but acknowledgement is requested, with reference to the document
symbol (UNCTAD/RMT/2013). A copy of the publication containing the quotation or reprint should be sent to the UNCTAD secretariat
at the following address: Palais des Nations, CH 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland.


UNCTAD/RMT/2013


UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION


Sales no. E. 13.II.D.9


ISBN 978-92-1-112872-7


e-ISBN 978-92-1-054195-4




ISSN 0566-7682




iii


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


The Review of Maritime Transport 2013 was prepared by the Trade Logistics Branch of the Division on Technology and Logistics,
UNCTAD, under the coordination of Jan Hoffmann with administrative support and formatting by Florence Hudry and Wendy
Juan, the supervision of José María Rubiato, and the overall guidance of Anne Miroux. The authors were Regina Asariotis,
Hassiba Benamara, Jan Hoffmann, Azhar Jaimurzina, Anila Premti, José María Rubiato, Vincent Valentine and Frida Youssef.


The publication was edited by John Rogers, Lucy Annette Deleze-Black and Maritza Ascencios. The cover was designed by
Sophie Combette and Nadège Hadjemian. The desktop publishing was carried out by Nathalie Loriot.


The considered comments and valuable input provided by the following reviewers are gratefully acknowledged:


Chapter 1: Clarkson Research Services, Tracy Chatman, Socrates Leptos-Bourgi, Jan-Willem Vanhoogenhuizen.


Chapter 2: Clarkson Research Services, Yann Duval, Thomas Pawlik.


Chapter 3: Hannes Finkenbrink, Robert Piller, Jan-Willem Vanhoogenhuizen.


Chapter 4: Mary R. Brooks, Ki-Soon Hwang, Dong-Wook Song.


Chapter 5: Mahin Faghfouri, Stephen Fevrier, André Stochniol, Matthew Wilson.


Chapter 6: Thanattaporn Rasamit, Gordon Wilmsmeier.


Thanks are also due to Vladislav Chouvalov for reviewing the publication in full.


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013iv


TABLE OF CONTENTS


Note ..................................................................................................................................................................................ii


Acknowledgements ...........................................................................................................................................................iii


Abbreviations .................................................................................................................................................................. viii


Explanatory notes.............................................................................................................................................................. x


Vessel groupings used in the Review of Maritime Transport ................................................................................................. x


Foreword ..........................................................................................................................................................................xi


Executive summary .......................................................................................................................................................... xii


1. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE ..........................................1


A. World economic situation and prospects ..................................................................................................... 2


B. World seaborne trade.................................................................................................................................. 6


C. Selected emerging trends affecting international shipping ........................................................................... 25


2. STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET ....................35


A. Structureoftheworldfleet ........................................................................................................................ 36


B. Ownershipandoperationoftheworldfleet................................................................................................. 42


C. Container ship deployment and liner shipping connectivity ......................................................................................51


D. Registration of ships ................................................................................................................................. 54


E. Shipbuilding, demolition and new orders .................................................................................................... 58


3. FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS .............................................67


A. Freight rates ............................................................................................................................................. 68


B. Recentdevelopmentsinshippingfinance:greaterinvolvementofprivateequity .......................................... 78


4. PORT DEVELOPMENTS ..........................................................................................87


A. Port throughput ........................................................................................................................................ 88


B. Financing port investments........................................................................................................................ 88


C. Recent port developments ......................................................................................................................... 94


D. Assessing port performance ...................................................................................................................... 99


E. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 100


5. LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS ..............................................103


A. Important developments in transport law .................................................................................................. 104


B. Regulatory developments relating to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from international
shipping and other environmental issues .................................................................................................. 105


C. Other legal and regulatory developments affecting transportation .............................................................. 114


D. Status of conventions .............................................................................................................................. 122


E. International agreements on trade facilitation ........................................................................................... 123




vTABLE OF CONTENTS


Annexes


I. World seaborne trade by country group (Millions of tons) ....................................................................... 152


II.(a) Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,
as at 1 January 2013 (Thousands of GT) ............................................................................................... ..157


II.(b) Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,
as at 1 January 2013 (Thousands of DWT) ............................................................................................ ..162


II.(c) Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,
as at 1 January 2013 (Number of ships) ................................................................................................ ..167


III. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,asat1January2013 ................................... 173


IV. Containerizedporttraffic(Alphabeticalorder) ......................................................................................... ..179


V. UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (Alphabetical order) ................................................................ ..181


LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND BOXES


Tables


1.1. World economic growth, 2008–2013 (Annual percentage change) ................................................................ 2


1.2. Growth in the volume of merchandisea trade, by country groups and geographical region, 2009–2012
(Annual percentage change) ........................................................................................................................ 5


1.3. Development in international seaborne trade, selected years (Millions of tons loaded) ..................................... 7


1.4. World seaborne trade in 2006–2012, by type of cargo, country group and region ....................................... 11


1.5. Major producers and consumers of oil and natural gas, 2012 (World market share in percentage) ................. 16


1.6. Somemajordrybulksandsteel:main producers, users, exporters and importers, 2012
(World market shares in percentages) ........................................................................................................ 19


1.7. EstimatedcontainerizedcargoflowsonmajorEast–Westcontainertraderoutes,2009–2012
(Millionsof TEUsandpercentageannualchange) ....................................................................................... 24


2.1. Worldfleetbyprincipalvesseltypes, 2012–2013(Beginning-of-yearfigures, thousands of dwt;
percentage share in italics)........................................................................................................................ 37


2.2. Container ship deliveries ........................................................................................................................... 38


2.3. Agedistributionoftheworldmerchantfleet,byvesseltype,asof1January2013
(Percentage of total ships and dwt) ............................................................................................................ 40


2.4. The35countriesandterritorieswiththelargestownedfleets,asof1January2013(Dwt) ........................... 43


6. SECURING RELIABLE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRANSPORT FOR LANDLOCKED
COUNTRIES .........................................................................................................139


A. Obstacles to transit chains ...................................................................................................................... 140


B. The cost of transit unreliability ...........................................................................................................143


C. A model for a change of paradigm in transit ............................................................................................. 145


D. Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 149




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013vi


2.5. The 20 leading liner companies, 1 January 2013 (Number of ships and total shipboard capacity
deployed,in TEUs) .................................................................................................................................... 51


2.6. The35flagsofregistrationwiththelargestregisteredfleets,asof1January2013(Dwt) ............................. 56


2.7. Distribution of dwt capacity of vessel types, by country group of registration, 2013
(Beginning-of-yearfigures,percentageofdwt) ........................................................................................... 57


2.8. Deliveries of newbuildings, major vessel types and countries where built, 2012 (Thousands of GT) ................ 59


2.9. Tonnage reported sold for demolition, major vessel types and countries where demolished,
2012 (Thousands of GT) ........................................................................................................................... 59


2.10. World tonnage on order, 2000–2013 ........................................................................................................ 62


2.11. Tonnage utilization by type of vessel, January 2013 (Percentage of dwt or cubic metres) .............................. 64


3.1. Container freight markets and rates ........................................................................................................... 69


3.2. Containershiptimecharterrates(Dollars per14-tonslot perday) ............................................................... 72


3.3. Baltic Exchange Index ............................................................................................................................... 73


3.4. Tanker market summary – clean and dirty spot rates, 2012–2013 (Worldscale) ........................................... 74


3.5. Selectedrecentprivateequityinvestmentsinshipping ................................................................................ 81


4.1. Container port throughput for 76 developing countries/territories and economies in transition for
years2010,2011and2012(Twenty-footequivalentunits) ......................................................................... 89


4.2. Top20containerterminalsandtheirthroughputfor2010,2011and2012(Twenty-footequivalent
units and percentage change) ................................................................................................................... 91


4.3. Acomparisonofinternationalfinancetothetransportsector(2012) ............................................................ 92


4.4. A brief comparison of potential investors in infrastructure ............................................................................ 93


4.5. Ten largest infrastructure funds, 2008–2012 ............................................................................................. 94


5.1. Contracting Parties to selected international conventions on maritime transport, as at 30 June 2013 .......... 122


5.2. Top 10 measures with the highest estimated need for technical assistance and capacity-building ............... 127


6.1. Distances to ports from selected landlocked developing countries ............................................................. 140


6.2. Number of days to export ........................................................................................................................ 141


6.3. Presence of main container shipping lines in landlocked developing countries, 2013 (Numberofoffices) ..... 147


Figures


1.1. The OECD industrial production index and indices for world gross domestic product, merchandise
trade and seaborne shipments (1975–2013), (1990 = 100) ......................................................................... 4


1.2. International seaborne trade, selected years (Millions of tons loaded) ............................................................. 7


1.3 (a). World seaborne trade, by country group, 2012 (Percentage share in world tonnage) ....................................... 8


1.3 (b). Participation of developing countries in world seaborne trade, selected years
(Percentage share in world tonnage) ............................................................................................................ 8


1.3 (c). World seaborne trade, by geographical region, 2012 (Percentage share in world tonnage) .............................. 9


1.4. World seaborne trade in cargo ton–miles by cargo type, 1999–2013 (Billions of ton–miles) .......................... 14




viiTABLE OF CONTENTS


1.5(a). Globalcontainertrade,1996–2013(Millionsof TEUsandpercentageannualchange) .................................. 23


1.5(b). EstimatedcontainerizedcargoflowsonmajorEast–Westcontainertraderoutes (Millionsof TEUs) ................ 24


2.1. Worldfleetbyprincipalvesseltypes,1980–2013(Beginning-of-yearfigures,in millionsofdwt) .................... 36


2.2. Trendsindeliveriesofcontainerships(Newcontainerships,in TEU,2005–2012) ........................................ 39


2.3. Agestructureofworldfleet,nationalandforeignflags ................................................................................ 40


2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
with economies in transition (Dwt, by country of ownership, 1 January 2013) ............................................... 45


2.5. Trendsincontainer-shipfleetdeployment(Index=100for2004,dataformid-2004–mid-2013) .................. 52


2.6. Trends in the LSCI (Index =100 for the maximum value in 2004) ................................................................. 54


2.7. Globalshareofforeign-flaggedfleet(Beginning-of-yearfigures,percentageofworldtotaldwt, 1989–2013) ......57


2.8. Deliveries of newbuildings, major vessel types and countries where built, 2012 (Thousands of GT) ................ 58


2.9. Tonnage reported sold for demolition in 2011, by age (Years and dwt) ......................................................... 60


2.10. World tonnage on order, 2000–2013 (Thousands of dwt) ............................................................................ 61


3.1. Growth of demand and supply in container shipping, 2000–2013 (Annual growth rates) ............................... 68


3.2. New ConTex Index, 2008–2013 ................................................................................................................ 70


3.3. Baltic Exchange Dry Index, 2007–2013 (Index base year 1985 – 1,000 points) ........................................... 76


3.4. Dailyearningsofbulkcarriervessels,2007–2013(Dollars perday) ............................................................ 76


3.5. The German limited partnership model ....................................................................................................... 80


4.1. A comparison of port productivity by region (2013) ..................................................................................... 99


5.1. Level of implementation of trade-facilitation measures per country ............................................................ 125


5.2. Full implementation level per area of trade-facilitation measures ............................................................... 126


5.3. Most-quotedreasonsfornon-implementation .......................................................................................... 126


5.4. Percentageofthemeasuresrequiringtechnicalassistanceandcapacity-building ...................................... 127


6.1. Cost to import (Dollars per container) ....................................................................................................... 141


6.2. Transport cost of being landlocked (Ratio) ................................................................................................ 142


6.3. Mineral ore extraction and intermodal transport chain ............................................................................... 146


Boxes


5.1. The current status of the ISO 28000 series of standards ........................................................................... 120


6.1. Inland terminals ...................................................................................................................................... 148


6.2. Proposed trusted transit operator scheme ................................................................................................ 148




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013viii


ABBREVIATIONS


AEO authorized economic operator


ASYCUDA Automated System for Customs Data


BIMCO Baltic and International Maritime Council


bpd barrels per day


BRICS Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa


BWM Convention International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments


CBP United States Customs and Border Protection


CO2 carbon dioxide


C–TPAT Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism


DIS Danish International Ship Register


dwt dead-weight ton(s)


ECA Emission Control Area


ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean


EEDI Energy Efficiency Design Index


Exim export-import


FEU 40-foot equivalent unit


FPSO floating production storage and offloading unit


FSU floating storage unit


GDP gross domestic product


GEF Global Environment Facility


GHG greenhouse gas


GRIs general rates increases


GT gross tonnage


HNS hazardous noxious substances


HNS Convention International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea


IAPP International Air Pollution Prevention (certificate, IMO)


ICS International Chamber of Shipping


ILO International Labour Organization


IMO International Maritime Organization


IOPC Fund International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund


ISO International Organization for Standardization


ISPS International Ship and Port Facilities Security


ITCP Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (IMO)


KG Kommanditgesellschaft


km kilometre(s)


KOICA Korean International Cooperation Agency


LDC least developed country


LNG liquefied natural gas


LPG liquefied petroleum gas




ix


LSCI Liner Shipping Connectivity Index


MARPOL International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships


MBM market-based measure


MEPC Marine Environment Protection Committee (IMO)


MLC Maritime Labour Convention


MOU memorandum of understanding


MRA mutual recognition agreement


MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company


NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization


NIS Norwegian International Ship Register


NOx nitrogen oxides


ODA official development assistance


OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development


OHRLLS Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing
Countries and Small Island Developing States


OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries


PAL Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea


PAL PROT Protocol to the PAL


PCASP privately contracted armed security personnel


ppm parts per million


PPP public–private partnership


SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade


SCR selective catalytic reduction


SDR special drawing right(s)


SEEMP Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan


SOLAS International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea


SOx sulphur oxides


SRI Seafarers’ Rights International


STCW International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers


TACB technical assistance and capacity-building


TEU 20-foot equivalent unit


TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership


UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change


UNICRI United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute


UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime


VLCC very large crude carrier


WCO World Customs Organization


WTO World Trade Organization


ABBREVIATIONS




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013x


EXPLANATORY NOTES


• The Review of Maritime Transport 2013 covers data and events from January 2012 until June 2013.
Where possible, every effort has been made to reflect more recent developments.


• All references to dollars ($) are to United States dollars, unless otherwise stated.


• Unless otherwise stated, “ton” means metric ton (1,000 kg) and “mile” means nautical mile.


• Because of rounding, details and percentages presented in tables do not necessarily add up to the totals.


• n.a. Not available


• A hyphen (-) signifies that the amount is nil.


• In the tables and the text, the terms “countries” and “economies” refer to countries, territories or areas.


• Since 2007, the presentation of countries in the Review of Maritime Transport has been different from
that in previous editions. Since 2007, the new classification is that used by the Statistics Division, United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and by UNCTAD in its Handbook of Statistics. For
the purpose of statistical analysis, countries and territories are grouped by economic criteria into three
categories, which are further divided into geographical regions. The main categories are developed
economies, developing economies and transition economies.


Vessel groupings used in the Review of Maritime Transport
Review Group Constituent Ship Types


Oil tankers Oil tankers
Bulk carriers Bulk carriers, combination carriers
General-cargo ships Multi-purpose and project vessels, roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) cargo, general cargo
Container ships Fully cellular container ships
Other ships Liquefied petroleum gas carriers, liquefied natural gas carriers, parcel (chemical)


tankers, specialized tankers, reefers, offshore supply, tugs, dredgers, cruise,
ferries, other non-cargo ships


Total all ships Includes all the above-mentioned vessel types


Approximate vessel-size groups referred to in the Review of Maritime Transport,
according to generally used shipping terminology


Crude oil tankers
Very large crude carrier 200,000 dwt* plus
Suezmax crude tanker 120,000–200,000 dwt
Aframax crude tanker 80,000–119,999 dwt
Panamax crude tanker 60,000–79,999 dwt


Dry bulk and ore carriers
Capesize bulk carrier 100,000 dwt plus
Panamax bulk carrier 60,000–99,999 dwt
Handymax bulk carrier 40,000–59,999 dwt
Handysize bulk carrier 10,000–39,999 dwt


Container ships
Post-Panamax container ship beam of >32.3 m
Panamax container ship beam of< 32.3 m


Source: Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Unless otherwise specified, the ships covered in the Review of Maritime Transport include all propelled seagoing


merchant vessels of 100 gross tonnage and above, excluding inland waterway vessels, fishing vessels, military
vessels, yachts and offshore fixed and mobile platforms and barges (with the exception of floating production storage
and offloading units and drillships).


* Dwt, deadweight tons.




xiFOREWORD


FOREWORD


In today’s interdependent and globalized world, efficient and cost-effective transportation systems that link
global supply chains are the engine fuelling economic development and prosperity. With 80 per cent of global
merchandise trade by volume carried by sea and handled by ports worldwide, the strategic economic importance
of maritime transport as a trade enabler cannot be overemphasized. The trade competitiveness of all countries
– developed and developing alike, and including landlocked countries – depends heavily on effective access to
international shipping services and port networks.


The 2013 edition of the Review of Maritime Transport estimates global seaborne trade to have increased by
4.3 per cent, with the total reaching over 9 billion tons in 2012 for the first time ever. Driven in particular by growing
domestic demand in China and increased intra-Asian and South–South trade, seaborne trade nevertheless
remains subject to persistent downside risks facing the world economy and trade. Freight rates have remained
low and volatile in the various market segments (container, liquid and dry bulk).


Maritime transport is facing a new and complex environment that involves both challenges and opportunities. Of
all the prevailing challenges, however, the interconnected issues of energy security and costs, climate change,
and environmental sustainability are perhaps the most unsettling. Climate change in particular continues to
rank high on the international policy agenda, including that of shipping and port businesses. Turning to the
opportunities, these include – to name but a few – deeper regional integration and South–South cooperation;
growing diversification of sources of supply; and access to new markets, facilitated by cooperation agreements
and by improved transport networks (for example the Panama Canal expansion).


In view of recent research that suggests that containerization has been a stronger driver of globalization than
trade liberalization has, the Review discusses global developments in container trade flows and containership
deployment. It also presents trends over 10 years in liner shipping connectivity in developing regions, building
upon UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index which was published in 2013 for the tenth year.


The special chapter on “Landlocked countries and maritime transport” provides an overview of recent progress
made in understanding impediments to accessing sea-shipping services, for the trade of goods between
landlocked territories and overseas markets. The Review proposes a new paradigm for transit based on a
conveyor-belt concept, which aims at achieving a continuous supply of transit transport services, supported by
institutional frameworks and infrastructure. The argument proposed here is that a regular, reliable and secure
transit system is the simple, straightforward goal to pursue in order to guarantee access for landlocked developing
countries to global shipping networks on the basis of non-penalizing conditions. Given the review of the Almaty
Programme of Action that is to take place in 2014, this proposal could be part of the actions within a new agenda
for landlocked and transit developing countries.


As with all previous issues published since 1968, the Review of Maritime Transport 2013 contains a wealth of
analysis and unique data. The Review is the acknowledged United Nations source of statistics and analysis
on seaborne trade, the world fleet, freight rates, port traffic, and the latest trends in the legal and regulatory
environment for international maritime transport.


Mukhisa Kituyi


Secretary-General of UNCTAD


24


Dr. Mukhisa Kituyi


Secretary-General of UNCTAD




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013xii


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


International seaborne trade grows
in 2012, but remains vulnerable to
downside risks facing the world
economy


While the reorientation in global production and trade
continues, with developing countries contributing
larger shares to world output and trade, the
performance of the global economy and merchandise
trade in 2012 is a reminder of the high level of global
economic integration and interdependence. During
the year, growth in world gross domestic product
decelerated to 2.2 per cent from 2.8 per cent recorded
in 2011. In tandem, and reflecting a simultaneous drop
in import demand of both developed and developing
economies, the growth of global merchandise trade
volumes also decelerated to 1.8 per cent year-on-year.


The knock-on effects of the problems in the European
Union on developing economies are tangible, while
the slowdown in larger developing countries, notably
China and India, is resonating in other developing
regions and low-income countries. Meanwhile, and
driven in particular by a rise in China’s domestic
demand as well as increased intra-Asian and South–
South trade, international seaborne trade performed
relatively well, with volumes increasing by 4.3  per
cent during the year. The performance of international
seaborne trade remains, nevertheless, vulnerable to
downside risks as well as the uncertainty affecting the
world economy and trade. It is also unfolding against
a background of an operating landscape for maritime
transport that is evolving and that entails some
potentially game-changing trends and developments.


Evolving trends affecting international
shipping and seaborne trade


Some key trends currently affecting international
shipping and its operating landscape include the
following elements:


(a) Continued negative effect of the 2008/2009 crisis
on global demand, finance and trade


(b) Structural shifts in global production patterns


(c) Changes in comparative advantages and mineral
resource endowments, in particular oil and gas


(d) Rise of the South and shift of economic influence
away from traditional centres of growth


(e) Demographics, with ageing populations
in advanced economies and fast-growing
populations in developing regions and with
related implications for global production and
consumption patterns


(f) Arrival of container megaships and other
transport-related technological advances


(g) Climate change and natural hazards


(h) Energy costs and environmental sustainability.


In this context, a number of challenges and
opportunities with implications for international
seaborne trade are also arising. Of all the prevailing
challenges, however, the interconnected issues
of energy security and costs, climate change and
environmental sustainability are perhaps the most
unsettling. Climate change in particular continues to
rank high on the international policy agenda. Emerging
opportunities, on the other hand, include for example:


(a) Deeper regional integration and South–South
cooperation


(b) Growing diversification of sources of supply
enabled by technology and efficient transportation


(c) Emergence of new trading partners and access
to new markets facilitated by growing trade and
cooperation agreements


(d) Expansion/opening of new sea routes (for
example, expansion of the Panama Canal and
Arctic routes)


(e) Increasing involvement of other developing
economies, notably in Africa and South-East
Asia, in lower added value and labour-intensive
sectors as China moves up the value chain and
rebalances towards higher value added sectors


(f) Growth in global demand induced by a growing
world population and a rise in the middle class/
consuming category


(g) Emergence of developing-country banks (for
example, the proposed BRICS bank – Brazil,
the Russian Federation, India, China and
South Africa) with the potential to raise funding
to meet the significant needs for investment in
transport infrastructure.




xiiiEXECUTIVE SUMMARY


The turn of the largest shipbuilding
cycle in history


The year 2012 saw the turn of the largest shipbuilding
cycle in recorded history. Between 2001 and 2011,
year after year, newbuilding deliveries reached new
historical highs. Only in 2012, for the first time since
2001, was the fleet that entered into service during the
year less than that delivered during the previous 12
months. In spite of this slowing down of new deliveries,
the world tonnage continued to grow in 2012, albeit
at a slower pace than in 2011. The world fleet has
more than doubled since 2001, reaching 1.63 billion
deadweight tons in January 2013.


Since the historical peaks of 2008 and 2009, the
tonnage on order for all major vessel types has
decreased drastically. As shipyards continued to
deliver pre-ordered tonnage, the order books went
down by 50 per cent for container ships, 58 per cent
for dry-bulk carriers, 65  per cent for tankers and
by 67  per cent for general-cargo ships. At the end
of 2008, the dry-bulk order book was equivalent to
almost 80 per cent of the fleet at that time, while the
tonnage on order as of January 2013 is the equivalent
of just 20 per cent of the fleet in service.


Chapter 2 of this year’s Review of Maritime Transport
presents unique fleet profiles for major ship-owning
developing countries. From these fleet profiles, it can
be seen that several oil- and gas-exporting countries
are also important owners of oil- and liquefied-gas
tanker tonnage, both under their respective national
flags (such as Kuwait) as well as under foreign flags
(such as ships owned by Oman registered abroad).
By the same token, countries with important offshore
investments also tend to own offshore supply ships.
Dry-bulk ships are less often controlled by the cargo-
owning countries than is the case of the oil-exporting
nations. Most container ships are foreign flagged as
they engage in international trade, serving routes that
connect several countries at the same time. Many of
the general-cargo fleets are nationally flagged and
serve the coastal or inter-island cabotage trades.


Larger ships and fewer container
carriers


This year’s Review also presents a special focus on 10
years of UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index
and the related analysis of container ship deployment.


The last 10 years have seen two important trends,
which represent two sides of the same coin. On
the one hand, ships have become bigger, and on
the other hand the number of companies in most
markets has diminished. As regards the number of
companies, the average per country has decreased
by 27 per cent during the last 10 years, from 22 in
2004 to just 16 in 2013. This trend has important
implications for the level of competition, especially
for smaller trading nations. While an average of 16
service providers may still be sufficient to ensure a
functioning competitive market with many choices for
shippers for the average country, on given individual
routes, especially those serving smaller developing
countries, the decline in competition has led to
oligopolistic markets.


Freight rates remained suppressed by
oversupply of newbuildings


In 2012, the maritime sector continued to experience
low and volatile freight rates in its various segments
because of surplus capacity in the global fleet
generated by the severe downturn in trade in the wake
of the 2008 economic and financial crisis. The steady
delivery of newbuildings into an already oversupplied
market, coupled with a weak economy, has kept rates
under heavy pressure.


The overall low freight rates observed in 2012 reduced
carriers’ earnings close to, and even below operating
costs, especially when bunker oil prices remained
both high and volatile. As a result, carriers tried to
apply various strategies to remedy the situation, in
particular by reducing bunker consumption. The
trend of maximizing fleet efficiency, slow steaming,
postponing newbuilding deliveries, scrapping and
idling some ships observed in 2011 persisted in
2012.


In this difficult shipping context, many private equity
funds have seized the opportunity created by tight
credit markets and historically low vessel values to
invest in ships and shipping companies. Between
2011 and 2012, private equity funds financed no
less than 22 shipping transactions with an aggregate
magnitude of more than $6.4 billion.


The role of private equity funds appears fundamental
for the growth of the sector and could affect its
development in several ways, including through the
consolidation and vertical integration of transport
services.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013xiv


World container port throughput
surpassed 600 million 20-foot
equivalent units in 2012


World container port throughput increased by an
estimated 3.8  per cent to 601.8  million 20-foot
equivalent units in 2012. This increase was lower than
the estimated 7.3  per cent increase of 2011. This
growth is also reflected in a strong port finance sector
as investors look to infrastructure to provide long-term
stable returns. This is paramount as a recent study
forecast that developing countries will need annual
investment of $18.8 trillion in real terms by 2020 to
achieve even moderate levels of economic growth.


Investments within ports will lead to increases in
efficiency which could help to lower transport costs by
enabling goods to get to and from markets in a more
timely and cost-effective manner. Recognizing the role
of ports in reducing a country’s transport costs and
working on the back of numerous mandates (Accra
Accord paragraphs 57, 121, 165, 166 and Doha
Mandate paragraphs 45, 47 and 48) from its member
countries, UNCTAD has a long history of working
on port reform in developing countries. Whereas
previously much focus was given to helping ports
identify efficiency indicators to measure and record,
the next logical step is for countries to share their
data to identify lessons learned and best practices.
Yet, despite all the activity on record keeping, it is
rare that the information is published at a port or
national level, let alone on a global basis. However,
external pressure to publish data came in 2013 when
a leading journal printed its ranking of container ports
using data obtained from liner operators. Thus efforts
to assess port performance by port customers are
leading towards an era of increased transparency in
port operations which could spur greater interport
competition, increased port performance and lower
transport costs.


Legal issues and regulatory
developments


Important legal developments include the entry
into force of the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention
(effective 20 August 2013) and of the 2002 Athens
Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and
their Luggage by Sea (effective 23 April 2014), as well
as a range of regulatory measures to strengthen the


legal framework relating to ship-source air pollution,
port reception facilities and garbage management.
Moreover, different sets of guidelines have been
developed with a view to facilitating the widespread
adoption of the 2010 Protocol to the International
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage
in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and
Noxious Substances by Sea, known as the 2010 HNS
Convention, and of the 2009 Hong Kong International
Convention for the Safe and Environmentally
Sound Recycling of Ships. Progress has also been
made in respect of technical matters related to the
implementation of the 2004 International Convention
for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast
Water and Sediments.


To assist in the implementation of a set of technical and
operational measures to increase energy efficiency and
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international
shipping, which entered into force on 1 January
2013, additional guidelines and unified interpretations
were adopted by the Marine Environment Protection
Committee of the International Maritime Organization
in October 2012 and May 2013. In addition, a
resolution on promotion of technical cooperation and
transfer of technology relating to the improvement of
energy efficiency of ships was adopted in May 2013,
and an agreement was reached that a new study be
initiated to carry out an update to the estimate of
greenhouse gas emissions for international shipping.
The issue of possible market-based measures for
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from
international shipping remained controversial, and
discussion was postponed.


In relation to maritime and supply-chain security,
main areas of progress include enhancements to
regulatory measures on maritime security and safety,
primarily under the auspices of the International
Maritime Organization, as well as implementation and
mutual recognition of authorized economic operator
programmes.


Implementing trade facilitation reforms


In the area of trade facilitation intensive work on a
global agreement continues under the auspices of
the World Trade Organization. In this context, results
from UNCTAD’s research on national trade facilitation
implementation plans illustrate that trade facilitation
remains a challenge but is also seen as a priority area
for national development by developing countries
themselves. By identifying the major areas of non-




xvEXECUTIVE SUMMARY


compliance with a future World Trade Organization
trade facilitation agreement, the Review of Maritime
Transport offers insights into the range of time and
resource requirements and the needs for technical
assistance and capacity-building for developing
countries.


Access of landlocked countries to
seaports


The passage of trade of landlocked countries through
coastal territories to access shipping services is
generally governed by a standard principle: goods
in transit and their carriage are granted crossing free
of fiscal duties and by the most convenient routes. In
practice, however, the implementation of this basic
norm suffers from numerous operational difficulties,
resulting in high transport costs and long travel
times, which undermine trade competitiveness and
ultimately the economic development of landlocked
countries. Over the past decade, under the Almaty
Programme of Action launched in 2003, new analytical
tools and extensive field research have brought fresh
valuable knowledge about the mechanisms explaining
detected inefficiencies. Among other things, analysis
has revealed that rent-seeking stakeholders may play
against improvements, making transit operations


unnecessarily complex and unpredictable, to the
detriment of governmental and traders’ efforts. Thus,
by exposing conflicting forces at play along transit
chains, the analysis shows that trade of landlocked
countries primarily suffer from unreliability resulting
from a lack of cooperation among stakeholders and
is a main reason behind high transport costs and long
transit times.


Chapter 6 of the Review of Maritime Transport 2013
provides an overview of these findings and, based on
them, explores a new paradigm that should allow for
a radical transformation of transit transport systems,
thereby enabling landlocked countries reliable access
to global value chains and allowing them to act in
ways other than as providers of primary goods. The
proposed approach of a transit belt system would
consist of a system open to all transit cargo, based
on a trusted transit operator scheme guaranteeing
uninterrupted transit from seaport to hinterland and
vice versa. The transit belt system aims at making
predictability of transit logistics chains a priority that
Governments of both landlocked and transit countries
should lead, in partnership with traders, port operators
and shipping lines, as main beneficiaries of the
improvement. Such a reliability model solution could
be made part of the priorities of the new development
agenda for landlocked and transit developing countries
to be adopted in 2014.






While the reorientation of global production and trade continues, with developing
countries contributing larger shares to world economic output and trade, the
performance of the global economy and merchandise trade in 2012 is a reminder of the
high level of global economic integration and interdependence. In 2012, growth in world
gross domestic product (GDP) decelerated to 2.2 per cent from 2.8 per cent recorded
in the previous year. In tandem, and reflecting a simultaneous drop in import demand
of both developed and developing economies, the growth of global merchandise trade
volumes also decelerated to 1.8  per cent year-on-year. The knock-on effects of the
problems in the European Union on developing economies are tangible, while the
slowdown in larger developing economies, notably China and India, is resonating in
other developing regions and low-income countries. Meanwhile, and driven in particular
by a rise in China’s domestic demand as well as increased intra-Asian and South–South
trade, international seaborne trade performed relatively well, with volumes increasing
by 4.3  per cent during the year. The performance of international seaborne trade
remains, nevertheless, vulnerable to downside risks and uncertainty affecting the world
economy and trade. It is also unfolding against a background of an evolving maritime
transport operating landscape that entails some potentially game-changing trends and
developments.


Chapter 1 covers developments from January 2012 to June 2013. Section A reviews the
overall performance of the global economy and world merchandise trade. Section B
considers developments in world seaborne trade, including by market segment.
Section  C highlights selected topical trends that are unfolding on the international
shipping arena and are affecting international seaborne trade.


DEVELOPMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL
SEABORNE TRADE


1




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 20132


A. WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION AND
PROSPECTS


1. World economic growth


The world economy slowed down in 2012 with GDP
increasing by 2.2 per cent, down from 2.8 per cent
in 2011. As shown in table 1.1, figures for the world
economy and country groupings conceal uneven
individual performances. Growth in GDP decelerated
in all three country groupings, namely to 1.2 per cent
in developed countries, to 4.6 per cent in developing
economies and to 3.0  per cent in economies in
transition. For comparison, equivalent growth rates in
2011 were 1.5 per cent, 5.9 per cent and 4.5 per cent,
respectively.


The United States of America GDP picked up speed
in 2012, growing at a rate nearly double (2.2 per cent)
the developed country group’s average (1.2 per cent).
Growth in the European Union came to a standstill
(−0.3  per cent), while in Japan it accelerated to
1.9 per cent, reflecting, in particular, post-March 2011
reconstruction efforts.


While still growing at a reasonable rate, developing
economies and the economies in transition are
increasingly being affected by the problems in
Europe and the fragile recovery in the United States.
Spillover effects have filtered down through various
channels, including through trade by depressing the
demand for the exports of developing countries and
the economies in transition. Countries such as the
Russian Federation, Brazil and China are, in addition


Table 1.1. Worldeconomicgrowth,2008–2013(Annualpercentagechange)


Region/country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 a


WORLD 1.5 -2.2 4.1 2.8 2.2 2.1


Developed economies 0.0 -3.8 2.6 1.5 1.2 1.0


of which:


United States -0.3 -3.1 2.4 1.8 2.2 1.7


Japan -1.0 -5.5 4.7 -0.6 1.9 1.9


EuropeanUnion(27) 0.3 -4.3 2.1 1.6 -0.3 -0.2


of which:


Germany 1.1 -5.1 4.2 3.0 0.7 0.3


France -0.1 -3.1 1.7 2.0 0.0 -0.2


Italy -1.2 -5.5 1.7 0.4 -2.4 -1.8


United Kingdom -1.0 -4.0 1.8 0.9 0.2 1.1


Developing economies 5.3 2.4 7.9 5.9 4.6 4.7


of which:


Africa 5.2 2.8 4.9 1.0 5.4 4.0


South Africa 3.6 -1.5 3.1 3.5 2.5 1.7


Asia 5.8 3.9 8.9 7.1 5.0 5.4


China 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.8 7.6


India 6.2 5.0 11.2 7.7 3.8 5.2


Republic of Korea 2.3 0.3 6.3 3.7 2.0 2.3


Developing America 4.0 -1.9 5.9 4.3 3.0 3.1


Brazil 5.2 -0.3 7.5 2.7 0.9 2.5


Leastdevelopedcountries(LDCs) 7.6 5.4 6.2 3.3 4.8 5.0


Transition economies 5.2 -6.6 4.5 4.5 3.0 2.7


of which:


Russian Federation 5.2 -7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 2.5


Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2013, table 1.1.
a Forecast.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 3


to falling export volumes, facing internal problems and
some structural challenges.


Economic growth in China slowed from 9.3 per cent in
2011 to 7.8 per cent in 2012, the lowest rate in more
than a decade. Weaker demand for Chinese exports,
especially in Europe, and a sharp decline in investment
growth in China dampened its overall output growth.
The deceleration is also indicative of China’s efforts to
slow down the pace of its economic growth, mainly
to reduce inflationary pressures. It also reflects its
changing growth patterns involving moving away from
an export-oriented and investment-driven path to
a more balanced growth based on higher domestic
demand and consumption. Growth in India was cut by
more than half in 2012 (3.8 per cent) while growth in
newly industrialized economies such as the Republic
of Korea also decelerated, owing to a large extent
to a reduced European demand for these countries’
exports. In Western Asia, robust growth experienced
in most oil-exporting countries was matched with
weakened economic activity in oil-importing countries.
Social unrest and political instability, notably in the
Syrian Arab Republic, remain major concerns for the
entire region and its economic growth prospects.


Underpinned by the performance of oil-exporting
countries, continued fiscal spending on infrastructure
projects and greater Africa–Asia investment and trade
linkages, Africa recorded the fastest growth among
all regions (5.4  per cent). Meanwhile, developing
countries in America recorded slower growth (3.0 per
cent) compared to the two preceding years as the
stagnation in the advanced economies and the
slowdown in China affected exports from the region,
especially in South America. Some countries such as
Brazil and Argentina have, in addition, faced domestic
problems that undermine growth (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013a).


Economies in transition continued to grow in 2012,
albeit at a moderate pace of 3 per cent. Strong energy
prices supported growth in the energy-exporting
economies (for example, Kazakhstan and the Russian
Federation), while the adverse effects of the crisis in
Europe hampered economic expansion in countries
and regions such as the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine
and Eastern Europe.


Growth in low income countries has generally been
more resilient, but is now also being affected by
the slowdown in both developed and developing
economies. Least developed countries (LDCs)
increased their GDP by 4.8 per cent in 2012, up from


3.3 per cent in 2011, albeit more slowly than the two
previous years (2009 and 2010). This trend reflects,
among other things, continued weakness in the world
economy, lower commodity demand, including from
large developing economies, and reduced levels
of official development assistance (United Nations
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013b).


World industrial production – a measure of economic
activity which includes two sectors that are highly
sensitive to consumer demand, namely manufacturing
and mining – increased by 3 per cent in 2012, despite
remaining flat in the advanced economies, in particular
the European Union and Japan (Danish Ship Finance,
2013). As shown in figure  1.1, industrial production
as measured by the industrial production index of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), world GDP, merchandise trade
and seaborne shipments continue to move in tandem.
With demand for shipping services being “derived”, the
performance of maritime transportation and seaborne
trade is largely determined by developments in the
world economy and international trade. However,
it has been observed that over the years, the world
merchandise trade has grown about twice as fast as
the world GDP due to the multiplier effect resulting
from, among others, the globalization of production
processes, increased trade in intermediate goods and
components, and the deepening and extension of
global supply chains.


UNCTAD expects GDP growth to remain flat in 2013
with the global economy still struggling to return to
a strong and sustained growth path. A number of
factors are undermining a sustained global economic
recovery, including the continued impacts of the
financial and economic crises that started in 2008, as
well as of the unsustainable financial processes and
domestic and international imbalances that have led
to the crises. In several countries weaker growth may
also be partly due to macroeconomic policy choices
(UNCTAD, 2013).


The attention-grabbing news about developing
economies fuelling global growth does not lessen
the continued interdependence among the world
economies. As has been noted in previous editions
of the Review of Maritime Transport, a reorientation
of global production, economic expansion and
trade has been unfolding over the years. Certainly,
the 2008/2009 crisis deepened this trend, with
developing countries increasingly gaining greater
influence and contributing larger shares to global GDP
and merchandise trade. And undoubtedly developing




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 20134


countries are playing a bigger role globally as well
as regionally, with deeper South–South linkages
and trade integration. However, the performance
of the world economy in 2012 is a reminder of the
high level of global integration and interdependence.
For the foreseeable future, the United States is
projected to remain the largest economy in the world
(in monetary terms) and developments there and in
Europe will continue to have knock-on effects on
developing regions (United Nations Development
Programme, 2013). In addition to the overspill
effects of the problems facing advanced economies,
other indicators, such as export flows of the United
States, are also pointing to a continued global
interconnectedness. Since 2007, exports from the
United States to OECD country partners increased
by 20  per cent, while its exports to developing
America and China expanded by over 50 per cent.


2. World merchandise trade


For the second year in a row and in line with
developments in the global economy and aggregate


demand, growth in international trade slowed notably
in 2012, averaging 1.8  per cent (table  1.2). This
figure refers to merchandise trade in volume terms,
that is, in value terms but adjusted to account for
inflation and exchange-rate movements. However,
trade flows in nominal terms display a similar trend. In
2012, the dollar value of world merchandise exports
only increased by 0.2 per cent to reach $18.3 trillion,
practically remaining unchanged due to falling prices
of commodities such as coffee (−22 per cent), cotton
(−42  per cent), iron ore (−23  per cent) and coal
(−21 per cent) (WTO, 2013).


Slower global trade growth resulted from a simultaneous
deceleration in import demand in both developed
and large developing economies. Constrained,
among other things, by austerity measures and rising
unemployment, Europe’s import demand contracted
while demand in the United States and Japan remained
subdued. Consequently, the global demand for exports
of developing countries and economies in transition
weakened while – with the exception of Africa – imports
destined for developing countries and economies in
transition declined markedly.


World
merchandise
trade


World
seaborne
trade


World GDP


OECD
Industrial
Production
Index


50


100


150


200


250


300


350


1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013


Figure1.1. TheOECDindustrialproductionindexandindicesforworldgrossdomesticproduct,merchandise
tradeandseaborneshipments(1975–2013),(1990=100)


Sources: UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of OECD Main Economic Indicators, May 2013; UNCTAD, The Trade and Development
Report 2013; UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, various issues; World Trade Organization (WTO) (table A1a); the
WTO press release 688, 10 April 2013, “World trade 2012, prospects for 2013”. The value of the index measuring growth
in world seaborne trade for 2013 is calculated on the basis of the growth rate forecast by Clarkson Research Services in
Shipping Review and Outlook, spring 2013 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013a).




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 5


Exports from developed economies decelerated
sharply from 4.9 per cent in 2011 to 0.4 per cent in
2012 due to a contraction in export volumes in the
European Union (−0.2 per cent) and Japan (−1.0 per
cent). In Japan, exports dropped 11 per cent in the
last two quarters of the year, presumably owing to
the territorial dispute with China and its adverse
effect on the trade between the two countries (WTO,
2013). Exports from the United States fared better,
with shipments increasing by 4.1 per cent, albeit at a
slower pace than 2011.


After falling by 8.3 per cent in 2011 due to the civil
war in Libya, Africa rebounded in 2012 to record
the fastest export growth of all regions at 5.7  per
cent. Despite export growth rates of 6.9 per cent in
Western Asia and 7.2 per cent in China, developing
Asia only managed a 3.7 per cent export growth due,
in particular, to falling shipments from India (−2.5 per
cent). In line with lower economic growth in the region,
exports in developing America grew at the slowest
rate (2.2  per cent), although the European Union
continues to record the worst performance. On the
import side, growth in world volumes slowed down
significantly in 2012 (1.6  per cent) with imports into


developed countries dropping by 0.5 per cent (3.4 per
cent in 2011). Imports into developing countries
and the economies in transition recorded a rapid
deceleration estimated at 4.5  per cent and 3.9  per
cent, respectively.


Reflecting expectations of a moderate pickup
in import demand in developed economies and
most developing regions, the WTO expects global
merchandise trade to grow by 3.3 per cent in 2013,
a rate below the average rate of the last 20 years
(5.3  per cent) (WTO, 2013). Export and import
volumes of developed economies are expected to
increase at the same rate of 1.4 per cent. Together,
exports of developing economies and the economies
in transition are projected to increase by 5.3  per
cent, while their imports are predicted to expand by
5.9 per cent.


In addition to the downside risks facing the world
economy, projected growth in world merchandise
trade could also be undermined by increased
protectionism and greater shortage in trade finance.
Reports by the WTO and the European Commission
have highlighted an increase in protectionist measures


Table1.2. Growthinthevolumeofmerchandiseatrade,bycountrygroupsandgeographicalregion,
2009–2012(Annualpercentagechange)


Exports
Countries/regions


Imports


2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012


-13.3 13.9 5.2 1.8 WORLD -13.6 13.8 5.3 1.6


-15.5 13.0 4.9 0.4 Developed economies -14.6 10.8 3.4 -0.5


ofwhich:


-24.8 27.5 -0.6 -1.0 Japan -12.2 10.1 4.2 3.7


-14.0 15.4 7.2 4.1 United States -16.4 14.8 3.8 2.8


-14.9 11.6 5.5 -0.2 European Union (27) -14.5 9.6 2.8 -2.8


-9.7 16.0 6.0 3.6 Developing economies -10.2 18.8 7.4 4.5


ofwhich:


-9.5 8.8 -8.3 5.7 Africa -6.2 8.4 2.8 8.0


-7.4 8.3 4.6 2.2 Developing America -17.9 22.5 10.8 2.5


-9.9 18.3 7.8 3.7 Asia -9.1 19.3 3.5 4.6


ofwhich:


-14.1 29.1 13.0 7.2 China -1.1 25.4 10.3 5.9


-6.8 14.0 14.2 -2.5 India -0.9 13.8 9.1 5.8


3.2 14.7 9.7 1.5 Republic of Korea -2.3 17.3 4.1 1.2


-4.8 5.7 6.5 6.9 Western Asia -14.2 8.4 8.1 5.8


-14.4 11.3 4.2 1.0 Transition economies -28.2 15.9 15.7 3.9


Sources: UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on UNCTADstat.
Note: Data on trade volumes are derived from international merchandise trade values deflated by UNCTAD unit value indices.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 20136


since 2008 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013), with
new trade restrictions continuously being implemented
and with nearly 3.0 per cent of world trade estimated
to be affected by trade restrictions introduced since
the beginning of the crisis (United Nations, 2012).
Meanwhile, shortage in trade finance continues to stir
some debate, including in view of Basel III regulations
and the associated potential restrictions to financing
trade (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2013). Since 2011,
trade finance originating from European banks and
destined for developing economies declined. A survey
in the fourth quarter of 2012 by the Asian Development
Bank reveals that the trade finance gap in Asia, for
example, amounted to $425 billion.


On the upside, some developments may help boost
trade, including the expected positive impact of
Japan’s fiscal stimulus package and expansionary
monetary policy; relatively strong GDP growth in
China; increased shipments from China to the United
States as the latter replaces the European Union as
China’s largest trading partner; and proliferating trade
liberalization arrangements. In this regard, worth
noting is the November 2011 commitment by nine
countries, including the United States, Mexico, Canada
and Japan to a broad agreement called the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Economist Intelligence Unit,
2013). Other relevant initiatives include the proposed
European Union–United States Free Trade Agreement;
the USASEAN Expanded Economic Engagement to
create further links between the ASEAN economies and
the TPP; a new Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership to be launched by the ASEAN Plus 6 group
(Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and the
Republic of Korea); current negotiations on a trilateral
trade agreement between China, Japan and the
Republic of Korea; and current free-trade agreement
negotiations between the European Union and Japan.
Meanwhile, at the time of writing, negotiations of the
European Union–India agreement were reported as
being at the finalization stage. Although trade deals,
if successful, can lift international trade flows, some
concerns nevertheless remain as to their potential to
also divert trade from countries that are not party to the
deal, especially when a global trade agreement is not
yet in place.


In conclusion, the knock-on effects of the crisis
in the European Union on developing economies
through reductions in trade, private capital flows,
remittances and aid are tangible, while the slowdown
in Chinese and Indian economies is resonating in
other developing regions and low-income countries.


Despite the current challenging market conditions
and the weakened prospects in Europe in particular,
global growth is expected to continue, driven mainly
by developing countries, including China. Other
countries in Asia, Africa and developing America
are also expected to offer significant opportunities,
not only in terms of economic growth and trade
expansion but also as regards maritime business and
seaborne shipments.


B. WORLD SEABORNE TRADE


1. General trends in seaborne trade


Driven in particular by a rise in China’s domestic
demand as well as increased intra-Asian and South–
South trade, international seaborne trade performed
better than the world economy, with volumes
increasing at an estimated 4.3 per cent in 2012, nearly
the same rate as 2011. About 9.2 billion tons of goods
were loaded in ports worldwide, with tanker trade
(crude oil, petroleum products and gas) accounting
for less than one third of the total and dry cargo being
responsible for the remaining lion’s share (tables 1.3
and 1.4, figure 1.2 and Annex I).


Strong growth (5.7 per cent) in dry-cargo shipments
remained the mainstay of the expansion in 2012,
driven in particular by continued rapid growth in dry-
bulk volumes. Fuelled by growing Asian demand
for iron ore and coal and in line with the long-term
trend, major dry-bulk shipments expanded at the
rate of 7.2  per cent. China, which has contributed
significantly to the growth of seaborne trade in
recent years, continues to generate impressive
import volumes. Although iron-ore import growth has
moderated compared with high previous levels, coal
has stepped in to fill the gap.


Growth in containerized trade measured in 20-foot
equivalent units (TEUs) slowed significantly in 2012,
with volumes increasing by 3.2 per cent, down from
13.1  per cent in 2010 and 7.1  per cent in 2011.
The slump in Europe’s import demand and the
consequent ripple effect on global export volumes,
in particular from Asia, have contributed significantly
to the deceleration.


During the year, volumes of crude oil and refined
petroleum products have grown marginally at 1.5 per
cent in 2012. It should be noted, however, that while
the economic slowdown, high oil price levels and new




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 7


technologies have dampened demand for crude oil,
petroleum-product trade fared better in comparison.
As regards gas trade, minimal additions of liquefaction
installations during the year have constrained volumes,
which increased by a moderate 1.6 per cent.


Reflecting to a large extent their increased participation
in the world trading system, developing countries
continued to contribute larger shares to international
seaborne trade. In 2012, they accounted for 60 per
cent of global goods loaded and 58 per cent of goods
unloaded in 2012 (figure 1.3(a)). However, while the
group’s share has been on the rise, contributions
by individual countries have been uneven, reflecting
their respective varying levels of integration into global
trading networks and supply chains.


While, in line with previous trends, cargo volumes
loaded in the ports of developing countries exceeded
the volumes of goods unloaded (figure 1.3(b)), their
shares have nevertheless evolved over the past four
decades to reach near parity in 2012. Driven by the
fast-growing import demand in developing regions –
fuelled by their industrialization process and rapidly
rising consumer demand – for the first time ever the
share of goods unloaded in developing countries is
likely soon to surpass their share of goods loaded.


Table1.3. Developmentininternational
seaborne trade, selected years
(Millionsoftonsloaded)


Year Oil and gas Main
bulks a


Other dry
cargo


Total
(all


cargoes)


1970 1 440 448 717 2 605
1980 1 871 608 1 225 3 704
1990 1 755 988 1 265 4 008
2000 2 163 1 295 2 526 5 984
2005 2 422 1 709 2 978 7 109
2006 2 698 1 814 3 188 7 700
2007 2 747 1 953 3 334 8 034
2008 2 742 2 065 3 422 8 229
2009 2 642 2 085 3 131 7 858
2010 2 772 2 335 3 302 8 409
2011 2 794 2 486 3 505 8 784
2012 2 836 2 665 3 664 9 165


Sources: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of
data supplied by reporting countries as well as data
obtained from relevant government, port-industry
and specialist sources. Data for 2006 onwards
have been revised and updated to reflect improved
reporting, including more recent figures and better
information regarding the breakdown by cargo type.
Figures for 2012 are estimated based on preliminary
data or on the last year for which data were available.


a Iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock. Data
from 2006 onwards are based on various issues of the Dry Bulk
Trade Outlook, produced by Clarkson Research Services.


0


2 000


4 000


6 000


8 000


10 000


12 000


Container 102 152 234 371 598 969 1 076 1 193 1 249 1 127 1 275 1 421 1 480 1 578


Other dry cargo 1 123 819 1 031 1 125 1 928 2 009 2 112 2 141 2 173 2 004 2 027 2 084 2 184 2 300


Five major bulks 608 900 988 1 105 1 295 1 709 1 814 1 953 2 065 2 085 2 335 2 486 2 665 2 786


Oil and gas 1 871 1 459 1 755 2 050 2 163 2 422 2 698 2 747 2 742 2 642 2 772 2 794 2 836 2 904


1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Figure1.2. Internationalseabornetrade,selectedyears(Millionsoftonsloaded)


Sources: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, various issues. For 2006–2013, the breakdown by type of dry cargo is based
on Clarkson Research Services’ Shipping Review and Outlook, various issues. Data for 2013 are based on a forecast by
Clarkson Research Services (2013a).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 20138


0


10


20


30


40


50


60


70


Loaded 35 60 6


Unloaded 40 58 2


Developed economies Developing economies Transition economies


0


10


20


30


40


50


60


70


Loaded 63 58 51 53 56 63 62 62 61 60 60 60
Unloaded 18 26 29 37 41 46 50 51 56 56 57 58


1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012


Figure1.3(a). Worldseabornetrade,bycountrygroup,2012(Percentageshareinworldtonnage)


Figure1.3(b). Participationofdevelopingcountriesinworldseabornetrade,selectedyears
(Percentageshareinworldtonnage)


Sources: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries, as well as data obtained from
relevant government, port industry and specialist sources. Estimated figures are based on preliminary data or on the last
year for which data were available.


Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, various issues.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 9


-


10


20


30


40


50


60


Loaded 39 23 18 11 9


Unloaded 57 16 22 1 4


Asia Americas Europe Oceania Africa


Figure1.3(c). Worldseabornetrade,bygeographicalregion,2012(Percentageshareinworldtonnage)


Sources: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries as well as data obtained from
relevant government, port-industry and specialist sources. Figures are estimated based on preliminary data or on the last
year for which data were available.


A regional breakdown indicates that in 2012, Asia still
dominated as the main loading and unloading region.
Other major loading and unloading areas included, in
descending order, the Americas, Europe, Oceania and
Africa on the loading side, and Europe, the Americas,
Africa and Oceania on the unloading side (figure 1.3 (c)).


Africa is increasingly attracting attention as a region
with significant potential for maritime transport and
seaborne trade. Although Africa’s impact on shipping
is still comparatively small, it is poised to expand as
the continent sets out to exploit its vast resources and
as consumption demand increases in tandem with
improved income levels. Africa is becoming increasingly
attractive, in particular to Asia, with the value of trade
between the regions steadily rising (Fairplay, 2013a).
While the European Union remains Africa’s biggest
trading partner, China has now overtaken the United
States as Africa’s largest single trading partner. Trade
flows between the United States and Africa were valued
at about $123 billion in 2011, while China–Africa flows
stood at about $133 billion (Fairplay, 2013a).


Recently, China and the United Republic of Tanzania
have signed an agreement to build a major port and
industrial zone in the country at an estimated cost


of up to $10  billion (United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, 2013c). Following another
discovery of natural gas off the coast of the United
Republic of Tanzania, an oil company is now planning
the construction of a liquefied natural gas (LNG)
facility worth $14  billion (United Nations Department
of Economic and Social Affairs, 2013c). Maritime
business in Africa could thrive on such developments,
with Africa increasingly moving away from being a niche
market for shipping operators to gaining mainstream
status (Fairplay, 2013b). According to the African
Development Bank, port throughput in Africa will rise
from 265  million tons in 2009 to more than 2  billion
tons in 2040, while transport volumes will increase
six- to eightfold, with a particularly strong increase of
up to 14 times for some landlocked countries (Fairplay,
2013a). Reflecting the expected growth, investments in
the free zones of Nigeria are reported to have reached
$9.4 billion, with six out of the total 25 free zones in the
country said to be under construction and four at the
design stage (P.M. News Nigeria, 2013).


The infrastructure gap remains a challenge that
undermines maritime transportation and seaborne trade
of many developing regions, including in Africa. Global




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201310


transport infrastructure needs have been estimated at
$11 trillion over the 2009–2030 period (OECD, 2011).
To close the gap on the large infrastructure deficit in
developing countries, including in transportation,
existing estimates indicate that spending must reach
$1.8  trillion–$2.3  trillion  per year by 2020 compared
with the current levels of $0.8 trillion–$0.9 trillion a year
(United Nations Development Programme, 2013). For
Africa, scaling up investment in transport infrastructure
is key, especially as the continent increasingly positions
itself as an important area for maritime business and
trade. In this context, an emerging “South” provides
an opportunity for innovative new structures and
partnerships to unfold, including with a view to financing
transport infrastructure development and maintenance.
Incidentally, at their annual summit held in March 2013,
Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South
Africa (the BRICS countries) agreed to establish a
BRICS Development Bank that would finance projects
in developing countries, including those aimed at
building infrastructure (Voice of America News, 2013).


Looking ahead, some analysts are predicting
that the value of world merchandise trade will
more than double between 2010 and 2020 and
that China’s exports to Europe will be valued at
almost twice those of the United States’ exports
to Europe (Ernst and Young, 2011). They are also
expecting that intraregional Asian trade will grow
rapidly to reach $5 trillion and that Europe’s exports
to Africa and Western Asia will be around 50  per
cent larger than its exports to the United States. In
terms of sectoral contribution, trade in machinery,
transport equipment, consumer electric products
(for example, computers, televisions and washing
machines) and industrial goods are expected to
make the largest contribution to global merchandise
trade over the next ten years (Ernst and Young,
2011). Some observers are projecting that by 2025,
annual consumption in developing economies will
rise to $30  trillion and that developing economies
can be expected to contribute over half of the
1 billion households whose annual earnings surpass
the $20,000  mark (United Nations Development
Programme, 2013). If these projections do materialize,
trade growth patterns and dynamics will likely be
affected. For seaborne trade, existing forecasts
are also pointing to continued growth, with one
estimate for 2013 indicating a projected growth of
4.2 per cent (Clarkson Research Services, 2013a).


Against a background of booming business
opportunities in emerging developing economies and


projected growth in the world merchandise trade, and
bearing in mind the prevailing risks and uncertainties,
the maritime transport industry will need to adjust its
business strategies to reflect changes in the world
economy and patterns of trade, which are expected
to intensify in the future.


2. Seaborne trade in ton-miles


Developments in the world economy and changes in
trade growth and patterns are shaping the demand
for commodities and determining the distances over
which cargo travels. Final demand for shipping services,
measured in ton–miles, offers better insight into maritime
transport activity and demand for ship capacity.


In 2012, growth in ton–miles performed by maritime
transportation increased by 4.2 per cent, down from
4.9  per cent in 2011. Bulk commodities, namely
minerals and raw materials, accounted for nearly three
quarters of the total ton–miles performed in 2012
(figure 1.4). The five major dry bulks (that is, coal, iron
ore, grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock) are
the main engine of growth, with ton–miles increasing
by 6.6 per cent, as compared with 6.1 per cent for
minor bulks, 3.9 per cent for other dry cargo including
containerized trade, 2.4 per cent for oil and petroleum
products, and 0.7 per cent for gas. Much of the growth
was driven by a rapid (11.8 per cent) increase in coal
ton–miles, followed by growth generated by grain and
iron-ore trades with ton–miles growing by 6.2 per cent
and 4.1 per cent, respectively.


Interestingly, with much talk about the changing
geography of world trade and the growing need to
diversify sources of supply often involving shipments over
longer journeys, average distances travelled by global
seaborne trade appear to have remained steady over
time. Between 1970 and 2008, the average distance
travelled by cargo remained stable  at an average of
4,100 nautical miles (Crowe, 2012). This trend reflects in
particular the growing importance of intraregional trade
and, to a lesser extent, some of the production moving
closer to markets, although in the latter case, the debate
on “nearsourcing” remains rather inconclusive.


Much of the increase in average distances travelled
during 1970–2008 was generated by trade in the
major five bulk commodities, with the average distance
increasing from 4,600 to 5,400 nautical miles due to
sharp increases in import demand in fast-growing
developing regions, in particular China (Crowe, 2012).
Robust coal and iron-ore import demand from Asia have
contributed significantly to the growth in dry-bulk trade




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 11


Country group Year


Goods loaded Goods unloaded


Total Crude


Petroleum
products
and gas Dry cargo Total Crude


Petroleum
products
and gas Dry cargo


Millionsoftons


World 2006 7 700.3 1 783.4 914.8 5 002.1 7 878.3 1 931.2 893.7 5 053.4


2007 8 034.1 1 813.4 933.5 5 287.1 8 140.2 1 995.7 903.8 5 240.8


2008 8 229.5 1 785.2 957.0 5 487.2 8 286.3 1 942.3 934.9 5 409.2


2009 7 858.0 1 710.5 931.1 5 216.4 7 832.0 1 874.1 921.3 5 036.6


2010 8 408.9 1 787.7 983.8 5 637.5 8 443.8 1 933.2 979.2 5 531.4


2011 8 784.3 1 759.5 1 034.2 5 990.5 8 797.7 1 896.5 1 037.7 5 863.5


2012 9 165.3 1 785.4 1 050.9 6 329.0 9 183.7 1 928.7 1 054.9 6 200.1


Developed economies 2006 2 460.5 132.9 336.4 1 991.3 4 164.7 1 282.0 535.5 2 347.2


2007 2 608.9 135.1 363.0 2 110.8 3 990.5 1 246.0 524.0 2 220.5


2008 2 715.4 129.0 405.3 2 181.1 4 007.9 1 251.1 523.8 2 233.0


2009 2 554.3 115.0 383.8 2 055.5 3 374.4 1 125.3 529.9 1 719.2


2010 2 865.4 135.9 422.3 2 307.3 3 604.5 1 165.4 522.6 1 916.5


2011 2 982.5 117.5 451.9 2 413.1 3 632.3 1 085.6 581.3 1 965.4


2012 3 162.9 121.6 447.3 2 594.0 3 678.8 1 097.7 573.7 2 007.5


Transition economies 2006 410.3 123.1 41.3 245.9 70.6 5.6 3.1 61.9


2007 407.9 124.4 39.9 243.7 76.8 7.3 3.5 66.0


2008 431.5 138.2 36.7 256.6 89.3 6.3 3.8 79.2


2009 505.3 142.1 44.4 318.8 93.3 3.5 4.6 85.3


2010 515.7 150.2 45.9 319.7 122.1 3.5 4.6 114.0


2011 505.0 132.6 42.0 330.5 156.7 4.2 4.4 148.1


2012 542.1 136.6 41.1 364.4 149.2 3.8 4.0 141.4


Developing economies 2006 4 829.5 1 527.5 537.1 2 765.0 3 642.9 643.6 355.1 2 644.3


2007 5 020.8 1 553.9 530.7 2 932.6 4 073.0 742.4 376.3 2 954.3


2008 5 082.6 1 518.0 515.1 3 049.6 4 189.1 684.9 407.2 3 097.0


2009 4 798.4 1 453.5 502.9 2 842.0 4 364.2 745.3 386.9 3 232.1


2010 5 027.8 1 501.6 515.6 3 010.5 4 717.3 764.4 452.0 3 500.9


2011 5 296.8 1 509.4 540.4 3 247.0 5 008.8 806.7 452.1 3 750.0


2012 5 460.3 1 527.2 562.5 3 370.6 5 355.7 827.3 477.2 4 051.2


Africa 2006 721.9 353.8 86.0 282.2 349.8 41.3 39.4 269.1


2007 732.0 362.5 81.8 287.6 380.0 45.7 44.5 289.8


2008 766.7 379.2 83.3 304.2 376.6 45.0 43.5 288.1


2009 708.0 354.0 83.0 271.0 386.8 44.6 39.7 302.5


Table1.4. Worldseabornetradein2006–2012,bytypeofcargo,countrygroupandregion




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201312


Country group Year


Goods loaded Goods unloaded


Total Crude


Petroleum
products
and gas Dry cargo Total Crude


Petroleum
products
and gas Dry cargo


2010 754.0 351.1 92.0 310.9 416.9 42.7 40.5 333.7


2011 723.7 338.0 68.5 317.2 378.2 37.8 46.3 294.1


2012 787.3 370.1 72.6 344.6 407.7 35.9 51.7 320.1


America 2006 1 030.7 251.3 93.9 685.5 373.4 49.6 60.1 263.7


2007 1 067.1 252.3 90.7 724.2 415.9 76.0 64.0 275.9


2008 1 108.2 234.6 93.0 780.6 436.8 74.2 69.9 292.7


2009 1 029.8 225.7 74.0 730.1 371.9 64.4 73.6 234.0


2010 1 172.6 241.6 85.1 846.0 448.7 69.9 74.7 304.2


2011 1 239.2 253.8 83.5 901.9 508.3 71.1 73.9 363.4


2012 1 287.2 250.7 91.6 944.9 538.5 77.5 79.4 381.6


Asia 2006 3 073.1 921.2 357.0 1 794.8 2 906.8 552.7 248.8 2 105.3


2007 3 214.6 938.2 358.1 1 918.3 3 263.6 620.7 260.8 2 382.1


2008 3 203.6 902.7 338.6 1 962.2 3 361.9 565.6 286.8 2 509.5


2009 3 054.3 872.3 345.8 1 836.3 3 592.4 636.3 269.9 2 686.2


2010 3 094.6 907.5 338.3 1 848.8 3 838.2 651.8 333.1 2 853.4


2011 3 326.7 916.0 388.2 2 022.6 4 108.8 697.8 328.0 3 082.9


2012 3 376.7 904.7 397.5 2 074.5 4 396.2 713.8 341.5 3 340.9


Oceania 2006 3.8 1.2 0.1 2.5 12.9 0.0 6.7 6.2


2007 7.1 0.9 0.1 2.5 13.5 0.0 7.0 6.5


2008 4.2 1.5 0.1 2.6 13.8 0.0 7.1 6.7


2009 6.3 1.5 0.2 4.6 13.1 0.0 3.6 9.5


2010 6.5 1.5 0.2 4.8 13.4 0.0 3.7 9.7


2011 7.1 1.6 0.2 5.3 13.5 0.0 3.9 9.6


2012 9.0 1.6 0.8 6.6 13.3 0.0 4.6 8.6


Percentageshare


World 2006 100.0 23.2 11.9 65.0 100.0 24.5 11.3 64.1


2007 100.0 22.6 11.6 65.8 100.0 24.5 11.1 64.4


2008 100.0 21.7 11.6 66.7 100.0 23.4 11.3 65.3


2009 100.0 21.8 11.8 66.4 100.0 23.9 11.8 64.3


2010 100.0 21.3 11.7 67.0 100.0 22.9 11.6 65.5


2011 100.0 20.0 11.8 68.2 100.0 21.6 11.8 66.6


2012 100.0 19.5 11.5 69.1 100.0 21.0 11.5 67.5


Developed economies 2006 32.0 7.4 36.8 39.8 52.9 66.4 59.9 46.4


2007 32.5 7.5 38.9 39.9 49.0 62.4 58.0 42.4


2008 33.0 7.2 42.3 39.7 48.4 64.4 56.0 41.3


2009 32.5 6.7 41.2 39.4 43.1 60.0 57.5 34.1


2010 34.1 7.6 42.9 40.9 42.7 60.3 53.4 34.6


2011 34.0 6.7 43.7 40.3 41.3 57.2 56.0 33.5


2012 34.5 6.8 42.6 41.0 40.1 56.9 54.4 32.4


Transition economies 2006 5.3 6.9 4.5 4.9 0.9 0.3 0.3 1.2


2007 5.1 6.9 4.3 4.6 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.3


2008 5.2 7.7 3.8 4.7 1.1 0.3 0.4 1.5


Table1.4. Worldseabornetradein2006–2012,bytypeofcargo,countrygroupandregion(continued)




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 13


Sources: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries as well as data obtained from
government, port-industry and specialist sources. Data from 2006 onwards have been revised and updated to reflect
improved reporting, including more recent figures and better information regarding the breakdown by cargo type. Figures
for 2012 are estimated on the basis of preliminary data or on the last year for which data were available.


Table1.4. Worldseabornetradein2006–2012,bytypeofcargo,countrygroupandregion(continued)


Country group Year


Goods loaded Goods unloaded


Total Crude


Petroleum
products
and gas Dry cargo Total Crude


Petroleum
products
and gas Dry cargo


2009 6.4 8.3 4.8 6.1 1.2 0.2 0.5 1.7


2010 6.1 8.4 4.7 5.7 1.4 0.2 0.5 2.1


2011 5.7 7.5 4.1 5.5 1.8 0.2 0.4 2.5


2012 5.9 7.7 3.9 5.8 1.6 0.2 0.4 2.3


Developing economies 2006 62.7 85.6 58.7 55.3 46.2 33.3 39.7 52.3


2007 62.5 85.7 56.9 55.5 50.0 37.2 41.6 56.4


2008 61.8 85.0 53.8 55.6 50.6 35.3 43.6 57.3


2009 61.1 85.0 54.0 54.5 55.7 39.8 42.0 64.2


2010 59.8 84.0 52.4 53.4 55.9 39.5 46.2 63.3


2011 60.3 85.8 52.2 54.2 56.9 42.5 43.6 64.0


2012 59.6 85.5 53.5 53.3 58.3 42.9 45.2 65.3


Africa 2006 9.4 19.8 9.4 5.6 4.4 2.1 4.4 5.3


2007 9.1 20.0 8.8 5.4 4.7 2.3 4.9 5.5


2008 9.3 21.2 8.7 5.5 4.5 2.3 4.7 5.3


2009 9.0 20.7 8.9 5.2 4.9 2.4 4.3 6.0


2010 9.0 19.6 9.4 5.5 4.9 2.2 4.1 6.0


2011 8.2 19.2 6.6 5.3 4.3 2.0 4.5 5.0


2012 8.6 20.7 6.9 5.4 4.4 1.9 4.9 5.2


America 2006 13.4 14.1 10.3 13.7 4.7 2.6 6.7 5.2


2007 13.3 13.9 9.7 13.7 5.1 3.8 7.1 5.3


2008 13.5 13.1 9.7 14.2 5.3 3.8 7.5 5.4


2009 13.1 13.2 7.9 14.0 4.7 3.4 8.0 4.6


2010 13.9 13.5 8.7 15.0 5.3 3.6 7.6 5.5


2011 14.1 14.4 8.1 15.1 5.8 3.7 7.1 6.2


2012 14.0 14.0 8.7 14.9 5.9 4.0 7.5 6.2


Asia 2006 39.9 51.7 39.0 35.9 36.9 28.6 27.8 41.7


2007 40.0 51.7 38.4 36.3 40.1 31.1 28.9 45.5


2008 38.9 50.6 35.4 35.8 40.6 29.1 30.7 46.4


2009 38.9 51.0 37.1 35.2 45.9 34.0 29.3 53.3


2010 36.8 50.8 34.4 32.8 45.5 33.7 34.0 51.6


2011 37.9 52.1 37.5 33.8 46.7 36.8 31.6 52.6


2012 36.8 50.7 37.8 32.8 47.9 37.0 32.4 53.9


Oceania 2006 0.0 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.2 – 0.7 0.1


2007 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.2 – 0.8 0.1


2008 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.0 0.2 – 0.8 0.1


2009 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.2 – 0.4 0.2


2010 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.2 – 0.4 0.2


2011 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.2 – 0.4 0.2


2012 0.1 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.1 – 0.4 0.1




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201314


volumes. Apart from China, iron-ore and coal demand
from other fast-growing economies, in particular India
and the Republic of Korea, have also been significant.
Iron-ore shipments from Brazil contributed the most
ton–miles growth given distances involved on the
Brazil–China trade. The average distance travelled by
iron-ore trade has risen by 6.7 per cent between 2000
and 2012 while, during the same period, the average
distance travelled by coal trade fell by 13.1  per cent
to 4,002 miles, reflecting, in particular, the shorter
distances between China, Australia and Indonesia
(Crowe, 2012). More recently, the shale revolution in
the United States has meant that there is now more
coal available to be exported, including to Europe and
Asia. As a result, coal ton–mile exports from the United
States are trending upwards. In 2011, its coal exports
were 127 per cent higher than in 2007, while in ton–
miles the growth averaged 152  per cent (Clarkson
Research Services, 2012a). In a separate development
affecting dry-bulk trade, some observers are predicting
that if new regulation in Indonesia – a major supplier of
minerals such as coal, bauxite and nickel destined for
China – effectively constrains exports from the country,
China will likely look for substitute sources, including
from relatively distant locations such as Australia. As


a result, dry-bulk shipments and mileage are likely to
increase. As regards grain trade, its share in the total
ton–miles increased from 4.2  per cent in 2000 to
5.4 per cent in 2012, with the sharp drop in exports
from the United States being, in ton–mile terms, offset
by a surge in Brazilian exports. Over 2000–2012, the
average distance travelled by grain cargo increased by
17.8 per cent and reached 6,807 miles, owing to fast-
growing flows originating in developing America and
destined for China (Crowe, 2012).


In 2012, containerized trade ton–miles increased by
3.0  per cent, compared with 8.8  per cent in 2011.
Between 2000 and 2012, the average distance travelled
by containerized trade dropped by 1.2 per cent, with
the drop in long-haul Asia–Europe and trans-Pacific
trade being offset by rapid growth in shorter-distance
intra-Asian flows. The continued rise in the longer-haul
North–South trade volumes is however likely to increase
the average container haul (Crowe, 2012).


Tanker cargo, including crude oil, petroleum products
and gas accounted for over one quarter of total ton–
miles in 2012, down from over one third in 2000. Within
tanker trade, crude oil held the lion’s share (19.1 per
cent), followed by petroleum products (5.7 per cent)


Figure1.4. Worldseabornetradeincargoton–milesbycargotype,1999–2013(Billionsofton–miles)


0


10 000


20 000


30 000


40 000


50 000


60 000


Gas 456 490 498 527 559 596 608 706 790 846 840 1 041 1 069 1 076 1 133


Oil 9 249 9 652 9 390 9 144 9 714 10 430 10 727 11 033 10 967 11 166 10 501 11 018 11 207 11 471 11 832


Other dry cargo 11 191 12 580 12 903 13 098 13 721 14 641 15 236 16 491 17 077 17 359 15 705 17 564 18 744 19 476 20476


Five main dry bulks 6 046 6 845 7 100 7 416 7 955 8 601 9 035 9 804 10 449 10 895 11 207 12 609 13 264 14 137 14 749


1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012a 2013b


Source: UNCTAD secretariat based on data from Clarkson Research Services (2013a).
a Estimated.
b Forecast.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 15


and gas (2.3 per cent). The average distance travelled
by crude oil declined marginally (−1.2  per cent)
between 2000 and 2012. In contrast, and reflecting
growing long-haul imports into Asia and flows from
the United States to developing America, average
distances travelled by petroleum products increased
by 6.4 per cent.1 This growth will likely continue in view
of, inter alia, the following elements: (a) refinery closures
in Europe which will create a shortage of middle
distillates that will require increasing imports, including
long-haul shipments from Western Asia, India and the
United States; (b) the need to meet growing demand
for distillates in Asia, in particular through increased
imports from Western Asia; (c) the intensified exports
from the United States to developing America and
potentially to other regions, including Africa where
demand for middle distillates is on the rise.


Another factor that will influence the ton–miles generated
by oil trade is the structure of oil production in the United
States, which is such that crude oil ton–miles will not
necessarily drop with the evolving energy profile of the
country. Refineries in the United States will continue to
import heavy crude oil from Western Asia as well as
from developing America in view of the fact that the
light crude oil produced in West Africa is similar in its
structure to the crude oil produced in the United States.
Therefore, imports from West Africa to the United States
are already declining, with much of the new surplus cargo
now being shipped to Asia and with associated crude oil
ton–miles increasing (Financial Times, 2013). Finally, as
pricing differentials also affect demand between regions,
additional trade in the direction of higher-priced Asia
could also likely to boost tanker ton–miles. Meanwhile,
with pipelines extending from Kazakhstan, the Russian
Federation and soon Myanmar to China, crude oil ton–
miles could be constrained in the future, which would
entail some implications for tanker demand, the global
tanker fleet and tanker trade patterns


3. Seaborne trade by cargo type


(a) Tanker trade


Tanker trade is greatly determined by global energy
production and aggregate demand, the world economy,
demographics, urbanization, industrialization and,
more importantly, by the “geography” of global energy
surpluses and deficits. To put in perspective some
of the key developments affecting tanker trade, it
is important to highlight at the outset the profound
structural transformation that is currently underway.


The global energy map is being redrawn amid, in
particular, a rise in oil and gas production in the United
States, reports of new finds of mineral resources in
various regions (for example, East Africa and the
Mediterranean), as well as advances in extraction
technology. The recent surge in the shale oil and gas
production in the United States – the largest world
oil consumer – is probably the single most game-
changing trend, with implications extending beyond
national borders and having a strong bearing on
tanker trade. The International Energy Agency expects
the United States to become a net exporter of natural
gas by 2020 and to overtake Saudi Arabia as the
largest global oil producer by the same year, before
becoming nearly self-sufficient in energy by 2035
(International Energy Agency, 2012). Looking ahead,
this may result in a new world energy map, with fewer
crude volumes traded internationally, more refined
products exported from the United States, and China
and India potentially emerging as large importers of
crude oil and exporters of refined petroleum products.
Demand by type of petroleum product will also evolve,
with middle distillates such as diesel used in transport
growing rapidly (Lloyd’s List, 2012a).


(i) Crude oil: Production and consumption


In 2012 and for the third year in a row, oil recorded the
slowest growth among fossil fuels. In line with weaker
global economic growth, in particular in Europe, global
oil consumption increased by less than 1.0 per cent,
a rate below the historical average (British Petroleum,
2013). As consumption in OECD countries fell by
1.3 per cent in 2012, the marginal growth in the global
oil demand, which reached 89.8  million barrels  per
day (bpd) during the year, was driven by non-OECD
countries. On the supply side, global production
expanded by 2.2 per cent, with total volumes reaching
86.2 bpd and with members of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) accounting for
most of the growth. An overview of global consumers
and producers of crude oil is presented in table 1.5.


(ii) Crude oil: Shipments


Reflecting oil supply and demand dynamics, global
crude-oil shipments grew by 1.3  per cent in 2012
with total volumes reaching 55.3 million bpd. Crude oil
carried on board tankers accounted for two thirds of
this total and increased by an estimated 1.5 per cent
taking the total volume to 1.78 billion tons. Growth was
particularly boosted by increased global production
and inventory-building ahead of the embargo involving




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201316


oil trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Major
crude-oil loading areas included Western Asia, Africa,
developing America and transition economies, while
main unloading ports were located in Japan, North
America, Europe and developing Asia.


Crude oil imports into the United States declined by
4.3 per cent in 2012, reflecting in particular increased
domestic production and pipeline shipments from
Canada (British Petroleum, 2013). While in 2007, crude
oil imports into the United States stood at 10.1 million
bpd, volumes declined to 9.2 million bpd in 2010 and to
8.5 million bpd in 2012. As its production ramps up and
imports fall, oil from traditional suppliers such as Angola,
Nigeria and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is
being directed towards new markets and customers.
India is expected to soon overtake the United States as
the main destination for Nigerian crude exports, while its
imports from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have
increased threefold since 2011 (Financial Times, 2013).
Meanwhile, and pending requisite regulatory approvals,
the United States can be expected to export its light
sweet crude oil and potentially emerge as a crude oil
exporter (Lloyd’s List, 2012b). This development may
further redefine the tanker trade map and, as tanker
demand increases in the United States, will probably


entail some implications for the application of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the Jones Act).


In Europe, as production in the North Sea declined,
crude oil was mainly sourced from Libya. Europe’s
imports are expected to eventually shift away from the
long-haul Western Asian exports to short-haul African
shipments. As weak economic conditions continue to
affect European refineries, a shift away from imports of
crude oil towards imports of petroleum products can
also be expected (Danish Ship Finance, 2013).


In 2012, crude oil import volumes increased by
7.4  per cent in China and over 4.0 per cent in India
(British Petroleum, 2013). As these countries continue
to build local refineries, their crude oil imports will
also increase, including from sources in West Africa
and Latin America. This trend is likely to alter the
direction of cargo flows, raise demand for tankers and
increase ton–miles. However, a potentially offsetting
pattern is that a growing proportion of imports into
China are likely to be delivered through pipelines from
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Myanmar.


As international sanctions prohibit imports of crude
oil from the Islamic Republic of Iran, top importers
such as China, India and the Republic of Korea are
forced to reduce their import volumes to qualify for
the 180-day waiver which allows these countries to
continue importing Iranian crude oil (United States
Institute of Peace, 2012). Consequently, the routing of
tanker trade has shifted as more Iranian cargo travels
eastward to Asia and as Europe replaces Iranian
exports by shipments from the Russian Federation and
West Africa (Danish Ship Finance, 2013). This trend is
likely to intensify with the duration of the sanctions.


(iii) Refinedpetroleumproducts:Supplyand
refinerydevelopments


Global refinery capacities increased by 0.4  per cent
in 2012 and reached a total of 92.5 million bpd. Over
50 per cent of this capacity is located in non-OECD
countries driven primarily by expansion in China,
India and Western Asia (British Petroleum, 2013).
Global capacity is expected to further increase with
worldwide refining investments required by 2035
estimated at around $1.3 trillion. Of this total around
$230 billion will be needed for existing projects, while
$300 billion will be required for additions and around
$750  billion will be dedicated for maintenance and
replacement (OPEC, 2012). In line with capacity
developments, global refinery throughput increased
by 0.6 per cent in 2012 with much of the growth being


Table1.5. Majorproducersandconsumers
of oil and natural gas, 2012
(Worldmarketshareinpercentage)


World oil production World oil consumption
Western Asia 33 AsiaPacific 33


Transition economies 16 North America 23
North America 15 Europe 15


Developing America 12 Developing America 10
Africa 11 Western Asia 9


AsiaPacific 10 Transition economies 6
Europe 4 Africa 4


World natural gas production World natural gas consumption


North America 25 North America 25
Transition economies 23 AsiaPacific 19


Western Asia 16 Transition economies 18


AsiaPacific 15 Europe 14
Europe 8 Western Asia 12


Developing America 7 Developing America 8
Africa 6 Africa 4


Source: UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data published
in the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World
Energy 2013.


Note: Oil includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and natural
gas liquids (the liquid content of natural gas where
this is recovered separately). The term excludes
liquid fuels from other sources, such as biomass
and coal derivatives.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 17


generated by refineries in Africa, Canada, China, India
and Mexico. Refineries are increasingly being closed
down in Europe and Japan in view of the growing
environmental constraints in the OECD region and
the heightened competition from refineries in Western
Asia and the Far East (Danish Ship Finance, 2013).


(iv) Refinedpetroleumproducts:Demandand
shipments


Demand for refined petroleum products is closely tied
to industrial production, driving and power generation.
Thus, reflecting weak industrial production and
reduced naphtha demand during the year, growth in
petroleum product shipments decelerated to 2.1  per
cent in 2012 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013a).
UNCTAD estimates this growth at 1.6 per cent; a rate
that also includes the performance of gas trade. Global
shipments of petroleum products and gas totalled
1.05 billion tons in 2012 (Clarkson Research Services,
2013a), with rising import volumes into Asia, in particular
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea offsetting the
drop in shipments destined for North America. Strong
demand from Asia, in particular for light (for example,
gasoline and naphtha) and middle distillates (for
example, diesel and kerosene) was met by supply from
Europe, India and Western Asia. Meanwhile, demand
has been weakening in North America – the second
largest importing region of refined oil products.


As gasoline imports into the United States were
traditionally met by European supply, the drop in demand
and falling imports into the United States are likely to
affect the transatlantic product trade. In contrast, exports
from the United States have increased – a relatively
new phenomenon – driven by the surplus created by
declining oil demand internally as well as by the growing
demand from developing America induced by the
region’s industrialization and infrastructure development
process. In the meantime, gasoline will increasingly be
shipped from Western Asia to the Far East and from
Africa to Europe (Danish Ship Finance, 2013).


In 2012, demand for increasingly popular middle
distillates was subdued as jet fuel and diesel
requirements weakened in line with the global
economic situation. However, demand is expected to
resume growth as the world economy recovers. Driven
mainly by transportation needs (expansion of car
fleets) and to a lesser extent industrial requirements,
growth in future demand for middle distillates is
expected to outpace that of light distillates, with Asia
and, in particular, China being in the lead, followed by
developing America.


Looking ahead, oil will likely continue to move closer to
markets, with the marginal barrel of production moving
west to North America and the refining capacity
moving to Asia (Financial Times, 2013). Demand for
refined petroleum products is expected to continue to
grow driven by increasing requirements in non-OECD
economies from Asia and South America, in particular
as they continue to industrialize and as existing refining
capacity remains insufficient (Clarkson Research
Services, 2012b). Growth in petroleum product trade
is expected to be firm on long-haul routes from India
and Western Asia in the direction of the Far East (that
is, the Republic of Korea, and Asia other than China
and Japan). As regards China, its growing domestic
production is likely to result in lesser import volumes
of petroleum products (Clarkson Research Services,
2013a). Imports into the European Union are expected
to remain weak, in line with the current challenging
economic situation, while in the United States lower
demand for petroleum products and growing refinery
capacity are likely to boost exports of petroleum
products, particularly in the direction of developing
America (Clarkson Research Services, 2013a).


To sum up, new trading lanes both for refined petroleum
products and crude oil are emerging in tandem with
changes in production, volume and structure of
demand as well as the location of global refineries.
These changes are likely to be further influenced
by other developments, including, for example, the
“60/66 programme” of the Russian Federation, which
cuts taxes on exports of crude oil and raises them
for refined products as a way to help expand and
modernize capacity, and the loan agreement between
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and China, which
will raise oil exports destined for China.


(v) Naturalgas:Liquefiedgasshipments


Global natural gas consumption increased by 2.2 per
cent in 2012 – a rate below the historical average of
2.7 per cent (British Petroleum, 2013). During the same
year, production grew by 1.9 per cent, with the United
States remaining the world’s largest producer (British
Petroleum, 2013). An overview of global consumers
and producers of natural gas is presented in table 1.5.


In line with supply and demand developments,
growth in global gas trade, including land-based and
seaborne shipments, remained flat in 2012, growing
at an annual rate of less than 1 per cent. Growth in
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and LNG came to a
standstill in 2012. Together, LNG and LPG volumes
totalled 289 million tons, the same level as 2011, with




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201318


a drop in LNG shipments being offset by a rise in LPG
cargo.2 Accounting for some 85 per cent of total gas
trade carried by sea, LNG shipments fell at an annual rate
of 1.2 per cent in 2012, due to falling imports in Europe
and the limited global liquefaction capacity expansion
recorded during the year (Clarkson Research Services,
2013a). Falling import demand in the United States is
having ripple effects both within and beyond national
borders. Lower import volumes are making the highly
capital-intensive regasification facilities in the United
States obsolete. Meanwhile, the relatively cheaper gas
is displacing coal as a source of power generation. In
2012, Europe, where more expensive gas has been
used for power generation, increased its coal import
volumes sourced from the United States (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013a). Qatar remained the largest
world exporter with a share of over 32.1  per cent of
global LNG exports (British Petroleum, 2013). Increased
export volumes were recorded not only in Qatar but
also in Australia, Malaysia, Nigeria and the United Arab
Emirates, while shipments from Algeria, Egypt and
Indonesia contracted (British Petroleum, 2013).


The outlook for LNG trade is positive as global
consumption is set to increase in view of:


(a) Surging production and exports in the United
States;


(b) New gas finds worldwide (for example, Cyprus,
Israel, Mozambique and the United Republic of
Tanzania);


(c) The projected growth in Asian LNG imports
sustained, in particular, by China’s strategic
commitment to promote gas use;


(d) The decline in nuclear power use;


(e) The attractiveness of gas as a “greener”
alternative to other fossil fuels.


Investments in building supporting infrastructure for
LNG trade continue unabated and provide a further
positive outlook for gas trade and carriers, operators
and builders. As of November 2012 there were 94
liquefaction installations in 19 countries (Clarkson
Research Services, 2012c). While there has been
little expansion in terms of liquefaction capacity in
2012, some 12 liquefaction projects are reported
to be under construction globally, including five in
Australia. Papua New Guinea and Colombia are likely
to become exporters after the completion of some
20 projects that are reported to be at the design or
final investment decision stage (Clarkson Research
Services, 2012c). On the import front, there are around
93 import facilities at locations in 26 countries and


these numbers are expected to continue to increase
with many countries lining up for their first cargoes
(Clarkson Research Services, 2012c). Given recent
gas discoveries in Africa, and assuming all projects
currently being pursued come on line according to
schedule, the region could emerge as the fourth major
supplier of LNG, after Australia, Western Asia and the
United States (Drewry Shipping Consultants, 2013).


Unlike LNG trade, and accounting for only 16  per
cent of global gas trade carried by sea, LPG demand
continued to grow in 2012, with total LPG volumes
increasing by 7.1 per cent and reaching 45 million tons
(Clarkson Research Services, 2013a). During the year,
large quantities were shipped from Western Asia in the
direction of India and the Far East as part of stock
building motivated by relatively lower prices and ample
supply. The use of LPG for cooking purposes, car gas
consumption and as an input into the petrochemical
industry is driving demand in developing regions. With
growing production, the United States is projected
to emerge as a key supplier of LPG with more and
more of its exports currently heading in the direction
of developing America.


(b) Dry-cargo trades: Major and minor dry
bulks and other dry cargo


Despite the weakness of the global economy, dry-
cargo trade volumes continued to grow at a healthy
rate of 5.7 per cent in 2012, taking total volumes above
the 6 billion tons mark. Judging by historic standards
and bearing in mind the global economic situation, this
performance is rather impressive (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013a).


The volume of dry-bulk cargo including the five major
bulk commodities (iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/
alumina and phosphate rock) and minor bulks
(agribulks, fertilizers, metals, minerals, steel and forest
products) increased by 6.7 per cent in 2012 (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013a). A breakdown of this total
indicates that much of the growth was generated
by the expansion in the five major bulk commodities
(7.2 per cent) and to a lesser extent by growth in the
minor bulks (4.6  per cent), which in volume terms
have added nearly 500 million tons to world seaborne
trade between 2002 and 2012 (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013a). During the year the five major bulk
commodities totalled about 2.7 billion tons while the
volume of minor dry bulks reached 1.4  billion tons.
Together, major and minor dry bulks accounted for
nearly two thirds of global dry-cargo volumes.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 19


On the import side, Asia, and in particular China, is the
leading source of import demand for dry bulks, while on
the export side the landscape is less clear cut as market
shares continue to evolve. Indonesia, for example, is
increasingly emerging as an important player with
respect to more than one commodity, including coal,
bauxite and metals. Its strategic geographical position,
as well as its abundance in several raw materials, most
notably coal, is now making Indonesia the fastest-
growing exporter to Asian countries (Danish Ship
Finance, 2013). Other smaller actors are also expanding
their shares including, for example, Liberia, Peru and
Sierra Leone. Table 1.6 provides an overview of major
players in the dry-bulk commodities market.


The main caution, however, to growth in dry-bulk
trade is the continued high dependence on the Asian
demand and on only two key commodities, namely
iron ore and coal. While growth is still strong in China,
the recent moderated growth in the country and a shift
away from an infrastructure-based investment growth
pattern, entail, nevertheless, some implications as to
the strength of future demand.


On the positive side however, some projections indicate
that the dry-bulk sector is set to emerge as a winner from
growth in the world population and urbanization. Some
observers maintain that by 2025 urban consumers are
likely to inject around $20  trillion annually in additional
spending into the world economy, which in turn will trigger
a boom in commodity trade (Shipping and Finance,
2013). With 1 billion people due to enter the consuming
category, rapid growth in urbanization and infrastructure
development will entail an increased demand for
resources and raw materials. The requisite infrastructure
needs in the port sector alone are estimated to be over
2.5 times the current port infrastructure level.


(i) Coal shipments


Coal is the fastest-growing fossil fuel, accounting for
30  per cent of global primary energy consumption
in 2012. Driven by non-OECD countries, global
consumption expanded by 2.5  per cent in 2012
while production increased by 2  per cent (British
Petroleum, 2013). During the year, the total volume
of coal shipments (thermal and coking) increased at
an annual rate of 12.3  per cent and surpassed the
1.06 billion tons mark for the first time. Thermal-coal
trade, which accounted for 78 per cent of the total,
increased at a strong rate of 14.2 per cent in 2012,
partly driven by the relative recovery in European
imports (following the downturn) and the continued
growth in Asian import demand as well as the availability


Table1.6. Somemajordrybulksandsteel:main
producers,users,exportersand
importers,2012(Worldmarketshares
inpercentages)


Steel producers Steel users


China 46 China 46


Japan 7 European Union 10


United States 6 North America 9


India 5 Transition economies 4


Russian Federation 5 Western Asia 3


Repubic of Korea 5 Developing America 3


Germany 3 Africa 2


Turkey 2 Others 22


Brazil 2


Ukrain 2


Others 18


Iron ore exporters Iron ore importers


Australia 45 China 65


Brazil 29 Japan 12


South Africa 5 European Union 10


India 3 Repubic of Korea 6


Canada 3 Others 7


Sweden 2


Others 13


Coal exporters Coal importers


Indonesia 33 European Union 18


Australia 30 Japan 17


United States 10 China 17


Colombia 8 India 15


South Africa 7 Repubic of Korea 12


Russian Federation 7 China, Taiwan Province of 5


Canada 3 Malaysia 2


Others 4 Thailand 2


Others 13


Grain exporters Grain importers


United States 20 AsiaPacific 31


Argentina 12 Developing America 21


European Union 10 Africa 20


Australia 10 Western Asia 18


Canada 9 Europe 7


Ukraine 8 Transition economies 3


Others 31


Sources: UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data from the
World Steel Association (2013a), Clarkson Research
Services (2013b) and the International Grains Council
(2013).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201320


of cargo from the Atlantic. Unlike iron-ore trade and to
a lesser extent coking coal, demand for thermal coal is
more diversified, with the European Union accounting
for about 18 per cent of imports, followed by Japan,
China, India and other smaller importers such as Hong
Kong (China), the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Taiwan Province of China. Coking-coal
trade grew 5.4 per cent in 2012 driven by increases in
import volumes of 43.7 per cent and 8 per cent in China
and India, respectively. Elsewhere, imports into Europe
and the Republic of Korea were constrained by limited
growth in steel production.


In 2012, increased coal exports from the United States
due to the shale-gas production dampened coal
prices and boosted imports into Europe, India and also
China, which overtook Japan as the largest thermal-
coal importer during the year. China’s coal imports
absorbed the equivalent of around 430 Supramaxes
in 2012 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013c).


Coal trade is set to grow in tandem with growing
import demand from China and as Indian installations
of coal-fired power stations expand. However, growing
environmental regulation, including in Europe, together
with the upside potential of China given its large
domestic coal resources, may have an offsetting effect
and result in a much moderated growth (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013a). There remains uncertainty
as to whether the Chinese imports, which have surged
since 2008, can continue to grow at the strong rate
observed so far. In a separate development, it should
be noted that new coal power plants are expected to
come on stream between 2012 and 2020 in Europe.
These plants should reach a capacity nearly double
the existing capacity during the preceding eight-year
period and result in approximately 80 power plant
units being newly built or replaced (Research and
Markets, 2012). These developments are likely to
affect demand for coal and further shape the flows
and patterns of coal trade.


(ii) Iron ore shipments and steel production and
consumption


As iron ore is a key ingredient used in steel production,
its trade is largely determined by developments in the
steel sector. According to data from the World Steel
Association, global apparent steel use and steel
production each increased by 1.2  per cent during
2012 (World Steel Association, 2013a, 2013b). China
continued to increase its production with its market
share rising from 45.4 per cent in 2011 to 46.3 per
cent in 2012. Against this background, iron-ore trade


expanded by 5.4  per cent in 2012, taking the total
volumes to 1.11 billion tons. Major iron-ore exporters
were Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, South Africa and
Sweden. Together, Australia and Brazil account for
73.5 per cent of global exports. Australia, the largest
world exporter (44.5  per cent share), increased its
shipments by 12.8 per cent. Similarly, other exporters
such as Canada, South Africa and Sweden have
also increased their shipments, while in India, mining
bans and taxes on iron-ore exports have significantly
constrained the country’s export volumes (−52.8  per
cent). As a result, India’s market share declined and
a structural shift unfolded, whereby India has moved
from being a major exporter to a net importer and its
import demand is likely to increase over the next few
years. Australia has been increasing its market share,
while Brazil recorded a decline due to the mine- and
infrastructure-expansion projects being completed in
Australia and expansion projects in Brazil being delayed.
Output from South Africa and smaller suppliers such as
Liberia, Peru and Sierra Leone has also been growing.


In 2012, China remained the main destination for iron
ore shipped out of Australia and Brazil, driven by large
investments in construction and infrastructure. China’s
economic development, infrastructure investment and
increasing per-capita steel consumption are crucial for
iron-ore trade. Apart from China, there seems to be no
other significant contributors to iron-ore trade growth,
as imports into Europe and Japan are stagnating
or declining and the import-demand growth in the
Republic of Korea is still relatively small scale. The
remaining concern is the over-excessive concentration
and dependency on the economy of one country
(Clarkson Research Services, 2012d). That said and
while any cut in China’s steel output remains a downside
risk, some factors could contribute to further support
growth in China’s iron-ore imports, at least in the short
term. These include low iron-ore stocks and the need
for restocking, low prices and higher Australian supply
(Clarksons Shipping Services, 2013).


(iii) Grain shipments


Economic growth and population expansion have
generated new grain trade patterns, with the share of
developing regions in world imports increasing over
time. While supply-side factors (for example, weather
conditions and arable land) are clearly fundamental for
grain markets and trade, demand-side considerations
(demographics, consumption patterns and food/feed/
industrial usage) are also important factors shaping
the structure, size and direction of trade flows.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 21


Total grain production in the crop year 2012/2013
fell by 3.5 per cent to 1.78 billion tons, while for the
crop year 2013/2014 the production is forecast to
grow by 7.4  per cent and take the total volume to
1.92  billion (International Grains Council, 2013). On
the demand side, global grain consumption dropped
by 1.7 per cent in 2012/2013 to 1.82 billion tons, but
is expected to recover and grow again by 3.6 per cent
in 2013/2014 to reach 1.88 billion tons. The significant
drop in global grain consumption is the first since 1995,
caused by high prices and their dampening effect on
ethanol production and livestock feed (Larsen, 2013).


The year 2012 was a negative year for grain trade as
the record harvest of 2011 was followed by a significant
contraction in output due to severe droughts affecting
crops in major producing and exporting countries,
namely the United States, the Russian Federation,
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Australia (Larsen, 2013).
World grain shipments by sea (wheat, coarse grain
and soybean) fell by 1.1  per cent and totalled
357 million tons for the crop year 2012/2013. Volumes
are forecast to increase by 2.8 per cent in the crop
year 2013/2014. Wheat and coarse grains continue
to account for over two thirds of the overall grain
trade, with the remaining share being accounted for
by soybean.


Global wheat exports fell by 4.4  per cent in the
crop year 2012/2013 while coarse grains dropped
by 1.9  per cent and soybean trade was the main
area of growth (5.5  per cent) (Clarksons Shipping
Services, 2013). Japan remained the world’s largest
importer of wheat and coarse grains with a total of
23.8 million tons, followed by Egypt (14.2 million tons),
the Republic of Korea (12.5  million tons), Mexico
(12.1 million tons), Saudi Arabia (11.7 million tons) and
China (9.1 million tons) (Clarksons Shipping Services,
2013). After achieving self-sufficiency for many years,
China is increasingly emerging as an important source
of grain import demand.


Although the United States is by far the world’s largest
grain exporter, its share of the world market is shrinking.
The 52  million tons of grain exported in 2012/2013
(down from 72.6 million tons shipped out in 2011/2012)
was the smallest volume since 1971 (Larsen, 2013).
Export volumes dropped from Australia but increased
from Canada, Ukraine and the European Union, while
they remained unchanged from Argentina.


One concern facing grain production and entailing
implications for seaborne trade is the levelling off of
returns for some key crops (for example, rice in Japan


and wheat in Europe) in addition to the potentially
devastating effect of climate change-induced weather
extremes (for example, drought and flooding). In view of
these risks, the traditional 70-days worth of grain stocks
is now considered inadequate to ensure food security
and a larger buffer is said to be required to avoid food
price shocks (Larsen, 2013). While food prices have
eased from recent highs, grain markets remain tight
due to historically low stock levels and the pressure on
food prices resulting from more expensive inputs (fuel
and fertilizer) (International Monetary Fund, 2013).


(iv) Bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock


Over the years, growth in bauxite trade has been
boosted by higher Indonesian exports, with China
accounting for most of global bauxite trade growth
between 2002 and 2012. Bauxite trade grew from
30  million tons in 2002 to 82  million tons in 2011
(Clarkson Research Services, 2012e). However,
in 2012, bauxite and alumina total volumes fell by
5.3  per cent from the 2011 levels and volumes
totalled 107  million tons. The contraction reflected
the new export rules introduced in May 2012 by the
Indonesian government, which dampened export
volumes from the country. There are now concerns
about the future of bauxite trade as Indonesia is a
crucial supplier of bauxite in addition to other key
commodities, including coal and nickel ore – a metal
used in many industrial and consumer products such
as stainless steel. A measure that would limit exports
could in the long term induce a shift in trade patterns
as China might be able to source more bauxite from
other locations such as Australia or Guinea. The latter
country accounted for 25 per cent of world exports in
2011 and has the largest bauxite reserves in the world
(Clarkson Research Services, 2012e). The effect on
ton–miles is likely to be positive.


As to phosphate rock, global production capacity is
projected to increase from 220 million tons per year
in 2012 to 256 million tons (United States Geological
Survey, 2013). Over half of the growth is expected
to originate in North Africa, with Morocco the largest
producer. Phosphate rock mines and expansions are
underway in a number of other countries, including
Angola, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the Congo,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan, Namibia,
Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, New Zealand,
Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and
Zambia. A growing world population and rising food,
feed and industrial requirements require extensive
use of phosphate fertilizer as part of the planting




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201322


and agricultural production process. As there are no
substitutes for phosphorous, its global use in fertilizer
is projected to increase from 41.9 million tons in 2012
to 45.3  million tons in 2016. Reflecting continued
demand for fertilizers, phosphate rock shipments
increased by 3.4 per cent in 2012, up from 29 million
to 30 million tons.


(v) Dry cargo: Minor bulks


In 2012, minor-bulks trade increased at a slower
annual rate than in the previous year, growing by
4.6 per cent and taking the total volumes to 1.4 billion
tons. Metals and minerals accounted for 45.6  per
cent of this total followed by manufactures (33.0 per
cent) and agribulks (21.3  per cent). The largest
growth was recorded in the metals and minerals
segment (for example, cement, nickel ore, anthracite)
with volumes growing by 6.0 per cent year-on-year.
Expansion in nickel-ore exports mainly destined for
China (33.8 per cent) fuelled the growth. This robust
increase occurred while the new export restrictions
introduced in May 2012 (until November 2012) in
Indonesia were still in force. This is because nickel-ore
shipments from the Philippines helped offset the lower
Indonesian availability (Clarkson Research Services,
2013a). The next largest contributor to growth was
the manufactures sector (for example, steel and forest
products) with 3.6 per cent annual growth. Recently,
trade patterns have been shifting in the manufactures
sector owing to the surge in Chinese exports with
flows destined mainly for other Asian countries, Africa
and developing America. Ample supply of the more
affordable Chinese steel, supported by a strong
global demand, has boosted trade in steel products.
Finally, agribulks (soymeal, oilseed/meal and rice) also
expanded at 3.5 per cent, despite a drop in sugar and
potash volume.


To sum up, dry-bulk commodities, including in
particular major bulks such as iron and coal, are the
backbone of international seaborne trade and have
been the major engine of growth reflecting in particular
the fast-growing demand from emerging developing
regions. Exporters of dry-bulk commodities are rather
diversified, with suppliers spanning different regions
and with smaller new players increasingly emerging
on the market. On the import side however, there
seems to be a greater concentration, with demand
emanating mainly from emerging developing regions,
namely in Asia, in particular China. Another feature is
the high concentration in the structure of the global
import demand, as much of global growth is being


entirely driven by iron-ore and coal shipments.
Dependence on one market, in particular China and
to a lesser extent India, as well as on two single
commodities can be problematic in the long run,
as growth patterns in these countries change and
their import demand moderates or slackens. In this
context, and in the absence of significant growth in
import demand from other markets that could offset
the decline in China and India, the futur of the dry-
bulk shipping market remains uncertain. For now
however, existing indicators are pointing to continued
growth in dry-bulk commodity trade, including in that
of minor bulks in tandem with current growth patterns,
urbanization trends and population expansion in
developing regions.


(vi) Other dry cargo: Containerized trade


For many decades, containerized trade has been
the fastest-growing market segment accounting
for over 16  per cent of global seaborne trade by
volume in 2012 and more than half by value (in 2007).
With containerization being closely associated with
globalization and fragmentation of global production,
a recent study considering 157 countries over the
1962–1990 period provided empirical evidence that
containerization is the driver of the twentieth century
economic globalization (Bernhofen et al., 2013). In the
22 industrialized countries examined, containerization
explains a 320 per cent rise in bilateral trade over the
first five years after adoption and 790 per cent over 20
years. By comparison, and over a 20-year period, a
bilateral free-trade agreement raises trade by 45 per
cent while membership of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade adds 285 per cent. Over the period
1962–1990, containerization appears to have had a
lesser effect on North–South and South–South trade,
probably reflecting the role of port and transport
infrastructure availability and efficiency (Bernhofen et
al., 2013).


For a long time, containerized trade flows could be
predicted by looking at the performance of world
GDP with the multiplier effect of the container volume
growth ranging between three to four times the GDP
growth. This ratio is currently being questioned with
some observers arguing that it is no longer a precise
predictor of container-demand growth since other
factors are also at play (Containerisation International,
2013a). These factors include the rate of offshoring
of manufacturing, the extent of containerization of
bulk cargoes, the goods-versus-services composition
and the manufactured-versus-commodities share




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 23


of countries. Some analysts maintain that the GDP
multiplier has fallen from an average of 3.4 times over
1990–2005 to only 1.5 times in 2012. The reduced
value of the multiplier has implications for future
growth in demand and for containerized trade, a
fact that is being increasingly acknowledged at the
industry level. According to a large container carrier,
current growth rates should be seen as the “new
normal” for the container industry and the 2008/2009
crisis has moved the industry away from the 9–10 per
cent growth recorded over the past three decades
(Containerisation International, 2013a).


Against this background, and while growth
decelerated significantly, containerized trade volumes
expanded in 2012 to reach 155 million TEUs (figure
1.5(a)) (Clarkson Research Services, 2013b).
Containerized trade, which accounted for 65  per
cent of “other dry cargo” in 2012 (that is, nearly two
thirds of the 2.28 billion tons of dry cargo that remain
after removing dry-bulk commodities), increased
by 3.2  per cent in 2012, down from 13.1  per
cent in 2010 and 7.1  per cent in 2011. The sharp
deceleration resulted from the depressed volumes


on the mainlane East–West trade, in particular, the
Asia–Europe trade route.


Data from Containerisation International indicate that
European import volumes have once again fallen back
below the pre-crisis level with volumes on the head-
haul route from Asia to Europe dropping by 2.6 per
cent in 2012, compared with a 6  per cent positive
growth in 2011 (table  1.7 and figure 1.5(b)). Falling
volumes affected almost all goods, including electrical
machinery, metal manufactures, travel goods and
handbags, telecom and recording equipment, textiles
and miscellaneous manufacture (Containerisation
International, 2013b).


The contraction is indicative of the severe pressure
weighing down on European economies, especially
in the Mediterranean. In addition to lower demand,
overcapacity is another challenge facing operators on
the Asia–Europe lane. In 2012, a number of measures
have been taken to manage the demand and supply
imbalance and control capacity, including among
others suspending or cancelling services, dropping
voyages, slow steaming and idling of ships (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013a).


0


20


40


60


80


100


120


140


160


180


1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Million TEUs (left)


-10


-5


0


5


10


15


20
Percentage annual change (right)


Figure1.5(a). Globalcontainertrade,1996–2013(Millionsof TEUsandpercentageannualchange)


Source: Based on Drewry Shipping Consultants, Container Market Review and Forecast 2008/2009, and Clarkson Research
Services, Container Intelligence Monthly, various issues.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201324


Table1.7. EstimatedcontainerizedcargoflowsonmajorEast–Westcontainertraderoutes,2009–2012
(Millionsof TEUsandpercentageannualchange)


Year Transpacific Europe Asia Transatlantic


Asia–North
America


North America–
Asia Asia–Europe Europe–Asia


Europe–North
America


North America–
Europe


2009 10.6 6.1 11.5 5.5 2.8 2.5


2010 12.3 6.5 13.3 5.7 3.2 2.7


2011 12.4 6.6 14.1 6.2 3.4 2.8


2012 13.3 6.9 13.7 6.3 3.6 2.7


Percentagechange
2011–2012 7.4 5.2 -2.6 0.4 5.9 -6.9


Sources: MDS Transmodal data as published in Data Hub Trade Statistics, Containerisation International, www.containershipping.
com, April, May and June 2013.


0


5


10


15


20


25


Trans-Pacific 8 8 8 8 9 11 11 12 13 15 16 18 19 19 17 19 19 20
Europe–Asia–Europe 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 11 12 14 16 18 19 17 19 20 20


Transatlantic 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 6 6 6


1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012


Figure1.5(b). EstimatedcontainerizedcargoflowsonmajorEast–Westcontainertraderoutes
(Millionsof TEUs)


Source: Based on the Global Insight Database as published in Bulletin FAL, issue number 288, number 8/2010 (“International
maritime transport in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2009 and projections for 2010”), United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Data for 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 are based on table 1.7.


The North America–Asia trade showed more
resilience and performed better than the previous
year as North American imports were relatively more
robust. In 2012, trade on the head-haul route from
Asia to North America expanded by 7.4  per cent
while traffic in the opposite direction expanded by


5.2 per cent. On the transatlantic route, depressed
European import demand caused a 6.9  per cent
contraction on the North America–Europe leg, while
flows into North America increased by 5.9 per cent,
sustained by relatively stronger demand in the United
States.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 25


Finally, an issue that is being increasingly mentioned
relates to the “nearsourcing” whereby a number of
firms are reported to be relocating closer to home
markets given production cost increases in China.
Some observers argue, however, that nearsourcing
affects limited areas of business and is therefore
overrated (Lloyd’s List, 2013c). In addition, it was
observed that there was more than one factor to take
into account when making decisions about where to
locate production and that there was no one-size-
fits-all solution, as in some cases – depending on
the product – nearsourcing can generate significant
savings while in others it could prove to be expensive
(Lloyd’s List, 2013c).


C. SELECTED EMERGING TRENDS
AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL
SHIPPING


Despite the positive growth in 2012, international
seaborne trade remains vulnerable to many downside
risks and exposed to some potentially game-changing
trends that could redefine the maritime transport
operating landscape. International shipping is facing
a new and complex environment that involves both
challenges and opportunities, including as noted above
the demand and supply mismatch, continued global
economic uncertainty and geopolitical tensions. Of all
the prevailing challenges however, the interconnected
issues of energy security and costs, climate change
and environmental sustainability are perhaps the most
unsettling. Climate change in particular continues to
rank high on the international policy agenda, including
of shipping and port business. Despite positive
developments on a number of fronts, the world is not
yet on track to limit the average global temperature
rise to 2°C (above pre-industrial levels) that would
ensure that climate change remains manageable
(International Energy Agency, 2013). With climate
change effects already being felt globally and in the
absence of adequate climate change mitigation and
adaption action, shipping and ports and therefore
international seaborne trade are likely to be severely
affected by the potentially devastating impacts of this
change (for example, extreme weather events and
rising sea levels). For a more detailed discussion on
the climate change challenge and maritime transport,
see previous first chapters of the Review of Maritime
Transport, 2009–2012.


Opportunities are, on the other hand, also arising in
connection with some of the following trends:


Away from the mainlanes, containerized trade flows
continued to grow at a rapid pace, albeit slower than
in 2011. North–South trade expanded by 3.9  per
cent in 2012, while intra-Asian and trade on non-
mainlane East–West routes grew by 6.2  per cent
and 3.7  per cent respectively (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013b). Containerized trade linking Asia,
developing America, Africa and Oceania has been
growing over the past few years, highlighting the
deepening of South–South ties. Reflecting intensified
interregional trade volumes the average size of
ships deployed on these routes increased markedly.
With consumer demand in developing regions set to
grow, markets in the “South” will continue to drive
global container trade growth (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013b). While as noted above the impact
of containerization on North–South and South–
South trade during the 1962–1990 period appeared
to have been relatively smaller than that on the
advanced regions, the rapid growth in non-mainlane
containerized trade observed over recent years
highlights to some extent the growing importance
of containerization in promoting trade within and
among developing regions.


The weak market fundamentals and the growing
deployment of increasingly larger ships have forced
operators to continue cascading their ships to
secondary and regional routes. Nevertheless, during
the year the market saw the arrival of the largest ships
to date (+16,000  TEU and Triple-E container ships
of 18,300  TEU). In addition to the arrival of these
megaships, 2012 saw some operational restructuring
with the decision by the largest world carriers Maersk
Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) and
CMA CGM to form the P3 alliance, a large vessel-
sharing alliance affecting the three major East–West
trade routes (Lloyd’s List, 2013a). If approved, the
initiative will likely affect not only carriers and their
bottom line but also ports, shippers, and smaller
operators (Lloyd’s List, 2013b).


Another trend that is unfolding is the continued
penetration of containerization into the bulk trade,
in particular on the backhaul routes of imbalanced
trades. Regulatory developments in the commodity
sector are supporting this trend as shown in the case
of Australian grain. Since 2008, when grain trading was
deregulated in Australia, the country’s containerized
wheat shipments increased tenfold. Similarly, recent
deregulation in Canada’s grain market is likely to result
in greater containerization of grain trade (Dynamar
B.V., 2013).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201326


(a) Deeper regional integration and South–South
cooperation;


(b) Growing diversification of sources of
supply enabled by technology and efficient
transportation;


(c) Emergence of new trading partners and access
to new markets facilitated by growing trade
and cooperation agreements;


(d) The expansion/opening of new sea routes (for
example, Panama Canal expansion and arctic
routes);


(e) Structural change in the world energy map and
consequent ripple effects on tanker trade;


(f) Moving-up of economies’ value chains from
labour intensive manufacturing to higher skilled
production (for example, China) and related
implications for other developing regions (Viet
Nam, Bangladesh, Africa);


(g) Growth in global demand induced by a growing
world population and a rise in the middle-class
consuming category;


(h) The emergence of developing-country banks
(for example, BRICS) with the potential to
raise funding to meet the significant transport
infrastructure investment needs.


Against this background, the following section focuses
on developments affecting three closely interrelated
topics, namely:


(a) Fuel costs and slow steaming;


(b) Lower-sulphur fuels and air emissions;


(c) Innovative ship design (eco-ships).


While these issues have been considered to different
extents in the previous editions of the Review of
Maritime Transport, providing an update on how they
are further unfolding is important, especially as related
debates are in some cases polarizing the industry
(for example, concerning eco-ships). Together, these
issues have one element in common, namely fossil
fuels, a strategic factor that can significantly determine
the competitiveness of shipping and its long term
sustainability.


A fourth issue addressed in this section is the
expansion of the Panama Canal and some related
potential implications. Dealing with this issue at this
juncture is particularly topical given, in particular the
fast-approaching 2015 deadline set for the completion
of the expansion work.


1. Fuel costs and slow steaming


Higher oil prices impact on trade and maritime
transport through both their dampening effect on
growth and the upward pressure on the cost of fuel
used to propel ships. From 2005, oil prices started
to rise with some acceleration observed since 2007,
and with 2008 recording a historic high of $150 per
barrel. For comparison, the spot price of European
Brent averaged around $29 in 2000, $55 in 2005,
$73 in 2007 and $112 in 2012 (2013 data from the
United States Energy Information Administration). This
means that oil prices more than doubled between
2005 and 2012 and have increased by more than half
since 2007. Marine fuel prices (bunkers) as illustrated
by the Rotterdam 380 centistoke increased by nearly
threefold between 2005 and 2012. The Rotterdam 380
centistoke averaged $138.4 per ton in 2000, $234 per
ton in 2005, $345.1 per ton in 2007 and $639.6 per
ton in 2012 (Clarkson Research Services, 2012d).
While oil prices and bunkers are correlated, their
relationship has evolved over recent years indicating
that bunker fuel prices not only depend on oil price
movements but are also determined by other factors,
such as growing demand for bunkers resulting from an
expanding world fleet and the tendency of refineries to
produce more distillates (Clarkson Research Services,
2012f).


With fuel costs reported to account for larger shares
of operating costs (as much as 50–60 per cent) (World
Shipping Council, 2008), a rise in bunker fuel costs
cuts significantly into the earnings of shipowners,
especially when freight markets are depressed. As
container ships operate at relatively higher speeds
than bulkers and tankers, rising bunker prices have
a special resonance among liner operators. It has
been estimated, for example, that the daily cost of
bunker fuel averaged 85 per cent of the daily ship cost
between 2003 and 2006, while since 2008 bunker
fuel cost has increased significantly and represents
over three times the daily cost of chartering a ship
(Clarkson Research Services, 2012f). A recent industry
survey revealed that fuel efficiency is a top priority for
shipping with 69 per cent of businesses indicating that
efforts should focus on developing more cost-effective
means of fuel consumption (Lloyd’s List, 2013d).


Since 2007, and while it started on the Asia–Europe
trade, slow steaming as a fuel-saving measure is being
implemented across shipping sectors and routes,
including on the North–South trajectory (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013b). While rising fuel costs




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 27


remain the main driver of slow steaming, sailing at
lower speed, especially at the worst of the economic
downturn, also helped absorb some of the prevailing
excess container ship carrying capacity.


However, views about the long-term sustainability of
slow steaming vary. Some expect the practice to be
transitional and therefore disappear with economic
recovery and less volatile oil prices, while others
maintain that slow steaming is here to stay. In this
regard, trend setters such as Maersk Line are reported
to be retrofitting ships to allow for slow steaming and
looking to extend the practice further into all trades
as well as introducing extra-slow steaming (15–18
knots) into selected trade (Lloyd’s List, 2013e). For
large container carriers, slow steaming at 18–20 knots
would bring fuel consumption from 125–175 tons per
day to less than 100 tons per day. With bunker pricing
approaching $700  per ton, these reductions would
generate significant daily overall fuel-cost savings
(Lloyd’s List, 2013e).


One recent study concludes that mandatory slow
steaming is legally feasible either under a global
agreement or unilaterally as a condition of entry to a
port and that it entails both benefits and costs (Faber
et al., 2012). Another study analysing four maritime
routes finds that the cost of slow steaming for shippers
and consignees (inventory costs, waiting time,
interest, insurance and depreciation) does not make
slow steaming viable at the supply chain level (Lloyd’s
List, 2013f). For shippers, the long-term acceptability
and sustainability of slow steaming rest on their ability
to adapt their global supply chains, production and
distribution to longer transit times while preserving
reliability and predictability of services. Adapting to
slow steaming can be more challenging for shippers
that are operating lean and just-in-time techniques
and who may need to reconfigure their production
and distribution (Lloyd’s List, 2013g). Another concern
relates to the technical requirements associated
with slow steaming and the need to retrofit engines
on existing ships which generates additional costs
(Wiesmann, 2010).


2. Lower-sulphur fuels and air
emissions


Fuel costs are also being affected by the requirement
of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (MARPOL) Annex VI, governing air pollution
and Emission Control Areas (ECAs) in the European


Union and North America (for additional information
see chapter 5). In 2020, the amount of sulphur allowed
in marine fuels will be lowered from 3.5 per cent to
0.5 per cent globally and from a current 1.0 per cent
to 0.1 per cent in 2015 for ships sailing though ECAs.


Restricting sulphur content in marine fuels and
requiring less-polluting fuels, namely distillate grade, is
crucial to reducing air pollution and its adverse effects
on human health and the environment. In this respect,
it is worth noting that the 7 per cent (or €58.4 billion)
contribution of shipping emissions to the total health
costs in Europe in 2000 is likely to increase to 12 per
cent (€64.1 billion) in 2020, while in the ECAs of the
Baltic Sea and North Sea, a drop in the sulphur dioxide
emissions will likely cause a 36 per cent reduction in
Europe’s public health costs arising from international
shipping. In value terms this implies a cost reduction
from €22  billion in 2000 to €14.1  billion in 2020
(European Commission, 2013).


While the benefits of using less-polluting fuels are not
called into question, by affecting the quality and the
cost of fuel, the requirement to reduce air emissions
entails, nevertheless, some implications for the future
of residual fuel, oil refineries, technologies such as
exhaust cleaning systems and alternative fuels.
Switching fuels could also raise transport costs as
shown by a study commissioned by the European
Community Shipowners’ Association (Dynaliners,
2013). The study forecasts that a switch in fuel types
would result in a 11.5 per cent to 20 per cent increase
in the average freight rates along 16 Baltic trade
routes. One concern facing the industry is whether
lower-sulphur fuels will be available at sufficient
levels and at affordable rates. While some argue
that fuels will be produced to meet the demand, the
costs are expected to be significant with the price
differential with residual fuels currently estimated at
50  per cent (Lloyd’s List, 2013h). Bearing in mind
the varied concerns, the IMO proposed to conduct
a fuel-availability study for 2018 that may suggest
postponing the 2020 global reduction by four years. In
Europe however, the requirement will be mandatory by
2020 with no fuel-availability study being envisaged;
in the meantime, it would appear that the shipping
industry remains somewhat hesitant to invest heavily
in scrubbers given outstanding concerns over their
cost-efficiency and their fitness for use on ocean-
going ships (Lloyd’s List, 2013h).


A potential side effect of lower-sulphur regulations
in shipping is the rise in road-transport fuel prices as
ships, trucks and cars compete for distillates (Lloyd’s




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201328


List, 2013h). Another factor that could potentially
affect bunker demand is the use of natural gas as fuel.
Although limited so far, recent contracting includes
two gas-powered container ships for use in the United
States ECAs (Clarkson Research Services, 2012f). The
availability of gas at relatively lower prices makes natural
gas an economically and environmentally attractive
proposition (Seatrade, 2013). However, it may take time
for gas-powered ships to be widely used, especially on
the mainlane container trade. As far as containerized
trade is concerned, gas-powered ships are not thought
to be viable for the next two or three decades (Seatrade,
2013). At present there seems to be a “chicken and egg”
situation whereby carriers are reluctant to invest in gas-
powered ships as requisite bunkering infrastructure is yet
to be made available, while ports remain uncertain about
the benefits of developing bunkering facilities when there
is no global gas-powered fleet (Ports & Harbors, 2013).


3. Innovative ship designs and
eco-ships


By all standards the era of cheap oil is probably over
and combined with depressed market fundamentals,
high fuel costs and rising environmental regulation,
demands for more fuel-efficient and eco-friendly
maritime transportation systems are set to intensify. In
this context, innovative ship designs are increasingly
being sought by industry as the answer to the fuel costs/
revenue/environmental sustainability conundrum.


The term “eco-ship” is currently a buzzword in the
shipping industry. While an established definition
of the concept is yet to emerge, eco-ships can be
described as ships that, through the process of hull,
engine design and new technologies, make significant
savings on costs, with the main savings being on the
engine fuel consumption (Roussanoglou, 2013). An
additional feature of these ships is their environmental
friendliness as reduced fuel consumption generates
lower air emissions, including greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions and air pollutants. Many experimental
designs and concepts for eco-friendly ships (for
example, wind and solar power) are being reported,
but their application in the near future remains doubtful
(Haider et al., 2013). The standards provided by the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) adopted in July
2011 under the auspices of IMO – which became
mandatory on 1 January 2013 for all newbuildings of
400 gross tonnage (GT) and above – will no doubt
significantly influence the design of the first generation
of eco-ships (Haider et al., 2013).


The emergence of eco-ships is causing a serious
dilemma for shipowners, especially in the context of
depressed freight markets, lower earnings, excess
ship capacity, finance shortage, stricter environmental
regulation and expanding slow-steaming practice.
Shipowners are struggling to determine whether
to invest in new eco-ships or make the requisite
adjustments and improvements to a relatively young
large existing fleet to ensure its optimization (Haider
et al., 2013). These considerations are dividing the
industry and raising many questions which amplify
the prevailing uncertainties and financial risks. What
heightens this dilemma is the potential market
segmentation that may result depending on decisions
made today. With the arrival of eco-ships it is possible
that a gap between eco-ships and existing ships –
considered less efficient – will further deepen and split
the shipping market into tiers (Haider et al., 2013). Eco-
ships are expected to be almost 30 per cent more fuel-
efficient than the current generation of ships (Haider
et al., 2013). For example, the new Triple-E ships are
reported to consume approximately 35 per cent less
fuel  per container than the 13,100-TEU ships being
delivered to other container shipping lines. The E-class
ships are also expected to reduce CO2 emissions by
more than 50 per cent per container moved, compared
to the industry average CO2 performance on the Asia–
Europe trade (Building the world’s biggest ship, 2013).
The division in the industry is tangible with proponents
of eco-ships promising significant improvements in
relation to the existing fleet (Roussanoglou, 2013) and
with sceptics arguing that the claimed benefits of these
new ships are yet to be verified (Haider et al., 2013).


Although the importance of cutting the cost of fuel
and reducing emissions of all kinds is never called
into question, there remains the need to bring more
clarity about some outstanding issues including,
for example, whether eco-ships constitute a good
investment for the future and whether they will provide
a more competitive solution in the market. This being
said, the deciding factor will be fuel costs, which are
set to remain elevated (BIMCO, 2013).


4. Panama Canal expansion


Operational for nearly one century, the Panama Canal
is a critical node in international trade and a key asset
which connects the East Coast of the United States
and Gulf ports with Asia, Oceania, and developing
America. The Panama Canal serves more than
144 maritime routes connecting 160 countries and




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 29


reaching some 1,700 ports in the world (Maritime
Services - PanCanal.com, 2013). Total crossings in
the Panama Canal reached 12,862 in 2012. Of this
total, 3,331 crossings were attributed to container
ships (Bloomberg, 2013). During the year, more
than 300  million tons (Panama Canal/Universal
Measurement System (PC/UMS)) of cargo were
handled at the canal.


Large-sized ships are increasingly dominating the
international shipping networks and the limitations
of the Panama Canal’s lock system prevent the
waterway from accommodating the operation of
ships surpassing the Panamax standard, that is, of a
capacity of up to 5,100 TEUs. In view of this, and of
the rapidly growing international trade flows causing
severe capacity constraints, a major expansion project
worth $5.25 billion was launched in 2006 to expand
the capacity of the canal. The expansion project,
which is set to conclude in 2015, will add a third set
of locks to the canal system as well as deepen and
widen existing channels.


In addition to allowing the passage of an ever-growing
number of “post-Panamax” ships with an estimated
cut-off point of around 13,500 TEUs, the expansion
aims to reduce delays and costs. The Panama Canal
Authority estimates the cost savings that will accrue to
shippers from economies of scale to range between
7  per cent and 17  per cent (Mid-America Freight
Coalition, 2011). Probably the first direct impact of the
upgraded canal will be felt by the West Coast ports
of the United States and the intermodal land bridge
(rail connections using double-stacked rail transport)
linking the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts. As the
land bridge provides a slightly faster connection, the
competition with the Panama Canal is an important
consideration and the way in which the West Coast
ports and railroads prepare to respond to the canal
expansion will determine the extent of the competition.
Rail companies in the United States are already
engaged in corridor development and inland terminal
initiatives (Lower, 2013).


Another overall likely impact is a change in the shipping
dynamics of various traded goods induced by a
change in not only the economies of scale, but also
the toll structure and reduced transit times. While
the expansion initially aimed to attract shipments
from Asia to the East Coast of the United States,
other goods and regions are emerging as potentially
important users of the new canal. By allowing larger
tonnage to pass, a number of markets, commodities


and goods can be expected to benefit. Examples
include the following: (a) grain moving from the United
States East Coast/Gulf ports to Asia (Mid-America
Freight Coalition, 2011); (b) soybean moving from
developing America to Asia; (c) coal and iron-ore
shipments from Colombia, the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela and Brazil with destinations in Asia; (d)
coal shipments from the East Coast of the United
States to Asia, in particular China; (e) oil flowing
from Ecuador to the East Coast of the United
States; (f) gas cargo originating from Trinidad and
destined for consumption in Chile; (g) gas exports
from the United States to Asia. Other important
potential impacts of the canal modifications include
the development of large trans-shipment capacity
and points for relay services in the Caribbean area
(Rodrigue and Notteboom, 2012), and the reduction
of carbon emissions from shipping, a side effect that
remains largely unacknowledged (Stott and Wright,
2012).


In addition to the physical expansion, a number of
considerations could affect the ability of the expanded
Panama Canal to position itself as a key strategic
maritime route and international trade asset. These
include, among others:


• Developments in fuel prices;


• Sourcing decisions;


• Delivery times;


• The redistribution of manufacturing base to other
locations;


• Shifts in the source of global demand towards
developing regions and away from traditional
locations and partners (Rodrigue and Notteboom,
2012);


• The extent to which ports will be able to handle
efficiently the loading and unloading operations
involving the larger post-Panamax ships;


• The effect of port investments on both coasts of
the United States and the underlying competition;


• The canal fees and how they will affect its
competitiveness (Bloomberg, 2013).


How other routes such as the Suez Canal respond to the
Panama Canal expansion will also be important. It should
be noted, however, that while these two passages are
considered to be competitors to some extent, they also
share complementarity given a renewed development of
round-the-world equatorial liner services which benefit
both canals (Bloomberg, 2013).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201330


While the expansion of the Panama Canal entails
numerous implications, these remain nevertheless,
difficult to assess with any great degree of certainty.
An expansion project of the scale of the Panama
Canal involves multiple players and is subject to
many unknowns given, in particular, global economic
uncertainties and rapid advances in technology,
including in ship size and design.


In conclusion and as noted in the present chapter
and reiterated in previous editions of this Review,
a number of trends are unfolding globally and are
likely to shape the future of maritime transportation
and deeply redefine its operating landscape. By
way of recapitulation and while not intended as
an exhaustive list, key trends currently at play and
requiring further monitoring and assessment include
the following:


(a) Continued negative effect of the 2008/2009
crisis on global demand, finance and trade;


(b) Structural shifts in global production
patterns;


(c) Changes in comparative advantages and
mineral resource endowments;


(d) Rise of the South and shift of economic influence
away from traditional centres of growth;


(e) Demographics, with ageing populations
in advanced economies and fast-growing
populations in developing regions, with
related implications for global production and
consumption patterns;


(f) The arrival of container megaships and other
transport-related technological advances;


(g) Climate change and natural hazards;


(h) Energy costs and environmental sustainability.


By redefining production, consumption, growth and
trade patterns and dynamics, and by altering shipping
networks and configurations, these trends are likely to
also deeply transform international shipping and ports
that, respectively, carries and handle 80 per cent of the
volume of global merchandise trade and a significant
share of its value.




CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 31


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United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013a). World economic situation and prospects. Monthly briefing,
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United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013b). World economic situation and prospects. Update as
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CHAPTER 1: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL SEABORNE TRADE 33


United States Geological Survey (2013). Mineral Commodity Summaries 2013. United States Geological Survey. ISBN 978–
1–4113–3548–6. Washington DC.


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Wiesmann A (2010). Slow steaming – a viable long-term option? Wärtsila Technical Journal. February.


World Shipping Council (2008). Record fuel prices places stress on ocean shipping. May.


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ENDNOTES
1 Average distances and rates of change are calculated on the basis of more recent data published in Clarkson Research


Services (2013a).
2 Based on data from Clarkson Research Services. Data on LPG trade covers OECD only.






This chapter presents the supply side of the shipping industry. It covers the vessel types, age profile, ownership and registration of the world
fleet. The chapter also reviews deliveries, demolitions and tonnage on order.


The year 2012 saw the turn of the largest shipbuilding cycle in recorded history. Between 2001 and 2011, year after year, newbuilding deliveries
reached new historical highs. Only in 2012, for the first time since 2001, was the fleet that entered into service during the year less than that
delivered during the previous 12 months. In spite of this slowing down of new deliveries, the world tonnage continued to grow in 2012, albeit
at a slower pace than in 2011. The world fleet has more than doubled since 2001, reaching 1.63 billion deadweight tons (dwt) in January 2013.


Since the historical peaks of 2008 and 2009, the tonnage on order for all major vessel types has decreased drastically. As shipyards
continued to deliver pre-ordered tonnage, the orderbooks went down by 50 per cent for container ships, 58 per cent for dry-bulk carriers,
65 per cent for tankers and by 67 per cent for general-cargo ships. At the end of 2008, the dry-bulk order book was equivalent to almost
80 per cent of the fleet at that time, while the tonnage on order as of January 2013 is the equivalent of just 20 per cent of the fleet in service.


Chapter 2 of this year’s Review presents unique fleet profiles for 48 major ship-owning developing countries. Several oil- and gas-exporting
countries are also important owners of oil- and liquefied-gas tanker tonnage, both under their respective national as well as under foreign
flags. By the same token, countries with important offshore investments also tend to own offshore supply ships. Dry-bulk ships are less
often controlled by the cargo-owning countries than is the case of the oil-exporting nations. Most container ships are foreign flagged as they
engage in international trade, serving routes that connect several countries at the same time. Many of the general-cargo fleets are nationally
flagged and serve the coastal or inter-island cabotage trades.


This year’s chapter 2 also presents a special focus on 10 years of UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) and the related analysis
of container ship deployment. The last 10 years have seen two important trends, which represent two sides of the same coin. On the one
hand, ships have become bigger, and on the other hand the number of companies in most markets has diminished. As regards the number
of companies, the average per country has decreased by 27 per cent during the last 10 years, from 22 in 2004 to just 16 in 2013. This trend
has important implications for the level of competition, especially for smaller trading nations. While an average of 16 service providers may
still be sufficient to ensure a functioning competitive market with many choices for shippers for the average country, on given individual
routes, especially those serving smaller developing countries, the decline in competition has led to oligopolistic markets.


STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP
AND REGISTRATION


OF THE WORLD FLEET


2




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201336


A. STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD FLEET


1. Worldfleetgrowthandprincipal
vessel types


The growth of the world fleet 1


The year 2012 saw the turn of the largest shipbuilding
cycle, in terms of GT, in recorded history. Between
2001 and 2011, year after year, newbuilding
deliveries reached new historical highs. Even after
the economic downturn of 2008, the dead-weight
tonnage delivered annually continued to increase
for three more years due to orders that had largely
been placed prior to the crisis. Only in 2012, for the
first time since 2001, was the fleet that entered into
service during the year less than that delivered during
the previous 12 months.


In spite of this slowing down of new deliveries, the
world tonnage continued to grow in 2012, albeit at a
slower pace; year-on-year growth amounted to 6 per


cent, compared to a 10 per cent increase the previous
year. The world fleet more than doubled since 2001,
reaching 1.63 billion dwt in January 2013 (figure 2.1
and table 2.1).


The turning point in the shipbuilding cycle is further
evidenced in figure  2.3, which illustrates the age
structure of the existing fleet. There was more tonnage
built in 2011 (that is, 2  years old in figure  2.3) than
tonnage built in 2012. Such a large weakening has not
been seen since the mid-1990s. The turning point is
also visible in figure 2.10, which shows that the order
book had already started to regress in 2009.


The numbers in the shipping fleet react only slowly to a
changing economic environment. While the downturn
in demand became clear in 2008, the order book
showed a decline in 2009, new deliveries went down
in 2012, and the existing fleet still continues to grow in
2013. The order book, however, is rapidly decreasing,
and the current schedule only provides for output of
close to recent levels for this year and a little less so
for 2014.


Figure 2.1. Worldfleetbyprincipalvesseltypes,1980–2013(Beginning-of-yearfigures,in millionsofdwt)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services and previous issues
of the Review of Maritime Transport.


Note: All propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above, excluding inland waterway vessels, fishing vessels, military
vessels, yachts, and offshore fixed and mobile platforms and barges (with the exception of floating production storage
and offloading units (FPSOs) and drillships).


0


200


400


600


800


1 000


1 200


1 400


1 600


1 800


Other 31 45 49 58 75 49 92 166
Container 11 20 26 44 64 98 169 207
General cargo 116 106 103 104 101 92 108 80
Dry bulk 186 232 235 262 276 321 457 685
Oil tanker 339 261 246 268 282 336 450 491


1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2013




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 37


The world fleet in January 2013 consists of 42 per
cent dry-bulk tonnage (in dwt), a historical record for
this vessel type. General-cargo tonnage, on the other
hand, continued its decline; its share of the world
total is now less than 5 per cent, down from a 15 per
cent share 20 years ago. Oil tankers, too, saw their
share decline, from almost half of the world tonnage
in 1980, to 30 per cent in January 2013 (table 2.1
and Annex II).


Oil tankers


Following heavy scrapping and conversions of single-
hull ships in recent  years, most oil tankers are now
double hulled, in compliance with relevant IMO
environmental and safety regulations, as well as the Oil
Pollution Act of the United States of America, which
phased out single-hull tankers from United States
waters in 2010. After the renovation of the fleet, today
only 14 per cent of tanker tonnage is 15 years or older.


When the last single-hulled very large crude carrier
(VLCC) was delivered in 1996, there were 376 in
service. In early 2013, there are only three. Only
243, however, were actually scrapped. Sixty were
converted into floating oil production and storage
facilities and 70 were converted into dry-bulk carriers.
Some of the older VLCCs are deployed as FPSOs
(Shipping Intelligence Weekly, 2013).


Bulk carriers


The largest existing ships in operation for ocean
transport are dry bulkers owned and operated by the
Brazilian iron-ore conglomerate Vale, called “Vale-
max”. In April 2013, the latest vessel of this series,
the Vale Korea, entered into service, with a capacity
of 402,303 dwt. While initially built to call in Chinese
ports, Vale is now developing trans-shipment hubs
in Malaysia and the Philippines as the ships are not
allowed to enter ports in China fully loaded. Due to
regulatory limitations in China, Vale-max ships that
entered Chinese ports in early 2013 were registered
as just under 300,000 dwt.


In 2012, seven times more tonnage of bulk carriers
was delivered than 10 years earlier. At the same time,
the order book is dwindling, amounting today to
just one fifth of the existing fleet (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013a).


General-cargo ships


General-cargo vessels – sometimes also referred to
as “break-bulk” ships – have seen their importance
decline over the last decades, largely to the benefit
of container ships. As more and more goods are
containerized, the market for carriage by break-bulk
cargo ships has dropped.


Nevertheless, some goods, in particular dry cargo that
is too large for containers, will always require transport
as break-bulk. The specialized break-bulk fleet has
been modernized in recent  years, as most older
ships were demolished. According to a recent report


Table 2.1. Worldfleetbyprincipalvesseltypes,
2012–2013(Beginning-of-yearfigures,
thousands of dwt; percentage share
initalics)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis
of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.


Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100  GT
and above.


Principal
types 2012 2013


Percentage
change


2013/2012


Oil tankers 469 516 490 743 4.5%


30.6% 30.1% -0.4%


Bulk carriers 623 006 684 673 9.9%


40.5% 42.0% 1.5%


General cargo ships 80 825 80 345 -0.6%


5.3% 4.9% -0.3%


Container ships 196 853 206 577 4.9%


12.8% 12.7% -0.1%


Other types: 166 667 166 445 -0.1%


10.8% 10.2% -0.6%


Gas carriers 44 060 44 346 0.6%


2.9% 2.7% -0.1%


Chemical tankers 23 238 23 293 0.2%


1.5% 1.4% -0.1%


Offshore 70 767 69 991 -1.1%


4.6% 4.3% -0.3%


Ferries and
passenger ships 5 466 5 504 0.7%


0.4% 0.3% 0.0%


Other/n.a. 23 137 23 312 0.8%


1.5% 1.4% -0.1%


World total 1 536 868 1 628 783 6.0%


100% 100% 0.0%




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201338


by Dynamar (Dynamar, 2013), among the almost
800 ships deployed by the 25 largest specialized
operators, fewer than 100 are older than 25  years,
with only a small number still dating from the 1970s.
With over 500 units built since 2000, the majority of the
specialized fleet consists of modern, highly productive
and multi-employable ships that carry a wide range
of cargoes, from forest products to bags and project
cargoes.


Container ships


Container ships carry an estimated 52  per cent
of global seaborne trade in terms of value (World
Shipping Council, 2013). Their share of the world fleet
has grown almost eightfold since 1980, as goods are
increasingly containerized for international transport.
Apart from manufactured goods, more and more
commodities (such as coffee) as well as refrigerated
cargo (fruit, meat, fish) are today largely transported in
standardized sea containers.


Most new container ships today are gearless, that is,
they are no longer equipped with their own container-
handling cranes, but depend on the seaports to
provide specialized handling equipment. This trend
goes hand-in-hand with the delivery of larger vessels,
as these are less often equipped with their own
cargo-handling equipment. This poses a challenge for
smaller ports, especially in developing countries, which
may not have enough volume to justify investment in
specialized and costly ship-to-shore cranes in their
container terminals.


The share of gearless ships among the total deliveries
of container vessels keeps increasing. In 2005, there
were four times more gearless ships delivered than
ships with their own handling equipment, while in 2012
the proportion was 6 to 1 (table 2.2 and figure 2.2).
Gearless container ships are on average more than
twice the size than geared vessels, and the average
size of both types of ships has gone up by almost
80 per cent since 2005.


The year 2013 also saw the delivery of the first “Triple
E” container ships by Daewoo in the Republic of Korea
to Maersk in Denmark. The Triple E stands for energy
efficiency, economies of scale and environmental
improvements. For a short period these ships, with
a declared container-carrying capacity of 18,000
full TEUs, were the largest container ships, taking over
from the 16,000-TEU vessels of CMA CGM, which
were the largest container vessels until early 2013. In
2013, CSCL from China placed orders for even larger
container ships, also in shipyards in the Republic of
Korea, scheduled to carry 18,400  TEU and to be
delivered in 2014.


Other types


Chemical tankers have seen a trend towards larger
vessels, aiming at economies of scale. The share of
ships above 36,000 dwt has increased from 23 per
cent in 2005 to 28 per cent today, while the share of
the smallest units (below 10,000 dwt) went down from
47  per cent to 40  per cent during the same period
(Fairplay, 2013).


Table 2.2. Containershipdeliveries


Gearless Geared Total


Year built Ships TEU Average vessel size(TEU) Ships TEU
Average vessel


size(TEU) Ships TEU
Average vessel


size(TEU)


2005 217 847 530 3 906 55 96 010 1 746 272 943 540 3 469


2006 285 1 237 630 4 343 86 142 104 1 652 371 1 379 734 3 719


2007 297 1 166 968 3 929 102 148 268 1 454 399 1 315 236 3 296


2008 321 1 319 897 4 112 114 181 322 1 591 435 1 501 219 3 451


2009 204 978 900 4 799 72 127 394 1 769 276 1 106 294 4 008


2010 217 1 297 291 5 978 48 92 117 1 919 265 1 389 408 5 243


2011 159 1 126 977 7 088 32 83 728 2 617 191 1 210 705 6 339


2012 172 1 161 695 6 754 29 89 476 3 085 201 1 251 171 6 225


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Fully cellular container ships of 100 GT and above.




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 39


2. Age distribution of the world
merchantfleet


In January 2013, 20 per cent of all seagoing merchant
ships were younger than 5 years, representing 40 per
cent of the world’s deadweight tonnage (see table 2.3
and figure 2.3). Ships delivered in more recent years
are on average larger than older ships. New container
ships are on average three times the size of those
built 20 or more  years ago, and only 5  per cent of
the container ship tonnage is older than 20 years. Oil
tankers, too, tend to be replaced relatively early; only
4 per cent of the existing oil-tanker tonnage was built
more than 20 years ago.


The average age (per ship) in January 2013 was highest
for general-cargo ships (25  years), followed by other
types (22.6 years), oil tankers (16.7 years), container ships
(10.8 years) and dry-bulk carriers (9.9 years). Following


0


200 000


400 000


600 000


800 000


1 000 000


1 200 000


1 400 000


1 600 000


2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012


Geared


Gearless


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, based on data provided by Clarkson Research Services.


Figure 2.2. Trendsindeliveriesofcontainerships(Newcontainerships,in TEU,2005–2012)


the surge of newbuildings in the dry-bulk segment,
almost half of the dry-bulk dead weight tonnage is
only 4 years old or younger, overtaking for the first time
container ships as the youngest vessel category.


As a reflection of most recent ships being larger than
older ones, the global average age per ship shows
an age of 20.3 years, while the average age by dwt
is 9.6  years. Their geographical distribution is also
well balanced and ships registered in developing
countries are now only slightly older (two years) than
those flying the flag of developed countries. Among
the 10 major flag states, Greece has the oldest fleet,
followed by Panama and China. The youngest fleets
are those registered in the Marshall Islands, Hong
Kong (China) and Singapore. On average, foreign-
flagged ships are slightly younger than nationally
flagged ones. This situation and its rationale are
discussed below.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201340


Figure 2.3. Agestructureofworldfleet,nationalandforeignflags


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data from Clarkson Research Services.
Note: For vessels of 1,000 GT and above.


1 000 dwt


0


20 000


40 000


60 000


80 000


100 000


120 000


140 000


160 000


180 000


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50


Age (years)


Foreign flag or international registry


National flag


Table 2.3. Agedistributionoftheworldmerchantfleet,byvesseltype,asof1January2013
(Percentageoftotalshipsanddwt)


Country grouping
Types of vessels


0–4
years


5–9
years


10–14
years


15–19
years


20 years
and +


Average
age


(years)
2013


Average
age (years)


2012


Percentage
change


2013/2012


WORLD


Bulk carriers Bulk carriers Ships 44 15 12 13 16 9.94 11.57 -1.63


Dwt 49 16 11 13 11 8.36 9.71 -1.35


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 81 514 75 173 65 405 71 528 48 211


Container ships Ships 23 29 18 20 10 10.81 10.73 0.08


Dwt 34 32 16 13 5 8.25 8.24 0.01


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 59 547 43 782 37 049 26 750 19 962


General cargo Ships 12 11 7 12 58 24.99 24.58 0.41


Dwt 22 13 10 10 44 19.10 19.61 -0.51


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 7 396 5 237 6 845 3 705 3 081


Oil tankers Ships 24 20 10 12 34 16.74 16.50 0.25


Dwt 37 28 20 10 4 8.14 8.01 0.13


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 69 029 64 212 87 809 35 925 5 921


Others Ships 17 13 10 10 50 22.57 22.29 0.28


Dwt 23 20 13 10 34 16.07 15.84 0.23


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 6 985 8 251 6 898 5 119 3 968


All ships Ships 20 15 10 12 44 20.34 20.30 0.03


Dwt 40 22 14 12 12 9.60 10.19 -0.59


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 40 664 32 047 31 610 21 098 6 267




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 41


Country grouping
Types of vessels


0–4
years


5–9
years


10–14
years


15–19
years


20 years
and +


Average
age


(years)
2013


Average
age (years)


2012


Percentage
change


2013/2012


DEVELOPINGECONOMIES


Bulk carriers Ships 41 10 9 16 24 11.77 13.99 -2.22


Dwt 48 10 8 17 16 9.76 11.76 -2.00


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 80 772 65 854 60 514 75 693 47 053


Container ships Ships 21 23 15 25 17 12.83 13.06 -0.23


Dwt 36 28 12 17 7 8.63 9.18 -0.55


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 56 530 41 481 28 210 22 545 13 619


General cargo Ships 11 12 5 8 63 25.38 24.95 0.43


Dwt 19 12 6 9 53 21.02 21.79 -0.78


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 6 396 4 194 5 808 4 342 3 102


Oil tankers Ships 24 14 7 12 43 18.69 18.61 0.08


Dwt 43 23 15 12 8 8.42 8.51 -0.09


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 64 176 59 987 74 818 37 046 6 404


Others Ships 20 15 9 11 45 20.19 20.01 0.18


Dwt 24 16 9 9 42 17.85 17.91 -0.06


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 5 122 5 269 4 909 4 265 4 224


All ships Ships 20 14 8 11 46 20.21 20.28 -0.07


Dwt 41 16 11 14 18 10.75 11.88 -1.13


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 35 193 22 382 25 060 23 249 6 856


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES


Bulk carriers Ships 46 19 14 12 9 8.31 9.28 -0.98


Dwt 50 20 13 11 6 7.24 8.03 -0.79


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 82 751 79 903 68 206 68 126 51 940


Container ships Ships 24 33 19 17 6 9.60 9.39 0.22


Dwt 33 33 18 12 4 8.07 7.86 0.21


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 61 076 44 622 40 797 30 302 30 536


General cargo Ships 16 12 11 19 41 20.89 20.57 0.32


Dwt 28 16 16 12 29 15.38 15.65 -0.27


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 8 690 6 825 7 618 3 319 3 751


Oil tankers Ships 26 28 15 14 17 12.59 12.13 0.46


Dwt 34 32 24 8 2 7.88 7.59 0.29


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 74 911 66 936 94 955 35 850 7 199


Others Ships 15 13 12 11 49 23.36 22.96 0.40


Dwt 23 23 15 10 28 14.63 14.17 0.47


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 9 764 11 817 8 684 6 534 4 971


All ships Ships 22 17 13 14 34 18.20 18.10 0.11


Dwt 39 26 17 10 8 8.61 8.82 -0.21


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 47 299 40 209 36 065 20 843 7 594


Table 2.3. Agedistributionoftheworldmerchantfleet,byvesseltype,asof1January2013
(Percentageoftotalshipsanddwt)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201342


B. OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION OF
THE WORLD FLEET


1. Ship-owning countries


The national concentration of fleet ownership is
illustrated by the fact that owners from five countries
– in order of decreasing tonnage, Greece, Japan,
China, Germany and the Republic of Korea – together
account for 53 per cent of the world tonnage. Among
the top 35 ship-owning economies, 17 are in Asia, 14
in Europe, and 4 in the Americas (table 2.4).


In terms of vessel numbers, the largest ship-owning
country is China, with 5,313 ocean-going merchant
ships, out of which about half fly the national Chinese
flag. This makes more nationally flagged Chinese-
owned ships than nationally flagged ships from
Greece, Japan and Germany combined.


Country grouping
Types of vessels


0–4
years


5–9
years


10–14
years


15–19
years


20 years
and +


Average
age


(years)
2013


Average
age (years)


2012


Percentage
change


2013/2012


COUNTRIESWITHECONOMIESINTRANSITION


Bulk carriers Ships 29 13 7 13 39 15.64 18.68 -3.04


Dwt 31 11 7 13 38 15.07 18.16 -3.09


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 45 120 35 203 43 734 42 427 40 694
Container ships Ships 13 3 17 30 37 18.20 17.27 0.93


Dwt 30 4 15 26 25 14.59 13.66 0.94


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 27 602 13 760 11 201 10 566 8 560
General cargo Ships 4 4 1 7 83 30.33 29.65 0.68


Dwt 7 7 2 10 74 26.39 25.97 0.42


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 6 144 6 124 5 299 4 403 2 985
General cargo Ships 17 14 5 5 60 22.69 22.88 -0.18


Dwt 34 34 17 6 9 9.46 8.89 0.57


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 48 168 58 518 81 964 31 915 3 636
Oil tankers Ships 7 5 3 5 80 28.57 27.92 0.65


Dwt 18 13 3 3 63 21.88 21.27 0.61


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 3 378 3 655 1 237 815 916
Others Ships 8 6 3 6 77 27.92 27.49 0.42


Dwt 27 22 11 9 32 14.96 15.46 -0.50


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 23 192 25 073 26 839 8 930 2 758
All ships Ships 8 6 3 6 77 27.92 27.49 0.42


Dwt 27 22 11 9 32 14.96 15.46 -0.50


Averagevesselsize(dwt) 23 192 25 073 26 839 8 930 2 758


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above.


Table 2.3. Agedistributionoftheworldmerchantfleet,byvesseltype,asof1January2013
(Percentageoftotalshipsanddwt)(continued)


Another way to consider fleet ownership is in terms
of ship value. Container vessels and gas carriers,
for example, are more expensive than dry and liquid
bulkers. The market value of a vessel also depends on
its age and maintenance. Estimates for January 2013
(Clarkson Research Services, 2013b) suggest that the
Japanese-owned fleet currently reaches the highest
value, amounting to almost $100 billion, followed by
the United States ($92  billion), Greece ($72  billion),
China ($61  billion) and Germany ($60  billion). The
total of the world fleet being estimated to be worth
$809  billion, the top five ship-owning countries by
fleet value thus would control almost 48 per cent of
the world fleet; the top 10 owner countries under this
criteria would have a market share in value terms of
67 per cent.


From a registration perspective, most of the top 35
ship-owning countries have more than half of their
tonnage under a foreign flag. Exceptions include




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 43


Table 2.4. The35countriesandterritorieswiththelargestownedfleets,asof1January2013(Dwt)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Vessels of 1,000 GT and above, ranked by deadweight tonnage.
a The country of ownership indicates where the true controlling interest (that is, the parent company) of the fleet is located. In several


cases, determining this has required making certain judgements. Thus, for instance, Greece is shown as the country of ownership
for vessels owned by a Greek national with representative offices in New York, London and Piraeus, although the owner may be
domiciled in the United States.


b “Foreign and international flag” in this table includes vessels registered in second/international registers such as the Danish or
Norwegian International Ship Registers (DIS or NIS respectively).


Country or territory
of


ownership a


Number of vessels Deadweight tonnage


National
flag


Foreign
and


internat.
flag b


Total
National
flagc


Foreign
and


international
flag b


Total


Foreign and
international
flagasa


percentage
oftotal b


Total
as a


percentage
of world


Greece 825 2 870 3 695 69 644 624 175 205 954 244 850 578 71.56 15.17
Japan 738 3 253 3 991 17 216 128 206 598 880 223 815 008 92.31 13.87
China 2 665 2 648 5 313 66 936 002 123 142 833 190 078 835 64.79 11.78
Germany 396 3 437 3 833 16 641 757 109 136 771 125 778 528 86.77 7.79
Republic of Korea 764 812 1 576 16 624 445 58 471 361 75 095 806 77.86 4.65
Singapore 1 090 798 1 888 32 711 136 31 441 668 64 152 804 49.01 3.98
United States 768 1 175 1 943 8 671 669 49 606 395 58 278 064 85.12 3.61
United Kingdom 415 822 1 237 10 447 630 39 857 066 50 304 696 79.23 3.12
Norway 414 1 494 1 908 2 190 036 43 802 209 45 992 245 95.24 2.85
TaiwanProvinceofChina 102 712 814 3 311 133 40 948 712 44 259 845 92.52 2.74
Denmark 45 946 991 68 724 40 646 119 40 714 843 99.83 2.52
Bermuda 4 206 210 209 778 32 686 529 32 896 307 99.36 2.04
Turkey 645 935 1 580 9 619 689 19 470 911 29 090 600 66.93 1.80
Italy 673 211 884 19 097 635 6 245 330 25 342 964 24.64 1.57
HongKong(China) 269 297 566 15 768 670 8 556 599 24 325 269 35.18 1.51
India 584 158 742 15 063 983 7 377 303 22 441 287 32.87 1.39
United Arab Emirates 82 617 699 700 914 18 772 655 19 473 569 96.40 1.21
Russian Federation 1 195 532 1 727 5 495 653 13 888 598 19 384 251 71.65 1.20
Malaysia 472 142 614 9 520 599 7 593 951 17 114 550 44.37 1.06
Netherlands 757 450 1 207 6 100 843 10 571 723 16 672 566 63.41 1.03
Brazil 202 108 310 2 837 889 13 314 666 16 152 555 82.43 1.00
Switzerland 39 291 330 1 144 359 14 506 537 15 650 896 92.69 0.97
Islamic Republic of Iran 108 121 229 1 748 219 13 568 542 15 316 761 88.59 0.95
Indonesia 1 383 147 1 530 11 910 441 3 390 980 15 301 421 22.16 0.95
Cyprus 183 192 375 6 178 327 7 745 606 13 923 933 55.63 0.86
France 179 230 409 3 862 058 7 144 805 11 006 863 64.91 0.68
Canada 206 145 351 2 650 551 6 571 778 9 222 329 71.26 0.57
Monaco 126 126 9 157 769 9 157 769 100.00 0.57
Belgium 90 155 245 4 008 509 4 720 024 8 728 533 54.08 0.54
Viet Nam 758 83 841 6 422 675 1 540 097 7 962 772 19.34 0.49
Saudi Arabia 62 125 187 1 036 358 6 771 973 7 808 332 86.73 0.48
Kuwait 40 36 76 4 037 837 2 862 528 6 900 365 41.48 0.43
Sweden 114 225 339 1 323 946 5 120 753 6 444 699 79.46 0.40
Oman 3 31 34 5 332 6 133 802 6 139 134 99.91 0.38
Thailand 336 79 415 4 444 401 1 652 413 6 096 814 27.10 0.38
Totaltop35countries 16 606 24 609 41 215 377 651 950 1 148 223 839 1 525 875 789 75.25 94.55
Other owners 2 655 2 522 5 177 29 703 524 52 879 452 82 582 976 64.03 5.12
Total of known country
of ownership 19 261 27 131 46 392 407 355 474 1 201 103 291 1 608 458 765 74.67 99.67


Others, unknown country
of ownership 730 5 297 140 0.33


World total 47 122 1 613 755 905 100




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201344


countries with a large cabotage fleet, such as India,
Indonesia or Viet Nam, and countries where the
national register provides a competitive flag that is
also used by many foreign owners, as is the case for
example for Singapore, which thus effectively become
an open register.


Figure  2.4 provides 48 maritime fleet profiles,
illustrating the type of ships controlled by the main
developing ship-owning countries, including the share
of nationally and foreign-flagged tonnage for each
main vessel type.


Several oil- and gas-exporting countries are also
important owners of oil and liquefied-gas tanker
tonnage, both under their respective national as well
as under foreign flags. Algeria, for example, has a
high share of oil and liquefied-gas tankers; Argentina’s
fleet consists of mostly foreign-flagged oil tankers;
Ecuador’s oil tankers include the nationally flagged
cabotage fleet (for example, to the Galapagos Islands)
as well as foreign-flagged tankers servicing the
international transport of Ecuador’s oil exports. Other
countries with a high share of oil and gas tankers
are Egypt, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman,
Peru, Qatar, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela.


By the same token, countries with important offshore
investments also tend to own ships providing offshore
supply services. Angola’s fleet, for example, largely
specializes in the oil and offshore business; Brazil, too,
owns an important fleet of offshore vessels, in addition
to its dry-bulk and oil-tanker fleet. Cameroun’s entire
fleet consists of nationally flagged offshore supply and
storage vessels, as do most of Nigeria’s and Tunisia’s
fleets. The offshore fleet of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, on the other hand, is fully foreign flagged.


Dry-bulk ships are less often controlled by the cargo-
owning countries than is the case of the oil-exporting
nations. Nevertheless, important owners of dry-bulk
tonnage include major importers and exporters of iron
ore and other dry commodities, such as Brazil (exports)
and China (imports). Other economies with a high
share of dry-bulk tonnage include Hong Kong (China),
Taiwan Province of China, Croatia, the Republic of
Korea, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore,
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine.


Most container ships are foreign flagged. They engage
in international trade, serving routes that connect
several countries at the same time. On such routes,


cargo reservation regimes have in practice shown
to be difficult to enforce. Countries/territories with a
share of foreign-flagged container fleets include Chile,
Hong Kong (China), Kuwait, Morocco, Singapore and
South Africa.


Many of the nationally owned fleets serve the national
(coastal or inter-island) cabotage trades or benefit from
other cargo-reservation regimes. These ships tend to
be nationally flagged as foreign ships are excluded
from certain markets by the national legislation.
Examples here include parts of Bangladesh’s bulk
and general-cargo ships, some of Chile’s dry- and
liquid-bulk fleet, an important share of China’s bulk
and general-cargo ships, part of Cuba’s general-
cargo carriers, India’s general-cargo and tanker
fleet, and a wide range of different vessels engaged
in Indonesia’s inter-island transport. Other countries
with important nationally flagged general-cargo fleets
include Ethiopia, Myanmar, the Russian Federation,
the Philippines and Viet Nam.


Panama, which is mostly known for its open register,
also comprises of some national shipowners, mostly,
albeit not exclusively, using the national Panama
flag. The largest part of the Panamanian-owned fleet
consists of general-cargo ships, and about half of
them do not use the flag of Panama. Owners from
Singapore also use both the national flag and foreign
flags.


2. Container ship operators


The largest container ship operators in 2013 continued
to be Maersk Line (Denmark), MSC (Switzerland) and
CMA CGM (France). Together, these three European
companies operate one third of the global container-
carrying capacity (TEU; table  2.5). On the main
East–West route between Asia and Europe these
same three carriers also deploy the largest ships and
they cooperate with each other through slot-sharing
arrangements, with plans to enhance their cooperation
through a P3 alliance (International Transport
Journal, 2013). This combination of larger ships
and cooperation allows them to achieve important
economies of scale, which smaller competing lines on
this route cannot match.


Among the top 20 operators, 14 are from Asia, 5 from
Europe, and one, Chilean CSAV, from South America,
which has a market share of 2  per cent. From a
continental origin angle, one could note that the
European companies, including the three world largest
carriers, gather a combined market share of 49 per




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 45


Figure 2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
witheconomiesintransition(Dwt,bycountryofownership,1January2013)


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


3
50


0
00


0


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Angola


Foreign flag


National flag
0 50 000


100 000


150 000


200 000


250 000


300 000


350 000


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Bahamas


Foreign flag


National flag


0


1
00


0
00


2
00


0
00


3
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


5
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


7
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


9
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other
Algeria


Foreign flag


National flag


0


1
00


0
00


2
00


0
00


3
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


5
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


7
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Argentina


Foreign flag


National flag


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


1
40


0
00


0


1
60


0
00


0


1
80


0
00


0


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Bangladesh


Foreign flag


National flag


0


1
00


0
00


2
00


0
00


3
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


5
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


7
00


0
00


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Cameroon


Foreign flag


National flag


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


3
50


0
00


0


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Angola


Foreign flag


National flag
0 50 000


100 000


150 000


200 000


250 000


300 000


350 000


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Bahamas


Foreign flag


National flag
0


1
00


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


5
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


7
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


9
00


0
00


0


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Brazil


Foreign flag


National flag


Chile


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


1
40


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201346


Figure 2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
witheconomiesintransition(Dwt,bycountryofownership,1January2013)(continued)


China


0


20
0


00
0


00


40
0


00
0


00


60
0


00
0


00


80
0


00
0


00


10
0


00
0


00
0


12
0


00
0


00
0


14
0


00
0


00
0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


15
0


00
0


00


20
0


00
0


00


25
0


00
0


00


30
0


00
0


00


China, Taiwan Province of


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Croatia


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


1
00


0
00


2
00


0
00


3
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


5
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


7
00


0
00


Ecuador


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


China, Hongkong SAR


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


3
00


0
00


3
50


0
00


4
00


0
00


4
50


0
00


Democratic Republic of the Congo


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Cuba


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


1
40


0
00


0


1
60


0
00


0


Egypt


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 47


Figure 2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
witheconomiesintransition(Dwt,bycountryofownership,1January2013)(continued)


0


2
0


00
0


4
0


00
0


6
0


00
0


8
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
20


0
00


1
40


0
00


1
60


0
00


1
80


0
00


2
00


0
00


Ethiopia


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Indonesia


0


1
00


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


5
00


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


3
00


0
00


3
50


0
00


4
00


0
00


Kazakhstan


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


3
50


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


4
50


0
00


0


Kuwait


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


India


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


Islamic Republic of Iran


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


10
0


00
0


00


20
0


00
0


00


30
0


00
0


00


40
0


00
0


00


50
0


00
0


00


Republic of Korea


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


3
00


0
00


3
50


0
00


4
00


0
00


4
50


0
00


5
00


0
00


Lebanon


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201348


Figure 2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
witheconomiesintransition(Dwt,bycountryofownership,1January2013)(continued)


Libya


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


Malaysia


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


Mexico


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
0


00
0


4
0


00
0


6
0


00
0


8
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
20


0
00


1
40


0
00


1
60


0
00


1
80


0
00


Myanmar


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Oman


0


1
00


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


5
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
0


00
0


4
0


00
0


6
0


00
0


8
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
20


0
00


1
40


0
00


1
60


0
00


Morocco


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Nigeria


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0
Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


3
00


0
00


3
50


0
00


4
00


0
00


4
50


0
00


5
00


0
00


Pakistan


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 49


Figure 2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
witheconomiesintransition(Dwt,bycountryofownership,1January2013)(continued)


Panama


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Peru


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


3
00


0
00


3
50


0
00


4
00


0
00


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


1
40


0
00


0


1
60


0
00


0


1
80


0
00


0


Philippines


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


14
0


00
0


00


Russian Federation


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


15
0


00
0


00


20
0


00
0


00


25
0


00
0


00


30
0


00
0


00


35
0


00
0


00


Singapore


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Qatar


0


1
00


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


5
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


1
00


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


5
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


7
00


0
00


0


Saudi Arabia


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


South Africa


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201350


Figure 2.4. Fleetprofilesofthemajor48ship-owningdevelopingcountries/territoriesandcountries/territories
witheconomiesintransition(Dwt,bycountryofownership,1January2013)(continued)


S
ou


rc
e:



U


N
C


TA
D


s
ec


re
ta


ria
t,


ba
se


d
on


d
at


a
pr


ov
id


ed
b


y
C


la
rk


so
n


R
es


ea
rc


h
S


er
vi


ce
s.


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ot


e:


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ro


pe
lle


d
se


ag
oi


ng
m


er
ch


an
t v


es
se


ls
o


f 1
,0


00
G


T
an


d
ab


ov
e.


0


2
00


0
00


4
00


0
00


6
00


0
00


8
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
20


0
00


0


Syrian Arab Republic


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other Thailand


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Tunisia


0


5
0


00
0


1
00


0
00


1
50


0
00


2
00


0
00


2
50


0
00


3
00


0
00


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


Ukraine


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


14
0


00
0


00


16
0


00
0


00


Turkey


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


2
00


0
00


0


4
00


0
00


0


6
00


0
00


0


8
00


0
00


0


10
0


00
0


00


12
0


00
0


00


14
0


00
0


00


16
0


00
0


00


United Arab Emirates


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other


0


5
00


0
00


1
00


0
00


0


1
50


0
00


0


2
00


0
00


0


2
50


0
00


0


3
00


0
00


0


Viet Nam


Foreign flag


National flag


Oil tankers


Bulk carriers


Container ships


General-cargo ships


Chemical tankers


Liquefied-gas carriers


Offshore supply


Other




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 51


cent, equivalent to the combined Asian participation.
It is also worth noting here that about half of the ships
operated by the shipping lines are chartered-in, that is,
the owners do not operate their container ships. Many
of these owners are based in Germany. Moreover, the


ships owned by the operators themselves tend to be
larger than the charter-owner fleet. In particular, ships
of 8,000  TEU and above are twice as often owned
by liner companies such as Maersk, MSC and CMG


CGM than by the charter-owners.


C. CONTAINER SHIP DEPLOYMENT AND
LINER SHIPPING CONNECTIVITY


1. Container shipping and international
trade


The importance of containerization for global
trade has recently been re-emphasized. As The
Economist put it, “Containers have been more
important for globalization than freer trade” (The
Economist, 2013). A new study (Bernhofen et al.,


2013) covering the introduction of containerization
until 1990 concluded that containerization had a
stronger impact on driving globalization than trade
liberalization, especially for developed countries
and North–North trade. At the same time, the
study concluded that during the early stages of
containerization, for trade involving developing
economies the impact of the gradual goods boxing
process had been relatively small.


On a related matter, and recalling that container trade
remains largely serviced by regular liner shipping
services, it appears worth noting that a recent study


Table 2.5. The20leadinglinercompanies,1January2013(Numberofshipsandtotalshipboardcapacity
deployed,in TEUs)


Ranking
(TEU) Operator Country/ territory


Number
of


vessels


Average
vessel
size


TEU


Share of
world total,


TEU
(percentage)


Cumulated
share,
TEU


(percentage)


Growth
in


TEU over
2012


(percentage)
1 Maersk Line Denmark 453 4 745 2 149 524 13.4% 13.4% 2.1%
2 MSC Switzerland 398 5 186 2 064 118 12.9% 26.2% 1.9%
3 CMA CGM Group France 288 4 004 1 153 088 7.2% 33.4% -0.7%
4 COSCO China 155 4 614 715 219 4.5% 37.9% 14.6%


5 Evergreen Line Taiwan Province of China 187 3 795 709 702 4.4% 42.3% 24.3%


6 Hapag-Lloyd Group Germany 141 4 533 639 148 4.0% 46.3% -1.5%
7 APL Singapore 127 4 492 570 497 3.6% 49.8% -4.9%
8 CSCL China 124 4 550 564 151 3.5% 53.3% 1.3%
9 Hanjin Republic of Korea 107 5 190 555 279 3.5% 56.8% 11.6%
10 MOL Japan 111 4 576 507 894 3.2% 60.0% 13.2%
11 OOCL Hong Kong (China) 102 4 442 453 044 2.8% 62.8% 14.0%
12 NYK Japan 93 4 334 403 030 2.5% 65.3% 28.0%
13 Hamburg Sud Germany 93 4 132 384 293 2.4% 67.7% 4.1%
14 HMM Republic of Korea 67 5 438 364 373 2.3% 70.0% 15.8%


15 Yang Ming Taiwan Province of China 86 4 222 363 057 2.3% 72.2% 5.7%


16 K Line Japan 75 4 558 341 848 2.1% 74.3% -0.2%
17 Zim Israel 71 3 978 282 411 1.8% 76.1% -7.1%
18 UASC Kuwait 41 6 361 260 818 1.6% 77.7% 36.5%
19 CSAV Chile 55 4 716 259 391 1.6% 79.3% -25.5%
20 PIL Singapore 98 2 426 237 776 1.5% 80.8% 0.3%


Total top 20 liner companies 2872 4519 12978661 80.8%


Others 2 957 1 041 3 079 572 19.2%


Total all liner companies 5829 2755 16058233 100.0%


Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on data provided by Lloyd’s List Intelligence, available at www.lloydslistintelligence.com.
Note: Includes all container-carrying ships known to be operated by liner shipping companies.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201352


by the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific and the World Bank (Arvis et al., 2013),
covering more recent data, found that liner shipping
connectivity – measuring the capacity of a country
to carry its containerized foreign trade using liner
shipping – had a stronger impact on trade costs
than the indicators for “logistics performance”, “air
connectivity”, “costs of starting a business” and “lower
tariffs” combined.


Annex V of this Review includes UNCTAD’s LSCI in
its tenth year. Since 2004, the LSCI has provided
an indicator of each coastal country’s access to the
global liner shipping network. The complete time
series is published in electronic format on UNCTADstat
(UNCTADStat – Statistical Database, 2013). The
underlying data is provided by Lloyds List Intelligence
(Lloyd’s List Intelligence – Containers, 2013); the LSCI
is generated from five components which capture
the deployment of container ships by liner shipping
companies to a country’s ports of call as follows:
(a) the number of ships; (b) their total container-
carrying capacity; (c) the number of companies
providing services with their own operated ships; (d)
the number of services provided; (e) the size (in TEU)
of the largest ship deployed.


Making use of the 10-year time series of the LSCI and
its underlying data, this section discusses, first, key
global developments in vessel deployment, and then
looks at trends in the LSCI in selected regions in Latin
America, Africa and Asia.


2. Bigger ships deployed by fewer
companies


The last 10  years have seen two important trends,
which represent two sides of the same coin. On the
one hand, ships are becoming bigger, and on the
other hand the number of companies in most markets
is diminishing (figure 2.5).


As regards vessel sizes, since 2004 the average
container-carrying capacity of the largest ship in the
159 countries covered by UNCTAD’s database has
almost doubled, from 2,812  TEU 10  years ago to
5,540  TEU in 2013. The size of the largest existing
ships has also almost doubled during these 10 years
(from 8,238  TEU to 16,020  TEU), and although the
new ultra-large container carriers are only deployed
on a small number of routes (mainly Europe–Asia),
they have pushed the previously used ships out of this
market, which have had to find cargo on other routes,


Maximum vessel size
TEU


Vessels


Services


Companies
60


80


100


120


140


160


180


200


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Figure 2.5. Trendsincontainer-shipfleetdeployment(Index=100for2004,dataformid-2004–mid-2013)


Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by Lloyds List Intelligence.




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 53


including North–South and intraregional trade lanes. In
other words, although the largest 15,000+ TEU ships
are not deployed in Latin America, Africa or South
Asia, their deployment still has an important impact
on these regions, as the cascading effect forces the
8,000+ TEU ships – the biggest in 2004 – to find new
markets. This trend can be expected to continue.
For the time being, the container ship order book is
dominated by post-Panamax ships, which account
for 92 per cent of the container-carrying capacity on
order (Clarkson Research Services, 2013c).


As regards the number of companies, the average per
country has decreased by 27 per cent during the last
10 years, from 22 in 2004 to just 16 in 2013. This trend
has important implications for the level of competition,
especially for smaller trading nations. While an
average of 16 service providers may still be sufficient
to ensure a functioning competitive market with many
choices for shippers for the average country, on given
individual routes, especially those serving smaller
developing countries, the decline in competition has
led to oligopolistic markets. For example, in 2004
there were 22  countries served by three or fewer
carriers, while in 2013, 31 countries were facing such
a less-than-desirable situation. Even on the main
East–West routes, analysts have expressed concerns
that shippers will be confronted with less choice, as
medium-sized carriers are squeezed out of the market
(Journal of Commerce, 2013).


Rather than increasing the number of vessels deployed,
the carriers response to the growing demand has
been the use of larger ships. As of 2004, the average
number of ships deployed per country has remained
almost constant, while the total container-carrying
capacity increased by more than 80 per cent.


From the shippers’ perspective, larger ships and
more total  TEU carrying capacity bring overall good
news. Both a comfortable available carrying capacity
for the growing trade in containerized goods, and the
doubling of ship sizes to achieve economies of scale
should lead to lower freight costs. However, lower
operational unit costs achieved by shipping lines
thanks to newer, larger and more fuel-efficient ships
may not necessarily be passed on to the shippers,
that is, the importers and exporters. The very process
of concentration of cargo in larger ships may also lead
to the same capacity now offered by fewer providers,
hence less competition and, in some oligopolistic
markets, a situation where shippers may in fact be
confronted with higher freight rates and less choice
of services.


3. Regional trends


Overall, thanks to larger ships and more container-
carrying capacity deployed from and to the world’s
ports, the average LSCI in most countries shows
that their connectivity has increased. Since 2004,
120 countries recorded an improved LSCI, while the
LSCI in 39 countries went down. Figure 2.6 illustrates
trends in some selected developing countries in Latin
America, Africa and Asia.


On the west coast of South and Central America,
Panama appears best connected to global liner
shipping networks, largely thanks to its canal. Although
Panama has less trade than its Southern neighbours,
its container terminals provide trans-shipment services
for practically all of North, Central and South America,
connecting East–West and North–South liner services.
In South America, Ecuador has not been able to
accommodate the same LSCI growth as its neighbours,
partly because its main port, Guayaquil, has been
confronted with limitations in the dredging of the access
channel and insufficient investment in specialized
container handling cranes. On South America’s east
coast, Brazil shows the highest LSCI, closely followed
by Argentina and Uruguay. Although much smaller
than its neighbours, Uruguay has been able to attract
liner services for transit and trans-shipment cargo. The
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, whose main export
is crude oil, has not recorded any increase in container
ship deployment during the last 10 years.


In West Africa, Nigeria has seen the highest growth
of its LSCI, mostly fuelled by growing demand for
imports. In general, the LSCI of the West African
countries move largely in parallel to each other, as
the same companies deploy the same ships to call
at most ports along the coast. The LSCI of the Côte
d’Ivoire has seen important drops in 2006 and 2010,
when political turmoil and economic embargoes
discouraged liner companies to serve the port of
Abidjan. In Eastern Africa, Djibouti has overtaken its
neighbours and became an important trans-shipment
centre, connecting East–West services with feeder
services from Eastern and Southern Africa. It also
serves as a gateway for neighbouring landlocked
Ethiopia and increasingly caters for cargo destined for
South Sudan.


In South Asia, the LSCI of Bangladesh, India and
Pakistan almost exclusively reflects the vessel
deployment for these countries’ national foreign trade.
In Sri Lanka on the other hand, large container ships
are deployed to connect to feeder services, including




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201354


to India, thus benefiting from cabotage restrictions
which continue to limit the attractiveness of Indian
ports for trans-shipment operations to the different
ports of this large country.


Malaysia, in South-East Asia, has seen its LSCI
grow much faster than its neighbours Indonesia and
Thailand, almost reaching the LSCI of Singapore.
Comparing the developments in Singapore and
Malaysia, it is interesting to note that the two countries’
LSCI moves largely in parallel, as the same companies
and ships provide the same services passing through
the Strait of Malacca. The data for 2007 and 2008,
however, also illustrate a certain competition, when one
country’s ability to attract additional liner companies
may be to the detriment of the other’s LSCI.


In East Asia, the Republic of Korea and Japan started
out with the same LSCI in 2004. Since then, Japan
has remained relatively stagnant, its rank slipping from
ninth in 2004 to fifteenth in 2013. During the same
period, the Republic of Korea has attracted more and
bigger ships, partly to cater for its own trade, but also
to provide trans-shipment services for cargo to and
from ports of neighbouring countries. For the last
10  years China has the highest LSCI not only in its
region but also among all countries covered by LSCI.


D. REGISTRATION OF SHIPS


1. Flags of registration


The five largest fleets by flag of registration in
January 2013, and in terms of dwt, were Panama
(21.5  per cent of the world total dwt), Liberia
(12.2 per cent), the Marshall Islands (8.6 per cent),
Hong Kong, China (8  per cent) and Singapore
(5.5  per cent) (see table  2.6 for details of the 35
flags of registration with the largest registered
fleets). The latter two were also those with the
highest year-on-year growth, increasing their
tonnage by more than 16  per cent. As regards
vessel types, Liberia caters largely for oil tankers,
while Panama flags a high number of dry-bulk
carriers. The Bahamas has many “other” vessels,
including a large number of cruise ships.


The traditional distinction between “national” flagged
fleets and “open registers” is becoming increasingly
blurred. Among the top 35 fleets, there are 11
that could be considered purely open as less than
2  per cent of the ships flying their flags belong to
owners from the same country. At the other end of
the spectrum, there are 8 flags that are used almost


Figure 2.6. TrendsintheLSCI(Index=100forthemaximumvaluein2004)


Colombia


Ecuador


Panama


Chile


Peru


10


15


20


25


30


35


40


45


50


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI West Coast
South America


Côte
d’Ivoire


Ghana


Nigeria


Benin


Togo


8


10


12


14


16


18


20


22


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI West Africa


Brazil


Uruguay


Argentina


Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela


15


20


25


30


35


40


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI East Coast
South America


India


Pakistan


Sri
Lanka


Bangladesh


0


5


10


15


20


25


30


35


40


45


50


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI South Asia




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 55


exclusively (more than 95  per cent of the total) by
owners from the country; these could be called
purely national flags. In between, 16 of the top 35
flags are used by both national and foreign owners.
The flag of the Philippines, for example, is used three
times more by foreigners than Philippine nationals.
For Singapore, the proportion of foreign to national
ownership is about 2:1, and for the United Kingdom
it is about 50:50 (not including here the flag of the
Isle of Man).


In January 2013, a new historical record share of
73 per cent of the world fleet was “flagged out”, that
is, the nationality of the vessel’s owner was different
from the flag under which the vessel was registered
(figure  2.7). In other words, for almost three out of
every four dwt, shipowners chose a flag different from
their own nationality. The remaining 27 per cent are
kept under the national flag because either the owner
considered the national flag competitive in terms of
costs and services provided, or he may not have had
a choice, as is often the case for government cargo
and cabotage traffic.


Figure 2.6. TrendsintheLSCI(Index=100forthemaximumvaluein2004)(continued)


Malaysia


Singapore


Thailand


Indonesia


0


20


40


60


80


100


120


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI South-East
Asia


Sudan


Djibouti


Kenya


United Republic
of Tanzania


4


6


8


10


12


14


16


18


20


22


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI Eastern
Africa


Japan


China


Republic
of Korea


Viet Nam


0


20


40


60


80


100


120


140


160


2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


LSCI East Asia


Source: UNCTAD. The LSCI is generated from data
provided by Lloyds List Intelligence. The LSCI for
159 countries is available on-line under (http://stats.
unctad.org/lsci).


In the past, important reasons to choose a foreign flag
were the tax regimes and the possibility to employ
foreign seafarers. The latter reason was particularly
important for countries with higher labour costs, that is
mostly developed countries (Cullinane, 2005). Today, the
responsibilities of flag States in ensuring compliance with
international regulations and in providing 24/7 services
to shipowners are increasingly important, and many
developing countries’ owners also choose to register
their fleets under foreign flags that offer a solid institutional
framework and enjoy a good compliance reputation.


The regional shares by vessel type and flag of
registration are provided in table  2.7 (see Annex  II
for the national shares). In total, developing countries
register more than three quarters of the world fleet,
including the world’s major open registers (Panama,
Liberia, and the Marshall Islands), but also important
national fleets employed in coastal and inter-island
cabotage trades (for example, China, India and
Indonesia), as well as mixed registers with national
and foreign owners (for example, Hong Kong (China),
Singapore and the Philippines). The fleets registered in
developed countries/overseas territories also include
major open registers (for example, Malta, the Isle of
Man and Bermuda), flags used by both nationals and
foreigners (for example, Cyprus, the United Kingdom
and France), and flags that are almost exclusively used
by national owners (for example, Germany and Japan).
The Danish (DIS) and Norwegian (NIS) international
ship registers are these countries’ second registers;
they provide better conditions to shipowners than the
same countries’ first registers in terms of taxes and
possibilities to employ foreign seafarers. DIS and NIS
are still today mostly used by Danish and Norwegian
nationals respectively (see Annex III).


Among the developing regions, Africa’s share is
determined largely by the register of Liberia, which




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201356


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above; ranked by deadweight tonnage.


a The estimate of national ownership is based on available information of commercial seagoing vessels of 1,000 GT and above.


Flag of registration Number of vessels
Share of world
total, vessels


Deadweight
tonnage


(thousands
dwt)


Share of
world total
(percentage


dwt)


Cumulated
share


(percentage
dwt)


National
ownership


(percentage) a


Dwt Growth
2013/2012
(percentage)


Panama 8 580 9.87 350 506 21.52 21.52 0.14 5.03


Liberia 3 144 3.62 198 032 12.16 33.68 0.01 5.83


MarshallIslands 2 064 2.37 140 016 8.60 42.27 0.11 11.08


HongKong(China) 2 221 2.55 129 806 7.97 50.24 12.15 16.87


Singapore 3 339 3.84 89 697 5.51 55.75 36.60 16.62


Greece 1 551 1.78 75 424 4.63 60.38 92.60 5.13


Bahamas 1 446 1.66 73 702 4.52 64.91 1.18 1.44


Malta 1 794 2.06 68 831 4.23 69.13 0.35 8.18


China 3 727 4.29 68 642 4.21 73.35 98.18 9.83


Cyprus 1 030 1.18 31 706 1.95 75.29 19.51 7.61


IsleofMan 422 0.49 22 629 1.39 76.68 0.00 9.32


United Kingdom 1 343 1.54 21 095 1.30 77.98 49.88 6.99


Italy 1 506 1.73 20 612 1.27 79.24 93.46 2.44


Japan 5 379 6.19 20 409 1.25 80.50 99.32 11.04


Norway(NIS) 536 0.62 18 093 1.11 81.61 82.33 5.37


Republic of Korea 1 894 2.18 17 720 1.09 82.69 96.47 -10.74


Germany 781 0.90 17 128 1.05 83.75 97.59 2.30


India 1 385 1.59 15 876 0.97 84.72 96.16 -3.45


Indonesia 6 293 7.24 14 267 0.88 85.60 90.28 0.17


Antigua and Barbuda 1 302 1.50 14 142 0.87 86.47 0.00 4.27


Denmark(DIS) 482 0.55 13 739 0.84 87.31 92.53 1.24


Bermuda 168 0.19 12 378 0.76 88.07 1.69 0.45


United States 3 452 3.97 12 321 0.76 88.83 73.93 -1.18


Malaysia 1 539 1.77 10 508 0.65 89.47 92.82 -3.15


Turkey 1 365 1.57 10 215 0.63 90.10 96.94 3.30


United Republic of
Tanzania 198 0.23 8 815 0.54 90.64 0.30 10.45


Netherlands 1 250 1.44 8 712 0.53 91.17 70.90 6.73


France 543 0.62 7 431 0.46 91.63 52.40 -0.22


Viet Nam 1 772 2.04 7 284 0.45 92.08 97.55 1.52


Belgium 216 0.25 6 913 0.42 92.50 58.35 0.46


Russian Federation 2 324 2.67 6 784 0.42 92.92 84.57 -2.14


Philippines 1 383 1.59 6 417 0.39 93.31 26.36 -2.41


St.Vincentandthe
Grenadines 1 046 1.20 4 919 0.30 93.61 0.08 -18.09


Thailand 755 0.87 4 811 0.30 93.91 97.95 -6.63


Cayman Islands 174 0.20 4 310 0.26 94.17 0.00 2.12


Top35total 66 404 76.38 1 533 889 94.17 94.17 24.30 6.71


World total 86 942 100.00 1 628 783 100.00 100.00 23.00 5.98


Table 2.6. The35flagsofregistrationwiththelargestregisteredfleets,asof1January2013(Dwt)




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 57


caters above all for container ships and oil tankers.
For the Latin American and Caribbean fleets, the flag
of Panama explains the region’s high share among
bulk carriers. Almost one quarter of the world fleet
is registered in developing countries in Asia, with a


Figure 2.7. Globalshareofforeign-flaggedfleet(Beginning-of-yearfigures,percentageofworldtotaldwt,
1989–2013)


Source: UNCTAD, Review of Maritime Transport, various issues.
Note: Estimate based on available information of seagoing merchant vessels of 1,000 GT and above.


40


45


50


55


60


65


70


75


Percentage of dwt 41.5 42.8 43.9 46.2 48.6 49.6 50.6 53.3 55.4 58.0 60.8 60.6 62.4 63.2 63.4 64.5 65.1 66.6 66.4 67.0 68.6 68.4 68.1 71.5 73.0
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


particularly high share among the general-cargo ships
(almost 33 per cent of the world total). The share of
Oceania reflects to a large extent the register of the
Marshall Islands, with its specialization in oil tankers
and dry-bulk carriers.


Total Oil tankers Bulk carriers General cargo ships
Container


ships Other types


Developing economies 75.49 72.23 81.13 65.07 72.26 70.92


… of Africa 13.55 16.87 10.07 5.37 23.11 10.17


… of America 28.57 21.08 34.95 24.74 23.24 32.86


… of Asia 24.42 21.94 27.46 32.80 21.64 18.61


… of Oceania 8.95 12.35 8.66 2.15 4.27 9.28


Developed economies 23.36 26.80 18.55 28.64 27.68 25.13


Transition economies 0.72 0.77 0.26 5.21 0.04 1.17


Unknownandotherflags 0.42 0.19 0.06 1.08 0.01 2.78
World total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00


Table 2.7. Distributionofdwtcapacityofvesseltypes,bycountrygroupofregistration,2013
(Beginning-of-yearfigures,percentageofdwt)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201358


2. Nationality of controlling interests


Vessel registers often specialize in different ship types
and countries of ownership. Annex  III provides a
detailed overview of the countries of ownership that
register their ships under the main flags of registration.
The flag of Antigua and Barbuda is mostly used by
owners from Germany; the Bahamas registers, above
all, ships from Canada, Greece and Norway; Greek
and German owners are the main clients for the
registers of Cyprus and of Liberia; and 47  per cent
of the Panamanian deadweight tonnage is Japanese
owned.


E. SHIPBUILDING, DEMOLITION AND
NEW ORDERS


1. Deliveries of newbuildings


Three countries (China, the Republic of Korea and
Japan) together built 92 per cent of the world’s new
tonnage (GT) in 2012, with China alone accounting
for more than 40 per cent. Almost 57 per cent of the
tonnage delivered in 2012 was on dry-bulk ships,


followed by oil tankers (18.4 per cent) and container
ships (14.4 per cent) (figure 2.8 and table 2.8). This
is a significantly different picture from just six  years
ago. In 2006, the Republic of Korea was the largest
shipbuilder, followed by Japan. China and Europe
each had a market share of about 15 per cent.


Shipbuilders also specialize in different vessel types.
While China and Japan have mostly built dry-bulk
carriers, the Republic of Korea had a far higher share
in container ships and oil tankers, and European
and other regions’ yards had a somewhat higher
share among the offshore and passenger vessels. In
addition to bulk carriers, Japan is also focusing on
other specialized ships, including gas and car carriers.
The four largest individual shipbuilding groups are from
the Republic of Korea; shipbuilding in China is spread
among a larger number of individual shipbuilders.


Even more so than ships, sea containers are almost
exclusively built in China. Low production costs and
the need for empty boxes to transport Chinese exports
made China the natural location for setting up factories
for the construction of containers. Interestingly, at
the end of 2013, a new factory for reefer containers
is scheduled to open in San Antonio, Chile. Maersk


Figure 2.8. Deliveriesofnewbuildings,majorvesseltypesandcountrieswherebuilt,2012(ThousandsofGT)


Source: UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above.


0


5 000


10 000


15 000


20 000


25 000


30 000


35 000


40 000


Other 1 914 1 391 1 406 1 989
Container 1 984 10 540 390 773
General cargo 1 833 260 472 583
Dry bulk 28 217 8 988 13 571 3 468
Oil tanker 4 729 10 311 1 592 877


China Republic of Korea Japan Others




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 59


Container Industry San Santonio is going to be the first
reefer container factory in South America (MCI San
Antonio, 2013). The company is scheduled to produce
40,000 reefer containers per year. South America is
among the regions with the highest demand for empty
reefer containers for export. The new factory will thus
help correct a reefer trade imbalance and reduce
repositioning costs as fewer empty reefer containers
will need to be moved from Asia to South America
(World Cargo News, 2013).


2. Demolition of ships


The Indian subcontinent continued to be the major
ship-breaking region in 2012, accounting for more
than 70 per cent of the tonnage (GT) reported sold for
breaking. Within the subcontinent, Bangladesh was
the largest ship-breaking country, followed by India
and Pakistan. Chinese breakers demolished 21.6 per
cent and the rest of the world the remaining 11.7 per
cent (table 2.9).


Table 2.8. Deliveriesofnewbuildings,majorvesseltypesandcountrieswherebuilt,2012
(ThousandsofGT)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data provided by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above.


China Republic of Korea Japan Philippines Rest of world World total


Oil tankers 4 729 10 311 1 592 251 626 17 510


Bulk carriers 28 217 8 988 13 571 2 342 1 126 54 244


General cargo 1 833 260 472 – 583 3 147


Container ships 1 984 10 540 390 – 773 13 687


Gas carriers 179 173 152 – 18 522


Chemical tankers 68 188 200 – 44 499


Offshore 967 506 108 102 819 2 502


Ferries and passenger ships 100 71 36 – 875 1 082


Other 600 453 910 – 131 2 094


Total 38677 31491 17429 2 696 4994 95287


China India Bangladesh Pakistan
Unknown


Indian
Subcontinent


Turkey Others/unknown World Total


Oil tankers 1 459 369 1 197 2 711 191 21 200 6 149


Bulk carriers 5 533 5 446 6 064 1 959 205 365 720 20 293


General cargo 316 393 1 166 28 – 291 471 2 665


Container ships 316 553 2 954 7 216 124 76 4 246


Gas carriers 4 89 30 – – 77 38 238


Chemical tankers 7 11 333 – 21 – 27 399


Offshore 154 4 44 649 156 75 100 1 182


Ferries and passenger ships 12 4 82 – – 139 66 303


Other 55 158 386 17 – 146 56 817


Total 7855 7027 12256 5372 790 1 239 1755 36 293


Table 2.9. Tonnagereportedsoldfordemolition,majorvesseltypesandcountrieswheredemolished,
2012(ThousandsofGT)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data from Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201360


As illustrated in figure 2.9, oil tankers tend to be sold
for breaking at a much younger age than dry-bulk
carriers. Environmental regulations often do not allow
older tankers to be deployed beyond two decades,
while dry bulkers often trade to carry cargo for three


or more decades. General-cargo and passenger
ships (included under “other” in figure 2.9) tend to be
deployed the longest; they are often trading on inter-
island and coastal cabotage services, which are not
bound by the international regulations of IMO.


Figure 2.9. Tonnagereportedsoldfordemolitionin2012,byage(Yearsanddwt)


Source: UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data from Clarkson Research Services.


0


1 000 000


2 000 000


3 000 000


4 000 000


5 000 000


6 000 000


15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40


Vessel age (years)


Dwt


Others


Container
ships


General-cargo
ships


Bulk carriers


Oil tankers


3. Tonnage on order


Following the peaks in 2008 and 2009, the tonnage
on order for all major vessel types has drastically
declined over the last few  years. As far fewer new
orders were placed since the economic crisis of
2008, and shipyards continued to deliver pre-ordered
tonnage, the order books went down by 50 per cent
for container ships, 58 per cent for dry-bulk carriers,
65 per cent for tankers and by 67 per cent for general-
cargo ships, as compared to the previous peaks
(figure 2.10 and table 2.10).


The reduction in the order book is even more
impressive if compared to the existing fleet. At the
end of 2008, the dry-bulk order book was equivalent
to almost 80 per cent of the fleet at that time, while
the tonnage on order as of January 2013 is the
equivalent of just 20 per cent of the fleet in service.
For tankers, the order book went down from 50 per


cent of the fleet at its peak to around 10 per cent in
January 2013.


For all main vessel types, new orders are at historical
lows, and the order book is declining rapidly. Unless
large numbers of countercyclical investors place new
orders in 2013 and 2014, by 2014 numerous shipyards
will need to reduce employment. Reports from ship
brokers suggest that in fact more such countercyclical
investors are emerging, expecting to benefit from
the current low newbuilding prices, and hoping for
a revival of the shipping markets in coming  years
(Clarkson Research Services, 2013a). Nevertheless,
from the shipyards’ perspective, the current capacity
is almost certainly too high for even the most optimistic
scenario. According to some estimates “shipyard
capacity could be slashed by as much as 40 per cent
across the world and the industry would still be able
to meet the demand for new ships for 2015” (China
Trade Today - Online Magazine, 2013).




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 61


4. Tonnage utilization


Ships are capital investments with high fixed costs
and relatively low running costs – only exceptionally
are they kept laid off. In early 2013, almost 99  per
cent of the tonnage was in service, the remainder


being laid off (0.73  per cent), used for long term
storage (0.16  per cent) or not in service for other
reasons (0.15  per cent). Among the different vessel
types, container ships had the highest utilization rate
(99.85 per cent), while offshore supply vessels had the
lowest (84.52 per cent) (table 2.11).


Figure 2.10. Worldtonnageonorder,2000–2013(Thousandsofdwt)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data supplied by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Propelledseagoingmerchantvesselsof100GTandabove;beginningofyearfigures.


Tankers


Bulk carriers


General-cargo ships
Container vessels


0


50 000


100 000


150 000


200 000


250 000


300 000


350 000


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201362


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3


3
00


4


62
2


5
3


06
1


5
3


61


97
1


7
5


29
1


79
3


00
4


0
37


4
8


40
7


Ja
nu


ar
y


20
05


9
7


75
7


1
5


58
6


3
47


9
6


8
71


0


85
1


8
0


74
1


4
4


05


96
3


5
3


59
4


5
24


6


89
8


5
0


38
5


6
1


10
1


7
07


5
2


90
2


22
2


29
5


9
77


4
2


20
1


Ja
nu


ar
y


20
06


1
02


2
02


1
8


82
5


4
74


1
7


5
62


3


95
0


7
9


60
4


6
9


04
1


2
21


6
2


99
5


4
38


5
1


2
10


4
4


94
6


6
6


37
1


8
75


4
8


84
2


45
7


50
7


1
38


3
7


91
3


Ja
nu


ar
y


20
07


1
69


7
98


2
7


03
6


3
07


5
1


06
1


49
1


3
63


7
7


87
9


9
9


19
1


4
48


7
2


93
5


7
93


7
1


2
86


4
5


05
2


8
3


53
2


2
31


4
6


43
3


52
1


55
9


0
31


4
1


43
0


Ja
nu


ar
y


20
08


1
84


5
48


3
1


74
5


8
40


1
2


48
6


98
2


9
84


8
3


34
4


1
4


26
6


1
8


89
7


9
25


7
9


70
2


1
4


29
5


5
77


5
1


1
47


7
2


9
38


4
7


78
5


38
6


91
1


2
41


4
4


5
74


9


Ap
ril


2
00


8
1


87
4


20
3


2
74


5
7


43
8


2
78


4
23


3
3


35
8


3
48


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1


6
33


4
2


1
84


7
9


44
7


8
85


5
1


3
82


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7


05
8


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88
3


3
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73


9
14


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98
8


4
4


45
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ly


2
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97
3


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9


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78


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6


02
8


4
03


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1


6
65


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2


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48


8
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18
8


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92


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1


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70


5
9


79
7


1
3


02
6


3
7


43
4


5
71


6
13


6
73


1
4


15
9


4
6


72
8


Oc
to


be
r2


00
8


2
06


4
13


3
2


05
6


4
60


5
3


29
5


57
3


8
63


8
5


31
1


1
7


24
2


2
1


49
8


4
52


7
7


87
5


1
2


80
6


0
84


0
1


3
19


9
3


5
61


4
8


42
6


44
2


86
1


4
05


8
4


9
16


7


Ja
nu


ar
y


20
09


1
92


5
32


2
9


57
6


5
33


1
3


24
7


72
3


8
24


8
4


93
0


1
6


16
9


1
9


65
8


6
74


7
4


44
5


1
2


00
6


2
03


7
1


2
58


2
3


2
80


4
9


61
6


20
4


99
1


3
22


6
5


0
15


8


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ril


2
00


9
1


75
0


63
2


8
19


6
2


34
4


3
23


2
34


3
7


97
8


5
12


9
1


6
18


6
2


0
64


8
3


17
7


0
01


7
1


0
98


6
3


76
7


1
3


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3
8


92
4


4
17


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97


6
19


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3


67
0


4
7


35
9


Ju
ly


2
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9
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9


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5
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1


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65


3
6


77
8


5
35


9
1


5
41


4
1


9
21


8
4


88
6


5
99


8
1


0
13


6
5


15
1


1
3


05
2


3
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71
4


7
26


5
68


3
05


1
2


75
5


4
8


03
9


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to


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r 2


00
9


1
52


1
56


2
3


90
6


3
90


4
3


09
0


77
3


6
29


8
5


16
9


1
4


61
4


1
7


83
8


6
78


6
3


00
4



94


7
6


6
53


0
1


2
38


2
3


2
42


4
9


02
5


51
2


33
1


1
99


1
4


9
36


3




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 63


Ta
bl



2.


10
.


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or


ld
to


nn
ag


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on


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rd


er
,2


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gi


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on


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nk


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lk


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ai


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r v


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he
r s


hi
ps


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ta


l


Thousands dwt


Number of ships


Average vessel size
(dwt)


Thousands dwt


Number of ships


Average vessel size
(dwt)


Thousands dwt


Number of ships


Average vessel size
(dwt)


Thousands dwt


Number of ships


Average vessel size
(dwt)


Thousands dwt


Number of ships


Average vessel size
(dwt)


Thousands dwt


Number of ships


Average vessel size
(dwt)


Ja
nu


ar
y


20
10


1
48


3
28


2
2


76
6


5
42


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3


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4
83


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1


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28


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1


5
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67
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7
1


53
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8


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9
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3


07
6


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3


6
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6


1
4


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4
71


4
6


45
8



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7
7


2
93


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20
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54
6


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4
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4
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64


8
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4
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8
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4
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5
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57
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5
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1
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14
1


79
1


6
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7
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9
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9
61


6
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54
8


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20
12


9
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55
9


1
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34
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0
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8
13


8
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10
6


8
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53


79
9


1
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81
3


5
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64


6
7


7
82


5
1


0
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4
1


7
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57
9


7
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96
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7


1
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3
53


4
70


6
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62
5


4
78


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49


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9
88


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9
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1
1


1
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4
4


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9


9
9


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2


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65
7


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6


9
27


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52
9


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7
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85
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97
5


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1



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5
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9
38


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nu


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20
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6
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bl
e.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201364


These apparently high utilization rates hide
the oversupply of vessel capacity, especially in
container shipping. The data captured in table 2.11
does not include “warm” lay ups, that is, short-
term withdrawals from regular container services,
when ships are considered “idle”. If idle capacity
is excluded, only about 95 to 96  per cent of the
container ship fleet was in service in January


2013. In addition, slow steaming, that is, providing
services at speeds below the optimum for which
the ships had been built, has helped to absorb
an additional capacity of about 1.7  million  TEU,
as more ships are deployed to ensure the same
frequency of service (Clarkson Research Services,
2013c). This is equivalent to more than 10 per cent
of the existing fleet.


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, on the basis of data from Clarkson Research Services.


Table 2.11. Tonnageutilizationbytypeofvessel,January2013(Percentageofdwtorcubicmetres)


In service Idle and laid up Long-term storage


Repairs and not
in service for
other reasons


Total


Bulk carriers 99.75 0.14 0.02 0.10 100.00


Chemical tankers 99.57 0.36 – 0.08 100.00


Container ships 99.85 0.12 – 0.03 100.00


Ferries and passenger ships 98.23 1.49 – 0.28 100.00


General-cargo ships 98.78 0.87 0.04 0.31 100.00


Liquefied-gascarriers 98.62 1.19 0.19 – 100.00


Offshore supply 94.52 4.40 – 1.08 100.00


Oil tankers 98.16 1.25 0.48 0.12 100.00


Other/n.a. 99.31 0.53 – 0.16 100.00


Total 98.96 0.73 0.16 0.15 100.00




CHAPTER 2: STRUCTURE, OWNERSHIP AND REGISTRATION OF THE WORLD FLEET 65


REFERENCES


Arvis J-F, Shepherd B, Reis JG, Duval Y and Utoktham C (2013). Trade costs and development: a new data set. World
Bank - Economic Premise. 104:1–4.


Bernhofen DM, El-Sahli Z and Kneller R (2013). Estimating the Effects of the Container Revolution on World Trade. CESifo,
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research. Munich.


China Trade Today – Online Magazine (2013). Shipyard capacity could be slashed by 40pc and still meet demand. March. See
http://om.shippingazette.com/OM/OM4/index.asp (accessed 28 August 2013).


Clarkson Research Services (2013a). The Clarkson Shipping Review and Outlook. Spring 2013.


Clarkson Research Services (2013b). World Fleet Monitor. January.


Clarkson Research Services (2013c). Container Intelligence Quarterly, Spring 2013. May.


Cullinane KPB, ed. (2005). Shipping Economics: Research in Transportation Economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam.


Dynamar B.V. (2013). BreakbulkIII–Operators,fleets,markets. Alkmaar. 244.


Fairplay (2013). Chemical tankers on cusp of rates recovery. 11 April.


International Transport Journal (2013). Maersk, MSC and CMA to establish alliance. 18 June.


Journal of Commerce (2013). Drewry: Demise of small carriers cuts competition. See http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/
container-lines/drewry-demise-small-carriers-cuts-competition_20130429.html (accessed 26 August 2013).


Lloyd’s List Intelligence – Containers (2013). See http://www.lloydslistintelligence.com/llint/containers/index.htm (accessed
27 August 2013).


MCI San Antonio (2013). See http://www.mcicontainers.com/aboutus/mciworldwide/pages/mcisanantonio.aspx (accessed
15 June 2013).


Shipping Intelligence Weekly (2013). Single hull VLCCs – The long goodbye. 14 June.


The Economist (2013). The humble hero. 18 May.


UNCTADStat – Statistical Database (2013). See http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx (accessed
27 August 2013).


World Cargo News (2013). MCI to build reefer factory in Chile. See http://www.worldcargonews.com/htm/w20111111.049104.
htm (accessed 28 August 2013).


World Shipping Council (2013). See http://www.worldshipping.org/ (accessed 29 August 2013).


ENDNOTES


1. The underlying data on the world fleet for chapter 2 has been provided by Clarkson Research Services, London. With
a view to focusing solely on commercial shipping, the vessels covered in UNCTAD’s analysis include all propelled
sea-going merchant vessels of 100 GT and above, including offshore drillships and FPSOs, and also including the
Great Lakes fleets of the United States and Canada, which for historical reasons had been excluded in earlier issues
of the Review of Maritime Transport. We exclude military vessels, yachts, waterway vessels, fishing vessels, and
offshore fixed and mobile platforms and barges. As regards the main vessel types (oil tankers, dry-bulk, container,
and general-cargo) there is no change compared to previous issues of the Review of Maritime Transport. As regards
“other” vessels, the new data includes a smaller number of ships (previously, fishing vessels with little cargo-carrying
capacity had been included) and a slightly higher tonnage due to the inclusion of ships used in the offshore transport
and storage. To ensure full comparability of the 2013 data with the two previous years, UNCTAD has updated the
fleet data available online for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013, applying the same criteria (http://stats.unctad.org/fleet).
As in previous years, the data on fleet ownership covers only ships of 1,000 GT and above, as information on the true
ownership is often not available for smaller ships.






This chapter covers the development of freight rates and maritime transport costs.
Section A encompasses some relevant developments in maritime freight rates in various
market segments, namely containerized trade, liquid bulk and dry bulk shipping in 2012
and in early 2013. It highlights significant events leading to major price fluctuations,
discusses recent industry trends and gives a selective outlook on future developments
of freight markets. Section B provides a brief overview of recent developments in ship
finance and the growing role of private equity as a new source of finance in the sector.


FREIGHT RATES
AND MARITIME


TRANSPORT COSTS


3




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201368


A. FREIGHT RATES
In general terms, the demand and the supply of
maritime transport services interact with each other
to determine freight rates. While there are countless
factors affecting supply and demand, the exposure of
freights rates to market forces is inevitable.


Cargo volumes and demand for maritime transport
services are usually the first to be hit by political,
environmental and economic turmoil. Factors such as
a slowdown in international trade, sanctions, natural
disasters and weather events, regulatory measures
and changes in fuel prices have an impact on the
world economy and global demand for seaborne
transport. These changes may occur quickly and have
an immediate impact on demand for maritime transport
services. As to the supply of maritime transport services,
there is generally a tendency of overcapacity in the
market, given that there are no inherent restrictions on
the number of vessels that can be built and that it takes
a long time from the moment a vessel order is placed to
the time it is delivered, and is ready to be put in service.


Therefore, maritime transport is very cyclical and goes
through periods of continuous busts and booms, with
operators enjoying healthy earnings or struggling to
meet their minimum operating costs.


In 2012, the maritime sector continued to experience
low and volatile freight rates in its various segments
because of surplus capacity in the global fleet
generated by the severe downturn in trade in the
wake of the 2008 economic and financial crisis. The
steady delivery of newbuild vessels into an already
oversupplied market, coupled with a weak economy,
has kept rates under heavy pressure, as described
below.


1. Container freight rates


In 2012, shrinking cargo volumes, mainly on the main
East–West containerized trade routes, combined
with an oversupply of tonnage, in particular of large
container ships, inevitably led to volatile container
freight rates and a weaker market in general, while
charter rates remained on the decline.


Figure3.1. Growthofdemandandsupplyincontainershipping,2000–2013(Annualgrowthrates)


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data from Clarkson Container Intelligence Monthly, various issues.
Note: Supply data refer to total container-carrying fleet capacity, including multi-purpose and other vessels with some container-


carrying capacity. Demand growth is based on million TEU lifts. The data for 2013 are projected figures.


2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Demand 10.7 2.4 10.5 11.6 13.4 10.6 11.2 11.4 4.2 -9.0 12.8 7.1 3.3 5.0


Supply 7.8 8.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 10.5 13.6 11.8 10.8 4.9 8.3 6.7 5.2 6.0


-15


-10


-5


0


5


10


15




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 69


As seen in chapters 1 and 2, there has been an imbalance
between the growth rates of demand and supply in
the container market. As illustrated in figure 3.1, global
container trade witnessed continuous downturn trends,
with a growth in volume of 3.3 per cent in 2012, compared
with 7 per cent in 2011. At the same time, the large influx
of new vessels continued to affect the container shipping
markets throughout 2012, with global container supply
growing 5.2 per cent, outpacing global demand.


In an attempt to handle the imbalance between excessive
supply and low demand, carriers deployed less capacity
on routes where trade was declining, such as the main
headhaul East–West routes, where trade was 5 per cent
less compared with 2011. They deployed more capacity
on the growing North–South routes, where trade grew
by 4 per cent, and on interregional trade, which grew by


7 per cent, stimulated by increased consumer demand
in emerging economies in 2012. (See chapter 1.)


Given the widening gap between the supply of vessel
capacity and the demand for transport services, freight
rates in the different container markets remained low,
but improved in relative terms compared with 2011
(table 3.1). This can be attributed mainly to a change
in shipping lines’ strategy and the imposition of market
discipline, that is, they were not seeking to gain market
share and volume as in 2011 but rather to improve
earnings. In 2011, rates remained low because the
shipping lines were undercutting each other, seeking
market share and volume. In an effort to control the slide
of freight rates, carriers exercised in the first half of 2012
some degree of market power by applying a common
pricing discipline known as general rate increases (GRIs).


Table3.1. Containerfreightmarketsandrates


Source: Various issues of Container Intelligence Monthly, Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Data based on yearly averages.


Freight markets 2009 2010 2011 2012
Trans-Pacific (Dollars per FEU)
Shanghai–United States West Coast 1 372 2 308 1 667 2 287


Percentage change 68.21 -27.77 37.19


Shanghai–United States East Coast 2 367 3 499 3 008 3 416


Percentage change 47.84 -14.03 13.56


Far East–Europe (Dollars per TEU)
Shanghai–Northern Europe 1 395 1 789 881 1 353


Percentage change 28.24 -50.75 53.58


Shanghai–Mediterranean 1 397 1 739 973 1 336


Percentage change 24.49 -44.05 37.31


North–South (Dollars per TEU)
Shanghai–South America (Santos) 2 429 2 236 1 483 1 771


Percentage change -7.95 -33.68 19.42


Shanghai–Australia/New Zealand (Melbourne) 1 500 1 189 772 925


Percentage change -20.73 -35.07 19.82


Shanghai–West Africa (Lagos) 2 247 2 305 1 908 2 092


Percentage change 2.56 -17.22 9.64


Shanghai–South Africa (Durban) 1 495 1 481 991 1 047


Percentage change -0.96 -33.09 5.65


Intra-Asian (Dollars per TEU)
Shanghai–South-East Asia (Singapore) 318 210 256


Percentage change -33.96 21.84


Shanghai–East Japan 316 337 345


Percentage change 6.65 2.37


Shanghai–Republic of Korea 193 198 183


Percentage change 2.59 -7.58


Shanghai–Hong Kong (China) 116 155 131


Percentage change 33.62 -15.48


Shanghai–Persian Gulf (Dubai) 639 922 838 981


Percentage change 44.33 -9.11 17.06




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201370


As a result, average freight rates rose 51 per cent for
the Far East–Europe and trans-Pacific trades in several
successful rounds of GRIs, despite weak demand on the
whole. Thus, rates from the Far East to the United States
West Coast reached $2,600 per FEU in June 2012, up
from $1,800  per FEU in January 2012. Comparably,
rates on routes from the Far East to Northern Europe
climbed from $750  per  TEU in January 2012 to a
peak of $1,900 per TEU in June 2012 (BIMCO, 2013).
Nevertheless, the industry’s collective resolution ceased
in the second half of the year as positive operating
incomes encouraged some carriers to revert to price
competition and rate cutting with the aim of grabbing
market share (Alphaliner, 2013). Consequently, rates
to Northern Europe fell to as low as $1,000  per  TEU
in November 2012 as demand continued dropping
(BIMCO, 2013).


The overall low freight rates observed in 2012 reduced
carriers’ earnings close to, and even below operating
costs, especially when bunker oil prices remained
both high and volatile. Accompanied by considerable


price fluctuations, fuel costs stood at an average
of $640  per ton in 2012, representing a 4  per cent
increase over the previous year.1 This could partially be
passed on to customers by way of bunker surcharges
and only adds pressure to overall increasing operating
costs and low revenues.


As a result, carriers tried to apply various strategies to
remedy the situation: laying up vessels,2 going for slow or
super-slow steaming,3 postponing newbuild deliveries,
raising surcharges and cutting services, suppressing
running capacity on the main lanes and scrapping.4


Nonetheless, container carriers continued to suffer
another year of negative operating earnings in 2012,
although less so than in 2011. A recent survey5 revealed
that 21 carriers of the top 30 that publish financial results
reported an overall operating loss of $239  million in
2012, with only seven carriers turning in positive results.
Although only one third of the 21 carriers reported a
profit, the overall result is seen as an improvement on
the combined operating losses of almost $6 billion that
these same 21 companies reported in 2011.6


Figure3.2. NewConTexIndex,2008–2013


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat, using the New ConTex index produced by the Hamburg Shipbrokers’ Association.
See http://www.vhss.de.


Notes: Index base: October 2007 – 1,000 points.
New ConTex is a container ship time charter assessment index calculated as an equivalent weight of percentage change


from six ConTex assessments, including the following ship sizes: 1,100, 1,700, 2,500, 2,700, 3,500 and 4,250 TEUs.


200


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1 000


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3




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 71


On the other hand, tonnage providers, outsourcing
the operation of their vessels, were direct victims of
low demand and overcapacity, as clearly illustrated by
low time charter rates (see table 3.2). As measured by
the New ConTex7 index (figure 3.2), the containership
charter rates failed to pick up. Average charter rates
remained low, with 2012 disappointing charter owners
for the second year in a row. As two thirds of the laid-up
tonnage average was charter-owned capacity – carriers
utilized their own tonnage – there is clear evidence that
the charter market suffered most in the process.8 The
largest decline in 2012 rates was observed in the larger-
size vessels, which dropped 34–48 per cent com pared
with the previous year (table 3.2).


Overall, surplus capacity generated by the severe
downturn in trade since the 2008 economic and
financial crisis has been and will remain a major threat
to container shipping freight rates. The surplus of
large ships (8,000+ TEUs) is leading to the cascading
of capacity (redeployment over different routes) and
is generating pressure on charter tonnage and freight
rate volatility. Reassignment of smaller container
vessels from main lanes facing declining demand to
the fast growing non-main lanes has been crucial in
managing the substantial delivery order of new larger
ships.9 This has also helped prevent the accumulation
of vessel surplus capacity on the main lane routes
where trade is low. (See chapter 2)


In 2013, global container trade is projected to grow
by 5 per cent, and global container supply, by 6 per
cent, according to June figures (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013c). During the first half of 2013, several
attempts by carriers to increase rates were again
applied to several trade lines as a result of GRIs.
Spot container shipping rates in Asia–Europe trade
thus increased 165  per cent in the week of 4  July
2013 as GRIs implemented by carriers on 1  July
took hold. The benchmark Shanghai–Rotterdam
route was $2,622  per FEU, up from $990 a week
earlier. On services from Asia to the West Coast of
the United States, prices increased by $269 to reach
$2,114 per FEU. From Asia to the East Coast of the
United States, they increased by $377 to $3,361 per
FEU (Lloyd’s List Containerisation International, 2013).
While GRIs are only temporary solutions to support
comparative returns, achieving long-term market
stability would enable shipping lines to deal with core
market fundamentals and adjust capacity to demand.


Another important action launched by the carriers
in 2013 in the face of difficult circumstances is the
operational alliance called the P3 Network, agreed by


the world’s three largest container shipping lines: Maersk
Line, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), and
CMA CGM. The agreement, which will go into effect in
the second quarter of 2014, would allow liners to control
overcapacity and reduce rates volatility. It would call for
the three liners to pool vessels equivalent to 15 per cent
of global capacity on three main lane trade routes (Asia–
Europe, trans-Pacific and transatlantic), with an initial
capacity of 255 vessels (or 2.6 million TEUs). Maersk
Line will provide about 42  per cent of the alliance’s
capacity – including its new Triple E ships, among the
world’s largest carriers – while MSC will contribute 34 per
cent and CMA CGM, 24  per cent (Financial Times,
2013a). The P3 East–West service network initiative is
considered by some analysts as a positive development
for the liner industry as a whole in the drive to reduce
costs and stabilize the market. The same observers
see no damage to the competition, where more than
15 carriers will continue operating independently and
competing on most trade routes, including those sailed
by the P3 partners (Drewry Container Insight, 2013).


Conclusion


In the near future, with world economies still under
pressure, the sector is expected to continue facing the
same weak demand volumes, especially in Europe,
which would continue to have an impact on container
freight rates, at least in 2013. This is compounded by
surplus capacity, especially with regard to sailing larger
ships on routes that have less cargo, while most of the
growth is coming from non-main lane routes that require
smaller ships. A major concern remains: how to reconcile
the surge in supply of very large ships with trade growth
generating demand for small and medium-sized units.


In the medium term, however, supply growth is likely
to slow down, owing to the fewer vessel orders placed
and the difficulty associated with financing new vessel
builds. These variations may reduce the gap of
new surplus and low demand, which would lead to
improved container freight rates (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013d). Likewise, changes in the world
economy and in trade and seaborne shipments will
influence the evolution of container freight rates.


2. Tanker freight rates


The tanker market, which encompasses the
transportation of crude oil, refined petroleum products
(clean and dirty products)10 and chemicals, witnessed
an equally difficult market environment in 2012. The
year saw ups and downs for the tanker industry; this




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201372


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CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 73


volatility was felt across the board in many ship sizes
and as a whole but perhaps slightly less so than in
2011. The average Baltic Exchange Dirty Tanker Index
for the full year 2012 dropped to 719 (8 per cent less
than the annual average of 2011), whereas the average
Baltic Exchange Clean Tanker Index was below 700
(11 per cent less than the annual average of 2011).11
These trends reflect the successive bad years recorded
in the oil chartering market, as shown in table 3.3.


The sector was affected by a combination of factors
leading to overall low freight rates: weak demand, slow
imports growth, a change in the structure of tanker
demand, new discoveries (e.g. the shale revolution in
the United States), high oil prices, and high idle and
tonnage capacity.


Freight rates and earnings for different tanker
markets


Table  3.4 provides average spot freight rates
quantified in Worldscale (WS), a standard measure
for establishing spot rates on major tanker routes for
various vessel sizes. It shows the general fall in dirty
tanker rates for most routes and for most of the year,
with the exception of a short peak in the last three
months of 2012, which benefited from some positive
rates. Large tonnage supply and lower tonnage
demand pressured freight rates downwards. Despite
the decline in the number of deliveries in 2012, fleet
capacity remained abundant, and the new influx
of dirty tankers only added to the problem, with a
capacity increase of 5 per cent (OPEC, 2013).


On the demand side, most of the tanker markets bore
the brunt of the weak global economic situation and
the performance of large oil consumers, namely the
OECD countries. Other contributing factors included
a less vigorous Chinese economy and a change in
the energy strategy of the United States, the world’s
largest consumer of petroleum. The United States
started increasing its oil production and decreasing its
imports accordingly (Barry Rogliano Salles, 2013).


VLCCs and the Suezmax markets were boosted
somewhat in the beginning of the year, mainly when
Saudi Arabia increased its production, and importers


started building inventories in anticipation of the
expected embargo on Iranian oil. However, once the
demand for tonnage started declining and the market
began slowing down, freight rates plummeted once
again (Danish Ship Finance, 2013).


Despite the downward trend, crude tanker earnings
rose on average by 12 per cent from $17,600 per day
to $19,700 per day in 2012. This increase in earnings
was spread across all segments, except Suezmax,
which suffered from the decline of United States
imports. VLCCs experienced the largest improvement,
going from $17,000  per day to $20,500  per day in
2012 (Danish Ship Finance, 2013). However, this could
barely cover operating costs estimated at $11,000–
$12,000, but not the return on investment for new
ships. Some vessel orders exceeded $150 million in
2008 (Barry Rogliano Salles, 2013).


For the Aframax market, 2012 has generally been
a dull year. The market as a whole had come
under pressure from a number of structural and
unexpected challenges. The trend towards vessel
upsizing, which brings vessels with capacities
relatively higher than those currently deployed in
respective routes, has been growing in different
markets, as operators seek greater economies of
scale. This has been the case of Suezmaxes taking
some market share from Aframaxes, particularly
in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013e). Moreover, the
Mediterranean–Mediterranean route has proved to
be particularly difficult, with rates changing from
WS 130 in December 2011 to WS 85 in December
2012. A major contributing factor was the growing
competition among ships for cargoes as vessels
crowded into the region to take advantage of the
increase in Libyan oil production and the spike in
rates towards the end of 2011 (see chapter  1).
Average spot earnings for Aframax across all
routes were estimated to be $14,885  per day in
2012, compared with $13,528 in 2011 (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013f). The operating costs
of Aframax modern vessels run around $8,000–
$9,000 per day.


Table3.3. BalticExchangeIndex


2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Percentage change (2012/2011)
2013


(Estimate)
DirtyTankerIndex 1 510 581 896 782 719 -8 638
CleanTankerIndex 1 155 485 732 721 641 -11 649


Source: Clarkson Research Services, Shipping Intelligence Network – Timeseries, 2013.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201374


The freight levels of Panamax crude tankers were
healthier than expected but still relatively low. This
could be attributed to declining overall volumes of
United States crude import levels, and upsizing, with
charterers fixing larger vessels at the expense of the
smaller Panamax tankers. Average Panamax dirty
products spot earnings increased from $10,535 in
2011 to $14,769 in 2012 (Clarkson Research Services,
2013f). Ultimately, the dependence of the Panamax
crude fleet on trade towards the United States,
coupled with the shift in the crude tanker market
towards larger vessels, is likely to make Panamax
crude trading largely obsolete in the medium term
(Clarkson Research Services, 2013f).


The product tanker market also witnessed an unstable
year. The average Baltic Clean Tanker Index for 2012
was down 11 per cent from the previous year average.
Weak economic growth led to low demand for oil
products, thereby compounding the large oversupply
of vessels. High bunker prices exacerbated the
situation further. With clean capacity rising by 2 per
cent (OPEC, 2013) and distance-adjusted demand
growing by 0.7  per cent,13 the imbalance between
supply and demand persisted in 2012. However,
some peak periods occurred, mainly due to demand
stemming from the chartering activity of Asian
countries in the Persian Gulf.


Table3.4. Tankermarketsummary–cleananddirtyspotrates,2012–2013(Worldscale)


Source: UNCTAD secretariat, based on Drewry Shipping Insight, various issues.
Note: The figures are indexed per ton voyage charter rates for a tanker of 75,000 dwt. The basis is the value WS 100.


2010 2011


Dec Dec Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May


VLCC/ULCC (200 000 dwt+)
Persian Gulf–Japan 61 59 67 52 59 63 63 44 36 35 38 37 41 48 -18.6 43 33 34 33 38
Persian Gulf–Republic of Korea 56 56 61 51 58 58 55 41 33 34 38 35 40 46 -17.9 41 31 33 31 36
Persian Gulf–Caribbean/East Coast
of North America 36 37 40 34 35 42 39 30 24 23 25 23 27 28 -24.3 26 17 18 17 22
Persian Gulf–Europe 57 59 .. 52 40 44 39 29 25 24 .. 22 30 26 -55.9 41 20 17 18 19
West Africa–China .. 58 61 55 59 62 60 44 37 36 40 41 49 47 -19.0 43 34 36 37 37


Suezmax (100 000–160 000 dwt)
West Africa–North-West Europe 118 86 91 77 87 68 81 70 65 57 56 59 58 70 -18.6 62 57 59 62 53
West Africa–Caribbean/East Coast
of North America 103 83 85 75 84 65 81 66 63 56 55 57 56 65 -21.7 59 52 57 57 53
Mediterranean–Mediterranean 113 86 98 86 84 73 93 85 69 64 56 62 66 67 -22.1 70 66 73 67 62


Aframax (70 000–100 000 dwt)


North-West Europe–North-West Europe 162 122 111 93 95 99 98 94 89 87 84 89 82 93 -23.8 88 87 94 94 80
North-West Europe–Caribbean/
East Coast of North America 120 .. 119 99 .. .. 99 .. .. .. .. .. 75 80 .. .. 85 .. ..


Caribbean–Caribbean/East Coast
of North America 146 112 118 129 112 131 115 105 94 94 89 91 110 91 -18.8 84 96 102 87 110
Mediterranean–Mediterranean 138 130 105 82 104 94 87 100 95 82 76 78 79 85 -34.6 82 85 86 84 71
Mediterranean–North-West Europe 133 118 97 82 105 91 85 92 100 81 75 77 77 80 -32.2 84 86 90 79 68
Indonesia–Far East 111 104 100 90 60 85 82 86 43 90 98 94 92 90 -13.5 83 74 68 72 68


Panamax (40 000 - 70 000 dwt)
Mediterranean–Mediterranean 168 153 147 157 147 140 125 120 120 .. 116 .. 154 168 9.8 135 145 115 12 125
Mediterranean–Caribbean/East Coast
of North America 146 121 124 121 118 127 137 127 105 111 114 134 126 160 32.2 98 100 104 111 100
Caribbean–East Coast of
North America/Gulf of Mexico 200 133 113 148 145 131 151 141 102 .. 118 105 130 156 17.3 115 133 138 113 118


All clean tankers
70 000–80 000 dwt Persian Gulf–Japan 125 105 100 86 84 91 88 91 99 104 96 107 122 116 10.5 88 81 93 96 80
50 000–60 000 dwt Persian Gulf–Japan 128 119 107 101 100 117 114 105 125 120 116 114 133 144 21.0 109 97 124 120 97
35 000–50 000 dwt Caribbean–East Coast of


North America/Gulf of Mexico 158 155 150 165 152 155 123 .. 100 108 105 117 164 162 4.5 120 126 60 120 132
25 000–35 000 dwt Singapore–East Asia 193 .. .. 150 155 183 223 .. 170 .. 190 205 215 220 199 185 199 191 175


Vessel type Routes


2012 Percentagechange
Dec. 2012/
Dec. 2011


2013




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 75


The overall decline in tanker freight rates has
encouraged shipowners to reduce their operating
costs considerably and in particular, bunker
consumption. The trend of maximizing fleet efficiency,
slow steaming, scrapping and idling some ships
observed in 2011 also increased in 2012.


The overall picture of the tanker market and tanker
freight rates has evolved since the 2008 global
economic and financial crisis. During the boom, the
tanker market was a robust one influenced by strong
import growth from the North Atlantic and Asia, with
supply capacities under control and freight rates
relatively high. Since then, the tanker market has slipped
into recession; average freight rates for most vessel
sizes and routes have decreased, including eastern and
western destinations. This has been compounded by
high oil prices that also modified consumer behaviour,
while environmental pressure and technical innovation
helped improve energy efficiency and reduce demand
for oil products (Clarkson Research Services, 2013e).


As a result, owners suffered from poor earnings and
some have been facing default or bankruptcy. For
example, the United States crude oil transportation firms,
General Maritime Corporation12 (Bloomberg, 2013a) and
Overseas Shipholding (Bloomberg, 2013b), filed for
bankruptcy protection in 2011, as they suffered from
slumping freight rates and global tonnage overcapacity
after having taken out big loans to fund fleet expansion.


More tanker companies may continue facing trouble
and new bankruptcies may emerge, as a significant
number of time charter contracts signed during the
boom years in early 2008 were to end in 2013. The
forecast of new bankruptcies comes after a recent poll
by Lloyd’s List found that 33 per cent of voters expected
more than four publicly listed tanker companies to be
in trouble in 2013 (Lloyd’s List, 2013a). Owners who
signed longer-term charters in early 2008 had been
enjoying high five-year time charter values – but that is
going to change. Modern 310,000 dwt VLCC contract
prices halved from $62,500 per day in August 2008 to
$31,000 in December 2012. Suezmax and Aframax
rates experienced a 40  per cent drop during that
period, while five-year contract prices for medium-range
product tankers fell by one third (Lloyd’s List, 2013b).


Conclusion


In 2014 and 2015, tanker freight rates should see
some improvement as cargo demand and fleet
supply become more balanced. However, in the long
run, several factors, mainly relating to oil demand,


production and industry developments, may influence
the tanker market. These are:
• Changes in consumption patterns are taking place in


the global oil market as energy efficiency and clean
transport programmes are being adopted in most
OECD countries and many developing countries;


• The United States, a major oil consumer, is
predicted to become the world’s largest oil
producer by 2020;


• Refineries are moving from the West to the East,
with the closure of refineries in the United States
and Europe and the growth of Indian, Chinese and
Middle Eastern refineries;


• Arctic routes are being opened up (North West
and North East passages) and the Panama Canal
is being widened and is expected to be opened to
Suezmaxes in 2015 (Barry Rogliano Salles, 2013); 14


• New energy efficiency measures, introduced by
IMO and which came into force at the start of
2013, aim to reduce vessel energy consumption
and to increase the use of environmentally less
damaging fuels.15


These changes, combined with fleet development,
will have an impact on the development of the tanker
market, freight rates and volatility mix movement.16


3. Dry bulk freight rates
Like other shipping markets, the dry bulk market,
generally categorized either as major bulk (iron ore,
coal, grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphate rock) or
minor bulk (agricultural products, mineral cargoes,
cement, forest products and steel products), has
also suffered from the severe overcapacity and slow
economy growth that have sustained low freight and
charter rates (Clarkson Research Services, 2013e; Barry
Rogliano Salles, 2013; Danish Ship Finance, 2013). As
a result, earnings in all fleet segments continued to fall.
Overall, bulk carrier average earnings went down to
$6,579 per day in 2012, 41 per cent lower than in 2011
(Clarkson Research Services, 2013e).


As shown in figure 3.3, the Baltic Exchange Dry Index
started 2012 with a sudden plunge from a temporal
average spike of 1,928 points in the last quarter of 2011
to 867 in the first quarter of 2012. By the third quarter
of 2012, the index averaged the lowest since 1998,
approaching the record lows of 1986. The average
Baltic Exchange Dry Index for 2012 was 923, down by
some 40 per cent from the annual average of 2011.


Given these low rates, most vessels, especially in the
larger segments, were running below operating costs.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201376


Figure3.4. Dailyearningsofbulkcarriervessels,2007–2013(Dollars perday)


Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Clarkson Shipping Intelligence Network, figures published by the London Baltic Exchange.
Note: Supramax – average of the six time charter routes; Panamax – average of the four time charter routes; Capesize – average


of the four time charter routes.


0


50 000


100 000


150 000


200 000


250 000


20
07


-0
5


20
07


-0
7


20
07


-0
9


20
07


-1
1


20
08


-0
1


20
08


-0
3


20
08


-0
5


20
08


-0
7


20
08


-0
9


20
08


-1
1


20
09


-0
1


20
09


-0
3


20
09


-0
5


20
09


-0
7


20
09


-0
9


20
09


-1
1


20
10


-0
1


20
10


-0
3


20
10


-0
5


20
10


-0
7


20
10


-0
9


20
10


-1
1


20
11


-0
1


20
11


-0
3


20
11


-0
5


20
11


-0
7


20
11


-0
9


20
11


-1
1


20
12


-0
1


20
12


-0
3


20
12


-0
5


20
12


-0
7


20
12


-0
9


20
12


-1
1


20
13


-0
1


20
13


-0
3


20
13


-0
5


20
13


-0
7


20
13


-0
9


Panamax
Capesize
Supramax


Figure3.3. BalticExchangeDryIndex,2007–2013(Indexbaseyear1985–1,000points)


10 318


1 928


867


1 024


846


953


0


2 000


4 000


6 000


8 000


10 000


12 000
20


07
-Q


2


20
07


-Q
3


20
07


-Q
4


20
08


-Q
1


20
08


-Q
2


20
08


-Q
3


20
08


-Q
4


20
09


-Q
1


20
09


-Q
2


20
09


-Q
3


20
09


-Q
4


20
10


-Q
1


20
10


-Q
2


20
10


-Q
3


20
10


-Q
4


20
11


-Q
1


20
11


-Q
2


20
11


-Q
3


20
11


-Q
4


20
12


-Q
1


20
12


-Q
2


20
12


-Q
3


20
12


-Q
4


20
13


-Q
1


20
13


-Q
2


Source: UNCTAD, based on London Baltic Exchange data.
Abbreviation: Q – quarter
Note: The index is made up of 20 key dry bulk routes measured on a time charter basis. The index covers Handysize, Supramax,


Panamax and Capesize dry bulk carriers, carrying commodities such as coal, iron ore and grain.




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 77


Figure  3.4 illustrates daily earnings of three different
vessels sizes: Capesize, Supramax and Panamax. It
clearly shows that Capesize vessels was the segment
that was hardest hit during a troubled and volatile year.


Capesize market


The biggest surge in newbuild vessels delivery took
place in the Capesize market, where more than 280
Capesizes (Barry Rogliano Salles, 2013) were delivered
in 2012, exerting supply-side pressure on the market
and resulting in weak earnings. With 12  per cent
Capesize fleet growth in 2012, which was lower than
the 19 per cent expansion recorded in 2011 (Clarkson
Research Services, 2013e), it still represented more
than twice the growth in iron ore trade, largely serviced
by Capesize vessels. This market imbalance led to a
fall in average Capesize earnings to $8,356 per day
in 2012, down 54 per cent year over year. Only the
last quarter of 2012 witnessed a short peak in rates,
where average earnings surpassed $10,000 a day
during the same period, with a peak of $22,000 per
day in October, sustained by a greater increase in
Chinese iron ore import demand (Clarkson Research
Services, 2013e).


On average, Capesize time charter rates were also
lower in 2012 with a general decline over the year. At
the start of 2012, the one-year time charter rate for
a 170,000 dwt vessel stood at $17,562 per day, but
had fallen to $11,750 per day by the end of December
2012, a disastrous development compared with the
all-time high average of $161,600 per day in October
2007 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013a).


Panamax market


With an expansion of 13  per cent in the deployed
capacity of Panamax fleets, oversupply had yet again
a considerable effect on the Panamax market, despite
the growth in steam coal trade, which increased
12 per cent in 2012.


With average earnings decreasing to just $5,838
a day in 2012, down 49 per cent, shipowners were
operating below the average levels required to cover
benchmark expenses.


Panamax time charter rates were also exposed to
significant downward pressure, with the one-year time
charter rate for a 75,000 dwt bulk carrier falling from a
low average of $11,100 per day at the start of 2012,
to $7,750  per day by the end of December 2012,


compared with an average of $79,375  per day in
October 2007 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013a).


Handy markets


Supramax


The Supramax markets in 2012 were affected by a
combination of additional supply-side pressure and
a slower growth of minor bulk trade. The average
Supramax trip earnings reached $8,857  per day,
down 36 per cent year over year. Although Supramax
earnings in 2012 remained above the benchmark
levels required to cover operating expenses, profit
margins of owners remained under substantial
pressure. Earnings in the first half of 2012 were on
average 20 per cent higher than in the second half,
as further rapid supply growth took its toll, while trade
volumes of some commodities weakened.


The average one-year time charter rate remained low,
around $8,750 per day in December 2012, compared
with $11,250 in January 2012.


Handysize


Despite slower expansion in the Handysize fleet, which
stood at a mere 1 per cent in 2012, compared with
previous years of strong deliveries, weaker growth in
minor bulk trade contributed to a further decrease in
Handysize rates in 2012.


The one-year time charter rate for a 30,000 dwt
vessel began the year at an already relatively low level
of $9,750  per day. It declined slowly, but steadily,
throughout 2012 to reach $7,250 per day by the end
of December. However, rates in the Atlantic Basin were
significantly higher than those in the Pacific. Supramax
rates in the Atlantic were about $9,900 ($16,500 in
2011) compared with $7,900 in the Pacific ($11,300
in 2011). Handysize rates were about $8,600 in the
Atlantic, compared with $7,000 in the Pacific. These
fluctuations can be explained by demand volatility
induced namely by a drop in Indian iron ore trade,
largely serviced by Supramaxes and Handysizes,
and a large number of deliveries of new ships out of
the Asian shipyards, which continued to put a heavy
burden on supply.


Overall and similarly to the other segments of shipping
markets, the continued deterioration of the dry bulk
market pressed owners to take radical measures
such as scrapping plans, deferring the delivery of new
vessels, slow steaming, idling ships and implementing
fuel efficiency programmes to cut costs and keep debt
levels low.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201378


Nevertheless, given the huge losses faced by the
market, several owners were not able to subsist and
had to file for bankruptcy. A recent example is Excel
Maritime Carriers Ltd, as it could no longer service its
debts. Other casualties include the United Kingdom’s
oldest shipping firm, Stephenson Clarke Shipping,
and Italy’s Deiulemar Shipping (Reuters, 2013).


Conclusion


In the short term, market conditions are likely to remain
challenging for dry bulk shipping. Thus, the strength
of Chinese demand growth for dry bulk imports will
remain a key influence in offsetting the supply side of
the oversupplied bulk market. However, a slower pace
of newbuilding deliveries and a sustained rhythm of
demolition should contribute to a more balanced dry
bulk market in the future.


B. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
SHIPPING FINANCE: GREATER
INVOLVEMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY


This section provides a brief overview of recent
developments in the shipping finance sector, with a
special focus on private equity and its growing role in
the wake of the 2008 global economic and financial
meltdown.


Over the past few years, private equity funds, new
players to this industry, have been showing growing
interest and gaining momentum in filling the gap of
traditional bank finance. Between 2011 and 2012,
private equity funds financed no less than 22 shipping
transactions with an aggregate magnitude of more than
$6.4 billion (Maritime Briefing, 2013). This new source
of capital is much welcomed by the sector, which has
been facing tighter credit markets, low charter rates and
heavy losses since the economic and financial crisis.


1. Theshippingfinancemarketbefore
and after 2008


Prior to 2008, shipping finance was widely available
as the industry was experiencing a period of sound
growth and historically high shipping rates. Many
shipping companies expanded and placed long-term
orders for large numbers of newbuild vessels. From
2003 to 2008, the newbuild market was booming –
new ships worth $800 billion were ordered, with half of
the orders placed in 2007–2008, when vessel prices


were at their peak (Stopford, 2010). Banks loans were
easily accessible, up to 80 per cent of loan to value
for new vessels, leaving little margin for error in vessel
values. Most of the new vessels were scheduled for
delivery in the years immediately following the financial
crisis of 2008 (PIMCO, 2012).


However, the global recession brought about by the
economic and financial crisis produced a completely
new scenario. After 2008, the slow growth of global
demand for goods on one hand, and a new supply of
vessels entering the market on the other, sent charter
rates plummeting in most markets. As a result, ship
values also collapsed, causing the shipping industry to
struggle with losses, loans defaults and bankruptcies.
Added to this was the need to find financing for
newbuild vessels under yard contracts that could not
be assigned or cancelled (Maritime Briefing, 2013).


In turn, the banking sector struggled, dealing with
default payments and decreased value for the
collateral that secured their loans. However, with the
price of vessels plunging to levels below outstanding
debt, banks preferred to defer repayments and to
restructure the terms of loans in order to avoid writing
off defaulting loans and forcing vessel foreclosures.
Currently, there are about $500  billion in shipping
debts. Of this, 40 top banks hold more than 90 per
cent; the top 12 banks account for over half, and
more than 80 per cent of shipping debt is financed by
European banks (PIMCO, 2012). Losses were more
pronounced for German banks, major financiers of the
sector. For example, Nordbank announced that it had
increased loan impairment charges by almost threefold
for its ship portfolio in 2012. This situation prompted
the German regulator BaFin to take action and place
greater scrutiny on banks’ shipping exposures in 2012
(Maritime Briefing, 2013).


In an effort to protect their existing assets, traditional
banks have started restricting their financing or
pulling out from financing the industry over the past
few years. In fact, the top 10 banks in shipping have
reduced their shipping loan books by over $50 billion
since 2008 (PIMCO, 2O12). This has made the
shipping market more difficult and influenced further
price downturns for second-hand ships. Yet, at a
time when many traditional European bankers such
as Nordbank, Commerzbank, Société Générale, BNP
Paribas, Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking
Group are downsizing their shipping exposure, other
mainly non-European banks are entering the market.
United States banks such as Citigroup and Bank of
America Corporation have become more active.17 This




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 79


may be explained by the fact that banks in the United
States are less constrained than European lenders by
the cost of funding in dollars and the impact of the
new Basel III regulations, which are explained further
below. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia and
Chinese banks have also increased their focus on the
shipping industry.


In the future and given the constraints encountered,
banks may not intervene in financing the sector to the
same extent as in the past. As the market slowed, the
perceived safety of vessels as assets weakened, and
lenders have grown cautious. Traditional finance may
be available but subject to more stringent requirements
(today banks finance up to 60 per cent loan–to–value
ratio for new vessels) and regulations, including the
implementation of the Basel III frameworks, which
create new regulatory millstones. The Basel III
agreement will require new capital ratios for banks
and is expected to be implemented gradually between
2013 and 2019. One of the main outcomes of Basel
III will be a significant rise in the banking industry’s
capital requirements, potentially requiring more core
equity capital by shipowners and raising the cost of
credit of traditional financing sources (KPMG, 2012).


The increasing role of export-import banks and
export credit agencies


The retreat of traditional bank lending reinforced the
role of export credit agencies and export-import (Exim)
banks in the sector. To stimulate sector development
and deals, export credit agencies have strengthened
their programmes to support the financing of vessels.
Key credit and guarantee agencies include Japan,
the Republic of Korea, Brazil, Germany and Norway,
which financed deals totaling $19.8  billion between
January 2012 and April 2013 (Lloyd’s List, 2013c).


On the other hand, the Export-Import Bank of China
has allocated a bigger share to ship finance to help
shipowners weather the current crisis. With a $12 billion
shipping portfolio in 2012, it is expected to increase
its investment by 20 per cent in 2013 (Barry Rogliano
Salles, 2013). Moreover, it has been actively seeking
new partnerships with other ship financing banks to
increase its exposure to syndicated shipping loans.
The Bank has also established a policy to encourage
funding orders by foreign owners in the Chinese
shipyards to support shipbuilding. This is illustrated
in agreements signed in May 2013 with three Greek
shipping companies, Diana Shipping, Angelicoussis
and Dynagas, to provide them with loans to order high-
end vessels in Chinese yards (Chinadaily.com, 2013).


The declining role of the German limited
partnership system


An important form of shipping finance directly
related to a specific country is the German limited
partnership, commonly known by its acronym KG
(Kommanditgesellschaft). In the 1970’s, the KG model
was established in Germany to raise private equity as a
form of financing for projects. KG funds are tax-driven
structures in the form of a German limited partnership
that acquires funds from private investors participating
in single-purpose companies and leveraged by bank
loans. The KG structure is exempted from corporate
tax and thus considered to be a cheaper source of
financing than banks.


KG financing covers several types of assets: ships, real
estate, aviation, renewable energy, natural resources,
infrastructure, containers, life insurance policies, films
and other media rights.


In the case of shipping, finance is used to buy a
specific vessel (mainly containers) with a charter
to a German owner and debt sourced from a
German bank. In a typical case of KG financial
structure, most often a shipowner will assign or
sell and charter back the vessel to a the KG fund
or special-purpose company, which is set up to
primarily own the vessel during the charter hire
period. The arranger (the fund) of the structure
will negotiate with banks and sell the equity to a
group of private German individuals, who will use
the investment to reduce their income taxes. The
arranger will then run the transaction and pay
dividends to private investors. The fund or single-
purpose company will be liquidated after the ship
is sold. (See figure 3.5.).


At first, the generous tax breaks offered to investors
made the scheme very popular. It has been estimated
that around one third of the world’s container ships
was financed by such partnerships (Journal of
Commerce, 2013).


However, following the ongoing and prolonged
shipping downturn, the KG system has faced a major
crisis. More than 150 single-ship funds have filed for
bankruptcy in 2012, and a further 500 to 1,000 risk
insolvency, according to some estimates (Journal
of Commerce, 2013). Investors have therefore lost
faith in the current KG financing model for shipping
investments, and shipping companies are seeking
complementary or alternative modes and sources of
ship financing (KPMG, 2012).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201380


2. Private equity in the shipping
market


In this difficult shipping context, many private equity
funds have seized the opportunity created by tight
credit markets and historically low vessel values to
invest in ships and shipping companies.


Private equity interest in shipping had started rather
slowly, with many funds sensing an opportunity but
waiting to make their investments at the bottom of
the market cycle. The sector, with its cyclical and
volatile charter rates markets, is not a typical private
equity target. Private equity investors consider that the
volatility and downside risks of the sector have made
it unattractive. However, recent developments, such
as the drop in asset prices, the range of investment
opportunities and portfolio sales, the scarcity of
available finance and the belief that the market has
hit bottom, have enticed many private equity firms
to enter the market. According to estimates, private
equity investments in the industry accounted for about
2 per cent of the shipping companies’ enterprise value
in 2013. This amount could double by the end of
2014 if alternative funding markets remain unavailable
(Financial Times, 2013b).


Private equity investment in the shipping industry


Private equity funds vary greatly in size and investment
objectives. Some private equity funds look for long-term
returns; others seek to make high returns on short-or


medium-term investments (three to seven years). The
latter have been the main force attracting private equity
funds to the shipping sector, which is cyclical and has
expectations for recovery and long-term growth.


Private equity generally consists of making
investments in equities of non-listed companies.
Besides capital, the investors become active owners
and would usually provide the companies with
strategic and managerial support to create value and
resell at a higher price. Value creation in private equity
is primarily based on achieving increased growth and
operational efficiency in acquired companies. The
type of investments can include a number of different
structures, as follows:


• Direct equity or investment in companies;


• Bridge financing and mezzanine financing for
shipping companies needing short-term liquidity;


• Debtor in possession, which entails buying the
debt of operators or buying portfolios of vessels;


• Sale-leaseback transactions, which entail vessel
sales of shipping companies to leasing companies,
a large cash inflow and leasing the vessel back
from the leasing company in order to maintain
operations;


• Joint ventures formed to acquire, manage and sell
shipping businesses.


The overall objective is to sell these investments and
generate above-market returns once the market
rebounds. In the context of shipping, private equity


Figure3.5. TheGermanlimitedpartnershipmodel


Shipyard


Private
investors




Financing
institutions




Charter


Single-purpose
company


Loan amount


Loan agreement


Collateral, principal,
interest




Time charter agreement


Vessel


Charter payment


Equity


Returns


Shipbuilding
contract




Vessel
Equity




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 81


Table3.5. Selectedrecentprivateequityinvestmentsinshipping


Investor
Value estimate


(millions of
dollars)


Asset type Company Type of investment Year


Riverstone Holdings LLC
Zhejiang Marine Leasing Co.


18 Clean product carriers
Vessel (Zhong Chang
118)


Ridgebury Tankers LLC
Yangxi Zhong Chang
Marine


Directequity/investment
Sale and leaseback
agreement


2013


Oaktree Capital 135 Product tanker Newco 5 medium-range product
tankers from Torm


2013


Oaktree & Goldman Sachs 150 Excel Maritime Debt
(from Nordea Bank)


Bank debt 2013


Kelso & Company LP 126 Containers (2 x 6
900 TEUships)


Technomar Shipping Joint venture 2013


Ontario Teachers Pension
Plan


470 507 000 containers
(795000 TEUs)


SeaCube Container
Leasing Ltd.


Direct investment 2013


Seaborne Intermodal
(Lindsay Goldberg LLC)


420 Container Buss Capital Containeracquisition
(275 000 containers)


2013


Roullier, Group BPCE 147 Dry bulkers (4 x fuel-
efficientHandysizebulk)


Louis Dreyfus Armateurs Joint venture 2013


Perella Weinberg Southern
Cross Latin America Private
EquityFunds


220 Product tankers Prime Marine Ultrapetrol Joint venture Direct
equity/investment


2012


Leasing company formed
by Regions Bank and the
Royal Bank of Scotland


59 Pure car truck carrier International Shipholding
Corporation


Sale and leaseback
agreement


2012


Global Hunter Securities
Trailer Bridge


15 Trailer Bridge, Inc Debtor in possession 2011


JP Morgan Project cargo/modern
and young heavy lift
vessels


Harren (SUMO Shipping) Joint venture 2011


Consortium led by WL Ross &
Co. (First Reserve Corporation,
China Investment Corporation)


1 000 Medium-range product
tankers


Diamond S Shipping Directequityinvestment 2011


Alterna Capital Partners 100 Product Tankers/
Supramax


Solo/Western Bulk 2010–
2012


Apollo Management 200 Suezmax tankers Principal Maritime
First Ship Lease Ltd


2010


Kelso & Company 200 Supramax bulkers Delphin Shipping LLC 2010


Littlejohn/Northern 100 Container ships Soundview Maritime LLC 2010


Kelso & Company Container ships Poseidon Container
Holdings LLC


2010


Carlyle 1 000 Container ships CGI (with Seaspan) 2010


Eton Park/ Rhone Capital 175 Container ships Euromar 2010


GreenbriarEquityGroup 100 Product tankers Seacove Shipping Partners 2009


Sterling Partners 170 Tankers and barges
flyingUnitedStatesflag


United States Shipping 2009


Fortress Investments 100 Handysize bulkers Clipper Bulk 2009


Blackstone/Cerberus 500 Tankersflying
UnitedStatesflag


American Petroleum Tankers 2008


New Mountain Capital Projectcargoflying
UnitedStatesflag


Intermarine Andre Grikitis 2008


Source: Marine Money, Watson, Farley & Williams, Lloyds, McQuilling Services and other sources.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201382


investors are capitalizing not only on the companies,
but also on the projected growth of the market
where companies are operating. This would require
strong cooperation between shipping and private
equity partners, and a good understanding of
industry fundamentals and maritime dynamics and
regulations, in particular of the following (Maritime
Briefing, 2013):


• The shipping market is characterized largely
by cyclical movements. These movements can
expose investors to high volatility, which leads to
high profits, but to considerable losses as well;


• Investments in shipping companies and shipping
assets can expose private equity funds to liability
under laws and regulations relating to competition
and foreign sanctions, for example;


• The choice of a vessel entails various considerations
that should be carefully weighed when buying
ships (e.g. ship classifications, newbuilding ships
versus ships in operation);


• The choice of flag can have a significant impact
on the cost of operations, chartering modalities,
financing and taxation issues;


• Expertise is required in the negotiation of yard
contracts, charters, commercial and technical ship
management agreements, and loan documents.
Shipping is also subject to special environmental
laws and regulations that can be a source of
significant liability.


Impacts of private equity on the shipping industry


The growth of private equity can influence the shipping
industry in several ways:


• In 2012, it was estimated that about $65 billion in
new debt and equity alone were needed to cover
orders of new ships, as well as sales and purchases
of existing vessels. In 2013 and 2014, the gap
will be $101  billion and $83  billion, respectively


(Bloomberg, 2012). Untapped private equity funds,
estimated to be around $1  trillion (CNN Money,
2012) can fill this gap and help the industry generate
economic growth and create new jobs;


• The emergence of private equity investment would
likely lead to further consolidation in the industry.
Under ongoing difficult circumstances, carriers
have been struggling to make profits because of
an overcapacity of vessels, slumping demand and
high operating costs. This may prompt private
equity investors to seek market consolidation with
the aim of controlling supply of tonnage and costs,
hence achieving price discipline and economies of
scale;


• Vertical integration is another possibility for private
equity funds. As private equity makes inroads into
the sector, vertically integrated investment may be
associated with its strategy for increased control
and competitive advantage gain. Because of the
high level of specialization in the maritime transport
sector, there are significant opportunities for the
vertical integration of companies into one or all
parts of the transport value chain and logistics.
Private equity funds that already have investments
in several related activities might consider merging
them into more a capital-intensive industry.


In conclusion, the role of private equity funds appears
fundamental for the growth of the sector and could
affect its development in several ways, including
through the consolidation and vertical integration of
transport services. This would call for improving the
efficiency of the sector and building more financially
sound companies. However, it must also be kept
in mind that private equity funds are temporary
investors whose overall objective is to sell or float
their investments once the market rebounds. While
their investment horizon is typically between three and
seven years, they would wish to be able to make their
own decision at any time as to the exit period in order
to maximize profits.




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 83


REFERENCES


Alphaliner (2013). Alphaliner Weekly Newsletter. 4 February.


Barry Rogliano Salles (2013). 2013 Annual Review: Shipping and Shipbuilding Markets. Barry Rogliano Salles.


BIMCO (2013). The shipping market in 2012 and looking forward. Available at https://www.bimco.org/Reports/Market_
Analysis/2013/0104_Reflections.aspx (accessed 5 August 2013).


Bloomberg (2011). Bank retreat on shipping seen filled by private equity: Freight. 23 May. Available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2012-05-22/bank-retreat-on-shipping-seen-filled-by-private-equity-freight.html (accessed 2 September 2013).


Bloomberg (2012).General Maritime files for bankruptcy protection with $1.4 billion in debt. Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-11-17/general-maritime-files-for-bankruptcy-protection-with-1-4-billion-in-debt.html (accessed 31 July 2013).


Bloomberg (2013b). Overseas shipholding group files for bankruptcy. Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
14/overseas-shipholding-group-files-for-bankruptcy.html (accessed 31 July 2013).


Chinadaily.com (2013). EXIM bank to finance Greek ship owners. 21 May. Available at //www.chinadaily.com.
cn/business/2013-05/21/content_16516813.htm (accessed 1 September 2013).


Clarkson Research Services (2013a). Shipping Intelligence Network – Timeseries. Available at http://clarksons.net/sin2010/
ts/Default.aspx (accessed 31 July 2013).


Clarkson Research Services (2013b). Container Intelligence Quarterly, First Quarter 2013.


Clarkson Research Services (2013c). Container Intelligence Monthly. June.


Clarkson Research Services (2013d). Container Intelligence Monthly. May.


Clarkson Research Services (2013e). Shipping Review & Outlook. A Half Yearly Review of the Shipping Market.


Clarkson Research Services (2013f). Oil & Tanker Trade Outlook. January.


CNN Money (2012). Private equity has $1 trillion to invest. 31 July. Available at http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/07/31/
private-equity-has-1-trillion-to-invest/ (accessed 29 July 2013).


Danish Ship Finance (2013). Shipping Market Review. Available at http://www.shipfinance.dk/~/~/media/Shipping-Market-
Review/Shipping-Market-Review---April-2013.ashx (accessed 1 September 2013).


Drewry Container Insight (2013). Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM to join forces. 23 June.


Financial Times (2013a). “Big three” container shipping groups plan alliance. 18 June.


Financial Times (2013b). Private equity investment in shipping predicted to double. 20 June.


Journal of Commerce (2013). Container ship financing remains available despite collapse of Germany’s KG system. 12 March.
Available at http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/ships-shipbuilding/container-ship-financing-remains-available-despite-
collapse-germany%E2%80%99s-kg-system_20130312.html (accessed 29 July 2013).


KPMG (2012). Ship Financing in Flux: Searching for a New Course. Available at http://www.kpmg.com/UK/en/IssuesAndInsights/
ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/Market%20Sector/Transport/ship-financing-in-flux.pdf (accessed 1 September 2013).


Lloyd’s List (2013a). Opinion poll predicts tanker bankruptcies. 10 January. Available at http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/
tankers/article414768.ece (accessed 31 July 2013).


Lloyd’s List (2013b). Clock is ticking on tanker company bankruptcies. 18 January. Available at http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/
sector/tankers/article415255.ece (accessed 31 July 2013).


Lloyd’s List (2013c). Nor-Shipping: Norway’s export credit agency favours safety and crew competence. Available at
http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/finance/article423950.ece (accessed 31 July 2013).


Lloyd’s List Containerisation International (2013). Asia–Europe rates double. 28 June. Available at http://www.lloydslist.com/
ll/sector/containers/article425313.ece.


Lloyd’s Loading List.com (2013a). Slow steaming: Everyone’s a winner now? 7 January. Available at http://www.lloydsloadinglist.
com/freight-directory/news/slow-steaming-everyones-a-winner-now/20018015270.htm#.Udl464j8LIU).


Lloyd’s Loading List.com (2013b). Top box lines lost $239m last year. 10 April. Available at http://www.lloydsloadinglist.com/
freight-directory/sea/top-box-lines-lost-239m-last-year/20018037395.htm


Maritime Briefing (2013). Private equity investments in ships and shipping companies. Watson, Farley & Williams. February.
Available at http://www.wfw.com/Publications/Publication1209/$File/WFW-Maritime-PrivateEquityGetsInterested.pdf
(accessed 1 September 2013).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201384


OPEC (2013). Monthly oil market report. February 2013. OPEC.


PIMCO (2012). Viewpoints. Global shipping: Any port in a storm? Available at http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/
Devabhaktuni-and-Kennedy-on-Global-Shipping.aspx (accessed 31 July 2013).


Reuters (2013). Outlook brightens for drybulk shippers, but fewer left afloat. 28 June (accessed 1 September 2013).


SeeNews Shipping (2012). US Genmar emerges from bankruptcy. 18 May. Available at http://shipping.seenews.com/news/
us-genmar-emerges-from-bankruptcy-276664 (accessed 9 September 2013).


Stopford M (2010). “A Year of Decisions for Shipping: How Will the Markets Develop?” Presentation made at the Financial
Times Deutschland Ship Finance Conference. SMM International Trade Fair, Hamburg, Germany. 6 September.
Available at http://www.clarksons.net/archive/research/freestuff/Martin%20Stopford%20How%20Will%20the%20
Market%20Develop%20%20Sept%2010%202010%20%28paper%29.pdf (accessed 1 September 2013).




CHAPTER 3: FREIGHT RATES AND MARITIME TRANSPORT COSTS 85


ENDNOTES
1 The benchmark Rotterdam bunker price (380 centistokes) peaked at $712 per ton in March 2012 (Clarkson Research


Services, 2013a).
2 Total idle containership capacity expanded from 3.6 per cent of the fleet at the end of 2011 to 5 per cent of the fleet


at the end of 2012 (Clarkson Research Services, 2013b). The most affected tonnage stands in the 3,000–5,000 TEU
range, comprising 40 per cent of total unemployed capacity at the end of 2012 (Barry Rogliano Salles, 2013).


3 It has been estimated that running a 10,000 TEU containership at 18–20 knots instead of the optimal cruising speed
of 20–25 knots can deliver daily savings of 175 tons of bunkers. Moreover, super-slow steaming at 15–18 knots can
save an additional 100 tons per day (Lloyds Loading List.com, 2013a).


4 Scrapping activity approached the record-high level of 2009, as more than 300,000 TEUs were scrapped (Danish Ship
Finance, 2013).


5 Based on Alphaliner’s survey of the operating results for 21 of the top 30 carriers that have published their financial
results for 2012. The survey shows that cumulative net losses of their parent companies, including the results of non-
liner shipping operations and various write-offs, reached $4.7 billion. See http://www.alphaliner.com/liner2/research_
files/newsletters/2013/no15/Alphaliner%20Newsletter%20no%2015%20-%202013.pdf.


6 CMA CGM registered the largest operating profit of $989 million, although this result includes its terminal business,
which contributed $200 million. Maersk Line came second, with a profit of $483 million. OOCL ranked third, with
$230 million. APL was the worst performer in terms of operating profit, reporting a loss of $279 million. In terms of
margin, SITC was the best performer, with a margin of 6.6 per cent. CMA CGM was second, with 6.2 per cent, and
Wan Hai third, with 4.5 per cent. CSAV was at the bottom of the list, with a margin of -5.6 per cent (Lloyds Loading
List.com, 2013b).


7 ConTex stands for “container ship time charter assessment”.
8 The proportion of the idle capacity owned by charter owners expanded from 45 per cent at the end of 2011 to 67 per


cent at the end of 2012. (Clarkson Research Services, 2013b).
9 Vessels larger than 8,000 TEUs have constituted 68 per cent of the capacity delivered to the sector over the last two


years. In recent years, smaller (2,000–3,000 TEUs) and mid-sized ships (3,000–5,100 TEUs) have been predominantly
deployed on the non-main lanes that have been enjoying higher growth rates.


10 Clean products refer to light, refined oil products such as jet fuel, gasoline and naphtha. These products are usually
carried in clean, coated tanks. Dirty products include refined oil products such as fuel oil, diesel oil or bunker oil.
(Clarkson Research Services, 2013e:37).


11 In general, clean tankers carry refined petroleum products such as gasoline, kerosene or jet fuels, or chemicals.
Dirty tankers carry heavier oils such as heavy fuel oils or crude oil. See http://www.shipfinance.dk/en/SHIPPING-
RESEARCH/Tankskibe/Produkttankskibe.


12 As a result of its financial restructuring, General Maritime reduced its outstanding debt by some $600 million and its
annual cash interest costs by some $42 million. In addition, the company received fresh capital of $175 million from
Oaktree Capital Management, which will now control 98 per cent of the company. It had had debts of more than
$1.3 billion before the restructuring (SeeNews Shipping, 2012).


13 Total product tanker trade grew by 1.4 per cent but fell to 0.7 per cent growth in travel distances because average
trading distances to Asia, Europe and North America shortened as supply shifted from long-haul trades to short-haul
trades (Danish Ship Finance, 2013).


14 However, there is still very much of a debate on whether the Arctic routes will be economically viable in the coming
decades, as substantial investments have to be made in the developing and maintaining of the required infrastructure
by the Russian Federation, which will lead to high costs of using this route.


15 MARPOL Annex VI stipulates that from 2015, ships steaming in emission control areas will be limited to the use of fuels
with no greater than 0.1 per cent sulphur content, which is anticipated to greatly increase demand for marine gas oil.
Another possible avenue for future bunker demand is the use of liquefied natural gas as fuel.


16 Some of these issues are also being covered in more detail in chapters 1 and 2 of the Review.
17 One example is the seven-year $140 million loan agreement to finance the construction of two VLCC tankers. It was


signed in 2012 between Sovcomflot (SCF Group) and Citigroup and Bank of America–Merrill Lynch.






This chapter covers container port throughput, port finance, selected global port
development projects and efforts aimed at assessing port performance. World container
port throughput increased by an estimated 3.8 per cent to 601.8 million TEUs in 2012.
This increase was lower than the estimated 7.3 per cent increase of 2011. The share of
Chinese mainland ports in total world container port throughput remains at an estimated
25 per cent. The financing of port infrastructure remains strong as investors continue
to seek long-term stable returns. Recent efforts by port customers to assess port
performance are leading towards an era of increased transparency in port operations
that could spur greater interport competition, increased port performance and reduced
transport costs.


PORT
DEVELOPMENTS


4




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201388


A. PORT THROUGHPUT
Port throughput is the amount of cargo that passes
through a port and is measured in volume or units and
categorized by cargo type. Ports are broadly categorized
into dedicated terminals (that is, usually reserved for
a single or small number of private cargo owners) or
common user terminals (open to any cargo owner to
use). This chapter deals with containerized cargo, which
accounts for 15.6 per cent by volume, but also more than
half in value, of international seaborne trade.


1. Container ports


Container port throughput is usually measured in the
number of TEUs moved. The latest figures available for
world container port traffic are given in table 4.1. Seventy-
six developing countries and economies in transition with
an annual national throughput of over 100,000 TEUs are
listed. (Annex IV shows port throughput figures for 127
countries/territories). In 2011, the container throughput
for developing economies grew by an estimated 8  per
cent to 406.9 million TEUs. This growth is lower than the
15.8 per cent seen in the previous year, when businesses
restocked inventories depleted because of uncertainties
surrounding the global economic crisis. The growth rate
for container throughput in developing economies for
2012 is still weak, estimated at 4.8 per cent.


Developing economies’ share of world throughput
continues to remain virtually unchanged at approximately
70  per cent. Out of the developing economies and
countries with economies in transition listed in table 4.1,
only four experienced negative growth in port throughput
in 2011, whereas in the previous year 10 countries
experienced negative growth. Of the top 10 developing
countries and countries with economies in transition, only
one, Brazil, is not located in Asia. Fifteen of the top 20
developing countries and countries with economies in
transition are also in Asia, while three are in Central and
South America (Brazil, Mexico and Panama) and two are
in Africa (Egypt and South Africa). The dominance of Asia
in container port throughput signifies the importance of
the region in international trade. The countries registering
the highest growth in 2012 were the Congo (44.6  per
cent), Ghana (30.0  per cent), Kenya (22.7  per cent),
Mauritus (19.1  per cent) Saudi Arabia (15.2  per cent),
the Russian Federation (14.3  per cent), South Africa
(10.9 per cent), the Philippines (8.7 per cent) and China
(7.7  per cent) . The country with the largest share of
container throughput continues to be China, with nine
of its ports, including Hong Kong (China) among the
top 20. Chinese ports, excluding Hong Kong (China),


experienced a positive growth of 9.2  per cent in 2011
to reach 143.8 million TEUs. Preliminary figures for 2011
show a reduced growth for Chinese port throughput to
around 6.9 per cent, at 155 million TEUs. Chinese ports,
with the exception of Hong Kong (China) and those of
Taiwan Province of China, accounted for around 25.3 per
cent of world container throughput in 2012, down slightly
from 25.8 per cent in the previous year (a more detailed
account of international trade demand and supply is
given in chapter 1).


Table 4.2 shows the world’s 20 leading container ports
for the period 2010–2012. The top 20 container ports
accounted for approximately 47  per cent of world
container port throughput in 2012. Combined, these
ports showed a 3.2 per cent increase in throughput in
2012, down from an 8.2 per cent increase in 2011. The
list includes 16 ports from developing economies, all
of which are in Asia; the remaining four ports are from
developed countries, three of which are located in Europe
and one in North America.


The overall picture that emerges is that while Asia
continues to lead the global demand for container port
services, growth is slowing. However, compared with
shipping, which is affected by an oversupply of vessels
and declining freight rates, the container port business
is growing.


B. FINANCING PORT INVESTMENTS
Financing new port development projects is capital
intensive. A recent study of the scale of future
infrastructure demand examined nine economies (Brazil,
China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Mexico, the
United Kingdom, and the United States), collectively
accounting for 60 per cent of world GDP, and found that
their annual spending on long-term investment totalled
$11.7  trillion for the year 2010. Extrapolating a range
of growth forecasts and investment projections from
external sources, the study estimated that developing
countries will need annual investment of $18.8 trillion in
real terms by 2020 to achieve even moderate levels of
economic growth (Group of 30, 2013).


While financing infrastructure from the public purse may
provide control of what infrastructure is created, in reality
money could be saved by transferring the majority of
projects to the private sector as sustainable businesses.
This is not always the case where the infrastructure
project may be more social than economic, for example,
building roads or bridges to remote communities with
small populations. However, on the whole, private
funding sources for infrastructure development seem




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 89


Table4.1. Containerportthroughputfor76developingcountries/territoriesandeconomiesintransitionfor
years2010,2011and2012(Twenty-footequivalentunits)


Country/territory 2010 2011 Preliminary figures for 2012


Percentage
change


2011–2010


Percentage
change


2012–2011


China 130 290 443 143 896 697 155 017 351 10.44 7.73


Singapore a 29 178 500 30 727 702 32 421 602 5.31 5.51


Hong Kong, China 23 699 242 24 384 000 23 100 000 2.89 -5.27


Republic of Korea 18 542 804 20 833 508 21 453 964 12.35 2.98


Malaysia 18 267 475 20 139 382 20 866 875 10.25 3.61


United Arab Emirates 15 176 524 16 780 386 17 211 602 10.57 2.57


Taiwan Province of China 12 736 855 13 473 418 13 977 453 5.78 3.74


India 9 752 908 9 979 224 9 826 249 2.32 -1.53


Indonesia 8 482 636 8 966 146 9 324 792 5.70 4.00


Brazil 8 138 608 8 536 262 8 864 368 4.89 3.84


Egypt 6 709 053 7 737 183 8 046 670 15.32 4.00


Thailand 6 648 532 7 171 394 7 372 298 7.86 2.80


Panama 6 003 298 6 911 325 7 187 778 15.13 4.00


Viet Nam 5 983 583 6 335 437 6 588 855 5.88 4.00


Saudi Arabia 5 313 141 5 694 538 6 557 448 7.18 15.15


Turkey 5 574 018 5 990 103 6 229 707 7.46 4.00


Philippines 4 947 039 5 264 086 5 720 749 6.41 8.68


Sri Lanka 4 000 000 4 262 887 4 433 402 6.57 4.00


South Africa 3 806 427 3 990 193 4 424 254 4.83 10.88


Mexico 3 693 956 4 080 434 4 243 651 10.46 4.00


Russian Federation 3 199 980 3 448 947 3 942 628 7.78 14.31


Chile 3 171 959 3 450 401 3 588 417 8.78 4.00


Oman 3 893 198 3 632 940 3 292 707 -6.68 -9.37


Islamic Republic of Iran 2 592 522 2 740 296 2 849 908 5.70 4.00


Colombia 2 443 786 2 402 742 2 498 852 -1.68 4.00


Pakistan 2 149 000 2 193 403 2 281 139 2.07 4.00


Argentina 2 021 676 2 159 110 2 245 474 6.80 4.00


Jamaica 1 891 770 1 999 601 2 079 585 5.70 4.00


Peru 1 534 056 1 814 743 1 887 332 18.30 4.00


Morocco 2 058 430 2 083 000 1 800 000 1.19 -13.59


Dominican Republic 1 382 680 1 461 492 1 519 952 5.70 4.00


Bangladesh 1 356 099 1 431 851 1 489 125 5.59 4.00


Bahamas 1 125 000 1 189 125 1 236 690 5.70 4.00


Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 1 226 508 1 162 326 1 208 819 -5.23 4.00


Ecuador 1 221 849 1 081 169 1 124 415 -11.51 4.00


Guatemala 1 012 360 1 070 065 1 112 867 5.70 4.00


Costa Rica 1 013 483 1 065 468 1 108 087 5.13 4.00


Kuwait 991 545 1 048 063 1 089 986 5.70 4.00


Kenya 696 000 735 672 903 000 5.70 22.74


Uruguay 671 952 861 164 895 611 28.16 4.00


Ghana 647 052 683 934 889 129 5.70 30.00


Lebanon 949 155 1 034 249 882 922 8.97 -14.63


Yemen 669 021 707 155 735 441 5.70 4.00


Ukraine 659 541 696 641 724 506 5.63 4.00




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201390


Country/territory 2010 2011 Preliminary figures for 2012


Percentage
change


2011–2010


Percentage
change


2012–2011


Syrian Arab Republic 649 005 685 998 713 438 5.70 4.00


Honduras 619 867 655 199 681 407 5.70 4.00


Jordan 619 000 654 283 680 454 5.70 4.00


Côte d'Ivoire 607 730 642 371 668 065 5.70 4.00


Djibouti 600 000 634 200 659 568 5.70 4.00


Trinidad and Tobago 573 217 605 890 630 126 5.70 4.00


Congo 338 916 358 234 518 000 5.70 44.60


Tunisia 466 398 492 983 512 702 5.70 4.00


Sudan 439 100 464 129 482 694 5.70 4.00


United Republic of Tanzania 429 285 453 754 471 904 5.70 4.00


Mauritius 332 662 350 624 417 467 5.40 19.06


Senegal 349 231 369 137 383 903 5.70 4.00


Qatar 346 000 365 722 380 351 5.70 4.00


Benin 316 744 334 798 348 190 5.70 4.00


Papua New Guinea 295 286 313 598 326 142 6.20 4.00


Bahrain 289 956 306 483 318 743 5.70 4.00


Cameroon 285 070 301 319 313 371 5.70 4.00


Algeria 279 785 295 733 307 562 5.70 4.00


Mozambique 254 701 269 219 279 988 5.70 4.00


Cuba 228 346 246 773 256 644 8.07 4.00


Georgia 226 115 239 004 248 564 5.70 4.00


Cambodia 224 206 236 986 246 465 5.70 4.00


Myanmar 190 046 200 879 208 914 5.70 4.00


Libya 184 585 195 106 202 910 5.70 4.00


Guam 183 214 193 657 201 403 5.70 4.00


Gabon 153 657 162 415 168 912 5.70 4.00


El Salvador 145 774 154 083 160 246 5.70 4.00


Madagascar 141 093 149 135 155 101 5.70 4.00


Croatia 137 048 144 860 150 654 5.70 4.00


Aruba 130 000 137 410 142 906 5.70 4.00


Nigeria 101 007 106 764 111 035 5.70 4.00


Brunei Darussalam 99 355 105 018 109 219 5.70 4.00


Sub total 375 760 063 406 133 627 425 712 710 8.08 4.82


Other reported b 796 607 746 145 772 903 -6.33 3.59


Total reported 376 556 670 406 879 772 426 485 613 8.05 4.82


World total 540816751 580022280 601772123 7.25 3.75


Table4.1. Containerportthroughputfor76developingcountries/territoriesandeconomiesintransitionfor
years2010,2011and2012(Twenty-footequivalentunits)(continued)


Sources: UNCTAD secretariat, derived from information contained in Lloyd’s List Intelligence (July 2013), from various Dynamar B.V.
publications, and information obtained by the UNCTAD secretariat directly from terminal and port authorities.


a In this list, Singapore includes the port of Jurong.


b The term “other reported” refers to countries for which fewer than 100,000 TEUs per year were reported.
Note: Many figures, especially for 2012, are estimates (thesefiguresareindicatedinitalics). Port throughput figures tend not to


be disclosed by ports until a considerable time after the end of the calendar year. Country totals may conceal the fact that
minor ports may not be included; therefore, in some cases, the actual figures may be higher than those given.




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 91


Port name 2010 2011 Preliminary figures for 2012
Percentage change


2011–2010
Percentage change


2012–2011


Shanghai 29 069 000 31 700 000 32 500 000 9.05 2.52


Singapore 28 431 100 29 937 700 31 600 000 5.30 5.55


Hong Kong (China) 23 699 242 24 384 000 23 100 000 2.89 -5.27


Shenzhen 22 509 700 22 569 800 22 940 000 0.27 1.64


Busan 14 194 334 16 184 706 17 030 000 14.02 5.22


Ningbo 13 144 000 14 686 200 14 973 400 11.73 1.96


Guangzhou 12 550 000 14 400 000 14 520 000 14.74 0.83


Qingdao 12 012 000 13 020 000 14 500 000 8.39 11.37


Dubai 11 600 000 13 000 000 13 280 000 12.07 2.15


Tianjin 10 080 000 11 500 000 12 300 000 14.09 6.96


Rotterdam 11145804 11876921 11900000 6.56 0.19


Port Klang 8 871 745 9 603 926 9 990 000 8.25 4.02


Kaohsiung 9 181 211 9 636 289 9 781 000 4.96 1.50


Hamburg 7 900 000 9 014 165 8 930 000 14.10 -0.93


Antwerp 8 468 475 8 664 243 8 629 992 2.31 -0.40


Los Angeles 7 831 902 7 940 511 8 080 000 1.39 1.76


Dalian 5 242 000 6 400 000 8 060 000 22.09 25.94


Tanjung Pelepas 6 530 000 7 500 000 7 720 000 14.85 2.93


Xiamen 5 820 000 6 460 700 7 200 000 11.01 11.44


Laem Chabang 5 068 076 5 731 063 5 927 000 13.08 3.42


Total top 20 253348589 274210224 28296392 8.23 3.19


Table4.2. Top20containerterminalsandtheirthroughputfor2010,2011and2012(Twenty-footequivalent
unitsandpercentagechange)


Source: UNCTAD secretariat and Lloyd’s List Intelligence, July 2013.
Note: In this list Singapore does not include the port of Jurong.


to be readily available. One industry research firm has
identified 662  institutions that are open to making new
infrastructure investments, 56  per cent of which are
actively seeking new opportunities in 2013, while the
remaining have an opportunistic investment strategy
(Preqin, 2013). Pensions are attracted to infrastructure
investments as they expect them to produce
predictable and stable cash flows over the long term.
Infrastructure assets can operate in an environment of
limited competition as a result of natural monopolies,
government regulation or concessions. Investments can
be capital intensive and include a tangible asset that must
be operated and maintained over the long term (OECD,
2011). In some countries, pension funds do not directly
invest into infrastructure projects because of a lack of in-
house expertise. However, this is not the case for many
pension funds in Australia, Canada and the Netherlands,
which have been investing directly in infrastructure


over the past 20 years (Financial Times, 2013a). Global
institutional investors put almost $214 billion into unlisted
infrastructure funds between 2004 and January 2013,
with nearly $111 billion heading into North America, just
over $62  billion into Europe and $21  billion into Asia
(Preqin, 2013).


The port is not an isolated entity and must be linked to
its hinterland. A distinction needs to be made regarding
which part of the port infrastructure and equipment will
be paid for by the port as service-production centre or
business unit, and which part the community as a whole
will finance, according to development objectives and
priorities. There may be certain large capital expenditure
items that would place too heavy a strain on port
finances. Some would argue that the connecting road
and rail systems should be financed by the port while
others argue that major long-term structures such as




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201392


breakwaters or channel dredging should be partly or
wholly charged to the central or regional government. It
is for each government to decide this policy according to
the financial capacity of existing ports and the expected
profitability of planned new ports (UNCTAD, 1985).


In Mozambique, the dredging operations to the port
of Maputo were financed by the port authority. Port
customers, however, complain that the high cost of
dredging is being passed onto them, whereas the cost
should be borne by the government, since the benefits
are for the wider population. Other ports within the same
country that do not need to dredge because they are
natural deepwater ports (for example, Nacala) can offer
more competitive prices to its customers. This can lead
to a bias towards one national port or a regional port
in a neighbouring country and create extended use of
land transport, which is costly both to the consumer and
the environment. In addition, deciding to invest in new
port facilities is not necessarily a clear-cut case. Related
issues that should be explored include how much to
expand or how deep to go, how to best cater for present
and future demand, and how to attract customers prior
to and following the modifications.


The funding of infrastructure can come from a number of
primary sources such as the public sector budget, official


  Total lending*(BillionsofUSdollars)
Infrastructure lending
(BillionsofUSdollars)


Transport Sector
lending***


(BillionsofUSdollars)


Transportation
sector share
(Percentage)


European Investment Bank 57.6(€44.8 billion)
13


(€10.1 billion) 23


Asian Development Bank 21.6 5 25


International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
/International Development
Association


35.3 4.4 13


International Finance Corporation 15.5 1.5


Inter-American Development Bank 11.4 1.7 15


European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development


7.7
(€6 billion)


1.6
(€1.3 billion) 21


African Development Bank 8.8(UA5.7 billion)
2.4**


(UA1.57 billion)
1.5


(UA1 billion) 17


Table4.3. Acomparisonofinternationalfinancetothetransportsector(2012)


Source: Complied by UNCTAD from various annual reports 2011–2012.
Notes: 1 Unit of Aid (UA; official currency of African Development Bank projects) = $1.53527.
* For 2012 except, where indicated, may also include third-party lending, guarantees and/or credit lines.
** For 2011.
*** May include other sectors, for example, communication or environment.


development assistance (ODA) and the private sector
(Bond et al., 2012). Table  4.3 lists some of the major
international banks that are providing infrastructure lending
and the share apportioned to the transportation sector.


Public–private partnerships (PPPs) in port development
projects have become common place in the last 25 years.
The most common form of PPP is the operation of a
concession agreement. This usually involves investment
by the private company to develop or rehabilitate the port
followed by a defined period of operation, during which
the investors recuperate their initial layout and make a
profit. The concession may adopt different forms of PPP
including build-operate-transfer, build-operate-own-
transfer and build-transfer-operate schemes. In the period
2000–2009, 29  per cent of public–private investment in
ports took place in East and South East Asia (Holman
Fenwick Willan LLP, 2013). To the partnership the private
sector brings much needed capital and know-how, as
well as expected increased efficiency gains associated
with combining construction, maintenance and operations
arrangements.


Furthermore, most PPPs are attractive to governments
because they are kept off government spending books.
However, this could prove costly in the long run as the
project may not be able to take advantage of lower




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 93


government lending to reduce the cost of the venture
(Engel et al., 2010). If this is the case, then the design of
PPP should be streamlined by adjusting the transfer point
from the public to the private sector, given that the highest
risk and the most costly part usually comes at the initial
construction phase. Investors often worry that projects
will be delayed before coming online, so incurring higher
interest rates. The removal of this risk by transferring the
asset after this point will lower costs.


The leading investors into infrastructure projects are
government agencies, asset managers, public pension
funds, funds of fund managers, corporate investors,
banks, investment companies, endowment plans,
insurance companies, private-sector pension funds and
foundations. Table  4.4 gives a brief overview of some
of the leading infrastructure investors. According to
one report more than half of current active investors in
infrastructure are looking to commit between $50 million
and $349  million in infrastructure in 2013, and 16  per
cent of investors are looking to invest $500  million or
more. For example, the $9.6 billion Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development is seeking to make a minimum of
three new infrastructure fund commitments over the next
12 months. This government agency has a 5 per cent
($470 million) target allocation for infrastructure projects,
with currently just 1  per cent ($96  million) invested
(Preqin, 2013). Aviva Investors are to launch funds aimed
at infrastructure investment, and the world’s largest asset
manager, BlackRock, launched a European infrastructure


debt division that will lend to companies in the transport
sector (Reuters, 2012). Sovereign wealth funds have over
$4  trillion in assets suitable for long-term investments
such as infrastructure (Group of 30, 2013).


One study estimated that between 2013 and 2030,
some $57  trillion in infrastructure investment (including
transport, power, water and telecommunications) will be
required to keep up with projected GDP growth and yet
still be insufficient to meet maintenance deficiencies or
the broader development goals of emerging economies,
let alone the cost of adapting to climate change
(McKinsey Global Institute, 2013). This report goes on
to say that institutional investors are frustrated about
not being able to find enough suitable vehicles to reach
their target allocations for infrastructure and that even
if pension funds and asset managers achieved their
infrastructure target allocations of around 6 per cent, from
3  per cent today, it would only represent an additional
$2.5 trillion in capital between now and 2030, far short
of the $57 trillion (or more) needed. While the $57 trillion
total includes roads, rail, ports, airports, power, water
and telecommunications, transport represents around
$23 trillion, with the share for ports around $1.5 trillion.
In Africa, another study estimates that transport volumes
will increase between six to eight times, and as much
as 14 times for some landlocked countries, and port
throughput will rise from 265 million tons in 2009, to more
than 2  billion tons in 2040 (Commonwealth Business
Council, 2013).


Global
Infrastructure


Partners


The Canada
PensionPlan


Investment Board


OntarioMunicipal
Employees


Retirement System
PrudentialPlc.


Macquarie
Infrastructure


and Real Assets


Description Aprivateequityfirm
that invests worldwide
in infrastructure
assets in the energy,
transport, and water
and waste industry
sectors


An investment
management
organization that
invests the assets
of18 million
Canadians


Established in 1962,
it manages over
930 employers’
pension funds for
429,000 members,
retirees and survivors


An international
financialservices
group serving more
than24 million
insurance
customers


The managers of
specialist funds which
focus on infrastructure,
real estate and adjacent
sectors


Total investments $13.9 billion
(GIPII$8.25 billion)


$10.3 billion $60 billion $600 billion $101 billion


Transport arm Allianz and Borealis
Infrastructure


Infracapital (M&G
Investments)


Transport-related
investments


$2.8 billion $4.6 billion $2.3 billion $31 billion


Significanttransport
investments


Gatwick Airport
(United Kingdom)


Toll roads (Chile),
Formula One
(United Kingdom)


Associated British
Ports, Channel Tunnel
Rail Link
(United Kingdom)


Associated British
Ports, Red Funnel
(United Kingdom)


M6 (United Kingdom),
Autoroutes Paris–Rhin–
Rhône (France), Warnow
Tunnel (Germany),
Incheon Grand Bridge
(Republic of Korea)
Busan New Port Phase
2V3 (Republic of Korea)


Table4.4. Abriefcomparisonofpotentialinvestorsininfrastructure


Source: Complied by UNCTAD from various company websites including M&G Investments, 2013 data.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201394


During the period 2000–2009, there were some 195
private investment projects in container, dry and liquid
bulk and multi-purpose cargo terminals worth $38 billion.
Seventy-eight greenfield projects in Asia, the Pacific,
Latin America and the Caribbean during the period
equalled around $20  billion. In the same period there
were 97 concession projects worth $15.5  billion while
there were 11 management and lease projects totalling
$305 million. China, India and Brazil have attracted the
highest number of private investments in recent years.
China drew almost $4 billion of private funds in 2006–
2009, India $2.5  billion and Brazil $1.5  billion. During
the same period Singapore’s PSA International invested
$2.92 billion, APM Terminals $2.46 billion and DP World
$1.91  billion (Holman Fenwick Willan LLP, 2013). One
Chinese firm, China Harbour Engineering Company,
a subsidiary of China Communications Construction
Company, has a global portfolio of projects valued in
excess of $10 billion in more than 70 countries (Cayman
Net News, 2012). The international marine engineering
and infrastructure construction firm continues to win
major port development contracts around the world in
collaboration with the Chinese investment bank CITIC
Securities, which has its headquarters in Shenzhen and
is listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.


In the United States some ports have secured finance
for infrastructure through the issuing of bonds to the
value of $12 billion to be repaid by existing and future
user fees. This process helps ports to shore up cash
flow and address liquidity constraints without relying on
public funds. Port revenue bonds are retired through
revenues, user fees and tariff charges paid principally
by port customers (PMSA, 2013). The issuing of bonds
is seen as a favourable means to raise revenue for new


infrastructure projects. In Cleveland the port authority
issued a $90  million bond to construct a new building
on its land which will then be tenanted to produce rental
income (The Plain Dealer - cleveland.com, 2013). In India,
tax-free bonds are also seen as a way to raise $769 million
for port projects (Livemint, 2013a). In Peru, $110 million
of bonds were used to finance new infrastructure at the
Paita Terminal Port in the region of Piura. In this case the
site was a brownfield location already generating income,
and this avoided the usual problem of construction risk
increasing the price of the bonds (Bacchiocchi, 2012).
Table 4.5 lists the ten largest infrastructure funds for the
period 2008 to September 2012.


C. RECENT PORT DEVELOPMENTS
Port development is seen as a catalyst to stimulate
economic activity and create employment. In the United
Kingdom, despite no longer being a major trading centre
for merchandised goods, it is estimated that 262,700
jobs and £13.8  billion ($21.5  billion) were generated in
2011 through the provision of maritime services (Oxford
Economics, 2013). The United Kingdom distribution
industry as a whole employed an estimated 2.67 million
people, 10  per cent of workplace employees in 2007
(Haven Gateway Partnership, 2010). Similarly, the six-
berth London Gateway terminal development nearing
completion is expected to create 12,000 new jobs and
another 20,000 jobs indirectly (Holman Fenwick Willan
LLP, 2013). Virtually every government, national, regional
or local authority, as well as the ports themselves, have
a port development plan with the aim of increasing the
wealth of its citizens through the provision of some
service. These plans may be driven in response to


Table4.5. Tenlargestinfrastructurefunds,2008–2012


Fund Firm
Size


(MillionsofUS
dollars)


Region


Global Infrastructure Partners II Global Infrastructure Partners 8 250 Global


Global Infrastructure Partners Global Infrastructure Partners 5 640 Global


Energy Capital Partners II Energy Capital Partners 4 335 North America


EIG Energy Fund XV EIG Global Energy Partners 4 121 Global


Alinda Infrastructure Fund II Alinda Capital Partners 4 097 North America, Europe


Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners Morgan Stanley Infrastructure 4 000 Global


Citi Infrastructure Partners Citi Infrastructure Investors 3 400 OECD


ArcLight Energy Partners Fund V ArcLight Capital Partners 3 310 North America, Europe


GS Infrastructure Partners II GS Infrastructure Investment Group 3 100 North America, Europe


BrookfieldAmericasInfrastructureFund BrookfieldAssetManagement 2 655 North America, South America


Source: (Preqin, 2012).




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 95


customer needs, as part of a regional integration plan,
or simply national aspirations aimed at capturing passing
trade. The following sections provide a brief overview of
some of these developments organized alphabetically.
The list is not exhaustive and the ports mentioned are
merely meant to give a regional perspective as well as
illustrate the variety and type of developments. Other
developments mentioned in previous issues of the
Review of Maritime Transport continue at their pace.


Africa


Container traffic in Africa is growing across the continent.
In West Africa a recent study highlighted that 3  million
TEU passed through the region in 2011 (CATRAM,
2013). The French carrier CMA CGM, which has a strong
presence in Africa, sold a 49 per cent stake in its terminal
operating business, Terminal Link, to China Merchants
for €400  million ($538  million) (Dynamar B.V., 2013a).
The deal gives the French company a capital injection
to be used in its main business, liner shipping, at a time
of when shipyards are offering to build cheap ships and
when banks are reluctant to lend. For the buyer it provides
quick means to expand its global presence in a growing
market. Another large liner shipping company, MSC, is
focusing its attention upon the port of Lomé as a regional
hub. While in Central Africa, the port of Pointe-Noire
(the Congo) is also being considered by various parties
to be in a good location to become an important trans-
shipment hub for North–South shipments and shipments
East–West to Latin America. Some recent infrastructure
improvements made by foreign investors include a third
berth in Dakar built by DP World, a third quay in Lomé for
both Bolloré and TIL/MSC (part of which is now owned
by China Merchants), and facilities in Cotonou (Benin) and
Pointe-Noire for Bolloré (CATRAM, 2013). Some other
African port-development projects currently underway
are detailed in the following paragraphs.


In Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, port expansion plans include
increasing TEU capacity to 1 million–1.5 million. In early
2013, a $933-million contract was signed between the
Abidjan Port Authority and China Harbour Engineering
Company Limited. The project involves waterway and
basin dredging, construction of a container terminal and
a ro-ro terminal, and waterway breakwater reconstruction
(Dredging Today, 2013). APMT is investing $40  million
into the container terminal so that vessels of 8,000 TEU
may be catered for in Abidjan (Sea-web, 2013).


In Cameroon, the Mbalam iron-ore project progressed
with the signing of a convention between the Minister
of Mines, Industries and Technological Development
and the Australian firm Sundance Resources through its


local partner Cam Iron. This will allow the developers to
start securing the $8.7  billion needed for construction
work which will include a 510-kilometre rail line for the
transportation of iron ore from the Mbarga Mine to
the Cameroon coast, with a 70-kilometre rail spur line
connecting to the Congo. A deepwater iron-ore export
terminal will be built at Lolabe, in Kribi, with the capacity
to handle Chinamax iron-ore bulk carriers (Cameroon
Tribune, 2012). The Cameroon–Congo–Gabon region
has been likened to the Pilbara, the region in Western
Australia that has some of the world’s biggest iron
deposits (Financial Times, 2013b).


In Ghana, an agreement between the Ghana Ports and
Harbours Authority and China Harbour Engineering
Company was signed for work to begin on the first
phase of the $150-million Takoradi Port Infrastructure
Development Project. The three year project includes the
demolition and reconstruction of port office buildings,
the expansion and reconstruction of access roads, land
reclamation and the development of water and electricity
facilities (Cayman Net News, 2012).


In Kenya, the Government has set aside $12  million
(1 billion Kenya shillings) to buy land to develop Mombasa
into a free port where manufacturers may undertake
works at reduced tax (Daily Nation, 2013). The port of
Mombasa handled some 19.6 million tons of cargo, of
which about 4 million tons were imports and 5 million tons
were transit cargo to neighbouring countries. Uganda is
the largest destination of transit cargo accounting for
nearly 85  per cent (4.2  million tons), of which 90  per
cent comprises imports. The Democratic Republic of the
Congo is the second largest transit market, taking up to
8 per cent of the total at 430,000 tons. Seventy-two per
cent of cargo going through Mombasa is for Kenya’s
domestic market, 22 per cent is for Uganda, 2.3 per cent
for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1.5 per cent
for Rwanda and less than 1 per cent is destined for the
United Republic of Tanzania, Burundi, South Sudan and
Somalia (The East African, 2012).


In Sierra Leone, a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources
and China Kingho Energy Group Co. Ltd. was signed in
May 2013. The MOU includes $6 billion of investments
for the construction of a railway from Tonkolili to Sulima
and a deepwater quay port for transportation of products,
among others (Awareness Times, 2013).


In the United Republic of Tanzania, an agreement with
the Government of China to build a $10 billion–$11 billion
new port at the historical port city of Bagamoyo was
announced in 2013. The new port will be the biggest




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201396


in the whole of Africa and handle some 20 million TEUs
a year when complete, compared with the 800,000
TEUs current throughput at Dar es Salaam. The project
will include the building of a 34-kilometre road joining
Bagamoyo to Mlandizi and 65 kilometres of railway
connecting Bagamoyo to the Tanzania–Zambia Railway
and the Central Railway. The bilateral deal calls for
China to commit $500 million in 2013 to start the port
construction with the rest of the Chinese financial aid
package to follow in 2014 and 2015 (Sabahionline.com,
2013; The East African, 2013). The port is also expected
to be run by Chinese operators and offer facilities to naval
vessels, albeit not necessarily China’s (Africainvestor,
2013). The new port will ease congestion at Dar es
Salaam, which may find other business in niche areas.
China is already financing the $1.2 billion construction of
a 532-kilometre gas pipeline linking recently discovered
gas reserves in the south of the United Republic of
Tanzania and northern Mozambique to the port of Dar es
Salaam (World Socialist Web Site, 2013). The new port is
good news for the landlocked neighbouring countries of
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, which will have a choice of
importing and exporting either through Mombasa, Kenya,
or Dar es Salaam. The development may negatively affect
Mombasa, as shipping lines may prefer to call directly at
Bagamoyo new port. Inefficiencies at Mombasa can add
50–80 per cent to the time required to move imports to
landlocked countries (The East African, 2013).


The Americas


In the Americas the anticipated opening of the newly
expanded Panama Canal and the implications this will
have for ports on the eastern seaboard is driving port
development. Ports on the eastern seaboard and in
the Caribbean have tended to remain smaller than their
peers on the Pacific coast because of the limitation
on vessel size governed by the historical width of the
Panama Canal. The Panama Canal expansion is set to be
complete by early 2015 and will increase the size of the
container ships able to transit from the present maximum
of around 4,800 TEU to 13,000 TEU.


In Jamaica, China Harbour Engineering Company is
set to invest between $1.2  billion and $1.5  billion in the
development of a trans-shipment port. The Port Authority of
Jamaica and China Harbour Engineering Company Limited
had signed an MOU for the establishment a new trans-
shipment port at Fort Augusta. However, the project has
since been expanded and it is now necessary to find a new
location with more space, which has yet to be determined
(Port Finance International, 2013). The plans are part of
a major infrastructure investment programme to meet


Jamaica’s desire to be a global logistics hub by 2015, and
which also include improvements to the north–south link
of Highway 2000 and the dredging of Kingston harbour to
accommodate larger cargo ships (RJR News, 2013).


In Nicaragua, plans to build a canal to rival the Panama
Canal passed through congress in June 2013. The cost
of the canal is estimated to be $40 billion and it will be
built and operated by a Chinese company – the Hong
Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Co. Ltd..
The company has been granted a 50–year concession to
build and operate the waterway with the option to extend
the concession for another 50 years. The canal is likely
to be three times longer, about 250 kilometres, than the
Panama Canal and include provision for two free trade
zones, an airport, a freight railway and an oil pipeline (The
Guardian, 2013). Crucially, the Nicaragua canal will be
wider than the Panama Canal and be able to cater for
the world’s largest cargo ships, including the Maersk
Triple E vessels of 18,000 TEU (CNNMoney, 2012). The
Nicaraguan government is expected to receive $10 million
a year for 10 years from the canal (The Guardian, 2013).


In Peru, the Ministry of Transport and Communications
and the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs
of the Republic of Korea have signed an MOU to update
the development plans for four Peruvian ports (those
of Iquitos, Ilo, Salaverry and San Juan de Marcona)
(Shipping Seenews, 2013). The port sector in Peru will
benefit from more than $2 billion of investment by 2015,
according to the National Port Authority. The planned
investments in public ports include the first phase of
DP World’s $617-million investment programme in
the Muelle Sur terminal at the Port of Callao in Lima,
$228 million at Terminales Portuarios Euroandinos Paita
port terminal, and Peru LNG’s $332-million LNG export
terminal at Pampa Melchorita (Fruitnet, 2011). Since a
bilateral trade agreement came into force on 1 August,
2011, Korean exports to Peru have increased by 29 per
cent – among others, exports of iron ore have increased
by 263  per cent, colour televisions by 268  per cent,
petrochemicals by 57 per cent and passenger cars by
42.5 per cent (around one third of all new cars sold in
Peru are made in the Republic of Korea). Other sectors
receiving investment from the Republic of Korea include
oil, hydrocarbons and mining (Financial Times, 2013c).


In the United States, Virginia Ports Authority received
an unsolicited $3.9  billion offer from APM Terminals to
operate its marine terminals for 48 years, as well as a bid
of $4.66 billion from JP Morgan for a 50-year concession.
The rival JP Morgan bid was originally presented by
RREEF America, part of the Deutsche Bank Group.
A third offer from Carlyle Infrastructure Partners, an




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 97


infrastructure investment unit of the Carlyle Group, was
withdrawn (Suffolk News-Herald, 2013). In the end all
bids were refused and the port authority instead opted to
rationalize both its management and financial positions.
It is thought that foreign interest in Virginia and other
United States East Coast ports comes as the Panama
Canal expansion means larger ships requiring better
port infrastructure are likely to serve this region. In New
York the Bayonne Bridge is being raised to allow bigger
vessels to access the Port Newark–Elizabeth Marine
Terminal, the largest container port on the East Coast.


Asia


In Asia, port development projects are largely spurred by
the importation of raw materials and increased industrial
output. China continues to lead the world in terms of port
throughput and efficiency and increasingly as a provider
of expertise in port construction and management. As
Chinese labour costs increase, some of the production
processes are moving to neighbouring countries and
Chinese companies are able to take advantage of this
movement of trade through the provision of other higher
value services such as expertise in port construction.


In Cambodia a new cargo terminal officially opened in
the capital in 2013, in response to a sharp increase in
shipments moving through the country’s existing ports.
The new terminal is located in the Kien Svay district of
Kandal province, about 30 kilometres from the existing
port in Phnom Penh, and cost over $28 million. It was
financed by the Chinese government and will be capable
of handling 300,000 TEUs when the second phase is
complete (PortCalls Asia, 2013).


In India plans to enable trust ports to lease land to
private companies are being considered for the purpose
of establishing industrial or special economic zones to
generate more trade. This proposal will affect 12 major
ports (Chennai, Kochi, Ennore, Jawaharlal Nehru,
Kolkata (including Haldia), Kandla, Mormugao, Mumbai,
New Mangalore, Paradip, Tuticorin and Visakhapatnam),
which have a capacity to handle over 740 million tons of
cargo each year and account for about 58 per cent of
India’s external trade shipped by sea. The proposed port
land policy will allow land to be leased up to a maximum
period of 30 years by a port with the approval of its board
of trustees. Leases of above 30 years and for a maximum
of up to 99 years will have to be recommended by the
port trust board to the shipping ministry for committee
approval (Livemint, 2013b). Elsewhere in India two new
port development projects are being considered by the
Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. One port called
Dugarajapatnam is located 45 kilometres from Gudur and


about 140 kilometres north of Chennai port. The proposed
port, which will occupy 5,000 acres and have an expected
throughput of 50 million tons per annum, will be the second
major port in Andhra Pradesh controlled by the central
government after Visakhapatnam. The other slightly larger
port project with an anticipated throughput of 54 million
tons per annum is located at Sagar in West Bengal. The
ports are part of the government’s “look east policy”
which aims to triple the country’s cargo-loading ability to
3.13 billion tons by 2020 through PPPs (The Hindu, 2013).
Just over one fifth of Indian cargo is containerized, which is
about half the world average (The Economist, 2013a). The
Government is set to increase this with the development
of container facilities along its east coast at the ports of
Ennore, Kakinada, Karaikal, Kattupalli and Krishnapatnam
(Drewry Container Insight, 2013).


Also in India, draft guidelines to allow major ports to fix their
own tariffs based on the market conditions are currently
being considered. Presently tariffs are regulated by the
Tariff Authority of Major Ports. It is thought that the private
sector is waiting upon the final decision as to how tariffs
are calculated before making investments. Indeed, it has
been cited as one of the chief reasons why there have
not been any private bidders at three recent port projects
proposals in Chennai, Tuticorin and Visakhapatnam
(Business Standard India, 2013). It is proposed that the
new tariff structure will be adjusted once a year and partly
index linked to inflation. Interestingly, statistics on cargo
traffic, berth day output, average turnaround time of
ships, average pre-berthing waiting time, percentage idle
time of total time of vessels at berth, as well as the actual
tariff levied for each major port-trust owned berth/terminal
should be provided within 15  days following the end
of each month (The Economic Times, 2013). However,
some argue that Indian ports are too regulated and that
the country’s private ports are more profitable than the
state-owned ports, suggesting that greater liberalization
may be the way forward (Lloyd’s List, 2013a).


In Myanmar, the existing port of Yangon has outdated
facilities and there is a need to build new port facilities
to help the country better integrate into the world trade
arena. However, there is still much uncertainty as to
where such new port facilities will be located. Two
possible sites have been identified, one at Kyaukphyu to
the north of Yangon, where oil and gas pipelines running
across Myanmar to China’s Yunnan province are being
completed, and the other is Dawei to the south, which
is only 250 kilometres from Bangkok and could be a
valuable source of transit cargo. Further assessment on
demand, revenue, investment, timeframes and technical
aspects need to be undertaken (The Vancouver Sun,




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 201398


2013). To directly service Yangon a new $200-million
riverine port called Thilawa will be constructed just to the
south of the city (The Economist, 2013b).


In Sri Lanka, the first stage of the Port of Colombo’s third
container-terminal expansion plans came online in 2013,
with the final stage expected to be completed by 2016.
The port has a draft of 18 metres and a gantry crane
outreach of 24 containers wide, which enables it to cater
for the largest container ships, including the Maersk Triple
E class container vessels. The new terminal will be in a
better position to serve cargo from and to Indian ports,
although competition between ports in the region will
grow (Drewry Container Insight, 2013).


In Thailand, a new PPP act is set to quicken the pace to
bring projects to fruition. The act will set a limit of 180 days
to the period between the winning of a government tender
and the signing of the contract, as well as establish a
committee for five-year strategic development plans. This
examining committee will consist of 17 members led by
the prime minister. The new act also states that a member
of the committee cannot become a board director of the
company winning the bid for three years after his or her
resignation from the committee. The previous 1992 PPP
act dealt with only 40 projects in its lifetime, 33 between
the private sector and national state agencies and seven
with provincial authorities (The Nation, 2013).


Reforms to the country’s infrastructure include the
building of high-speed rail lines, four more ports and
other transport infrastructure over the next seven years,
amounting to investments of $67.6 billion. The ports are
to be located on the banks of Bangkok’s main river, the
Gulf of Thailand and on the Andaman Sea coasts. The
government has said the projects will bolster Thailand’s
economic growth rate by 1 per cent a year and create
500,000 jobs. By borrowing the funds overseas, delays
provoked by the annual government budget process
can be avoided, thus alleviating investors’ concerns that
the project could be delayed. Funding projects through
the regular annual budget can be problematic if there’s
a change of government or in politics, as the schemes
could be discontinued. The borrowing bill will enable
private investors to plan their investment to develop
infrastructure more confidently (Sea News Turkey, 2013).


Europe


In Europe, port developments relate mainly to building new
terminals within existing ports rather than developing new
greenfield sites. As such, much of the reform process is more
to do with the organization and operational aspects of ports.


In Belgium, organizational practices designed to spur
improvements in performance had to be reviewed.
DP World and its partners that operate the Antwerp
Gateway, as well as PSA’s Deurganck Terminal, owed the
Port of Antwerp Authority some €70 million ($93 million)
in underperformance penalties, principally because of
a decrease in cargo volumes as a result of the global
downturn (Dynamar B.V., 2012).1


Concession agreements to operate container terminals
can contain clauses which specify minimum throughput
volumes. If throughput falls below the minimum, the
tenant, the terminal operator, must compensate the
landlord, usually the port authority. The Port of Antwerp
Authority, however, announced that it will reduce
the underperformance penalties for not reaching the
contractually stipulated volumes for DP World’s Antwerp
Gateway and PSA’s Duerganck Terminal to €4.0 million
($5.1 million) and €9.47 million ($12.1 million), respectively
(Dynamar B.V., 2013b).


The European Commission launched a new initiative
to improve port operations at 319 key seaports. The
guidelines are aimed at proposing legal changes that will
help port operators upgrade their services and facilities
as well as giving them more financial autonomy. Currently,
74  per cent of the goods entering or leaving Europe
are transported via sea, with one fifth of this volume
passing through just three ports: Rotterdam, Hamburg
and Antwerp. This concentration results in congestion
and extra costs for shippers, transport operators and
consumers. The new proposals could save the European
economy up to €10 billion ($12.8 billion) by 2030 and help
develop new short sea links (Europa, 2013). The proposal
excludes cargo handling and passenger services from
market-access rules. Included is a new Social Dialogue
Committee, which will handle labour reform issues. More
stringent measures are planned to deal with concession
and public contract awards and financial procedures,
which reinforce transparency in the way that charges
are set. The proposal extends the freedom of ports to
levy infrastructure charges and to reduce charges for
vessels with better environmental performance (Lloyd’s
List, 2013b).


In the Netherlands, the Port of Rotterdam Maasvlakte 2
port expansion area has opened to shipping, making the
site accessible by road, rail and water. By the end of 2013,
ship-to-ship transfer will commence. Construction of the
two container terminals at Maasvlakte 2, one operated
by DP World-led Rotterdam World Gateway and the
other by Netherlands-based APMT, is on schedule to be
operational at the end of 2014 (Lloyd’s List, 2013a).




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 99


D. ASSESSING PORT PERFORMANCE
Efficient ports could help to lower transport costs by
enabling goods to get to and from markets in a more
timely and cost-effective fashion. UNCTAD has a number
of mandates from its member countries which state
for the need to help developing countries reduce their
transport costs (Accra Accord paragraphs 57, 121, 165,
166 and Doha Mandate paragraphs 45, 47 and 48) as
well as a long history of working on port reform. Previously,
much focus was given to helping ports identify efficiency
indicators to measure and record. The next logical step is
for countries to share their data to identify lessons learn
and best practices. By showing what similar-sized ports
have achieved, greater operational advances and lower
transport costs may result.


The considerable amount of data collected by ports
includes not just information on the cargo but also
upon the assets, equipment usage/performance and
maintenance. This data is used by the port managers
to monitor performance and plan for future needs.


However, ports tend to assess their performance on an
inward-looking and historical perspective, that is, they
judge themselves today on how well they did yesterday,
not against how their competitors are performing today. In
some countries it is mandatory for port data to be submitted
to the national Government for analysis. In the previous
section C (Recent port developments) an example of the
Indian Government’s collection of port statistics was given.
However, many developing countries only have one main
port and comparisons with other ports are impossible.
Despite all the activity on record keeping, it is rare that the
information is published at a port or national level, let alone
on a global basis. Ports may be reluctant to publish data
since there is no pressure to do so, nor any direct benefit
without reciprocation. This is an important point, for unless
there is a clear benefit to the port the situation is unlikely to
change without some external intervention.


This external intervention came in early 2013 when
the Journal of Commerce in association with Ocean
Shipping Consultants obtained data from 17 liner
shipping companies visiting 650 ports to produce a


Source: Journal of Commerce and Ocean Shipping Consultants.


Figure4.1. Acomparisonofportproductivitybyregion(2013)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013100


Port Productivity Ranking list (Journal of Commerce,
2013). The analysis of this data enables a comparison
of container-port productivity by region as depicted in
Figure 4.1. The results show that port performance has
been assessed by the number of crane moves per hour
in various broad geographical regions. The raw data
and how the calculations have been made are not yet
freely available. The research shows wide variations in
the average cargo-handling times, from 19 moves per
hour in African ports to 71 per hour in ports in North
Asian. One important limitation is that ports cannot
see how they rank compared against other ports,
although selective port comparisons have been made
in separate lists; another is that it is limited to container
activities which represent about 15 per cent of global
port throughput. The most significant factor is that ports
are not the only holders of data on their activities. Port
customers are also collecting data on port performance
and if the ports do not reveal their own statistics then
it will be hard for them to dispute any suggestions of
inefficiency.


A way forward for ports would be to publish their own
data and not rely on customer assessment of their
performance. The challenge for policymakers would be
to convince their ports to voluntarily share data. Official
reporting systems could be devised on a national
basis, but this does not guarantee that efforts will be
reciprocated by other countries. A common repository
of the data would still be needed to facilitate the
publication of data for independent analysis. Analysis
could be undertaken by the Port Performance Research
Network, an informal network made up of academics
from various institutions located around the world who
meet annually along with the International Association
of Maritime Economists. The publication of the raw
data would also provide ports with an opportunity to
undertake their own analysis rather than having to
accept comparisons forced upon them. Thus, ports
who rank low in any overall assessment could obtain
a more meaningful measure by comparing themselves
against their peers or ports in other regions.


What data to collect


Volume and time are the two crucial aspects of measuring
performance. Volume, which is a measurement of
throughput or a port’s output, is expressed in either
units (TEUs) or weight (tons). The time goods spend
in a port is also a useful figure that is easy to compare.
Examples of time measurements within a port include
ship turnaround time, ship waiting time, berth occupancy
rate, working time at berth, cargo dwell time and number
of cargo-crane moves per hour. The primary focus when
comparing global port performance, on an initial basis,
should therefore be time and volume. Measuring how long
a vessel spends in port and how much cargo is transferred
seems an achievable first step towards creating any global
assessment of port performance. The data should also
cover all cargo types and not just containers.


E. CONCLUSIONS
Global port developments are continuing despite, or
perhaps because of, recent uncertainties in world
trade. Ports are generally considered to be a long-term
investment offering steady returns and hence their appeal
to long term asset managers. At the same time ports are
also becoming more capital intensive with the growth of
cities creating spatial constraints that force expansion
plans further out to sea, the complexity of cargo handling
superstructures and operations also adding to the price
of development. Developing countries, however, stand
to benefit from both the need of investment portfolios
to invest in long-term stable businesses and from the
experience of international terminal operators that have
perfected their techniques at some of the world’s most
voluminous ports and need new markets to invest in.
Without port reform countries will struggle to get their
goods to markets at competitive price levels as well as to
secure their needs at reasonable prices. Port efficiency,
a subject of concern to many developing countries and
UNCTAD, will, through the advent of modern proliferation
of data collection practices, become a reality either by
port managers’ own actions or that of port users.




CHAPTER 4: PORT DEVELOPMENTS 101


REFERENCES


Africainvestor (2013). China builds the biggest port in Africa. 8 April.


Awareness Times (2013). $6Billion Chinese investment for Sierra Leone. 13 May.


Bacchiocchi GG (2012). The project bond evolution: Port of Paita case study. Latin Infrastructure Quarterly. Issue 4. June.


Bond DL, Platz D and Magnusson M (2012). Financing small-scale infrastructure investments in developing countries.
DESA Working Paper No. 114. ST/ESA/2012/DWP/114. May.


Business Standard India (2013). Private bidders give port sector a miss. 11 May.


Cameroon Tribune (2012). Cameroon: Cam Iron gets mining convention for Mbalam iron project. 30 November.


CATRAM (2013). Market study on container terminals in West and Central Africa. Final report – MLTC/CATRAM.
23 January. 1–133.


Cayman Net News (2012). China Harbour wins major Ghana port project. 27 September.


CNNMoney (2012). Nicaragua OKs canal to be built by Chinese company. 27 September.


Commonwealth Business Council (2013). Africa Infrastructure Investment Report. ISBN 978-0-9570432-6-8.
London. March.


Daily Nation (2012). Sh1bn set aside for free port project. 5 December.


Dredging Today (2013). Dredging Today – Côte d’Ivoire: CHEC Signs EPC Contract for Abidjan Port Dredging.
24 January.


Drewry Container Insight (2013). Competition heating up on India’s East Coast. 17 March.


Dynamar B.V. (2012). DynaLiners Weekly. 21 December.


Dynamar B.V. (2013a). DynaLiners Weekly. 5 April.


Dynamar B.V. (2013b). DynaLiners Weekly. 29 March.


Engel EM, Fischer RD and Galetovic A (2010). The economics of infrastructure finance: Public-private partnerships
versus public provision. EIB Papers. 15(1): 40–69.


Europa (2013). Press release – Commission proposes upgrade for 300 key seaports. 23 May.


Financial Times (2013a). Pension funds wary of UK infrastructure. 7 February.


Financial Times (2013b). Sundance calls off takeover by Hanlong. 9 April.


Financial Times (2013c). Peru: the South Koreans are coming. Beyondbrics blog. 4 May.


Fruitnet (2011). Peru to boost port investment. 16 March.


Group of 30 Working Group (2013). Long-term Finance and Economic Growth. ISBN 1-56708-160-6. Group of Thirty.
Washington D.C.


Haven Gateway Partnership (2010). The economic impact of the ports, transport and logistics industry on the Haven
Gateway area. Colechester, United Kingdom.


Holman Fenwick Willan LLP (2013). Global investment in ports and terminals. Ports and Terminals. Holman Fenwick
Willan LLP. London.


Journal of Commerce (2013). Introducing JOC port productivity. Journal of Commerce. 14(3).


Livemint (2013a). Tax-free bonds issued by ports get poor response. 19 March.


Livemint (2013b). Policy aims to attract port infrastructure investments. 21 April.


Lloyd’s List (2013a). Power ports. Lloyd’s List – Ship Operations. 19 June.


Lloyd’s List (2013b). Brussels moves to prevent price abuse at European ports. Lloyd’s List – Ports and Logistics. 23 May.




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McKinsey Global Institute (2013). Infrastructure productivity: How to save $1 trillion a year. McKinsey and Company.
New York. January.


OECD (2011). Pension funds investment in infrastructure – a survey. September. Available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/
futures/infrastructureto2030/48634596.pdf.


Oxford Economics (2013). The economic impact of the UK maritime services sector. Oxford Economics. February.
Available at http://www.oxfordeconomics.com/publication/open/239345 (accessed 26 September 2013).


PMSA (2013). Port investment. Pacific Merchant Shipping Association. Available at http://www.pmsaship.com/port-
investment.aspx (accessed 25 September 2013).


Port Finance International (2013). Chinese company to invest more than $1.2bn in new Jamaican transshipment port
- Port Finance International. 5 February.


PortCalls Asia (2013). Cambodia opens new container terminal. 28 January.


Preqin (2012). 2012 Preqin Infrastructure Review. Preqin.


Preqin (2013). Infrastructure spotlight. April.


Reuters (2012). BlackRock to tap infrastructure debt demand. 26 November.


RJR News (2013). Plan for trans-shipment port at Fort Augusta abandoned, larger site being sought. 30 April.


Sabahionline.com (2013). Tanzania and China sign port development package. 27 March.


Sea News Turkey (2013). Bangkok seeks US$67m loan to build infrastructure, ports and railways. 31 March.


Sea-web (2013). News and analysis. APMT explains plans at African ports. 13 June.


Shipping Seenews (2013). Peru to update plans for 4 ports with support from South Korea. 7 March.


Suffolk News-Herald (2013). VPA punts port bids. 26 March.


The East African (2012). Congestion at Mombasa port slows down trade in EAC bloc. 13 December.


The East African (2013). With $11bn Bagamoyo port, Tanzania prepares to take on EA hub Mombasa. 11 May.


The Economic Times (2013). Major ports will soon be allowed to fix market-linked tariff. 19 March.


The Economist (2013a). China’s foreign ports – the new masters and commanders – China’s growing empire of ports
abroad is mainly about trade, not aggression. 8 June.


The Economist (2013b). New bay dawning. 27 April.


The Guardian (2013). Nicaragua waterway to dwarf Panama canal. 12 June.


The Hindu (2013). Cabinet nod for two new major ports in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh. 9 May.


The Nation (2013). New act tipped to speed up projects. 27 May.


The Plain Dealer - cleveland.com (2013). Port Authority board approves $90 million bond deal for new Cuyahoga
County headquarters. 14 March. Available at http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2013/03/port_
authority_board_approves.html (accessed 25 September 2013).


The Vancouver Sun (2013). Thai–Burma port project stalled. 24 February.


World Socialist Web Site (2013). New Chinese president courts Africa. 28 March.


UNCTAD (1985). Port Development: A Handbook for Planners in Developing Countries. TD/B/C.4/175/Rev. 1. United
Nations publication. New York.


ENDNOTES
1 The ownership share of all partners is as follows: DP World (42.5 per cent), Zim Ports (20 per cent), Cosco Pacific


(20 per cent ), Terminal Link/CMA CGM (10 per cent ) and Duisport (7.5 per cent ).




This chapter provides information on some important legal issues and recent regulatory
developments in the fields of transport and trade facilitation, together with information
on the status of the main maritime conventions. Important issues include the entry into
force of the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention (MLC 2006) (effective 20 August 2013),
and of the 2002 Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their
Luggage by Sea (PAL 2002) (effective 23 April 2014), as well as a range of regulatory
developments relating to maritime and supply-chain security and environmental issues.


To assist in the implementation of a set of technical and operational measures to increase
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international
shipping, which entered into force on 1 January 2013, additional guidelines and unified
interpretations were adopted at the International Maritime Organization in October 2012
and May 2013. In addition, a Resolution on Promotion of Technical Cooperation and
Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships was
adopted in May 2013, and an agreement was reached that a new study will be initiated
to carry out an update to the GHG emissions estimate for international shipping. The
issue of possible market-based measures (MBMs) for the reduction of GHG emissions
from international shipping remained controversial, and discussion was postponed.


Results from UNCTAD’s research on national trade-facilitation implementation plans
illustrate that trade facilitation remains a challenge but is also seen as a priority area
for national development by the developing countries themselves. By identifying the
major areas of non-compliance with a future WTO trade-facilitation agreement, the
report offers insights into the range of time and resource requirements and the needs
for technical assistance and capacity-building for the developing countries.


LEGAL ISSUES
AND REGULATORY


DEVELOPMENTS


5




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013104


A. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN
TRANSPORT LAW


1. Entry into force of the 2006 Maritime
Labour Convention


Following ratification by the Russian Federation and the
Philippines on 20 August 2012, the MLC 2006 enters
into force on 20 August 2013.1 The Convention, which
had been adopted in 2006 under the joint auspices
of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and
the IMO, consolidates and updates more than 68
international labour standards relating to seafarers,
setting out their responsibilities and rights with regard
to labour and social matters in the maritime sector. It is
considered an important fourth pillar, complementing
three major IMO conventions, namely the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS),
1974, the International Convention on Standards of
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(STCW), 1978, and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).


The MLC 2006 aims to achieve both decent
conditions of work for the world’s more than
1.2  million seafarers and to create conditions of fair
competition for shipowners. Following its entry into
force, seafarers working on around 70 per cent of the
world’s international shipping tonnage will be covered
by the new Convention. The Convention establishes
minimum requirements for almost all aspects of
working conditions for seafarers, and a strong
compliance and enforcement mechanism based on
flag State inspection and certification of seafarers’
working and living conditions.


The Convention comprises three different but related
parts: the Articles, the Regulations and the Code. The
Articles and Regulations set out the core rights and
principles and the basic obligations of Member States
ratifying the Convention.2 The Code contains detailed
information on the implementation of the Regulations.
It consists of part A (mandatory standards) and part B
(non-mandatory guidelines).3 The Regulations and the
Code are organized into general areas under five titles
containing groups of provisions relating to a particular
right or principle, including (a) minimum requirements
for seafarers to work on a ship; (b) conditions of
employment; (c) accommodation, recreational
facilities, food and catering; (d) health protection,
medical care, welfare and social security protection;
and (e) compliance and enforcement.4


The MLC 2006 also imposes certain documentary
obligations on Member States. Thus, each Member State
shall require its ships of over 500 GT that are involved in
international voyages to carry and maintain a maritime
labour certificate, as well as a declaration of maritime
labour compliance, conforming to a model prescribed by
the Code.5 The working and living conditions of seafarers
that must be inspected and approved by the flag State
before certifying a ship are as follows:


• Minimum age;


• Medical certification;


• Qualifications of seafarers;


• Seafarers’ employment agreements;


• Use of any licensed or certified or regulated private
recruitment and placement service;


• Hours of work or rest;


• Manning levels for the ship;


• Accommodation;


• On-board recreational facilities;


• Food and catering;


• Health and safety, and accident prevention;


• On-board medical care;


• On-board complaint procedures;


• Payment of wages.


Two handbooks have recently been issued by ILO
to assist Member States in implementing their
responsibilities under the MLC 2006 (ILO, 2012a; ILO,
2012b). The first contains a model for legal provisions
that implement MLC 2006, and is intended as an aid
for national legislators. The second covers issues of
social security for seafarers by providing both the
necessary background on the subject and practical
information related to the implementation of the
Convention. Also worth highlighting is guidance for
ship operators on Port State Control that has been
issued by the global shipowners’ organization, the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) (ICS, 2013).


It should also be noted that a Special Tripartite
Committee, mandated to keep the Convention under
continuous review, is set to meet in early 2014 to
discuss, inter alia, proposed amendments to the Code
of the Convention to address the issue of financial
security for crew members/seafarers and their
dependents with regard to compensation in cases of
personal injury, death and abandonment.6




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 105


2. Entry into force of the Athens
Convention relating to the Carriage
of Passengers and their Luggage
by Sea, 2002


The 2002 Protocol to the Athens Convention relating to
the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea
(PAL PROT 2002) achieved the required 10 ratifications7
on 23 April 2013 and is set to enter into force one year
later, on 23 April 2014.8 The 2002 Protocol revises and
updates the 1974 Athens Convention relating to the
Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea (PAL
1974),9 which established a liability regime in respect of
passenger carriage, including personal injury or death
at sea. The PAL 1974 as amended by the PAL PROT
2002 is referred to as the Athens Convention relating to
the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea,
2002 (PAL 2002).10


The PAL 2002 introduces some important changes
to the liability regime. Key elements11 include the
following:


(a) PAL 2002 replaces the fault-based liability
system of the 1974 Convention with a strict
liability system for shipping-related incidents
(that is, collision, stranding, explosion, fire,
and defects in the ship), subject to very limited
exceptions for force majeure-type incidents.


Thus, the carrier will be held liable in cases
of personal injury or death of a passenger,
irrespective of fault, up to a limit amounting to
250,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDR) per
passenger on each occasion; if loss or damage
exceeds this limit, the carrier is liable for an overall
amount of up to 400,000 SDR per passenger,
on each occasion, unless the carrier can prove
that the incident was not due to fault or neglect
on the part of the carrier, or his servants.12
By way of comparison, under PAL 1974 the
carrier’s limit of liability for death or personal
injury was set at 46,666 SDR per passenger. An
“opt-out” clause enables States Parties to retain
or introduce higher limits of liability (or unlimited
liability) in the case of carriers that are subject to
the jurisdiction of their courts.


(b) To ensure that claims are not frustrated, carriers
are required to maintain insurance or other financial
security to cover the limits for strict liability under
the Convention in respect of death of and personal
injury to passengers. The limit of the compulsory


insurance or other financial security shall not be
less than 250,000 SDR per passenger on each
distinct occasion. Any passenger ship trading
within an area where the PAL 2002 applies will
have to be issued with a certificate attesting that
insurance or other financial security is in force;
where a vessel is either uninsured or a certificate
is not obtained, fines will apply.13


(c) Regarding loss or damage to luggage, the
carrier’s limit of liability varies under the PAL
2002, depending on the type of luggage (cabin
luggage, vehicle and luggage carried in or on
such vehicles, and other luggage).14


(d) PAL 2002 introduces the tacit acceptance
procedure for amending the limits of liability, so
that any future increase in limits can enter into
force more easily.15


The entry into force of the PAL 2002 significantly
strengthens the international passenger liability regime,
in particular in respect of personal injury and death.
However, pending more widespread adoption of
PAL 2002, the international legal framework remains
complex. In this context it should be noted that PAL
1974 will remain in force for Contracting States to
that Convention that have not yet acceded to the PAL
PROT 2002;16 some of these States had reserved their
right to exclude the application of the 1974 Convention,
and apply their own limits of liability, when both the
passenger and the carrier were nationals of that
State.17 Moreover, it should be noted that a number of
States have not ratified or acceded to PAL 1974, but
have adopted a similar limitation regime, as a matter of
domestic legislation, albeit with higher liability limits.18


B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
RELATING TO THE REDUCTION
OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
FROM INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING
AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL
ISSUES


1. Reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions from international
shippingandenergyefficiency


A key development, reported in the 2012 edition of
the Review of Maritime Transport (UNCTAD, 2012a),
was the adoption of a set of technical and operational




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013106


measures19 to increase energy efficiency and reduce
emissions of GHGs from international shipping (IMO,
2011a, Annex 19). The new measures, introducing the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships and
the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP)
for all ships,20 were adopted by way of amendments
to MARPOL Annex VI, through introduction of a new
Chapter 4, and entered into force on 1 January 2013.
According to the Second IMO GHG Study 2009
(IMO, 2009), technical and operational measures
have a significant potential for the reduction of GHG
emissions from international shipping.21 Issues related
to the reduction of GHG emissions from international
shipping continued to remain one of the main areas
of focus of the work of the IMO’s Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC) at its sixty-forth and
sixty-fifth sessions22 held during the current reporting
period. Further information about relevant deliberations
and outcomes is presented below.


Energy efficiency for ships


Complementing four sets of guidelines (IMO, 2012a,
Annexes 8–11), which had been adopted earlier, the
MEPC, at its sixty-fourth session, adopted additional
guidelines and unified interpretations for the smooth
implementation of the mandatory regulations on
energy efficiency for ships, set out in Chapter 4 of
MARPOL Annex VI. In particular, the MEPC adopted
amendments to the “2012 Guidelines on the method
of calculation of the attained EEDI for new ships”,
relating to the calculation of shaft-generator power
and shaft-motor power (IMO, 2012b, Annex 8). The
MEPC also approved the following guidance and
interpretations (IMO, 2012b, Annex 7):


• Unified interpretation for the definition of “new
ships” for phases 1, 2 and 3 of the EEDI framework
under Regulation 2.23 of MARPOL Annex VI;


• Unified interpretation of the phrase “major
conversion” under Regulation  2.24 of MARPOL
Annex VI;


• Unified interpretation on the timing for existing
ships to have on board a SEEMP under
Regulations 5.4.4 and 22.1 of MARPOL Annex VI;


• Unified interpretation on the appropriate category
to be applied for dedicated fruit-juice carriers;


• Unified interpretation for section 2.3 of the
supplement to the International Air Pollution
Prevention (IAPP) certificate.


• In addition, the MEPC approved:


• Subject to concurrent decision by the ninety-first
session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC),
the draft MEPC–MSC circular for the interim
guidelines for determining minimum propulsion
power to maintain the manoeuvrability of ships in
adverse conditions (IMO, 2012c, Annex 2);


• Interim guidelines for the calculation of the
coefficient “fw” for decrease of ship speed in
representative sea conditions for trial use (IMO,
2012c, Annex 3);


• An amendment to the “2012 Guidelines on survey
and certification of the EEDI”23 (IMO, 2012b,
Annex 9).


At its sixty-fifth session in May 2013, the MEPC:


• Approved draft amendments to MARPOL
Annex VI, with a view to their adoption at the sixty-
sixth session of the Committee. The amendments
envisage: (a) extending the application of EEDI
to ro-ro cargo ships (vehicle carriers, Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) carriers, cruise passenger ships
having non-conventional propulsion, ro-ro cargo
ships and ro-ro passenger ships; (b) exempting
ships not propelled by mechanical means, and
platforms including Floating Production Storage
and Offloading Facilities (FPSOs), Floating Storage
Units (FSUs) and drilling rigs, regardless of their
propulsion, as well as cargo ships having ice-
breaking capability (IMO, 2013c, Annex 13);


• Adopted amendments to update the “Guidelines
for calculation of reference lines for use with the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)”, including
the addition of ro-ro cargo ships (vehicle carriers),
ro-ro cargo ships, ro-ro passenger ships, and LNG
carriers (IMO, 2013c, Annex 14);


• Noted, with a view to adoption at MEPC 66, the
finalized amendments to the “2012 Guidelines on
the method of calculation of the Attained Energy
Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships”;


• Approved amendments to unified interpretation
MEPC.1/Circ.795, to update the circular with
regards to requirements for SEEMP, to exclude
platforms (including FPSOs and FSUs), drilling rigs,
regardless of their propulsion, and any other ship
without means of propulsion;


• Adopted the “2013 Interim guidelines for
determining minimum propulsion power to maintain
the manoeuvrability of ships in adverse conditions”,
which are intended to assist administrations and
recognized organizations in verifying that ships,




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 107


complying with the EEDI requirements set out
in Regulation  21.5 of MARPOL Annex  VI, have
sufficient installed propulsion power to maintain
the manoeuvrability in adverse conditions (IMO,
2013c, Annex 16);


• Approved the “2013 Guidance on treatment
of innovative energy efficiency technologies for
calculation and verification of the attained EEDI”, which
are intended to assist manufacturers, shipbuilders,
shipowners, verifiers and other interested parties
related to the EEDI of ships to treat innovative
energy-efficiency technologies for calculation and
verification of the attained EEDI, addressing systems
such as air lubrication, wind propulsion systems,
high temperature waste heat recovery systems, and
photovoltaic power generation systems (IMO, 2013d);


• Adopted the “2013 Guidelines for calculation of
reference lines for use with the Energy Efficiency
Design Index (EEDI) for cruise passenger ships
having non-conventional propulsion” (IMO, 2013c,
Annex 17);


• Adopted amendments to the “2012 Guidelines on
survey and certification of the Energy Efficiency
Design Index (EEDI)” (IMO, 2013c, Annex 18), to
add references to measuring sea conditions.


The MEPC also endorsed an updated work plan
to continue its work on development of the EEDI
framework for ship types and sizes, and propulsion
systems not covered by the current EEDI requirements,
and to consider guidelines on propulsion power
needed to maintain the manoeuvrability of the ship
under adverse conditions (IMO, 2013e, Annex 9).


Finally, it should be noted that the MEPC decided to
establish a new sub-item under its agenda item 4 (“Air
pollution and energy efficiency”) for the discussion of
further technical and operational measures to enhance
the energy efficiency of international shipping; a
working group will be established under this sub-
agenda item at the MEPC’s sixty-sixth session (IMO,
2013c, paragraphs 4.136–4.147). The decision
followed discussions related to an amended proposal
for the establishment of attained energy-efficiency
standards for new and existing ships through a phased
approach, starting with a data-collection phase.24


Technical cooperation and transfer of technology


Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex  VI, adopted in July
2011, includes Regulation 23 on “Promotion of
technical cooperation and transfer of technology


relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of
ships”. Under this regulation, administrations, in
cooperation with IMO and other international bodies,
are required to promote and provide, as appropriate,
support, directly or through IMO, to States, especially
developing States that request technical assistance.
The regulation also requires administrations to
cooperate actively with one another, and, subject
to their national laws, regulations and policies, “to
promote the development and transfer of technology
and exchange of information to States, which request
technical assistance, particularly developing States, in
respect of the implementation of measures to fulfill the
requirements of Chapter 4 [of MARPOL Annex VI ]”.


At the time of the adoption of Chapter 4, MEPC agreed
to develop a resolution linked to the implementation
of Regulation 23, and of the other energy-efficiency
measures. Following extensive deliberations over the
course of several working sessions, the work was
completed, and resolution MEPC.229(65) on “Promotion
of technical cooperation and transfer of technology
relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of
ships” (IMO, 2013c, Annex  4), was adopted during
the sixty-fifth session of the MEPC. In its preamble, the
resolution makes reference both to the IMO principles of
non-discrimination and no more favourable treatment,25
and to the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities under the
UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. 26


The resolution requests the IMO, through its various
programmes, to provide technical assistance to its
Member States to enable cooperation in the transfer of
energy-efficient technologies to developing countries in
particular, and further assist in the sourcing of funding
for capacity-building and support to States, in particular
developing States, which have requested technology
transfer.27


The resolution also urges Member States, subject to
their ability, and subject to their respective national
laws, regulations and policies, “to promote the
provision of support especially to developing States
… including, but not limited with regard to:


1. Transfer of energy-efficient technologies for
ships;


2. Research and development for the improvement
of energy efficiency of ships;


3. Training of personnel, for the effective
implementation and enforcement of the
regulations in Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI;
and




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013108


4. The exchange of information and technical
cooperation relating to the improvement of
energy efficiency for ships.”


In relation to technical cooperation and capacity-
building, it should also be noted that the IMO
Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP)
and the Korean International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA) have recently concluded an agreement for
implementation of a project on “Building capacities in
East Asian Countries to address GHG emissions from
ships”. A comprehensive portfolio of training material
for capacity-building activities on energy efficiency for
shipping has been produced under that agreement.
In addition, a series of capacity-building workshops
and training courses have been implemented in
countries including Bulgaria, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Uruguay,
and Viet Nam, and IMO is seeking additional funding
from various sources including the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) to scale up these activities.28


Market-based measures and related matters


Despite improvements in the fuel-efficiency of ships,
GHG emissions from maritime transport are projected
to increase rapidly over the coming decades. To
address their growth, market based measures (MBMs)
for the reduction of GHG emissions from international
shipping29 have been proposed to complement
technical and operational measures already adopted.
While discussions on different proposals for possible
MBMs have been ongoing for some years under the
auspices of the IMO, the issue remains one of the
most controversial on the MEPC agenda.30


One of the main issues in the debate on MBMs
at the IMO has been their impact on developing
countries and especially on remote economies. Worth
mentioning in this context is a recent study (Climate
Strategies et al., 2013) that quantifies the economic
impacts of MBMs for 10 case-study economies as well
as globally.31 According to the study report, the case-
study economies were selected in the expectation
that they would be relatively highly impacted because
of their remoteness or dependence on international
aviation or maritime transport. The key findings of the
report – reflected here for the purposes of information
only – are as follows:


(1) Economic impacts of Market Based Measures
(MBMs) for International Shipping and Aviation on
Developing Countries considered in this study, and
globally, are small. The reductions in GDP are less than
0.01 per cent on average and less than 0.2 per cent


for all but a few of the case study countries. MBMs
which raise more revenues have a larger impact.


2) The volume and certainty of CO2 reductions
achieved by the MBMs considered for the time
frame (2015–2025) in this study are comparable
to each other, although emission reductions from
project-based emissions reductions (offsets) are
the most significant. In the longer term, innovations
in fuel-efficiency may decrease in-sector emission
reductions costs and the associated in-sector CO2
reductions could be more significant.


3) In most cases, aviation MBMs have larger
economic impacts than those associated with
the implementation of shipping schemes. Aviation
has larger impacts on tourism, and shipping is
less responsive to price increases and less carbon
intensive.


4) Countries with a higher dependency on tourism
and trade are likely to experience greater economic
impacts. Some of these countries are small island
developing states that are also vulnerable to climate
change impacts.


5) Undesired economic impacts can be addressed.
However, since the factors that cause these vary
between countries, applicable measures vary as
well. Instead, a combination of appropriate measures
could be taken to address the impacts in question.
Exemptions, lump-sum rebates, investments in
infrastructure efficiency and into the development of
more efficient ships and aircraft could be considered.


At the IMO, discussions related to market-based
measures have been ongoing for several years, but are
moving only slowly. A number of revised and updated
proposals were submitted at the sixty-fourth session
of the MEPC. However, due to time constraints, the
Committee agreed to postpone relevant detailed
debate to the sixty-fifth session. In addition, the co-
sponsors32 of one of the submissions (IMO, 2012d)
suggested that high priority should be given to the
development of an MEPC resolution to ensure that
financial, technological and capacity-building support
from developed countries for the implementation
of regulations on energy efficiency for ships by
developing countries. Hence, they considered that all
further decisions on MBMs must await the adoption
of this resolution, and that future consideration of
MBMs must fully take into account potential impacts
of those measures on developing countries. As a
result, pending the adoption of the resolution, during
its sixty-fifth session, the MEPC agreed to suspend
discussions on market-based measures and related
issues to a future session.33




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 109


Update of the GHG emission estimate for
international shipping


The MEPC, at its sixty-third session, had noted that
uncertainty existed in the estimates and projections
of emissions from international shipping and agreed
that further work should take place to provide reliable
and up-to-date information for the Committee to
base its decisions on. At the sixty-fourth session of
the MEPC, an outline document regarding the need
for an update of the GHG emissions estimate for
international shipping prepared by the IMO Secretariat
was considered (IMO, 2012e). The outline document
highlights the need for an updated GHG inventory, as
the current estimate contained in the Second IMO
GHG Study 2009 (IMO, 2009) does not take into
account the economic downturn experienced globally
since 2008.34 In addition, analytical work undertaken
since the publication of the Second IMO GHG Study
2009 and information obtained through analysis of the
Automatic Identification System (AIS), as well as other
sources for ship activity data, indicate that some of
the assumptions used at that time may need to be
reconsidered. The document proposed that the update
would build on the methodology developed under the
Second IMO GHG Study 2009 and would be based
on available data on fleet composition and size as well
as on other technical ship-specific data. The inventory
would include current global emissions of GHGs and
relevant substances emitted from ships of 100 GT and
above engaged in international transport.


In the context of consideration of the IMO Secretariat
document, the MEPC report (IMO, 2012b) expressly
notes the following views from delegations:


• An update of the GHG estimate for international shipping
must be undertaken in a fair, open and transparent manner
and in coordination with the Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice of the UNFCCC, whose
agenda includes a specific item for the consideration of
emissions from fuel used for international aviation and
maritime transport, and that this work should take into
consideration the methodological work developed by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC);


• Further consideration is needed to be given to
ensuring the estimates related to those made by other
international organizations, that the work is scientifically
based, equitable and balanced, which will be tasked to
undertake the work, how the data will be used and the
methodology to be used;


• There is an urgent need for information on the actual
fuel consumption of ships and hence highlighted the
need of moving forward with a bottom-up (ship activity)


approach of the GHG emissions estimate as well as top-
down analysis which has been used in the past; and


• Monitoring and reporting of data was also important.35


Following further discussion at an expert workshop36
held in early 2013, the MEPC at its sixty-fifth session,
approved the terms of reference37 for an Update GHG
Study, and agreed that (a) the Update Study should
focus on global inventories (as set out in paragraph 1.3
of the terms of reference) and, resources permitting,
should also include future scenarios of emissions (as
set out in the chapeau and paragraph 1.10 of the
terms of reference); (b) its primary focus should be to
update the CO2 emission estimates for international
shipping, and subject to adequate resources, the
same substances as those estimated by the Second
IMO GHG Study 2009 should also be estimated;
(c) a steering committee should be established that
should be geographically balanced, should equitably
represent developing and developed countries and
should be of a manageable size.38 The final report of
the Update Study is expected to be submitted to the
MEPC at its sixty-sixth session, in March 2014.


WTO-related issues


Related to the issue of possible MBMs for international
shipping, the MEPC during its sixty-fourth session
considered a submission39 that argued that MBMs
show incompatibility with the WTO rules (IMO, 2012f).
The document also considers that the conclusion of the
third Intersessional Meeting of the Working Group on
GHG Emissions from Ships (GHG-WG 3) – that MBMs
are, in principle, compatible with the WTO rules – was
premature, since most of the MBM proposals were not
yet sufficiently elaborated to support that conclusion.


At the request of the IMO Council, comments were
sought from WTO on the above document, and note
was taken of the response by the WTO Secretariat
(IMO, 2013h) during the sixty-fifth session of the
MEPC. In its response, the WTO Secretariat indicated
that it was not authorized to interpret WTO rules, as
this was the exclusive prerogative of WTO members.
However, it had prepared a neutral document which
set out the WTO disciplines most relevant to the types
of MBMs that the IMO was considering.40


Matters concerning the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change


With respect to matters concerning UNFCCC, during
its sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth sessions the MEPC
noted a number of documents.41 The Committee




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013110


also noted the latest status reports as contained in
Annex 11 of IMO (2012b) and Annex 20 of IMO (2013c),
by the UNFCCC Secretariat on the current state of
negotiations in general and on bunker fuels in particular.


2. Ship-source pollution and
protection of the environment


(a) Developments regarding the
International Convention on Liability
and Compensation for Damage
in Connection with the Carriage
of Hazardous and Noxious Substances
by Sea, 1996, as amended
by its 2010 Protocol


As may be recalled, in 2012 a report with a focus
on ship-source oil pollution was published by the
UNCTAD secretariat. The report, entitled Liability
and Compensation for Ship-Source Oil Pollution: An
Overview of the International Legal Framework for Oil
Pollution Damage from Tankers (UNCTAD, 2012b)
was prepared to assist policymakers, particularly
in developing countries, in their understanding of
the complex international legal framework and in
assessing the merits of accession to the latest of the
relevant international legal instruments. 42 As noted in
the report, accession could offer considerable benefits
to a number of coastal developing States that may be
vulnerable to oil pollution from tankers.


While the report focuses on the international liability and
compensation framework for oil pollution from tankers,
known as the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC Fund) regime,43 it also highlights some of
the key features of two important related international
conventions that provide for liability and compensation
in respect of other types of ship-source pollution.
These are the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 (2001 BOPC),44
which covers bunker oil spills from ships other than
oil tankers, and the 1996 International Convention on
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances
by Sea (1996 HNS Convention), which deals with
liability and compensation arising in connection
with the carriage of a broad range of hazardous and
noxious substances (HNS). An amending Protocol to
the 1996 HNS Convention had been adopted in April
201045 to address a range of practical problems that
had prevented many States from ratifying the 1996
Convention.


While the 2001 BOPC is in force internationally, the 1996
HNS Convention, as amended by its 2010 Protocol
(2010 HNS Convention) has not yet attracted the required
number of accessions for its entry into force. Thus, at
present, no international regime is in force to provide
for liability and compensation arising in connection with
the carriage of HNS cargos. This is a matter of concern,
given the potential for coastal pollution, as well as
personal injury and death that may be associated with
an incident involving the carriage of chemicals and other
HNS cargos.


The 1996 HNS Convention is modelled on the IOPC
Fund regime and establishes a two-tier system for
compensation to be paid in the event of pollution
incidents involving HNS such as chemicals. Tier
one provides for shipowner liability, backed by
compulsory insurance cover. Tier two provides
for compensation from a fund, financed through
contributions from the receivers of HNS in cases
when the shipowner’s insurance does not cover a
given HNS incident or is insufficient to cover the
claim.


One of the major obstacles to ratification of the 1996
HNS Convention had been difficulties regarding one
of the key requirements under the Convention, the
submission of reports on “contributing cargo”, that
is, on HNS cargo received in each State. Other
obstacles appeared to be related to the setting
up of a reporting system for packaged goods and
the difficulty of enforcing payment, in non-States
Parties, of contributions to the liquefied natural
gas account established under the Convention.
By addressing these problems, the 2010 Protocol
to the 1996 HNS Convention was considered an
important development towards the strengthening
of the international liability framework for ship-
source pollution. The 2010 HNS Protocol was open
for signature from 1 November 2010 to 31 October
2011 and thereafter has been open for accession.


While so far no State has yet acceded to the
Protocol, it should be noted that a set of guidelines
for reporting contributing cargo under the 2010 HNS
Convention (IMO, 2013j) was agreed by delegates
from 29 States at a workshop on reporting of HNS
organized in late 2012 by the IMO in cooperation
with the IOPC Funds.46 The guidelines are intended
to assist States with the Convention’s accession
or ratification, and were endorsed by the Legal
Committee of the IMO during its 100th session,
in April 2013. In so doing, the Legal Committee
expressed the following views:




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 111


• The guidelines were the result of the work of a
large number of Member States and observers;


• It was of paramount importance that the
Convention be applied uniformly and the guidelines
could assist this process;


• The guidelines were not binding, but were merely
intended to facilitate the implementation and entry
into force of the 2010 HNS Protocol, particularly
States’ submissions of contributing cargo to
the Secretary-General of IMO, on ratification, or
accession to the HNS Protocol;


• The proposed solutions in the guidelines should
not exclude the use by implementing States of
other options which were also provided for in the
HNS Protocol.47


It is hoped that the international community’s collective
efforts towards the entry into force of the 2010 HNS
Convention will continue and eventually be successful,
thus closing an important regulatory gap.


(b) Liability and compensation issues
connected with transboundary
pollution damage from offshore oil
exploration and exploitation


The Legal Committee during its 100th  session
noted information on the outcome of the
second International Conference on Liability and
Compensation Regime for Transboundary Oil
Damage Resulting from Offshore Exploration and
Exploitation Activities, held in Bali in November
2012 (IMO, 2013k), as well as a submission
containing principles for guidance on model
bilateral/regional agreements or arrangements on
liability and compensation issues connected with
transboundary pollution damage from offshore
exploration and exploitation activities (IMO, 2013l).


The Committee recalled its previous decision to
analyse further the liability and compensation issues
connected with transboundary pollution damage
resulting from offshore oil exploration and exploitation
activities, with the aim of developing guidance to
assist States interested in pursuing bilateral or
regional arrangements.48 It agreed that assistance
should be provided to those States which are in need
of guidance for bilateral and multilateral agreements.
Member States were invited to send examples of
relevant legislation and, in particular, examples of
existing bilateral and regional agreements to the
secretariat.49


(c) Other developments at the International
Maritime Organization


During its sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth sessions, the
MEPC approved draft amendments and adopted
guidelines related to MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13
on nitrogen oxides (NOx), the NOx Technical Code,
2008 and the implementation of the revised MARPOL
Annex  V “Prevention of pollution by garbage from
ships”. It also adopted two sets of guidelines, which
together with the four sets of guidelines previously
adopted, complete the development of all guidelines
referred to in the text of the Hong Kong International
Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound
Recycling of Ships, 2009 (Hong Kong Convention).
The MEPC also granted basic and final approval to
a number of ballast water management systems that
make use of active substances, approved a draft
resolution to facilitate the smooth implementation of
the 2004 International Convention for the Control and
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments
(BWM Convention), and issued a number of ballast
water management circulars. A more detailed overview
of relevant issues is presented in the following sections.


(i) Air pollution from ships


In addition to striving to reduce its carbon footprint from
international shipping, IMO is working on regulations
to reduce emissions of other toxic substances from
burning fuel oil, particularly sulphur oxides (SOx) and
NOx. These significantly contribute to air pollution
from ships and are covered by Annex VI of MARPOL,50
which was amended in 2008 to introduce more
stringent emission controls.51


Sulphur oxide emissions


As reported in the 2012 edition of the Review of
Maritime Transport, with effect from 1 January
2012, MARPOL Annex  VI established reduced SOx
thresholds for marine bunker fuels, with the global
sulphur cap reduced from 4.5 per cent (45,000 parts
per million (ppm)) to 3.5 per cent (35,000 ppm). The
global sulphur cap will be reduced further to 0.50 per
cent (5,000 ppm) from 2020 (subject to a feasibility
review in 2018).52 Annex  VI also contains provisions
allowing for special SOx Emission Control Areas
(ECAs) to be established where even more stringent
controls on sulphur emissions apply.53 Since 1 July
2010, these ECAs have SOx thresholds for marine
fuels of 1 per cent (from the previous 1.5 per cent);
from 1 January 2015, ships operating in these areas




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013112


will be required to burn fuel with no more than 0.1 per
cent sulphur. Alternatively, ships must fit an exhaust
gas cleaning system,54 or use any other technological
method to limit SOx emissions.


The European Union has recently revised its directive
on sulphur in fuels, generally including MARPOL
Annex VI provisions. According to the new directive,
the limits for the sulphur content of marine fuels used in
designated SOx ECAs (SECAs) will be 1 per cent until
31 December 2014, and 0.1 per cent from 1 January
2015. In addition, the IMO sulphur limit of 0.5  per
cent will become mandatory in waters of European
Union Member States by 2020.55 The inclusion of this
fixed entry-into-force date (2020) has raised concerns
about possible inconsistency with the IMO provision
which makes such a date dependent on the outcome
of the 2018 feasibility study (Platts, 2012).


As noted in the previous Review of Maritime
Transport, the shipping industry, while supportive
of the 2008 amendments, has expressed concerns
about some aspects of the implementation of
the requirements. This includes in particular the
availability of compliant low-sulphur fuel to meet the
new demand (MarineLink.com, 2012).


During its sixty-fourth session, the MEPC discussed
proposals (IMO, 2012i;56 IMO, 2012j57) related to
a review on the availability of compliant fuel oil to
meet the requirements set out in MARPOL Annex VI,
Regulation 14 on emissions of SOx from ships.


A number of delegations recognized that a preliminary
study for the assessment of the availability of compliant
fuel oil in 2020 could provide further information to
industries, and that it would be important in identifying
sooner rather than later what action is necessary
to ensure availability of compliant fuel oil. Other
delegations expressed the view that the preliminary
study could not provide additional certainty with
respect to the availability of compliant fuel oil due to
the difference in sulphur limits of the fuels to be studied
and the specific geographic location in which the ECA-
compliant fuel oil was to be used, and observed that
the assessment methodology already developed by the
correspondence group contains proven models that
do not need revalidation. The MEPC agreed to revisit
the matter of a review at a future session, and invited
relevant submissions to its sixty-sixth session in 2014.


The MEPC also noted that, based on the monitoring
of the worldwide average sulphur content of marine
fuel oils supplied for use on board ship, in 2011 the
average sulphur content of residual fuel worldwide


was 2.65 per cent, and that of distillate was 0.14 per
cent (IMO, 2012k).


Emissions of nitrogen oxides


In addition to SOx, ship engines emit elevated levels
of the harmful compounds of the general formula
NOx, which have negative effects that include
GHG formation in the atmosphere and damage to
respiratory health. Progressive reductions in NOx
emissions from ship engines have also been agreed
at IMO. For specified ships that operate in ECAs,58 the
strictest controls are applicable to ships constructed
on or after 1 January 2016. Such ships must produce
NOx emissions below a level known as “tier III”. For
ships operating outside such areas, tier II controls
apply.59 Unlike SOx, where emission reductions can
be achieved fairly simply, albeit at some cost, by
switching to low-sulphur fuels or installing exhaust
gas SOx scrubbers, major adjustments are needed to
ensure compliance with NOx tier III requirements.


According to a correspondence group report (IMO,
2013m) on technology availability submitted at the
sixty-fifth session of the MEPC, technologies identified
that may be used to achieve the tier III NOx limits
included the following:


• Selective catalytic reduction (SCR);


• Exhaust gas recirculation (EGR);


• LNG, either in a dual-fuel or alternative-fuel
arrangement;


• Other technologies: direct water injection; humid
air motor, scrubbers, treated water scrubber;
variable valve timing and lift; dimethyl ether as an
alternative fuel.


However, there was broad agreement among
members of the correspondence group that SCR can
meet the tier III limits as a sole emission-reduction
strategy for most, if not all, marine engines and vessel
applications. It is an emission reduction method that
reduces NOx emissions, through after-treatment
technology, by using a catalyst to chemically reduce
NOx. Some marine engine manufacturers are already
marketing SCR-based tier III-compliant SCR engines
(IMO, 2013m).


During its sixty-fifth session, the MEPC:


• Considered and agreed to proposed draft
amendments to MARPOL Annex VI Regulation 13
on NOx to amend the date for the implementation
of tier III standards within ECAs to 1 January




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 113


2021, from the current effective date of 1 January
2016. The draft amendments will be circulated for
consideration at the sixty-sixth session of MEPC
(MEPC 66) in 2014, with a view to adoption;


• Approved, with a view to subsequent adoption,
draft amendments to the NOx Technical Code,
2008, concerning use of dual-fuel engines (IMO,
2013c, Annex 7);


• Adopted guidelines in respect of non-identical
replacement engines not required to meet the tier
III limit (IMO, 2013c, Annex 8);


• Adopted a unified interpretation on the “time of
the replacement or addition” of an engine for the
applicable NOx tier standard for the supplement to
the IAPP certificate (IMO, 2013c, Annex 9).


(ii) Port reception facilities and garbage
management


Garbage from ships can be just as dangerous to marine
life as oil or chemicals. As pointed out in the previous
issue of the Review of Maritime Transport, amendments
to MARPOL Annex  V “Prevention of pollution by
garbage from ships”, were adopted that entered into
force on 1 January 2013 (IMO, 2011a, Annex 13). The
revised Annex V prohibits the discharge of all garbage
into the sea, except as provided otherwise.60 Guidelines
were also adopted to assist in the implementation of
the revised MARPOL Annex V.


During its sixty-fifth session, the MEPC adopted
amendments to the “2012 Guidelines for the
implementation of MARPOL Annex  V”, concerning
electronic wastes, such as electronic cards, gadgets,
computers, printer cartridges, and the like, generated on
board during normal operation, maintenance or upgrading
of vessels (IMO, 2013c, Annex  28). The MEPC also
approved draft amendments to the form of the “Garbage
Record Book” under MARPOL Annex V, to update the
record of garbage discharges, for circulation with a view
to adoption at MEPC 66 (IMO, 2013c, Annex 27), and
an MEPC circular on adequate port reception facilities for
cargoes declared as harmful to the marine environment
under MARPOL Annex V (IMO, 2013n).61


(iii) Ship recycling


The MEPC, at its sixty-fourth session adopted the
following:


• The “2012 Guidelines for the survey and certification
of ships under the Hong Kong Convention62” (IMO,
2012b, Annex 2);


• The “2012 Guidelines for the inspection of ships
under the Hong Kong Convention” (IMO, 2012b,
Annex 3).


These two sets of guidelines, together with the four
sets of guidelines adopted earlier,63 complete the
development of all guidelines referred to in the text
of the Hong Kong Convention. The guidelines are
intended to assist ship-recycling facilities and shipping
companies to introduce voluntary improvements to
meet the requirements of the Hong Kong Convention,
which was adopted in May 2009 but has not yet
entered into force.64


An intersessional correspondence group was re-
established65 during MEPC 65 and instructed to finalize
the development of threshold values and exemptions
applicable to the materials to be listed in Inventories of
Hazardous Materials as well as to amend accordingly
the “2011 Guidelines for the development of the
Inventory of Hazardous Materials”. It will report the
outcome of its deliberations to the MEPC 66.


(iv) Ballast water management


In February 2004, the BWM Convention had been
adopted, under the auspices of the IMO, to prevent,
minimize and ultimately eliminate the risks to the
environment, human health, property and resources
arising from the transfer of harmful aquatic organisms
carried by ships’ ballast water from one region to
another.66 The Committee urged those States which
have not yet ratified the Convention to do so at the
earliest possible opportunity.


After considering the reports of the twenty-first–
twenty-fifth meetings of the Joint Group of Experts
on the Scientific Aspects of Marine Environment
Protection Ballast Water Working Group, which took
place in 2012 and the beginning of 2013, the MEPC
granted basic approval to eight,67 and final approval
to six ballast water management systems68 that make
use of active substances during its sixty-fourth and
sixty-fifth sessions.


The MEPC at its sixty-fifth session approved a
draft Assembly resolution on the application of
Regulation B-3 of the BWM Convention to ease and
facilitate the smooth implementation of the Convention
(IMO, 2013c, Annex  3), which will be submitted to
the twenty-eighth session of the IMO Assembly69
for approval. The draft resolution recommends that
ships constructed before the entry into force of the
BWM Convention will not be required to comply with
Regulation D-2 (ballast water performance standard)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013114


until their first renewal survey following the date of
entry into force of the Convention. The aim of the draft
resolution is to clarify uncertainty in relation to the
application of Regulation B-3, through the application
of a realistic timeline for enforcement of Regulation D-1
(ballast water exchange standard) and Regulation D-2
(ballast water performance standard), upon entry into
force of the Convention.


The MEPC also approved:


• The BWM Circular on clarification of “major
conversion”;


• The BWM Circular on Guidance on ballast water
sampling and analysis for trial use;


• Amendments to the MEPC resolution (IMO,
2013c, Annex 1), on information reporting on type
approved ballast water management systems;


• The BWM Circular on amendments to the
Guidance for administrations on the type approval
process for ballast water management systems;


• The BWM Circular on options for ballast water
management for offshore support vessels.70


Key developments in summary


As the above overview of regulatory developments
shows, in the year under review, several regulatory
measures have been adopted to strengthen the
legal framework relating to ship-source air pollution,
port reception facilities and garbage management.
Moreover, different sets of guidelines have been
developed with a view to facilitating the widespread
adoption of the 2010 HNS Convention and the 2009
Hong Kong Convention on ship recycling; progress
has also been made in respect of technical matters
related to the implementation of the 2004 BWM
Convention. As concerns the reduction of GHG
emissions from international shipping, significant
progress has been made in respect of technical and
operational measures. Thus, a number of guidelines
and unified interpretations have been issued to ensure
the smooth implementation of the new mandatory
regulations on energy efficiency for ships under
Chapter 4 of MARPOL Annex VI; further technical and
operational measures to enhance the energy efficiency
of international shipping have been scheduled for
discussion as part of the MEPC deliberations on air
pollution and energy efficiency. Moreover, a study
has been initiated to provide an updated GHG
emissions estimate for international shipping by the
spring of 2014. Particularly worth highlighting is also


the adoption of an important resolution to promote
technical cooperation and the transfer of technology
relating to the improvement of energy efficiency of
ships. This is an issue of particular practical relevancy
from the perspective of developing countries and
adoption of the resolution represents an important
step towards ensuring all countries have access to
and benefit from energy-efficient technologies for
ships.


C. OTHER LEGAL AND REGULATORY
DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING
TRANSPORTATION


This section highlights some key issues in the field of
maritime security and safety that may be of particular
interest to parties engaged in international trade and
transport. These include developments relating to
maritime and supply-chain security and some issues
related to piracy. Matters related to piracy will, for
reasons of space, not be covered extensively here, but
are the subject of a separate report by the Secretariat.


1. Maritime and supply-chain
security


There have been a number of developments in
relation to existing maritime and supply-chain security
standards that had been adopted under the auspices
of various international organizations such as the
World Customs Organization (WCO), IMO and the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
as well as at the European Union level and in the
United States, both important trade partners for many
developing countries.


(a) World Customs Organization
Framework of Standards to Secure
and Facilitate Global Trade


As noted in previous editions of the Review of Maritime
Transport, in 2005 WCO had adopted the Framework
of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (the
SAFE Framework),71 with the objective of developing a
global supply-chain framework. The SAFE Framework
provides a set of standards and principles that must be
adopted as a minimum threshold by national customs
administrations. These standards are contained within
two pillars – pillar 1, customs-to-customs network
arrangements and pillar 2, customs–business
partnerships.72




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 115


The SAFE Framework has been updated and has
evolved over the years as a dynamic instrument,
aiming to balance trade facilitation and controls
while ensuring the security of the global supply
chain. It is a widely accepted instrument that serves
as an important reference point for customs and for
economic operators alike. 73


In June 2010, the WCO issued its SAFE Package,
bringing together all WCO instruments and guidelines
that support its implementation.74 As part of yearly
updates, the 2012 version of the SAFE Framework
includes a new part 5 in respect of coordinated
border management, and a new part 6 in respect of
trade continuity and resumption. The text on mutual
recognition has thus been moved to a new part 7;
that concerning the authorized economic operator
(AEO) conditions, requirements and benefits has
been moved to a new Annex  III, and the text of the
Customs Cooperation Council resolution on the SAFE
Framework has been moved to a new Annex  IV. In
addition, a new Annex I has been created, containing
definitions, including the definition of “high risk
cargo”.75


As an important feature of the SAFE Framework, the
AEOs76 are private parties that have been accredited
by national customs administrations as compliant with
WCO or equivalent supply-chain security standards.
AEOs have to meet special requirements in respect
of physical security of premises, hidden camera
surveillance and selective staffing and recruitment
policies. In return, AEOs are typically rewarded by way
of trade-facilitation benefits, such as faster clearance
of goods and fewer physical inspections. Over the
course of recent years, a number of mutual recognition
agreements (MRAs)77 of respective AEOs have been
adopted by customs administrations, usually on a
bilateral basis. However, it is hoped that these will, in
due, course form the basis for multilateral agreements
at the sub-regional and regional level.78 As of 30 June
2013, 26 AEO programmes had been established
in 52 countries79 and seven further countries plan to
establish them in the near future.80


Capacity-building assistance under the WCO
Columbus Programme remains a vital part of the SAFE
implementation strategy. Implementation is further
supported by Customs and private sector working
bodies established within the WCO Secretariat
and working in close collaboration to maintain the
relevance of the SAFE Framework in a changing trade
environment.81


(b) Developments at the European Union
level and in the United States


For many developing countries, trade with the
European Union and the United States remains
of particular importance. Hence, certain relevant
developments in the field of maritime and supply-
chain security are also reported here.


As regards the European Union, previous editions
of the Review of Maritime Transport have provided
information on the Security Amendment to the
Community Customs Code (Regulation (EC)
648/2005 and its implementing provisions), which
aims to ensure an equivalent level of protection
through customs controls for all goods brought into or
out of the European Union’s customs territory.82 Part of
these changes was the development of common rules
for customs risk management, including setting out
common criteria for pre-arrival/pre-departure security
risk analysis based on electronically submitted cargo
information. Since 1 January 2011, this advance
electronic declaration of relevant security data has
been an obligation for traders and is no longer optional;
relevant security data have had to be sent before the
arrival of the goods on the European Union customs
territory. If such data is not sent in advance, then the
goods need to be declared immediately on arrival at
the border, which may delay the customs clearance
of consignments at the border pending the results
of risk analysis for safety and security purposes.83
The Security Amendment to the Customs Code also
introduced a sophisticated common Customs Risk
Management Framework, encompassing detailed
common risk criteria and standards. In this context,
the European Commission commissioned a study
to evaluate the existing strengths and weaknesses
of European Union risk analysis and targeting
capabilities, and assess some potential options for
improvement (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012).84 The
study concluded that several issues required urgent
action, including data quality, supply-chain modelling
and certain aspects of the methodology applied.


Subsequently, in January 2013, the European
Commission adopted a “Communication on Customs
risk management and the security of the supply chain”
(European Commission, 2013). The Communication
characterizes the European Union’s current cargo risk
assessment strategy as “not sufficient”, and states
that “a new approach to EU risk management is
needed”.85 It sets out a strategy to enable Customs to
better tackle risks associated with goods being traded




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013116


in international supply chains and suggests a number of
key actions to be taken.86 Following the adoption of the
above Communication outlining the European Union’s
approach, concerns have been expressed by industry
associations about the complexity of the current
European Union advance cargo security system and
about the fact that a single, unified European Union
customs regime may not be a realistic option in the near
term.87 In a joint submission to the European Parliament
and Council (International Air Transport Association
et al., 2013), a number of major carrier and freight
forwarder trade associations have drawn attention to
several issues that remain to be clarified and decided
through ongoing deliberations at the European Union.
These include the need to define and identify what
additional data elements will be required for a proper
advance cargo risk assessment, who will be required to
file such data, through which system and when.


Part of the changes to the European Union Customs
Code was also the introduction of provisions regarding
AEOs, a status which reliable traders may be granted
and which entails benefits in terms of trade-facilitation
measures. In this context, subsequent related
developments – such as the recommendation for self-
assessment of economic operators to be submitted
together with their application for AEO certificates,88
and the issuance of a revised self-assessment
questionnaire,89 to guarantee a uniform approach
throughout all European Union Member States, are
also worth noting.


In respect of mutual recognition of AEO programmes
through agreements between the European Union and
third countries including major trading partners,90 it is
worth noting that the decision between the European
Union and the United States regarding mutual
recognition of their “secure traders” programmes,
namely the European Union AEO and the United
States Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism
(C–TPAT)91 programmes, signed on 4 May 2012
(European Union–United States Joint Committee,
2012), was fully implemented as of 31 January 2013.
The final phase of the agreement that this decision
represents provides reciprocal benefits to safe traders,
including lower risk score and less examination by
customs when shipping cargo (United States Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), 2013).


It should also be noted that the CBP has recently
announced that as part of their Trusted Trader
Program, they are planning to join the C-TPAT and
Importer Self-Assessment processes. This is intended
to enable CBP to provide additional incentives to


participating low-risk partners, while benefiting from
the added efficiencies of managing supply chain and
trade compliance within one partnership programme.
A number of participants will serve as pilots, and the
implementation of the first phase of the programme is
targeted to begin by the end of the fiscal year 2013.92


(c) International Maritime Organization


(i) Measures to enhance maritime security


The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the Legal
Committee (LEG) and the Facilitation Committee
(FAL) of IMO cover issues related to maritime security,
including piracy, as part of their agenda. In this respect,
certain developments at the most recent sessions
of these committees over the past year – relating to
the effective implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2
and the International Ship and Port Facilities Security
(ISPS) Code, combating piracy and armed robbery,
requirements related to privately contracted armed
security personnel on board ships, and enhancing
maritime trade recovery in the event of large-scale
emergencies – are worth noting.


Maritime Safety Committee


The MSC at its ninety-first session93 noted that a
number of Contracting Governments were not fulfilling
their obligations under SOLAS Regulation XI-2/13 on
communication of information. Therefore, it urged these
Governments to review their information in the Global
Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) and
update it as necessary; in this context, the intention
of the secretariat to review and enhance the module’s
accessibility and value as an information source was also
noted. The MSC further noted the current availability of
the IMO Guide to Maritime Security and the ISPS Code
(IMO sales number: IA116E; ISBN: 978-92-801-1544-
4) in English and French, and its expected availability
in Spanish later in 2013, and the need to follow the
procedures detailed therein (IMO, 2012l).


The MSC also reviewed the latest statistics on piracy
and armed robbery against ships (IMO, 2012m) and
noted the encouraging downward trend in piracy
attacks in the western Indian Ocean. However, it was
noted that there were still many innocent seafarers
held hostage in Somalia, some for more than two
years. In addition, a major concern was the increase in
the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery
against ships in the Gulf of Guinea, and the increasing
level of violence of those attacks (IMO, 2012n,
pages 59–62).




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 117


At its ninety-second session,94 the MSC noted that a
study on the human cost of maritime piracy in 2012
had just been released (Oceans Beyond Piracy,
2013). While referring to the issue of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in the Gulf of Guinea,
the Committee welcomed the regional initiative
by the Economic Community of Central African
States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the Gulf of Guinea
Commission, pursuant to United Nations Security
Council resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012),
to develop a Code of Conduct on the repression
of piracy, armed robbery against ships and other
illicit activities at sea. This Code of Conduct, which
complemented the integrated coastguard function
network project, launched by IMO and the Maritime
Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)
in 2006, and the African Union’s Integrated Maritime
Strategy 2050, was adopted at a ministerial meeting
in Cotonou, Benin, in March 2013. The Code was
adopted formally by the meeting in Yaoundé, attended
by 13 Heads of State from West and Central African
countries, and was opened for signature on 25 June,
2013.95


Under the new Code, signatories commit to cooperate
to the fullest possible extent in the prevention and
repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships,
transnational organized crime in the maritime domain,
maritime terrorism, illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing and other illegal activities at sea with a view
towards:


• Sharing and reporting relevant information;


• Interdicting ships and/or aircraft suspected of
engaging in such illegal activities at sea;


• Ensuring that persons committing or attempting
to commit illegal activities at sea are apprehended
and prosecuted;


• Facilitating proper care, treatment and repatriation
for seafarers, fishermen, other shipboard personnel
and passengers subject to illegal activities at sea,
particularly those who have been subjected to
violence.96


With respect to piracy and armed robbery against
ships in waters off the coast of Somalia, the
Committee noted that although the numbers of piracy
attacks in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean
had significantly reduced, it still remained a significant
threat and there was no cause to relax (IMO, 2013o,
page 63).


Legal Committee


The Legal Committee at its 100th session97 received
a document (IMO, 2013p)98 in response to its earlier
request for the IMO to approach agencies in those
regions directly involved in combating piracy and
armed robbery (primarily the European Union Naval
Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime (UNODC)) to obtain information on
the number of pirates captured and handed ashore
for further investigation, as well as information on the
difficulties identified in the apprehension of pirates.
The following views were expressed in respect of the
above document and the written comments to it:


• transparency in identifying problems related to the
apprehension of pirates was beneficial to all parties
involved in combating piracy or struggling with the
consequences of this crime;


• as the information on the number of pirates captured
and handed ashore for further investigation, as
well as information on the difficulties identified
in the apprehension of pirates, had only been
received from UNODC, the Committee was still far
from meeting its goal of obtaining the information
it was seeking;


• the information related to the piracy suspects/
convicted pirates held in other States provided by
UNODC in document LEG 100/6/1 needed to be
updated following the reports provided by States
attending the WG 2 piracy meeting which took place
in April 2013;


• Member States and organizations in consultative
status with IMO should share their experience in
resolving problems related to apprehension of pirates
and should provide related information to IMO;


• IMO is the primary forum within the United Nations
system responsible for coordinating efforts of the
wider international community in its fight against
piracy; and


• it is important to include in the database States
whose national law does not allow the use of Privately
Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in its


territorial waters.99


With respect to the last point, a circular containing a
questionnaire100 on information on port and coastal
State requirements related to PCASP on board ships
(IMO, 2011b), includes information on national laws
on the use of PCASP, firearms and security-related
equipment.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013118


Another document was introduced, containing
information on the database on court decisions related
to piracy (IMO, 2013r) established by the United
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute (UNICRI).101 Statistics were also provided
by UNICRI, drawn from its piracy analysis, including
the average age of pirates, the region and clans they
come from, their occupations, when attacks are most
likely to occur, the number of pirates participating in
individual attacks, the use of motherships, the number
of casualties occurring in pirate ranks and the number
and type of ships boarded. The UNICRI piracy portal
also provided information on court decisions, intended
to make the database more comprehensive, as well
as links to other databases in different jurisdictions
and regions and information on post-trial transfers.
There was general support for the database and the
Legal Committee agreed to collaborate closely with
UNICRI with regard to piracy-related issues.102


The Legal Committee at its 100th session, also
adopted draft Guidelines on the preservation and
collection of evidence following an allegation of a
serious crime having taken place on board a ship, or
following a report of a missing person from a ship, and
on pastoral and medical care of victims. These draft
guidelines focus on what can practically be carried out
on board a ship to preserve and/or collect evidence
and protect persons affected by serious crimes, until
such time that the relevant law enforcement authorities
commence an investigation. They were submitted
for consideration and adoption at the twenty-eighth
session of the IMO Assembly to be held in November
2013, along with a related draft resolution.


The main purpose of the draft guidelines is to assist
ship masters in the preservation of evidence and in
the pastoral and medical care of persons affected
and, when appropriate, in the collection of evidence
during the period between the report or discovery
of a possible serious crime and the time when law
enforcement authorities or other professional crime
scene investigators take action.103


Facilitation Committee


A number of maritime security-related measures were
considered during the thirty-eighth session of the
Facilitation Committee held from 8 to 12 April 2013.
The Committee approved “Guidelines on measures
towards enhancing maritime trade recovery related
to the global supply-chain system and maritime
conveyances” (IMO, 2013s). These are intended to be


a practical tool, to be used by IMO Member States and
industry for the purpose of considering relevant issues
to increase the resilience of the global supply chain
and minimize the impact of disruptions in the event
of large-scale emergencies. The guidelines consist of
three parts: (a) a listing of information requirements
critical to improving supply-chain resilience and
facilitating trade recovery following a severe disruption
to the maritime supply chain; (b) information relating
to the development of communication mechanisms
between parties; (c) information relevant to the
establishment of industry support groups.


The guidelines take into account work done by
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Trade
Recovery Programme (APEC), WCO and ISO in
developing guidelines for Customs administrations
and organizations to improve and facilitate trade
recovery.104


The Committee considered a document (IMO,
2013t) that contained information related to the
questionnaire (IMO, 2011b)105 on port and coastal
State requirements in relation to privately contracted
armed security personnel on board ships. The circular
urged Member Governments and, in particular, those
of the coastal States bordering the Indian Ocean,
Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, to raise
awareness of their relevant national legislation, policies
and procedures relating to the carriage, embarkation
and disembarkation of firearms and security-related
equipment through their territory and to the movement
of PCASP, by completing the questionnaire and
submitting it to the IMO.


A number of developments related to supply-chain
security in the work of the Facilitation Committee
are also worth noting. In particular, the Committee
approved:


• “Interim guidelines for use of printed versions
of electronic certificates” (IMO, 2013u). The
purpose of the guidelines was limited to providing
information to administrations using electronic
certificates; the guidelines were only the first
step in the transition to a paperless system and
greater reliance on web-based electronic access
to certificates. Inputs from other IMO committees
were expected as well.


• “Revised IMO Compendium on facilitation
and electronic business” (IMO, 2013v). The
compendium provides updated information,
guidance and recommended formats for electronic
exchange of information required by public




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 119


authorities for the arrival, stay, and departure of
the ship, persons and cargo to facilitate clearance
processes.


• “List of certificates and documents required to
be carried on board ships, 2013” (IMO, 2013w).
Only the certificates and documents that are
required under IMO instruments are listed, but
not certificates or documents required by other
international organizations or governmental
authorities.


• “Amendments to the International Convention
for Safe Containers (CSC), 1972” (IMO, 2013o,
Annex 7). These include amendments relating to
the safety approval plate and to the approval of
existing and new containers.


(ii) Other issues


Fair treatment of seafarers


The Legal Committee at its 100th session was
provided with the findings of a survey conducted
by Seafarers’ Rights International (SRI), concerning
respect for the rights of seafarers facing criminal
prosecution (IMO, 2013x). The survey, conducted in
eight languages, was carried out over a 12-month
period, ending in February 2012. A total of 3,480
completed questionnaires had been submitted
by seafarers from 68 different nationalities.106 The
findings of the survey strongly suggested that the
rights of seafarers, as enshrined in the “Guidelines on
fair treatment of seafarers in the event of a maritime
accident”, adopted jointly by the IMO and ILO, are
often subject to violation. The views expressed
during the meeting included the following:


• The statistics demonstrated the need to maintain
the focus on the guidelines and to keep up the
pressure for their better implementation;


• Seafarers were more exposed to criminal
proceedings than many other workers and
therefore needed special assistance;


• Legal assistance for seafarers should, in the first
place, be provided by the shipowner;


• The findings of the survey could be taken into
account by the Legal Committee during the drafting
of guidelines on the collation and preservation of
evidence following an allegation of a serious crime
having taken place on board a ship or following
a report of a missing person from a ship, and
pastoral and medical care of victims.


The Legal Committee expressed general support
for the continuous promotion of the guidelines, and
agreed that the issue of fair treatment of seafarers in
the event of a maritime accident should remain on the
agenda of the Committee. Delegations were invited to
submit proposals for outputs to improve compliance
with the guidelines to its next session.107


(d) International Organization for
Standardization


As pointed out in earlier editions of the Review of
Maritime Transport, during the last decade, ISO
has been actively engaged in matters of maritime
transport and supply-chain security. Shortly after
the release of the ISPS Code, and to facilitate its
implementation by the industry, the ISO technical
committee ISO/TC 8 published ISO 20858:2007,
“Ships and marine technology – Maritime port
facility security assessments and security plan
development”.


Relevant also is the development of the ISO 28000
series of standards “Security management systems
for the supply chain”, which are designed to help
the industry successfully plan for, and recover from,
any disruptive event that is ongoing (see box on the
current status of the ISO 28000 series of standards).
The core standard in these series is ISO 28000:2007,
“Specification for security management systems
for the supply chain”, which serves as an umbrella
management system that enhances all aspects of
security: risk assessment, emergency preparedness,
business continuity, sustainability, recovery, resilience
and/or disaster management, whether relating to
terrorism, piracy, cargo theft, fraud, or many other
security disruptions. It also serves as a basis for AEO
and C-TPAT certifications. Various organizations
adopting such standards may tailor an approach
compatible with their existing operating systems. ISO
28003:2007, also a published standard in force since
2007, provides requirements for providing audits and
certification to ISO 28000:2007.


A new ISO/PAS 28007:2012 that has recently been
developed by ISO/TC 8 sets out guidance for applying
ISO 28000 to private maritime security companies
and establishes criteria for selecting companies
that provide armed guards for ships. It provides
guidelines containing additional sector-specific
recommendations, which companies or organizations
that comply with ISO 28000 can implement before
they provide PCASP on board ships.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013120


Key developments in summary


The reporting period has been characterized by
continued progress made by countries and international
and regional organizations, supported by Customs
and the private sector, regarding the implementation
of the existing framework and programmes in the field
of maritime and supply-chain security. Main areas of
progress include enhancements to regulatory measures
on maritime security and safety, primarily under the
auspices of the IMO, as well as implementation and
mutual recognition of AEO programmes. For the benefit
of traders compliant with internationally required supply-
chain security standards, it is hoped that the increasing
number of bilateral mutual recognition agreements will,
in due course, form the basis for mutual recognition of


AEOs at a multilateral level. In relation to the incidence
of maritime piracy, an encouraging downward trend
may be observed off the Coast of Somalia, the Gulf of
Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. However at the
same time, the number and violence of piracy attacks
has increased in the West African Gulf of Guinea area.
To address the issue, a regional Code of Conduct on
the repression of piracy, armed robbery against ships
and other illicit activities at sea was adopted by Heads
of State from West and Central African Countries in
Yaoundé in June 2013. It is hoped that this Code of
Conduct will serve as an effective framework for its
signatory States – 22 so far – to cooperate to the fullest
possible extent in the prevention and repression of
piracy and armed robbery against ships, and related
crimes.


Box5.1. ThecurrentstatusoftheISO28000seriesofstandards


Standards published:


• ISO 28000:2007 – “Specification for security management systems for the supply chain.” This provides the overall
"umbrella" standard. It is a generic, risk-based, certifiable standard for all organizations, all disruptions, all sectors. It is
widely in use and constitutes a stepping stone to the AEO and C-TPAT certifications.


• ISO28001:2007 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Best practices for implementing supply-chain
security, assessments and plans.” This standard is designed to assist the industry meet the requirements for AEO status.


• ISO28002:2011 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Development of resilience in the supply chain –
Requirements with guidance for use.” This standard provides additional focus on resilience, and emphasizes the need
for an on-going, interactive process to prevent, respond to and assure continuation of an organization’s core operations
after a major disruptive event.


• ISO28003:2007 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Requirements for bodies providing audit and
certification of supply-chain security management systems.” This standard provides guidance for accreditation and
certification bodies.


• ISO28004-1:2007 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Guidelines for the implementation of ISO
28000 – Part 1: General principles.” This standard provides generic advice on the application of ISO 28000:2007. It
explains the underlying principles of ISO 28000 and describes the intent, typical inputs, processes and typical outputs
for each requirement of ISO 28000. This is to aid the understanding and implementation of ISO 28000. ISO 28004:2007
does not create additional requirements to those specified in ISO 28000, nor does it prescribe mandatory approaches
to the implementation of ISO 28000.


• ISO/PAS28004-2:2012 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Guidelines for the implementation of ISO
28000 – Part 2: Guidelines for adopting ISO 28000 for use in medium and small seaport operations.” This provides
guidance to medium and small ports that wish to adopt ISO 28000. It identifies supply-chain risk and threat scenarios,
procedures for conducting risks/threat assessments, and evaluation criteria for measuring conformance and effectiveness
of the documented security plans in accordance with ISO 28000 and ISO 28004 implementation guidelines.


• ISO/PAS28004-3:2012– “Security management systems for the supply chain – Guidelines for the implementation of ISO
28000 – Part 3: Additional specific guidance for adopting ISO 28000 for use by medium and small businesses (other
than marine ports).” This has been developed to supplement ISO 28004-1 by providing additional guidance to medium
and small businesses (other than marine ports) that wish to adopt ISO 28000. The additional guidance in ISO/PAS
28004-3:2012, while amplifying the general guidance provided in the main body of ISO 28004-1, does not conflict with
the general guidance, nor does it amend ISO 28000.


• ISO/PAS28004-4:2012 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Guidelines for the implementation of
ISO 28000 – Part 4: Additional specific guidance on implementing ISO 28000 if compliance with ISO 28001 is a
management objective.” This provides additional guidance for organizations adopting ISO 28000 that also wish to
incorporate the best practices identified in ISO 28001 as a management objective on their international supply chains.




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 121


Box5.1. ThecurrentstatusoftheISO28000seriesofstandards (continued)


• ISO28005-1:2013– “Security management systems for the supply chain – Electronic port clearance (EPC) – Part 1:
Message structures.” This standard provides for computer-to-computer data transmission.


• ISO28005-2:2011 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Electronic port clearance (EPC) – Part 2: Core
data elements.” This standard contains technical specifications that facilitate efficient exchange of electronic information
between ships and shore for coastal transit or port calls, as well as definitions of core data elements that cover all
requirements for ship-to-shore and shore-to-ship reporting as defined in the ISPS Code, FAL Convention and relevant
IMO resolutions.


• ISO/PAS 28007:2012 – “Ships and marine technology – Guidelines for private maritime security companies (PMSC)
providing privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board ships (and pro forma contract).” This gives
guidelines containing additional sector-specific recommendations, which companies(organizations) that comply with
ISO 28000 can implement to demonstrate that they provide PCASP on board ships.


• ISO 20858:2007 – “Ships and marine technology – Maritime port facility security assessments and security plan
development.” This standard establishes a framework to assist marine port facilities in specifying the competence
of personnel to conduct a marine port facility security assessment and to develop a security plan as required by the
ISPS code. In addition, it establishes certain documentation requirements designed to ensure that the process used
in performing the duties described above was recorded in a manner that would permit independent verification by
a qualified and authorized agency. It is not an objective of ISO 20858:2007 to set requirements for a contracting
Government or designated authority in designating a Recognized Security Organization (RSO), or to impose the use
of an outside service provider or other third parties to perform the marine port facility security assessment or security
plan if the port facility personnel possess the expertise outlined in this specification. Ship operators may be informed
that marine port facilities that use this document meet an industry-determined level of compliance with the ISPS code.
ISO 20858:2007 does not address the requirements of the ISPS code relative to port infrastructure that falls outside the
security perimeter of a marine port facility that might affect the security of the facility/ship interface. Governments have a
duty to protect their populations and infrastructures from marine incidents occurring outside their marine port facilities.
These duties are outside the scope of ISO 20858:2007.


Standards under development:


• ISO28006 – “Security management systems for the supply chain – Security management of RO-RO passenger ferries.”
This includes best practices for application of security measures.


Note: For more information, including on the procedure of preparing international standards at ISO, see www.iso.org.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013122


Title of Convention
Date of entry into force or


conditions for entry into force
Contracting States


United Nations
Convention on a Code
of Conduct for Liner
Conferences,1974


Entered into force 6 October 1983 Algeria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Congo, Costa
Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guyana,Honduras,India,Indonesia,Iraq,Italy,Jamaica,Jordan,Kenya,Kuwait,
Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,
Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation,
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Somalia, Spain,
Sri Lanka,Sudan,Sweden,Togo,TrinidadandTobago,Tunisia,UnitedRepublic
of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia (76)


United Nations
Convention on the
Carriage of Goods by Sea,
1978(HamburgRules)


Entered into force 1 November
1992


Albania, Austria, Barbados, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile,
Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, Guinea, Hungary,
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco,
Nigeria, Paraguay, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania,
Zambia (34)


International Convention
onMaritimeLiensand
Mortgages,1993


Entered into force 5 September
2004


Albania, Benin, Ecuador, Estonia, Lithuania, Monaco, Nigeria, Peru, Russian
Federation, Spain, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Serbia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vanuatu (17)


United Nations
Convention on
InternationalMultimodal
TransportofGoods,1980


Notyetinforce–requires
30 Contracting Parties


Burundi, Chile, Georgia, Lebanon, Liberia, Malawi, Mexico, Morocco, Rwanda,
Senegal, Zambia (11)


United Nations
Convention on Conditions
for Registration of Ships,
1986


Notyetinforce–requires
40 Contracting Parties with at least
25 per cent of the world’s tonnage
asperAnnex IIItotheConvention


Albania, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Georgia, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Iraq,
Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Oman, Syrian Arab Republic(15)


International Convention
on Arrest of Ships, 1999


Entered into force 14 September
2011


Albania, Algeria, Benin, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Estonia, Latvia, Liberia, Spain, Syrian
Arab Republic (10)


Note: For official status information, see http://treaties.un.org.


Table5.1. ContractingPartiestoselectedinternationalconventionsonmaritimetransport,
as at 30 June 2013


D. STATUS OF CONVENTIONS


A number of international conventions in the field
of maritime transport were prepared or adopted
under the auspices of UNCTAD. Table 5.1 provides
information on the status of ratification of each of
these conventions as at 30 June 2013.




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 123


E. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON
TRADE FACILITATION


1. A trade facilitation agreement at
the World Trade Organization: an
opportunity for the Bali Ministerial


Trade facilitation has a long history in UNCTAD, whose
mandate in this area dates from the final act of its first
Ministerial Conference in 1964. The work of UNCTAD
in the trade-facilitation area has taken various forms,
constantly adjusting to the needs and the priorities of
UNCTAD member States. An example of the work of
UNCTAD in this area is the Automated SYstem for
CUstoms DAta (ASYCUDA), used by more than 90
countries. With regard to the transport sector, trade
facilitation is an essential element to ease the burden
of international transport operations, which are often
hampered by excessive and repetitive procedures, in
particular at border crossing along the transport chain.


The window of opportunity for WTO members to
reach a trade-facilitation agreement at the ninth WTO
Ministerial Conference to be held in Bali, Indonesia
(3–6 December 2013) remains open. Expectations
are that the Ministerial Conference will deliver on
some elements of the Doha package, including trade
facilitation, a package for the LDCs and some aspects
of agriculture and development issues. There are
diverging views amongst the WTO membership on
whether a deliverable on trade facilitation is possible,
and some have questioned the desirability of focusing
on only a few issues while others of high importance
for developing countries, such as agriculture, may not
be programmed for discussion at Bali. This lack of
consensus was previously noted in the 2012 edition
of the Review of Maritime Transport, that is, the
linkage of the trade facilitation to other items of the
Doha round and the need to fine tune the agreement
itself to provide the appropriate balance between
commitments and flexibilities (UNCTAD, 2012a).


Efforts persist on many fronts to emphasize the
potential benefits of having a multilateral agreement
on trade facilitation for the world economy as a whole
and for developing countries in particular. In the
WTO, in parallel to the negotiations on the text of the
trade-facilitation agreement, there have been a series
of regional and global conferences to address the
practical experience of implementing trade-facilitation
reforms, including their costs and benefits. These
events included dedicated sessions on showcasing


trade-facilitation programmes supported by bilateral
and multilateral development partners and highlighted
the wealth of existing technical assistance and
capacity-building programmes in the trade-facilitation
area. In addition, with the launch in November 2012
of the WTO Technical Assistance Programme for
National Self-Assessments of Trade Facilitation
Needs and Priorities 2012-2014, the focus was once
again on identifying and evaluating the gaps in the
implementation capacity of developing countries,
especially amongst LDCs. Ensuring that the needs
of the developing countries are well matched by the
assistance offered by the international community of
donor countries and organizations remains the major
goal and challenge of all these activities.


However, there remain some WTO members that
are concerned with the lack of progress in preparing
the package of deliverables for the Bali Ministerial
Conference (Miles, 2013; International Centre for
Trade and Sustainable Development Reporting, 2013).
This need to accelerate the speed and progress in
the negotiations is reflected in the establishment of
an ambassador-level “friends of the chair” process
to intensify the negotiations around the three articles
V, VII and X, as well as on section II on “Special and
differential treatment”. Although it is clear that this
new approach has brought renewed vigour to the
negotiations, some systemic issues remain to be
closed, primarily around the notion of the level of
ambition in section I and the extent of the flexibilities
in section II.


Progress has certainly been made on improving
the language in most of the provisions of the draft
consolidated negotiating text and, especially, the
provisions related to publication of and access
to trade-related information, appeal procedures,
penalty disciplines, release and clearance of goods,
authorized operators, freedom of transit and customs
cooperation.108 Far from restricting the negotiations to
the proposals already included in the text, in 2013 the
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation also included
a few new substantive provisions. These include a
new paragraph on the electronic payment for duties,
taxes, fees and charges collected by customs (article
7, paragraph 2), a new paragraph on release and
clearance of perishable goods (article 7, paragraph 9)
and a separate paragraph on acceptance of copies
(article 10, paragraph 3).


Work is also continuing intensively on section II of the
draft that contains special and differential treatment
provisions for developing countries and LDCs. The




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013124


last revision, revision 16, takes into account the
recent proposals tabled by a number of developing
countries and illustrates some progress made in the
categorization of the obligations and changing (shifting)
amongst the categories after notification. In particular,
shifting from categories B and C, though still subject to
notification and consideration by the proposed WTO
Trade Facilitation Committee, is no longer reserved
for the cases with “exceptional circumstances”. The
proposed grace period for the application of the WTO
dispute settlement system to the LDCs is now taking
a more precise form, with some suggestions for actual
time periods being placed on the table. Progress has
also been made on clarifying the proposal which calls
on developed countries to make available annual
information on the provided technical assistance and
capacity-building, contact points and process and
mechanisms for requesting assistance. Important
gaps remain, however, including concerning the
practicalities related to the notification of measures
under section II and, in particular, measures in category
C, where the developing countries’ commitment
to the exact implementation times and schedule is
dependent on the donor’s commitment to provide
technical assistance and capacity-building (TACB)
and the exact scope and timeframe of such aid.


It remains to be seen whether these developments
alleviate the developing countries’ concerns regarding
the costs and other challenges of implementing an
eventual trade-facilitation agreement in WTO. In this
context, some lessons can be drawn from the recent
UNCTAD work on helping developing countries
establish national implementation plans for the trade-
facilitation measures currently considered in WTO.


2. Lessons on trade-facilitation
implementation from the UNCTAD
project “Implementation Plans
for WTO Trade Facilitation
Agreement in Developing
Members” (2011–2013)109


During the period 2011–2013, UNCTAD has worked
closely with 26 developing countries on updating the
current implementation status of the trade-facilitation
measures addressed by WTO and on identifying the
activities, time, resources and TACB required for
achieving compliance with the measures yet to be
fully implemented. This work was carried out with
the financial support of the European Union, Norway,


the United Nations Development Account, the United
Nations Development Programme and the World
Bank, and in close cooperation with other Annex  D
organizations, including OECD and WCO. The
participating countries included LDCs, middle-income
developing countries, landlocked countries, transit
developing countries, and small island economies in
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America.


The consolidated results of these 26 national
implementation plans shed some light on the
challenges that some developing countries currently
have regarding implementation of some of the
modalities currently envisaged in the draft text but
also on the opportunities for building the capacity
to implement and sustain the measures which are
currently on the table.


These national assessments have been particularly
useful in highlighting the existing gaps between what
is being proposed at the WTO and what is being
implemented on the ground, in developing countries,
and in LDCs in particular. As illustrated in figure
5.1, in the majority of the participating developing
countries, less than 50 per cent of the trade-facilitation
measures under discussion in the WTO are currently
fully implemented. In all of the participating countries,
the rate of full implementation was below 76 per cent,
with the lowest implementation rate being 19 per cent.
The implementation rate is even lower for LDCs, with
the majority of them below the 40 per cent level. At
the same time, the measures that have not yet been
implemented constitute a clear minority, ranging from
3 to 28  per cent, which suggests that only a small
number of the proposed trade-facilitation reforms are
completely new to the developing countries.


Another conclusion from the consolidated results is
that the level of full implementation of the individual
trade-facilitation measures suggests that measures
with the strongest customs-related component,
covered by articles 4, 7, 9bis, 10, 11 and 12 are
characterized by high implementation rates. At the
same time, most of the cross-sectoral or cross-agency
measures, such as single window, enquiry points,
publication of trade-related information, disciplines
on fees and charges, together with some advanced
customs techniques, such as advance ruling and
authorized operators, have the lowest implementation
rates, especially in LDCs. This suggests that many
challenging trade-facilitation measures remain to be
implemented by developing countries in terms of the
level of inter-agency cooperation and sophistication of
the institutional, legal and regulatory frameworks.




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 125


Figure5.1. Levelofimplementationoftrade-facilitationmeasurespercountry


0%


20%


40%


60%


80%


100%


Co
un


try
A


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
B


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
C


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
D


Co
un


try
E


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
F


Co
un


try
G


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
H


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
I


Co
un


try
J


Co
un


try
K


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
L


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
M


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
N


Co
un


try
O


Co
un


try
P


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
Q


Co
un


try
R


Co
un


try
S


Co
un


try
T


Co
un


try
U


Co
un


try
V


(L
DC


)


Co
un


try
W


Co
un


try
X


Co
un


try
Y


Co
un


try
Z


Fully implemented Partially implemented


Source: Forthcoming report – The new frontier of competitiveness in developing countries: Implementing trade facilitation,
UNCTAD, 2013.


Moreover, the national implementation plans reveal that
there remain numerous obstacles to trade-facilitation
reforms in developing countries (figure 5.2). The reasons
offered by the trade-facilitation stakeholders in the
participating countries to explain the absent or partial
implementation of the trade-facilitation measures go
beyond the mere lack of resources and include the gaps in
the existing legal framework, lack of awareness about the
benefits of the particular trade-facilitation measure both
for traders and the administrations involved, information
and communication technology and infrastructure
issues, lack of inter-agency cooperation, and lack of
organizational or institutional framework (figure 5.3). At
the same time, the lack of resources remains one of
the main obstacles for the implementation, especially in
LDCs.


On the other hand, several encouraging developments
for the trade-facilitation implementation could also be
observed. One of these developments is the growing
recognition in developing countries of the importance of
effective trade facilitation for growth, development and
investment. The trade-facilitation stakeholders in the
participating countries considered most of the trade-
facilitation measures as having a medium to high priority
rate for the national economic development. The positive
impact of trade-facilitation reforms seems to be more
recognized in non-LDCs, which tend to award higher
priority to the trade-facilitation measures than LDCs.


Moreover, the estimates on the time requirements
for achieving the full implementation of these trade-


facilitation measures show the acceptable time
parameters within which this full implementation could
be achieved. The estimated implementation time for
the majority of the measures was, on average, about
3 years and not higher than five years for most of the
remainder of the reforms. This makes it possible for
most of the countries to envisage full implementation
status within a five-year period. Estimating the
necessary financial resources was a much more difficult
task and varied greatly depending on the country.
However, in general the amount remained reasonably
modest, especially in the light of the substantial and
continuous increase in the international aid for trade
facilitation-related TACB.


Finally, for the participating countries, it seemed
possible to fully reduce the trade-facilitation
implementation gap, using the flexibilities proposed
in section II of the draft consolidated negotiating
text. The results of the national implementation plans
showed that to move forward with the trade-facilitation
implementation, the developing countries expected to
rely significantly on these flexibilities both in terms of
the additional implementation times and the TACB
which would be provided. Depending on the country,
the percentage of the measures that would either
require additional time, or additional time and TACB,
ranges from 10 per cent to 67 per cent (figure 5.4).
For the majority of the countries and for most of the
LDCs, these measures constitute, at least, one third of
the measures currently included in the draft WTO text.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013126


Figure5.2. Fullimplementationlevelperareaoftrade-facilitationmeasures


0 20 40 60 80 100


Art 9bis. Declaration of transhipped or
in transit goods] [domestic transit]


Art 10. Formalities connected with importation
and exportation and transit


Art 11. Freedom of transit


Art 12. Customs cooperation


Art 4. Appeal [review] procedures


Art 7. Release and clearance of goods


Art 6. Disciplines on fees and charges imposed on
or in connection with importation and exportation


Art 5. Other measures to enhance impartiality,
non-discrimination and transparency


Art 14. National Committee on Trade Facilitation


Art 2. Prior publication and consultation


Art 9. Border agency cooperation


Art 3. Advance ruling


Art 1. Publication and availability of information


Full
implementation
(% of countries)


Source: Forthcoming report – The new frontier of competitiveness in developing countries: Implementing trade facilitation,
UNCTAD, 2013.


Figure5.3. Most-quotedreasonsfornon-implementation


38


78


70


30


24


43


19
22


95


54


24


38


49


30


0


20


40


60


80


100


Lack of
understanding
or knowledge


of the measure


Existing legal
framework


Lack of
resources


ICT and
infrastructure


issues


Lack of inter-
agency


cooperation


Lack of
organization and


institutional
framework


Other


M
ai


n
q


uo
te


d
r


ea
so


n
(p


er
ce


nt
ag


e
o


f
m


ea
su


re
s)


LDCs non-LDCs


Source: Forthcoming report – The new frontier of competitiveness in developing countries: Implementing trade facilitation,
UNCTAD, 2013.




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 127


The need for TACB was considered to be highest
for the 10 measures detailed in table 5.2, which
correspond to the measures with the lowest
implementation levels in the developing countries and
which represent a combination of measures requiring
intensive domestic or cross-border cooperation,
infrastructure and information and communication
technology investments, and use of advanced
customs techniques.


The consolidated results of the national trade-
facilitation implementation plans, developed by
UNCTAD, illustrate that trade facilitation remains a
challenge but is also seen as a priority area for national
development by the developing countries themselves.
By identifying the major areas of non-compliance,
the range of time and cost requirements, and the


Source: Forthcoming report – The new frontier of competitiveness in developing countries: Implementing trade facilitation,
UNCTAD, 2013.


Figure5.4. Percentageofthemeasuresrequiringtechnicalassistanceandcapacity-building


0


10


20


30


40


50


60
C


o
un


tr
y


S


C
o


un
tr


y
Z


C
o


un
tr


y
W


C
o


un
tr


y
T


C
o


un
tr


y
R


C
o


un
tr


y
L


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
Y


C
o


un
tr


y
Q


C
o


un
tr


y
U


C
o


un
tr


y
M


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
X


C
o


un
tr


y
J


C
o


un
tr


y
N


C
o


un
tr


y
D


C
o


un
tr


y
I


C
o


un
tr


y
O


C
o


un
tr


y
G


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
P


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
C


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
A


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
F


C
o


un
tr


y
B


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
K


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
E


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
V


(L
D


C
)


C
o


un
tr


y
H


(L
D


C
)


M
ea


su
re


s
(p


er
c


en
ta


ge
)


Table5.2. Top10measureswiththehighest
estimated need for technical
assistance and capacity-building


Single window (TN/TF/165/W/Rev. 16, article 10, paragraph 5)


Test procedures (article 5, paragraph 3)


Information available through Internet (article 1, paragraph 2)


Border agency cooperation (article 9)


Advance ruling (article 3)


Enquirypoints(article1,paragraph3)
Disciplines on fees and charges imposed on or in connection with
importation and exportation (article 6, paragraph 1)
Publication (article 1, paragraph 1)
Reduction/limitationofformalitiesanddocumentationrequirements
(article 10, paragraph 2)
Risk management (article 7, paragraph 4)


needs for TACB, this work offers valuable insights
into the priority needs of developing countries and the
national and regional ambitions in implementing trade-
facilitation reforms. In this respect it provides some
important guidance for both developing countries and
their development partners.


3. Conclusions


On 8 July 2013, on the occasion of the fourth
Global Review of Aid for Trade in Geneva, high-level
representatives of 27 Governments and organizations,
including UNCTAD, issued a “Joint Statement –
Trade Facilitation Assistance” for trade-facilitation
implementation. The statement emphasized the
benefits of concluding a trade-facilitation agreement in
Bali and highlighted the Governments’/organizations’
strong commitment to continue to provide support for
its implementation.110


Much of the discourse of most multilateral and
bilateral development partners continues to focus on
the volume of the aid to trade facilitation. However, for
potential beneficiary countries the challenge remains
to effectively match not only the volume but also the
scope and nature of this assistance to their needs and
priorities. Indeed, the assistance required for many
trade-facilitation reforms will likely have to go beyond
a financial aid and will have to involve significant efforts
in long-term sustainable capacities, technological and
institutional infrastructure development, and training
and reforms aimed at better governance.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013128


Developing countries need to carefully evaluate the
specific requirements and available resources so
that they can accurately plan the implementation of
the trade-facilitation reforms both in terms of time,
possible technical assistance and capacity-building.
They should also define appropriate sequencing of
actions required to ensure full compliance with their
trade-facilitation commitments and programme their
implementation time and scope effectively taking
advantage of the flexibilities offered in section II of
the draft consolidated negotiating text (Rubiato and
Hoffmann, 2013).


The national implementation plans approach,
developed by UNCTAD, and the WTO needs
assessments are important steps in this direction, but
remain one part of the whole journey, which, in the
end, will rely extensively on the countries’ capacity to
maintain an inclusive and productive national dialogue
on the trade-facilitation reforms. In this context,
supporting the establishment and operationalization
of national trade-facilitation committees in developing
countries will prove to be an important element in
effectively implementing and monitoring needs and
progress under an eventual WTO agreement.




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 129


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CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 133


NOTES
1 The MLC 2006 enters into force 12 months after the date on which it was ratified by 30 members accounting for a


total share in the world ship GT of at least 33 per cent. The Convention is now in force in 38 International Labour
Organization (ILO) member States representing 69 per cent of the world ship GT. The status of ratification of the MLC
2006 is based on information on the ILO website, as of 9 July 2013. For a list of international conventions that will be
revised after the entry into force of MLC 2006 see http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/
WCMS_150389/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 17 October 2013).


2 The text of MLC 2006 is available at http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/WCMS_090250/
lang--en/index.htm (accessed 17 October 2013). See also the “Explanatory Note to the Regulations and Code of the
Maritime Labour Convention”, on page  12 of the International Labour Conference document above. The articles
and regulations can only be changed by the Conference in the framework of article 19 of the Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation (see Article XIV of the Convention).


3 The Code can be amended through the simplified procedure set out in Article XV of the Convention.
4 See MLC 2006.
5 See MLC 2006 Regulation 5.1.3.
6 See “Report of the Legal Committee on the work of its one-hundredth session” (IMO, 2013a), paragraph 4.4. The


amendments to be discussed were based on the recommendations of the joint IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Group on
Liability and Compensation regarding Claims for Death, Personal Injury and Abandonment of Seafarers, adopted in
2009.


7 The entry into force of PAL PROT 2002 followed the submission of the instrument of ratification by Belgium on 23 April
2013. Instruments of ratification had been earlier submitted by Albania, Belize, Denmark, Latvia, the Netherlands,
Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Serbia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the European Union.


8 It is worth noting that for the first time in an IMO Convention, express provision has been made for signature,
approval or accession by a regional economic integration organization, conferring upon such organization “the
rights and obligations of a State Party, to the extent that the Regional Economic Integration Organization has
competence over matters governed by this Protocol” (see Article 19 of the Convention). The European Union
acceded to the 2002 Protocol at the end of 2011. However, this does not substitute for individual ratification by
its member States.


9 PAL 1974 was adopted on 13 December 1974 and entered into force on 28 April 1987. A 1976 Protocol to the
Convention introduced the SDR as the applicable unit of account, replacing the “Poincaré franc”, based on the
“official” value of gold. A 1990 Protocol to the Convention was intended to raise the relevant limits of liability but did not
enter into force and was later superseded by the 2002 Protocol. The PAL PROT 2002 was adopted on 1 November
2002 and will enter into force on 23 April 2014.


10 Article 15(3) of PAL PROT 2002 states that Articles 1 to 22 of the Convention, as revised by the Protocol, together with
Articles 17 to 25 of the Protocol and the Annex thereto, shall constitute and be called the Athens Convention relating
to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 2002 (PAL 2002).


11 For some further information, see also a compilation of documents on the Athens Convention, available at
http://www.gard.no/ikbViewer/Content/72411/Athens%20Convention%20and%20ratifications%20April%20
2013.pdf (accessed 25 November 2013).


12 See Articles 3(1) and 7(1) of the Convention. However, it should be noted that the Convention envisages the possibility
for Contracting States to enter certain reservations.


13 See Article 4bis of the Convention.
14 For loss or damage to cabin luggage, the carrier’s liability is limited to 2,250 SDR per passenger, per carriage. Liability


for loss of or damage to vehicles, including all luggage carried in or on the vehicle, is limited to 12,700 SDR per vehicle,
per carriage. Liability for loss of or damage to other luggage is limited to 3,375 SDR per passenger, per carriage.


15 Under PAL 1974, limits can only be raised by adopting amendments to it, which require a specified number of
States’ acceptances to bring the amendments into force. For instance, an earlier Protocol to PAL 1974, adopted
in 1990, which was also intended to increase the liability limits, did not enter into force and was superseded by
PAL PROT 2002. Under the tacit acceptance procedure, described in Article 23 of the Convention, a proposal
to amend the limits, as requested by at least one half of the Parties to the Protocol, but in no case less than six,
would be circulated to all IMO member States and all States Parties and would then be discussed in the IMO Legal
Committee. Amendments would be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties to the Convention as
amended by the Protocol present and voting in the Legal Committee, on condition that at least one half of these
States shall be present at the time of voting, and would enter into force 18 months after its deemed acceptance
date. The deemed acceptance date would be 18 months after adoption, unless within that period not less than one
fourth of the States that were States Parties at the time of the adoption of the amendment have communicated to
the IMO Secretary-General that they do not accept the amendment.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013134


16 See Article 17.5 of PAL PROT 2002. As a precondition for joining, Parties to the PAL PROT 2002 are required to
denounce PAL 1974 and its 1976 and 1990 Protocols. As of 30 June 2013, PAL 1974 was in force in 35 Contracting
States, representing 45.88 per cent of world GT. This will reduce to 31 States on 23 April 2014. As of 30 June 2013,
PAL PROT 1976 was in force in 26 Contracting States; this will reduce to 23 States on 23 April 2014.


17 Relevant declarations were made by Argentina and the Russian Federation, in accordance with Article 22 of PAL 1974.
18 These are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Relevant liability limits under domestic legislation


are in line with or very similar to the amounts set out in a 1990 Protocol to the PAL 1974 which, however, never entered
into force. It should be noted that Denmark has now ratified PAL PROT 2002 and will thus be a Party to PAL 2002. For
further information on the status of these conventions as at 30 June 2013, see IMO (2013b).


19 The set of measures were added as an amendment to MARPOL Annex VI “Regulations on the prevention of air
pollution from ships”, as a new Chapter 4 entitled “Regulations on energy efficiency for ships”.


20 For a summary of the content of the regulations, see UNCTAD (2012a), pages 97–98. For an overview of the discussions
on the different types of measures, see UNCTAD (2010), pages 118–119 and UNCTAD (2011a), pages 114–116.


21 The study suggests that, if implemented, relevant measures could increase energy efficiency and reduce the emissions
rate by 25–75 per cent below the current levels. For a detailed insight on a range of the potential implications of climate
change for shipping see also an edited volume, Maritime Transport and the Climate Change Challenge, published in
May 2012 (Asariotis and Benamara, 2012). The book, a United Nations co-publication with Earthscan/Routledge,
includes contributions from experts from academia, international organizations – such as the IMO, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat, OECD, the International Energy Agency and the
World Bank – as well as the shipping and port industries. Issues covered include the scientific background; GHG
emissions from international shipping and potential approaches to mitigation; the state of play in terms of the relevant
regulatory and institutional framework; potential climate-change impacts and approaches to adaptation in maritime
transport; and relevant cross-cutting issues such as financing and investment, technology and energy. For further
information, see the UNCTAD website at www.unctad.org/ttl/legal.


22 The MEPC held its sixty-fourth session 1–5 October 2012 and its sixty-fifth session 13–17 May 2013.
23 This amendment updated a footnote referring to the International Towing Tank Conference recommended procedure


7.5-04-01-01.2 as the preferable standard.
24 The proposal of the United States to enhance energy efficiency in international shipping. Additional documents


considered by the Committee under this item include those by: IMarEST, providing information relating to a goal-
based approach to “fuel consumption measurement”; CSC, providing comments on the submissions by the United
States and IMarEST, and offering additional information on the different approaches to monitoring and reporting fuel
consumption and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from ships; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Norway
and the United Kingdom, supporting the development of technical and operational measures to increase the energy
efficiency of ships.


25 “BEING COGNIZANT of the principles enshrined in the Convention on the Organization, including the principle of
non-discrimination, as well as the principle of no more favourable treatment enshrined in MARPOL and other IMO
Conventions.”


26 “BEING COGNIZANT ALSO of the principles enshrined in the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol including the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”


27 Several delegations made statements on the resolution, which are set out in Annex 5 of IMO (2013c). As reported
by the Third World Network (Chiew, 2013), during the subsequent UNFCCC Climate Change Conference in Bonn, in
June 2013, a group of developing countries have taken the express reference in the IMO resolution to the principle of
“common but differentiated responsibilities”(CBDR) as a clear signal that the IMO respects the principles and provisions
of the UNFCCC in its work related to climate change. An opposing view was expressed by some developed-country
delegations, including Japan, asserting that the adoption of the preamble paragraph in the Resolution, which refers
to “being cognizant” of CBDR should not limit the activities under the principles of the IMO, pointing out that the
reiteration of this point was recorded in the MEPC 65 report.


28 See a note by the IMO to the thirty-eighth session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice,
Bonn, 3 to 14 June 2013, providing an update on the IMO work to address emissions from fuel used for international
shipping, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/sbsta/eng/misc15.pdf (accessed 7 November 2013).


29 In respect of possible MBMs, see particularly UNCTAD (2011a) pages 114 and 117–119 and UNCTAD (2012a),
pages 99–101.


30 It should be noted that a range of concerns on matters of principle and policy concerning reduction of GHG emissions
and in respect of potential MBMs have been expressed by a number of developing countries’ delegations, including in
particular the delegations of Brazil, China and India. For further details, see also the statements by several delegations
(IMO, 2012c, Annexes 14–17).


31 The countries studied include Chile, China, the Cook Islands, India, Kenya, the Maldives, Mexico, Samoa, Togo, and
Trinidad and Tobago.


32 Brazil, China, India, Peru, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 135


33 Based on a proposal by its Chair, the MEPC agreed to suspend discussions on market-based measures and related
issues to a future session and consider only the following three items: (a) update of the GHG emission estimate for
international shipping; (b) WTO-related matters; (c) UNFCCC matters (IMO, 2013c, paragraph 5.1).


34 As reported in previous issues of the Review of Maritime Transport, key figures in the latest (second) IMO GHG
Study (IMO, 2009) estimated that international shipping emitted 870 million tons, or about 2.7 per cent, of the global
emissions of CO2 generated by human activity in 2007.


35 See IMO (2012b), page 36.
36 The expert workshop to further consider the methodology and assumptions to be used in the update of GHG


emissions estimate for international shipping was held from 26 February to 1 March 2013. Its report is contained in
document IMO (2013f).


37 The terms of reference of the Update Study are set out in the Annex to the document (IMO, 2013f).
38 The steering committee was subsequently established by the IMO Secretary-General on 12 July 2013 by circular letter


(IMO, 2013g).
39 By India and Saudi Arabia.
40 It should be noted that the delegation of India expressed the view that the WTO Secretariat was not in a position


to provide the information requested and, therefore, the information in the Annex to the document should not have
been requested nor should it be considered further (IMO, 2013c, paragraph 5.20).


41 Documents submitted by the IMO Secretariat were as follows: IMO (2012g) on the outcome of a United Nations
Climate Change Conference held in Bonn from 14 to 25 May 2012; IMO (2012h) on the first board meeting of the
Green Climate Fund which was held from 23 to 25 August 2012 in Geneva, Switzerland; IMO (2013i) on the outcome
of the United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012.


42 The report highlights central features of the international legal framework and provides an analytical overview of key
provisions of the most recent of the international legal instruments in force. It also offers considerations for national
policymaking.


43 This covers the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 and its 1992 Protocol as
well as the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage (Fund Convention) 1971 and its 1992 and 2003 Protocols.


44 The convention entered into force on 21 November 2008 and as of 30 June 2013 had 70 States Parties representing
90.04 per cent of world tonnage. The convention covers oil pollution from ships other than tankers, for example,
container vessels, reefers, chemical tankers, general cargo ships, cruise ships and ferries.


45 The 2010 Protocol to the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996. The Protocol has not yet entered into force. See also
UNCTAD (2010), pages 124–125.


46 The workshop took place in London, in November 2012. For further information see www.hnsconvention.org
(accessed 11 November 2013).


47 IMO (2013a), pages 5–6.
48 Particularly following the Deepwater Horizon incident in 2010 and the 2009 incident on the Montara offshore oil


platform, located in the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone, in which a well exploded, leading to a significant oil spill.
49 For a summary of views expressed by the delegations see IMO (2013a), pages 21–24. Also noted in the report is an


informal consultative group to discuss issues connected with transboundary pollution damage from offshore exploration
and exploitation activities and coordinated by the delegation of Indonesia. The online address for participating in this
group is ind_offshorediscussion_imoleg@yahoogroups.com.


50 MARPOL Annex VI came into force on 19 May 2005, and as at 30 June 2013 it had been ratified by 72 States,
representing approximately 94.30 per cent of world tonnage. Annex VI covers air pollution from ships, including SOx
and NOx emissions and particulate matter.


51 See UNCTAD (2008), page 119.
52 In case of a negative conclusion of the review, the new global cap should be applied from 1 January 2025.
53 The first two SOx ECAs, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea areas, were established in Europe and took effect in


2006 and 2007, respectively. The third established was the North American ECA, taking effect on 1 August 2012. In
addition, in July 2011, a fourth ECA, the United States Caribbean Sea, was established. This latter area covers certain
waters adjacent to the coasts of Puerto Rico (United States) and the United States Virgin Islands, and will take effect
on 1 January 2014.


54 Also called exhaust gas SOx scrubbers.
55 Directive 2012/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012, amending Council


Directive 1999/32/EC as regards the sulphur content of marine fuels; OJ L 327, 27 November 2012, pages 1–13.
Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:327:0001:0013:EN:PDF (accessed
12 November 2013).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013136


56 This proposal by the ICS suggested that, during the period 2012–2014, the fuel-availability model proposed by the
Correspondence Group on the assessment of availability of fuel oil under MARPOL Annex VI should be used to carry
out a preliminary study to provide fuel availability scenarios for the period 2015–2016.


57 This proposal by the United States opposed the early initiation of the assessment of availability of fuel oil under
MARPOL Annex VI, as the results of an earlier preliminary analysis would be of little value in assessing fuel availability
in 2020, for several reasons.


58 So far, only the North American ECA is designated for NOx control. An application to make the Baltic Sea an ECA
is being discussed by the surrounding States through the Helsinki Commission. For more information see Lloyd’s List
(2013).


59 Limits of tier III are almost 70 per cent lower than those of tier II, thus requiring additional technology.
60 For an overview of the revised MARPOL Annex V discharge provisions, see UNCTAD (2012a), table 5.1, page 104.
61 According to this circular, until 31 December 2015 cargo hold wash water from holds having previously contained solid


bulk cargoes classified as harmful to the marine environment may be discharged outside special areas under specific
conditions. The circular also urges Parties to MARPOL Annex V to ensure the provision of adequate facilities at ports
and terminals for the reception of solid bulk cargo residues, including those contained in wash water.


62 The Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships 2009.
63 These are the “2012 Guidelines for safe and environmentally sound ship recycling”, (IMO, 2012a, Annex  4),


the “2012 Guidelines for the authorization of ship recycling facilities” (IMO, 2012a, Annex 5), the “2011 Guidelines
for the development of the Inventory of Hazardous Materials” (IMO, 2012a, Annex 3), and the “2011 Guidelines for
the development of the Ship Recycling Plan” (IMO, 2011a, Annex 2).


64 The Hong Kong Convention has been opened for accession since 1 September 2010 and it is not yet in force. It will
enter into force 24 months after the date on which 15 States, representing 40 per cent of the world’s merchant fleet
tonnage, have become parties to it. As of 30 June 2013, only Norway had acceded to the Convention.


65 This group was initially established during the MEPC 64 to develop threshold values and exemptions applicable to the
materials to be listed in Inventories of Hazardous Materials and to consider the need to amend, accordingly, the “2011
Guidelines for the development of the Inventory of Hazardous Materials”.


66 The BWM Convention has not yet entered into force. As of 30 June 2013, 37 States, with an aggregate merchant
shipping tonnage of 30.32 per cent of the world total, have ratified it. The Convention will enter into force twelve months
after the date on which no fewer than 30 States, the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 35 per
cent of the GT of the world merchant shipping, have become parties to it. Several delegations had indicated earlier that
they were expecting to submit their instruments of ratification to IMO in the near future, since the process of ratifying
the Convention is in the final or advanced stage in their countries. See also UNCTAD (2011b, page 8).


67 These ballast water systems were proposed by China, the Netherlands, Norway and the Republic of Korea. Details of
these systems can be found in the respective documents submitted during MEPC 64 and 65, available at www.imo.
org.


68 These systems were proposed by China, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea. Details of these
systems can be found in the respective documents submitted during the MEPC 64 and 65, available at www.imo.org.
Many types of ballast water treatment systems have been granted IMO approval in the last few years. Some of them
have later been withdrawn from the market again for lack of compliant operation after installation on ships.


69 To be held from 25 November to 4 December 2013.
70 Copies of these BWM circulars (BWM.2/Circ.42–45) are available at www.imo.org.
71 A June 2012 updated version of the SAFE Framework can be found in document WCO (2012a).
72 Pillar 1 is based on the model of the Container Security Initiative introduced in the United States in 2002. Pillar 2 is


based on the model of the Customs–Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programme introduced in the
United States in 2001. For more information on these as well as for an analysis of the main features of the customs
supply-chain security, namely advance cargo information, risk management, cargo scanning and authorized economic
operators (AEOs), see WCO research paper No.18, “The Customs supply chain security paradigm and 9/11: Ten years
on and beyond September 2011”, available at www.wcoomd.org. For a summary of the various United States security
programmes adopted after September 11 see UNCTAD (2004).


73 As of 30 June 2013, 168 out of 179 WCO members had expressed their intention to implement the SAFE Framework.
74 See also UNCTAD (2011a), pages 121–122. The Package includes the SAFE Framework of Standards; Customs


Guidelines on Integrated Supply Chain Management; AEO Implementation Guidance; AEO Compendium; Model AEO
Appeal Procedures; AEOBenefits:AcontributionfromtheWCOPrivateSectorConsultativeGroup; Guidelines for
the Purchase and Deployment of Scanning/Imaging Equipment; SAFE Data Element Maintenance Mechanism; Trade
Recovery Guidelines; FAQ for Small and Medium Enterprises. The SAFE Package is available at: http://www.wcoomd.
org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/tools/safe_package.aspx (accessed 25 November 2013).


75 For more information, see the WCO website http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/facilitation/instrument-and-tools/
tools/safe_package.aspx (accessed 18 November 2013).




CHAPTER 5: LEGAL ISSUES AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 137


76 The SAFE Framework AEO concept has its origins in the revised Kyoto Convention, which contains standards on
“authorized persons”, and national programmes.


77 For more information on the concept of mutual recognition in general, as well as on the guidelines for developing
an MRA, included in the SAFE Package, and the WCO research paper No.18 on the issue, see UNCTAD (2012a),
pages 106–107.


78 The first MRA was concluded between the United States and New Zealand in June 2007. As of 30 June 2013,
19 bilateral MRAs had been concluded and a further 10 were being negotiated between, respectively, China–European
Union, China–Japan, Japan–Malaysia, China–Republic of Korea, Hong Kong (China)–Republic of Korea, India–Republic
of Korea, Israel–Republic of Korea, New Zealand–Singapore, Norway–Switzerland and Singapore–United States.


79 Due to the fact that 27 European Union countries have one common uniform AEO programme.
80 This is according to information provided by the WCO Secretariat. For more information see the latest “Compendium


of AEO Programmes” (WCO, 2012b).
81 For more information see WCO, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c and 2013d.
82 See in particular UNCTAD (2011a) which provided an overview of the major changes this amendment introduced to


the Customs Code, at pages 122–123.
83 For more information see http://ec.europa.eu/ecip/security_amendment/index_en.htm (accessed 18  November


2013).
84 A redacted copy of the document has been made available to UNCTAD by the European Commission Taxation and


Customs Union Directorate-General.
85 See European Commission (2013) page 9.
86 For background, see also European Commission (2012).
87 See article by the World Shipping Council President and Chief Executive Officer (Koch C, 2013). Members of the World


Shipping Council operate approximately 90 percent of the global liner ship capacity.
88 According to information provided by the European Commission’s Taxation and Customs Union Directorate General,


as of 25 June 2013, a total of 15,359 applications for AEO certificates had been submitted, and a total of 13,104
certificates had been issued. The total number of applications rejected up to 15 June 2013 was 1,523 (10 per cent
of the applications received) and the total number of certificates revoked was 691 (5.3 per cent of certificates issued).
The breakdown reported per certificate type issued as of 31 December 2012, was: AEO-F 6023 (49 per cent); AEO-C
5969 (48 per cent); and AEO-S 354 (3 per cent).


89 For the self-assessment questionnaire, see http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/
policy_issues/customs_security/aeo_self_assessment_en.pdf (accessed 18 November 2013). Explanatory notes
are also available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/customs/policy_issues/customs_
security/aeo_self_assessment_explanatory_en.pdf (accessed 18 November 2013).


90 The European Union has already concluded MRAs with Japan, Norway, Switzerland and the United States. Negotiations
are ongoing with China, and will soon start with Canada. The United States, in addition to the European Union, has
MRAs with Canada, China, Taiwan Province of, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea.


91 Membership in the C-TPAT as of May 2013 reached 10,512 companies accounting for over 50 per cent (by value)
of goods imported into the United States. As of March 2013, CBP had signed MRAs with Canada, China, Taiwan
Province of, the European Union, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea. For more information, see
www.cbp.gov.


92 For more information see the CBP website, available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/trade_outreach/coac/
coac_13_meetings/may22_meeting_dc/ (accessed 19 November 2013).


93 Held from 26 to 30 November 2012.
94 Held from 12 to 21 June 2013.
95 The document was signed, bringing the Code into effect for 22 signatory States: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape


Verde, Chad, the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, and Togo.


96 The full text of the Code is available at https://195.24.195.238/en/multimedia/documents/437-sommet-sur-la-
piraterie-code-de-conduite-english (accessed 19 November 2013). See also MarineLink.com (2013).


97 Held from 15 to 19 April 2013.
98 The document provided information by UNODC. Written comments to it were provided in document IMO (2013q).


The Committee noted with regret that NATO had informed the Secretariat that it had no relevant records or information
and that no response had been received from the European Union Naval Force Somalia.


99 See IMO (2013a), page 10.
100 The answers provided by member States to this questionnaire are available at the IMO website, see http://www.imo.


org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Responses-received-on-Private%20Armed%20Security.aspx
(accessed 19 November 2013).




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013138


101 See http://unicri.it/topics/piracy/database/ (accessed 19 November 2013).
102 As regards the inclusion of national legislation on piracy in the database, this information may be found in the database


established by the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/piracy/
piracy_national_legislation.htm (accessed 19 November 2013).


103 For further information see IMO (2013a) pages 12–16.
104 Relevant guidance from the WCO Trade Recovery Guidelines, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Trade Recovery


Programme and ISO 28002:2011 has been consolidated and integrated into the Guidelines (IMO, 2013s).
105 This questionnaire was finalized by an intersessional meeting of the Maritime Security and Piracy Working Group.
106 The full text of the report is available on the Seafarers’ Rights International website at www.seafarersrights.org


(accessed 19 November 2013).
107 For further information, see IMO (2013a), pages 7–9.
108 The content of this and the following paragraphs is based on the comparison between revision 12 and revision 16 of


the draft consolidated negotiating text (TN/TF/165).
109 This section is based on the forthcoming UNCTAD report, “The competitiveness’ new frontier: Implementing trade


facilitation in developing countries”.
110 The full text of the statement is available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/fac_08jul13_e.htm


(accessed 20 November 2013).




SECURING RELIABLE
ACCESS TO MARITIME


TRANSPORT FOR
LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES


6


The passage of trade of landlocked countries through coastal territories to access shipping
services is generally governed by a standard principle: goods in transit and their carriage
are granted crossing free of fiscal duties and by the most convenient routes. In practice,
however, the implementation of this basic norm suffers from numerous operational
difficulties, resulting in high transport costs and long travel times, which undermine trade
competitiveness and ultimately the economic development of landlocked countries. Over
the past decade, under the Almaty Programme of Action launched in 2003, new analytical
tools and extensive field research have brought fresh knowledge about the mechanisms
explaining detected inefficiencies. Among other things, it has revealed that rent-seeking
stakeholders may play against improvements, making transit operations unnecessarily
complex and unpredictable, to the detriment of governmental and traders’ efforts. Thus, by
exposing conflicting forces at play along transit chains, the analysis shows that the trade of
landlocked countries primarily suffers from unreliability resulting from a lack of cooperation
among stakeholders, often explaining high transport costs and long transit times.


This chapter provides an overview of these findings, and based on them, explores a new
paradigm that should allow for a radical transformation of transit transport systems,
providing landlocked countries reliable access to global value chains and allowing them
to act in ways other than as providers of primary goods.


The proposed approach aims to make the predictability of transit logistics chains a
priority of the governments of both landlocked and transit countries – in partnership
with traders, port operators and shipping lines, who stand to benefit the most from such
an improvement – as well as a priority of the new development agenda for landlocked
and transit developing countries to be adopted in 2014.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013140


A. OBSTACLES TO TRANSIT CHAINS
The many obstacles faced by landlocked countries’ trade
transiting through other territories are commonly known.
They range from long distances to inadequate transport
services and infrastructure, and inefficient institutional and
operational transit frameworks. Until recently, higher costs
and longer times had been seen as the reasons for the lack
of competitiveness of traders from landlocked countries.
However, in the past decade, new research and field
studies on local transit economics (Limao, 2001; Faye et
al., 2004; Collier, 2007; Arvis et al., 2011, UNCTAD 2013,)
show that the unreliability of the transit logistics system
is the greatest impediment faced by manufacturers in
landlocked developing countries as they attempt to enter
value chains at both the regional and global levels. Other
findings are briefly discussed here.


1. Distances, travel times and
transport costs


In many landlocked developing countries, production and
consumption centres are located more than 800 kilometres
(km) away from the closest seaport (table 6.1), which translates
in two or more days’ travel time. Although extremely long
hauls ranging between 2,500 km and 6,000 km or shorter
distances of less than 500 km remain the exception, in all
cases the distance to the sea not only adds costs and travel
time, but also has consequences at the operational level:
long travel times imply fewer turnovers of a given vehicle over
a given period, often facing costly and long empty returns,
and, ultimately, entailing lesser return on investment for the
owner. Such a sequence dissuades investing in renovating
the vehicles and leads to low quality of services provided by
old, less reliable and less carbon-friendly equipment. In some
cases, discussed below, prevailing protectionist regulations
have had their share in defending the use of aging trucking
fleets. (Arvis et al., 2010; Kunaka et al., 2013).


The remoteness from the sea has long been an obvious
explanation of the disadvantage of long travel times
and high transport costs affecting trade to and from
landlocked territories. Widely documented (Arvis et al.,
2010, 2011), these extra costs and times have also
been generally qualified as excessive based on the
comparison with data for coastal countries crossed by
the landlocked cargoes or on international benchmarks
providing comparison of other countries. Both types of
comparison lead one to conclude that the difference of
cost and times associated with remoteness from the sea
cannot be denied and constitutes a serious disadvantage.


Nevertheless, because of the way these figures are
collected, these comparisons might be misleading.


Transport times and costs given for coastal countries’ trade
usually reflect the ocean transport to a port of entry in the
coastal country. These do not include the necessary steps
– and associated times and costs – required for traders in
coastal countries to have their goods on their premises and
that include unloading from the ship, cargo storage at ports,
customs clearance procedures and inland transport. In
contrast, figures for landlocked countries do include all port
charges and other cargo handling and transport costs – and
times – necessary for the carriage of trade to reach the final
inland destination. The use of data not reflecting a similar
content for times and costs in the comparison between
the trade of landlocked and costal countries results in cost
differences (figure 6.1) and time differences (table 6.2).


Table6.1. Distancestoportsfromselected
landlocked developing countries


Landlocked
developing country Ports


Range
(km) Mode


Afghanistan 2 1 200–1 600 road


Armenia 2 800–2 400 rail, road


Azerbaijan 2 800 rail-road
Bolivia (Plurinational
State of) 8 500–2 400 rail, river, road


Botswana 4 950–1 400 rail, road


Burkina Faso 5 1 100–1 900 rail, road


Burundi 2 1 500–1 850 lake, rail, road


Bhutan 1 800 rail, road
Central African
Republic 2 1 500–1 800 rail, road


Chad 2 1 800–1 900 rail, road


Ethiopia 3 900–1 250 rail, road


Kyrgyzstan 4 4 500–5 200 rail, road
Lao People’s
Democratic Republic 3 600–750 rail, road


Lesotho 2 500 rail, road


Malawi 3 600–2 300 rail, road


Mali 6 1 200–1 400 rail, road


Mongolia 4 1 700–6 000 rail, road


Nepal 2 1 100–1 200 rail, road


Niger 3 900–1 200 rail, road


Paraguay 4 1 200–1 400 rail, river, road


Republic of Moldova 2 800 rail, road


Rwanda 2 1 500–1 700 lake, rail, road


Swaziland 4 250–500 rail, road


Uganda 2 1 300–1 650 lake, rail, road


Uzbekistan 3 2 700 rail, road


Tajikistan 3 1 500–2 500 rail, road
The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia 1 600 rail, road


Turkmenistan 3 4 500 rail, road


Zambia 8 1 300–2 100 rail, road


Zimbabwe 3 850–1 550 rail, road
Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat based on


data from the Economic Commission for Africa,
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific, ECLAC and the World Bank.




CHAPTER 6: SECURING RELIABLE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRANSPORT FOR LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES 141


That these comparisons may exacerbate the actual
difference and thereby exaggerate the handicap
suffered by landlocked countries is important. But more
importantly, because geographical distance – which
cannot be shortened – is only one aspect of the problem,
its relative weight should be more accurately assessed.


A close look at recently studied transit corridors shows
that truck or rail operating costs (ton/km) in both
transited and landlocked countries remain very close to
or even lower than global standards or benchmarks in
developed countries (UNCTAD, 2013). If carriers’ costs
are similar but freight paid by users is much higher than
in comparable circumstances in other parts of the world,
then distance per se cannot explain a transport cost of
being landlocked showing surpluses of up to 60 per cent
and an average of 45 per cent (figure 6.2). In other words,
apart from the distance factor, the difference between the
freight costs paid by traders in landlocked and coastal
developing countries for an equivalent transport must be
due to other factors not associated with the remoteness


Figure6.1. Costtoimport(Dollarspercontainer)


Landlocked developing


All developing


World


Transit developing


500


1000


1500


2000


2500


3000


2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011


Source: Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island
Developing States (OHRLLS) 2013, based on World Bank Indicators.


Table6.2. Numberofdaystoexport


Source: OHRLLS, based on World Bank indicators.


2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Landlocked developing countries 49 49 48 48 46 44 43


Transit developing countries 30 27 26 25 24 23 23


All developing countries 32 30 29 28 27 26 26


World 28 26 25 25 24 23 23


from the sea. This is precisely one of the relevant
outcomes of the most recent field studies: there are
factors other than distance and transport costs that make
trade expensive for landlocked developing countries.
These factors must be sought in the environment that
surrounds transit operations, and regulatory frameworks
are central among them.


2. Impacts of regulatory arrangements
for transit


Borders may be more than just political boundaries.
They also set the limits of different business and of
technological and administrative cultures. Crossing a
border entails entering distinctive market spaces where
diverse requirements govern practices and different rules
apply. Goods in transit and their carriers must adapt to
these changing rules and standards. Research has shed
some light on the consequences of rules and procedures
being applied to cargoes in transit.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013142


Figure6.2. Transportcostofbeinglandlocked(Ratio)


0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1


Afghanistan


Armenia


Azerbaijan


Bhutan


Bolivia (Plurinational
State of)


Botswana


Burkina Faso


Burundi


Central African Republic


Chad


Ethiopia


Kazakhstan


Kyrgyzstan


Lao People’s Democratic
Republic


Lesotho


Malawi


Mali


Mongolia


Nepal


Niger


Paraguay


Republic of Moldova


Rwanda


Swaziland


Tajikistan


The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia


Turkmenistan


Uganda


Uzbekistan


Zambia


Zimbabwe


Average


2010


2006


Source: OHRLLS, 2013.
Note: For example, a value of 0.5 means that the transport cost is 50 per cent higher in a landlocked country, compared with


that of a representative coastal economy. Data for 2010 were not available for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
and Afghanistan.




CHAPTER 6: SECURING RELIABLE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRANSPORT FOR LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES 143


These studies also show that private sector operators,
performing under the protection of restrictive regulatory
schemes and obtaining rent-seeking monopolistic
or oligopolistic positions, may become the strongest
opponents to any type of facilitation efforts to bring
transparency and simplicity to the transit system (Arvis
et al., 2011). While road transport is currently a dominant
mode of transport in transit systems serving landlocked
countries, it is also a major factor for high freights paid for
transport services by traders in these countries. Transit
logistics costs, which include all the different steps of
transit operations, could in fact be considerably reduced
and become more environmentally efficient by either
improving the efficiency of road transport operations or
by designing systems leading to a modal shift to rail or
river transport.


A recent study by the World Bank (Kunaka et al., 2013)
shows that while great attention has been given to
road infrastructures, in many cases the management
of international road transport services continues
being based on regulations favouring market access
restrictions to protect national carriers. Thus many
bilateral agreements governing road transport, including
transit agreements, have turned into barriers for transit
facilitation, even in integrated economic schemes.
Although reciprocity and territoriality are key principles
in bilateral instruments, agreements may provide for
embedded operational restrictions stemming from the
nationality of the operator or country of registration of the
vehicles, traffic rights on certain routes, quotas governing
the number of trips, cargo volumes, carrying capacity or
numbers of permits for authorized carriers to undertake
cross border transport. This leads to empty returns,
distortions in available carrying capacities, transport
supply chains interrupted or fragmented by mandatory
transhipments, high freight rates unrelated to actual
operating costs, long travel times, and in general, greater
uncertainty in cargo flows.


B. THE COST OF TRANSIT
UNRELIABILITY


As mentioned previously, distance also brings additional
problems. The longer the road or the track, the higher
the possibility of facing an unforeseen event resulting
in transport disruptions. These likely incidents mean
that there will be an increased uncertainty of transport
times due to extended risks of mechanical failures, and
accidents resulting from driver fatigue over long working
hours or as a result of poor road or rail maintenance.
Long routes are also a risk factor of theft and numerous


stops due to checkpoints along the road, including
weighbridges or stops at railway stations, and border
crossings. However, many of these stops may also take
place along fairly short distances and remain unrelated
to official controls applied to transit transport. A natural
exception must, however, be made for required rest stops
for drivers along the route (Fitzmaurice and Hartmann,
2013).


As a result of these long delays and uncertainties
concerning deliveries, traders in landlocked countries
may have to bear considerable inventory costs that may
sometimes be even higher than transport costs, reaching
more than 10 per cent of the value of the goods (World
Bank, 2013). The main sources of transit logistics costs
are found in the relationships and interests governing the
interactions of participants in the corridor supply chain:
traders, transport companies, customs brokers, freight
forwarders, banks, insurance companies, customs and
other government agencies. Because these different
parties have diverse and sometimes conflicting vested
interests, the transit supply chain, which operates
over long distances, is relatively complex and appears
frequently as a fragmented sequence of a series of
disconnected steps.


Another source of costs is linked to various official and
informal payments levied along the transit route (Arvis
et al., 2011). For example, “In many environments the
complexity of the supply chain means that traders or their
forwarders need to spend more time and staff to get things
done, and this adds to the costs. It has been shown that in
some cases, like Western Africa, these additional costs are
on a par with the cost of trucking”. Transit chains are thus
subject to inefficiencies and “even rent-seeking activities
and corruption” (World Bank, 2013).


Supply chains, such as the transit systems connecting
landlocked countries to seaports, need predictable
events so that they can be organized and their sequence
efficiently arranged. Global production value chains,
which engage processes distributed over several
geographically distant centres, also rely on strict delivery
times for both dispatches and deliveries. The lack of
predictability of transit delivery schedules may constitute
the most important single obstacle for producers in
landlocked countries to enter value chains other than at a
very initial stage, as providers of the primary input.


1. Different views


Reliability may not have the same value or relevance for
different parties intervening along the transit chain. For
government authorities, it may mean having the certainty




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013144


that all relevant rules are fully applied. For customs, this
may mean that fiscal risk, resulting from diversion to
national markets, is minimized or fully covered through
guarantee schemes. For agencies dealing with sanitary
risks, certainty may mean the country remains safe from
possible hazards to animal or vegetal contamination
from goods in transit. For providers of transport and
trade support services operating along a transit route,
predictability may mean foreseeable volumes of freight
allowing for investment and business development. For
transport planners, infrastructure service providers and
terminal operators, predictability may mean ensuring the
best use of infrastructures and equipment and correctly
size their development. For traders, predictability means
transit times, including carriage and pre- and post-
transport stages, and the logistics chain as a whole
are safe and reliable in terms of quality and time; it also
means the goods are in the hands of qualified operators
and will reach their destination in good condition. For
traders, the low reliability of transit supply chains is more
worrisome than the average transit time. For instance,
retail operators such as local supermarkets must maintain
several months’ inventory in landlocked developing
countries instead of a few weeks in developed markets
(World Bank, 2013).


This way, together with cost effectiveness and speed,
reliability constitutes a primary objective to be pursued
for the supply chain of transit services linking seaports
and landlocked countries. As mentioned before,
while the multiplicity of actors in the chain and their
vested and sometimes conflicting interests remain a
main cause of uncertainty, there are ways of turning
silo-minded players into sharing a systemic collective
understanding.


2. Seeking closer cooperation


As early as 2003, UNCTAD developed a supply chain
management approach applied to transit transport
services (Hansen and Annovazzi-Jakab, 2008) which,
emulating assembly lines in manufacturing industry
sectors, allowed for cluster development and transit
corridors stakeholders’ cooperation to improve transit
operations. The methodology, based on the observation
of the sequence of interventions in transit operations,
showed that actors along the chain operate on a user–
provider or client–supplier relationship. Although players’
actions are interrelated and dependent on each other,
they often do not occur in the way and time expected
by the user of the service provided. This is mainly due
to a lack of exchange of information between users and


providers regarding their respective needs and goals,
which in turn results from a lack of trust among the
players. Such malfunctions result in two types of activities
taking place in the operation of the transit chain: those
adding value at a cost and those adding cost at no value.
The latter translate into unnecessary delays, high costs
and efficiency losses.


UNCTAD implemented this approach from 2003–
2007 in the framework of a technical assistance
project conducted in three pilot corridors. The project
showed that clusters as cooperative platforms would
allow stakeholders along transit corridors to acquire
a comprehensive understanding of their respective
roles along the whole transit supply chain. It also
revealed the impact of the actions of their members
on the performance of various stages along the transit
chain as well as the benefits accruing from collectively
optimizing the chain as a whole, as opposed to trying
to maximize individual returns. Such collaborative
schemes constitute an essential step towards building
a new vision and common goals for the different players
in transit systems with the common aim of ending the
unreliability of transit operation.


3. Prospects for solutions


Even after 10 years of continuous efforts and detailed
field research, and despite the progress achieved on
many fronts, scepticism remains as to the possibility of
finding effective and comprehensive solutions. Because
possible solutions would probably antagonize transport
sectors by breaking current protective freight allocation
arrangements or by opening transport markets
to foreigners (Arvis et al., 2011), some conclude
that “feasible implementation strategies of corridor
improvement are extremely constrained. On the one
hand, a reform package should change the paradigm
of corridor organization and introduce quality-based
regulation of incentives. On the other hand, it should
offer options to those numerous operators who are
unlikely to meet the requirements of the reformed freight
and transit system.” They also argue that this would
entail a “transition in market for services with some form
of dual market structure, with a modern sector open
to international competition and meeting the standards
of a fast-track system, while the old procedures
and control may remain available for the rest” (Arvis
et al., 2011). The “rest” were sheltered by current
arrangements dating from the 1970s to the early 1980s,
in which many of the market transit systems favoured
small independent operators, regardless of the quality
of service they offered.




CHAPTER 6: SECURING RELIABLE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRANSPORT FOR LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES 145


C. A MODEL FOR A CHANGE OF
PARADIGM IN TRANSIT


In view of the possible reluctance from some sectors of
stakeholders with vested interests in currently operating
transit chains, chances are that the change of paradigm
in transit corridor operations might need to come at
least in part inspired by successful solutions in transport
and logistics systems that differ from transit ones. The
following proposal builds on three pillars sourcing
respectively from the best practice model offered by the
high performing integrated logistics of mining industry,
the regular services offered by liner shipping maritime
activities and an anchor inland station in the form of a
freight consolidation centre also known as a dry port.


Briefly described, the proposed design framework model
may be seen as a conveyor belt type system supplying
continuous overland transport capacity between two
locations along a transit corridor: a transit seaport and a
connected inland dry port. The model could also apply
between two inland dry ports if one is connected to a
transit seaport. The basic rationale of this model and
some general details are discussed below.


1. The concept of the conveyor belt in
shipping


In 2011, a major shipping line started offering a daily call
service aimed at guaranteeing a fixed time transportation
service based on frequency, reliability and consistency.
According to the company, these three basic, most highly
sought qualities of any transport system were inspired
by the proposal of one customer interested in having
the flexibility of a continuous service available every day,
which would make it possible to miss the ship one day,
knowing that the next day it would be available again.
The suggestion consisted of developing a conveyor belt
type system in which goods could be delivered to the
shipping line at any time, knowing that, in any case, they
would depart soon after on ships calling on a regular
basis. This way, and as in a conveyor belt operation,
goods will reach the end of the belt at a given time. The
shipping line subscribed to the idea and explained that
linking “four ports in Asia (Ningbo, Shanghai, Yantian and
Tanjung Pelepas) and three ports in Europe (Felixstowe,
Rotterdam and Bremerhaven) amounts to a giant ocean
conveyor belt for the world’s busiest trade lane” (Maersk,
2011). After one year, and due to low volumes, the
service had to be limited to five days per week; at the
same time, it was extended to two additional other ports
at each end of the belt.


The rationale of guaranteeing consistency, reliability and
frequency is based on the fact that guaranteed and
predictable transport times are more relevant than actual
speed. This is what is actually missing in transit systems
connecting landlocked countries with world seaports.


The conveyor belt concept for a regular transport service
can be transposed in its essence from sea shipping to
land transport transit services. It should function as a
shuttle-like service, linking one transit port to one inland
destination in a landlocked country or within the same
coastal country as a part of a transit corridor.


2. The integrated logistics chain in
mining operations


To a certain extent, the conveyor belt operation
resembles that of integrated intermodal transport chains
developed for minerals. These systems are developed
to carry homogeneous cargo, each piece, pellet or
material unit, of which is constant and identical to the
other. That thinking was behind the development of the
container as a standard box that would unitize cargo
and make break-bulk loads appear uniform for transport
operators The containerization of cargo is in its essence
a method designed to ensure that different cargoes,
fruits, electronics, garment or spare parts are handled
with standard equipment and transport means. The
container is a successful attempt to make general cargo
behave like bulk cargo on a different scale, but allowing
for continuous transport of loads through different means
and via integrated transport logistics systems.


The conveyor belt approach developed by the shipping
line mentioned above, now applied to land transit
transport connecting the seaport and inland dry port,
could operate based on the bulk-cargo-carrying model,
making no distinction between the type and origin of
boxes and assuring the shipper that the goods will be
delivered at the other end of the belt, alternatively the
seaport and the dry port, at a given time and on a regular
basis.


Such an idea had been addressed more than 10 years
ago in ECLAC studies on best practices for intermodal
transport (Rubiato, 2001). The study looked at mineral
extraction transport to port and shipping overseas for
copper and iron ore, in Chile and Brazil respectively.
While the Minera Escondida example described the use
of pipelines (“slurry pipelines” or “mineroducts”) to carry
liquefied copper mineral, the Vale case (the company was
called Vale Do Rio Doce at the time) boasted impressive
performances for an intermodal system involving truck




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013146


carriages, car dumpers, rail transport and ocean shipping
all linked and articulated around 160-wagon 6,400-ton-
unit trains. These departed every 45 minutes from the
mine, reaching the port of Tubarao 700 km away and
achieving a total annual transport of 50  million tons or
140,000 tons a day; 300,000 dwt ocean vessels were
being fully loaded in two to three days (see figure 6.3).


In terms of the lessons that mining systems could offer
for application to other types of transport systems, the
following are relevant for transit transport systems:


• Ensuring continuous regular and large flows of
cargoes – Where large volumes of transit loads are not
available, terminal operators at freight consolidation
centres or dry ports (see box 6.1) may play a role in
gathering necessary volumes to ensure the best use
of transport means and infrastructures;


• Organizing transport to serve traders – Securing
means of transport adapted to the specific product,
flat trucks or wagons in the case of containers for
transit purposes, for instance, is key to the cost of
transport and the final value of the product but also
with regard to its rhythms and periodicity of delivery,
volumes and service of trade according to traders’
needs;


• Ensuring interconnectivity and interoperability
between different modes of transport –
Compatibility between different modes is a basic
condition in the operation of intermodal transport
systems, such as those used in transit corridors
The adaptation of means and the management
of the system as a whole, ideally under a central
command either by a single operator or a
consortium, is one of the aspects better addressed
in bulk transport logistics chains;


• Operating with long-term contracts and long-
standing partnerships – Regular guaranteed
cargo flows allow contracts and long-standing
cooperation with different transport and logistics
companies and enable investments in transport
equipment and supply chain management
technologies;


• Designing the transport system in cooperation
with all stakeholders – Large mining companies
maintain a close relationship with many suppliers
and base logistics systems with all partners
concerned in the operation.


3. Applying the mining operation
model to a sea–land logistics chain


Although specific transit corridor operations would require
a business process mapped and designed in detail for a
tailored implementation of the transit belt model, successful
operations would include the following key features:


• Frequency of availability of service – This
should be adapted first to known existing and
potential volumes and types of cargo, origins
and destinations. The design should then be
validated with pre- and post-carriage players,
including cargo handling and terminal operators,
government agencies such as customs and other
intervening public agencies, at both ends, in the
transit port and the inland dry port. Depending on
estimated needs, the belt service could start on
the basis of several rounds per week;


• Choice in modes of transport – Wherever rail
transport would be available, it would be used
as the primary mode to develop the system.
Examples already exist in other parts of the world


Figure6.3. Mineraloreextractionandintermodaltransportchain


Source: Quintiq Inc., 2013.




CHAPTER 6: SECURING RELIABLE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRANSPORT FOR LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES 147


of established regular connections between
seaports and inland terminals, such as that of the
Interporto in Bologna, Italy, where up to 15 trains
a day, consisting of container-carrying flat wagons,
link this freight village to different seaports in Italy
and northern Europe. These regular services also
operate as a conveyor belt. Cargoes would be
dispatched from the dry port to final destinations
by road or carried to the transit port in the case
of outbound traffic. Wherever road transport
remains the main or only choice, a system should
be designed to allow free access to cargoes by
qualified trucking companies eligible to function as
trusted transit operators according to quality and
reliability criteria;


• Uninterruptedtransitflowsalongthetransitbelt–
In order for transport of transit cargoes to be fully
efficient, they should benefit from an uninterrupted
transit status based on a trusted transit operator
scheme (see box 6.2). This issue is discussed in
recent UNCTAD research (2013) in which a three-
pronged approach is proposed, including transit
coordination by means of a corridor management
arrangement, secure transit operators by means
of risk-management and authorized operators
customs schemes, and consolidation centres
along the corridor.


4. Main drivers in developing a transit
belt system


Three main sectors should benefit from a more predictable
operation of transit system both in landlocked and transit
countries:


• Government agencies and control authorities
dealing with trustable and well-controlled
operations should find benefits in terms of
confidence in trade sectors, which would release
important highly qualified resources towards more
troublesome traffic. Due to the expected higher
volumes of orderly and better-monitored trade,
revenues should also increase. Last but not least,
a transit belt system offers an opportunity to build
a smoothly operating, secured system on the basis
of PPPs in both landlocked and transit countries;


• Traders and manufacturers in landlocked countries
will be the main beneficiaries of reliable and
predictable transit connections. A major factor
in the possibility to integrate a global value chain
resides in a performing logistics system, which in
turn requires a last-mile link, in our case, the land
transit one. Inventory cost would also benefit from
reliable logistics, which would diminish the need for
keeping large stocks. Over time, and through better
returns on investment for carriers, transport costs
should also decrease, resulting in lower freight rates.
Predictability also permits stable arrangements,
including long-term contracts between shippers and
transport service providers, leading to investment
in fleets and handling equipment by carriers and
freight terminal operators;


• Liner shipping companies and terminal operators,
including seaports and dry ports – Initially, in
particular those operating containerized trade, would
find a significant practical advantage in being able to
see the containers leave and return to the port on
schedule. A straightforward continuous operation
would allow boxes to exit the port over shorter dwell
times, thereby increasing the handling and storage
capacity of sea terminals, and ultimately increasing
the efficiency of vessel operations in ports. Finally,
higher traffic volumes are of direct interest to sea
carriers, eager to attract cargoes from and to inland
markets, as shown by their current presence in
landlocked countries (see table 6.3) .


5. Prerequisites to support the
establishment of a transit belt
system


At the conceptual design stage, which would need to be
adapted to local needs and capacities in each case, a
transit belt system requires three components to be in
place and ready for operation:


Table6.3. Presenceofmaincontainer
shipping lines in landlocked
developing countries, 2013
(Numberofoffices)


Source: UNCTAD secretariat – Websites of the above-
mentioned shipping companies. It would appear that
the following landlocked developing countries do
not have a local subsidiary office for any of the three
largest container shipping lines: Afghanistan, Bhutan,
Tajikistan, Lesotho and Swaziland (probably served
by agencies based in neighbouring South Africa).


Landlocked
developing countries


by region
Maerskline MSC CGM-CMA


Africa (14) 11 8 2


Asia (13) 1 4 -


Latin America (2) 2 2 2


Total (31) 14 14 4




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013148


Inland terminals have become an intrinsic part of the transport system, particularly in gateway regions with
a high reliance on trade. The integration of maritime and inland freight distribution systems has favoured the
setting of inland ports to integrate with the maritime terminal and support efficient access to the inland market
both for inbound and outbound traffic. Since the inland terminal is essentially an extension of some port
activities inland, the term “dry port” has gained acceptance. However, there seems to be no consensus on the
terminology, resulting in a wide range of terms such as dry ports, inland terminals, inland ports, inland hubs,
inland logistics centres and inland freight villages. Regardless of the terminology used, three fundamental
characteristics are related to an inland node:


• An intermodal terminal, either rail or barge that has been built or expanded;


• A connection with a port terminal through rail, barge or truck services;


• An array of logistical activities that supports and organizes the freight transited.


The functional specialization of inland terminals has been linked with the cluster formation of logistical activities.
They have become excellent locations for consolidating a range of ancillary activities and logistics companies.
Inland terminals are part of a port regionalization strategy supporting a more extensive hinterland. Each dry
port is confronted with a local or regional economic, geographical and regulatory setting that not only defines
the functions taken up by the dry port, but its relations with seaports. Best practices can only be applied
successfully by taking into account the relative uniqueness of each dry port setting.


Source: http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/appl4en/ch4a4en.html.


Authorized economic operators, an international production and distribution model set out in the World
Customs Organization’s SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, would provide a
suitable option for developing a mechanism for customs transit procedures tailored to the needs of landlocked
country traders. Some basic principles could apply to transit operators, including traders, carriers and logistics
operators, in the framework of a regional trusted transit operator programme:


• Automatic inclusion in the programme: Trusted operators with established good compliance histories
should be automatically inducted into such programmes upon periodic examination of physical security
by the competent governmental authority;


• Targeting the entity, not the transaction: Border management procedures should be designed to focus
on risk of the trusted transit operator ending the transaction-by-transaction review;


• Regional certification: Customs authorities within regional schemes should agree to accept a single
trusted transit operator application for all the entities the applicant may list in the regional community
and to recognize such status granted in partner countries as applicable in all member countries;


• Coordinated border management: Trusted transit operator status should be granted on coordinated
grounds by relevant border management agencies to avoid duplicative procedures at borders;


• Assurance of uninterrupted transit: Consignments from trusted transit operator traders to trusted
transit operator traders through trusted transit operator logistics providers should not be interrupted
by any agency for any reason except in the case of clear evidence of a threat or violation. Assurance of
uninterrupted transit should be adopted as a basic feature of all trusted transit operator programmes
and be supported by verifiable public metrics.


Source: Adapted from International Chamber of Commerce Draft policy position paper on authorized economic operators
(forthcoming).


Box6.1. Inlandterminals


Box6.2. Proposedtrustedtransitoperatorscheme




CHAPTER 6: SECURING RELIABLE ACCESS TO MARITIME TRANSPORT FOR LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES 149


An inland freight terminal or dry port in the landlocked
country or in the transit country along the transit corridor
and physically linked to the transit seaport through
adequate transport systems (see box 6.1);


A regulatory scheme allowing the uninterrupted transit of
goods based on a trusted transit operator scheme that
would need to be adopted at the regional or bilateral level
(see box 6.2);


A logistics operator scheme ensuring the smooth
integration of the different stakeholders and various stages
of the transit chain, including public and private players.
Wherever transit corridors and corresponding corridor
management authorities exist, these would constitute
the natural counterpart for the design and development
phase of the transit belt system. Corridor authorities could
contact traders, logistics operators and shipping lines to
design an economically viable system. This may require
formalization through bilateral or regional instruments.


D. CONCLUSIONS
Thanks to the Almaty Programme of Action, the past
10 years have brought considerable progress in terms
of knowledge and practical solutions to improve the
access of landlocked countries to sea shipping services.
Detailed field research has shed light on the rationale and
high complexity of transit operations, their fragmentation
resulting from stakeholders’ individual interests and
sometimes the conflicting relationships linking business
and the public sector.


Paradoxically, while one of the most important advances in
the analysis was achieved by applying a systemic supply
chain approach to transit operations, applied solutions
have remained partial, affecting only some stages of the
transit chain. Improvements have mostly benefited well-


established and better-structured administrations such
as customs or port authorities. These have benefited
from modern technologies, improving both management
techniques and processes equally, through privatization
in ports or the ASYCUDA programme in customs.
In most cases, however, other sectors, notably land
transport industries and ancillary services central to the
efficiency of transit operations, i.e. customs brokers and
freight forwarders, lag far behind.


The time has come to design a new transit system
paradigm for landlocked countries enabling them to
operate along more reliable transit supply chains. The
transit belt system approach would involve the design of
a system open to all transit cargo, based on a trusted
transit operator scheme guaranteeing uninterrupted
seaport–hinterland transit and vice versa. The proposed
approach would not only ensure reliability of the transit
operation but would also bring higher quality services
and lower traffic with higher volumes, thereby reducing
the carbon footprint.


The 10-year Review Conference on the Implementation of
the Almaty Programme of Action to be convened in 2014,
as decided by the General Assembly in its resolutions
66/214 and 67/222, offers a good opportunity to include
the design of such a paradigm in a new global framework
for transit transport cooperation for landlocked and transit
developing countries in the next decade and to ensure
improved access of landlocked developing countries to
international maritime transport services.


Transit systems can learn best practices from other
transport and logistics systems, such as the maritime
industry or mineral ore value and transport chains and
combine their own experience to develop reliable and
predictable transit logistics chains to increase the
shipping connectivity of landlocked developing countries.




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013150


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Direction in Development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4258. June. World Bank. Washington, D.C.


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Washington, D.C.




STATISTICAL
ANNEX


I. World seaborne trade by country group (Millions of tons) .................................... 152


II. (a) Merchant fleets of the world by flags of registration, groups of economies
and types of ship, as at 1 January 2013 (Thousands of GT) ............................ ..157


II. (b) Merchant fleets of the world by flags of registration, groups of economies
and types of ship, as at 1 January 2013 (Thousands of DWT) ........................ ..162


II. (c) Merchant fleets of the world by flags of registration, groups of economies
and types of ship, as at 1 January 2013 (Number of ships) ............................. ..167


III. True nationality of the 20 largest fleets by flag of registration,
as at 1 January 2013 .............................................................................................173


IV. Containerized port traffic (Alphabetical order) .................................................. ..179


V. UNCTAD Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (Alphabetical order) ................... ..181




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013152


Annex I. Worldseabornetradebycountrygroup(Millionsoftons)


Area Year


Goods loaded


Total
goods
loaded


Goods unloaded


Total
goods


unloaded


Oil & gas


Dry cargo


Oil & gas


Dry cargo
Crude


Petroleum
products
and gasa


Crude
Petroleum
products
and gasa


Developed economies


North America


2006 22.2 86.4 436.8 545.4 501.0 155.7 492.1 1 148.7


2007 24.9 91.3 516.7 632.9 513.5 156.1 453.1 1 122.7


2008 24.1 119.0 549.4 692.5 481.3 138.9 414.3 1 034.5


2009 23.9 123.8 498.5 646.1 445.2 132.0 306.4 883.6


2010 25.5 126.9 530.1 682.5 465.2 113.7 331.0 909.9


2011 24.3 154.4 599.4 778.0 413.0 113.9 368.6 895.5


2012 26.0 148.4 626.8 801.2 410.5 114.1 360.8 885.4


Europe


2006 100.9 235.8 768.6 1 105.2 535.6 281.9 1 245.2 2 062.7


2007 96.9 253.3 776.6 1 126.8 492.2 262.2 1 154.7 1 909.2


2008 88.2 261.5 751.1 1 100.8 487.9 273.0 1 213.1 1 974.0


2009 78.1 236.0 693.8 1 008.0 467.9 281.8 935.0 1 684.6


2010 93.7 266.3 735.1 1 095.1 484.2 280.6 1 044.1 1 808.9


2011 77.9 269.8 748.7 1 096.3 457.9 336.5 1 049.7 1 844.1


2012 78.9 271.0 798.4 1 148.3 463.7 318.1 1 067.2 1 849.0


Japan
and Israel


2006 0.0 10.0 153.1 163.1 219.3 84.4 559.6 863.3


2007 0.0 14.4 161.2 175.7 213.3 88.5 560.9 862.6


2008 0.0 21.0 162.0 183.0 254.7 92.8 548.8 896.2


2009 0.0 19.3 139.8 159.0 190.7 102.3 417.0 710.0


2010 0.0 24.7 148.4 173.1 191.1 109.6 480.4 781.2


2011 0.0 17.4 146.8 164.2 187.1 113.6 478.1 778.8


2012 0.0 15.5 164.0 179.5 192.9 124.6 508.4 825.9


Australia
and
New Zealand


2006 9.9 4.2 632.7 646.8 26.2 13.5 50.2 90.0


2007 13.3 4.0 656.3 673.6 27.0 17.3 51.7 96.0


2008 16.7 3.8 718.5 739.1 27.3 19.2 56.7 103.2


2009 12.9 4.8 723.4 741.1 21.5 13.8 60.8 96.1


2010 16.7 4.3 893.6 914.6 24.8 18.7 60.9 104.5


2011 15.3 10.4 918.2 943.9 27.5 17.3 69.0 113.9


2012 16.7 12.5 1 004.8 1 033.9 30.5 16.8 71.1 118.5


Subtotal:
developed
economies


2006 132.9 336.4 1 991.3 2 460.5 1 282.0 535.5 2 347.2 4 164.7


2007 135.1 363.0 2 110.8 2 608.9 1 246.0 524.0 2 220.5 3 990.5


2008 129.0 405.3 2 181.1 2 715.4 1 251.1 523.8 2 233.0 4 007.9


2009 115.0 383.8 2 055.5 2 554.3 1 125.3 529.9 1 719.2 3 374.4


2010 135.9 422.3 2 307.3 2 865.4 1 165.4 522.6 1 916.5 3 604.5


2011 117.5 451.9 2 413.1 2 982.5 1 085.6 581.3 1 965.4 3 632.3


2012 121.6 447.3 2 594.0 3 162.9 1 097.7 573.7 2 007.5 3 678.8




STATISTICAL ANNEX 153


Area Year


Goods loaded


Total
goods
loaded


Goods unloaded


Total
goods


unloaded


Oil & gas


Dry cargo


Oil & gas


Dry cargo
Crude


Petroleum
products
and gasa


Crude
Petroleum
products
and gasa


Developing economies


Economies
in
transition


2006 123.1 41.3 245.9 410.3 5.6 3.1 61.9 70.6


2007 124.4 39.9 243.7 407.9 7.3 3.5 66.0 76.8


2008 138.2 36.7 256.6 431.5 6.3 3.8 79.2 89.3


2009 142.1 44.4 318.8 505.3 3.5 4.6 85.3 93.3


2010 150.2 45.9 319.7 515.7 3.5 4.6 114.0 122.1


2011 132.6 42.0 330.5 505.0 4.2 4.4 148.1 156.7


2012 136.6 41.1 364.4 542.1 3.8 4.0 141.4 149.2


North Africa


2006 117.4 63.8 77.2 258.5 6.0 13.3 142.0 161.3


2007 116.1 61.8 80.2 258.1 7.5 14.6 155.4 177.4


2008 113.2 61.3 77.2 251.8 11.3 16.1 151.1 178.5


2009 101.1 64.9 71.3 237.3 12.2 14.3 156.2 182.7


2010 94.4 65.5 76.2 236.1 11.3 14.4 171.1 196.8


2011 73.7 40.9 83.0 197.7 8.2 14.9 128.0 151.1


2012 108.5 42.4 90.0 240.8 9.0 15.4 134.4 158.8


Western Africa


2006 110.6 12.6 39.8 162.9 5.4 14.2 62.4 82.0


2007 110.1 10.3 46.5 166.9 7.6 17.1 67.8 92.6


2008 111.8 9.1 54.2 175.1 6.8 13.5 61.5 81.8


2009 104.4 10.5 41.4 156.2 6.8 10.8 66.2 83.8


2010 112.1 13.5 56.0 181.5 7.4 12.8 92.3 112.5


2011 115.0 18.1 57.4 190.5 5.1 15.5 87.7 108.3


2012 111.9 18.4 64.3 194.6 5.7 16.6 91.5 113.8


Eastern Africa


2006 11.8 1.1 29.0 42.0 2.1 7.7 18.2 28.0


2007 13.6 1.2 23.3 38.1 2.1 8.3 19.8 30.3


2008 19.7 0.8 27.8 48.2 1.8 7.9 23.8 33.5


2009 19.0 0.6 18.3 37.8 1.7 9.2 24.4 35.3


2010 19.0 0.5 29.5 49.1 1.9 8.6 26.3 36.8


2011 20.0 1.0 16.7 37.7 1.4 9.6 39.0 50.0


2012 22.0 1.1 16.8 39.9 1.5 10.4 42.1 54.0


Central Africa


2006 114.0 2.6 6.3 122.8 2.1 1.7 7.3 11.2


2007 122.7 2.6 7.8 133.1 2.8 1.9 7.7 12.3


2008 134.2 5.8 9.0 149.0 1.7 2.8 8.9 13.5


2009 129.3 2.0 8.5 139.7 1.9 2.7 10.9 15.5


2010 125.3 7.2 9.7 142.1 1.4 2.3 8.3 12.0


2011 129.3 6.0 9.3 144.7 1.4 3.8 12.5 17.8


2012 127.3 6.8 11.4 145.4 0.9 4.4 14.2 19.4


Annex I. Worldseabornetradebycountrygroup(Millionsoftons)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013154


Annex I. Worldseabornetradebycountrygroup(Millionsoftons)(continued)


Area Year


Goods loaded


Total
goods
loaded


Goods unloaded


Total
goods


unloaded


Oil & gas


Dry cargo


Oil & gas


Dry cargo
Crude


Petroleum
products
and gasa


Crude
Petroleum
products
and gasa


Southern Africa


2006 0.0 5.9 129.9 135.8 25.6 2.6 39.1 67.4


2007 0.0 5.9 129.9 135.8 25.6 2.6 39.1 67.4


2008 0.3 6.2 136.0 142.5 23.4 3.1 42.8 69.3


2009 0.3 5.1 131.5 136.8 22.0 2.7 44.8 69.4


2010 0.3 5.4 139.5 145.1 20.8 2.3 35.7 58.8


2011 0.0 2.5 150.7 153.2 21.7 2.5 26.8 51.0


2012 0.5 3.9 162.1 166.5 18.9 5.0 37.9 61.7


Subtotal:
developing
Africa


2006 353.8 86.0 282.2 721.9 41.3 39.4 269.1 349.8


2007 362.5 81.8 287.6 732.0 45.7 44.5 289.8 380.0


2008 379.2 83.3 304.2 766.7 45.0 43.5 288.1 376.6


2009 354.0 83.0 271.0 708.0 44.6 39.7 302.5 386.8


2010 351.1 92.0 310.9 754.0 42.7 40.5 333.7 416.9


2011 338.0 68.5 317.2 723.7 37.8 46.3 294.1 378.2


2012 370.1 72.6 344.6 787.3 35.9 51.7 320.1 407.7


Caribbean
and Central
America


2006 108.4 34.6 73.5 216.6 18.5 42.1 101.5 162.2


2007 100.4 32.4 75.2 208.1 38.8 44.5 103.1 186.5


2008 89.1 41.0 84.4 214.5 35.7 47.0 103.5 186.2


2009 75.1 27.4 71.0 173.4 33.6 46.8 87.2 167.6


2010 75.9 29.3 81.3 186.5 34.7 51.4 99.4 185.5


2011 80.1 31.7 89.0 200.8 35.7 47.5 121.2 204.4


2012 75.0 33.9 98.3 207.2 37.7 49.8 126.0 213.5


South America:
northern
and eastern
seaboards


2006 110.8 49.1 499.5 659.4 16.9 10.3 116.2 143.5


2007 120.2 47.8 530.7 698.7 19.9 10.8 125.3 156.1


2008 112.6 40.5 560.2 713.2 22.7 13.9 128.3 165.0


2009 119.0 38.8 524.4 682.2 19.6 14.5 94.8 128.9


2010 123.5 42.6 620.6 786.8 17.5 11.4 144.2 173.1


2011 126.7 36.3 661.6 824.6 22.2 13.1 163.2 198.5


2012 125.6 40.8 681.0 847.4 25.0 13.8 159.1 197.9


South America:
western
seaboard


2006 32.1 10.2 112.4 154.8 14.1 7.7 45.9 67.8


2007 31.6 10.5 118.3 160.4 17.2 8.7 47.5 73.4


2008 32.9 11.5 136.0 180.4 15.8 9.0 60.9 85.7


2009 31.7 7.8 134.7 174.2 11.1 12.3 52.0 75.4


2010 42.1 13.2 144.0 199.3 17.6 12.0 60.6 90.1


2011 47.1 15.5 151.3 213.9 13.2 13.3 78.9 105.4


2012 50.1 16.9 165.6 232.6 14.8 15.8 96.6 127.1




STATISTICAL ANNEX 155


Annex I. Worldseabornetradebycountrygroup(Millionsoftons)(continued)


Area Year


Goods loaded


Total
goods
loaded


Goods unloaded


Total
goods


unloaded


Oil & gas


Dry cargo


Oil & gas


Dry cargo
Crude


Petroleum
products
and gasa


Crude
Petroleum
products
and gasa


Subtotal:
developing
America


2006 251.3 93.9 685.5 1 030.7 49.6 60.1 263.7 373.4


2007 252.3 90.7 724.2 1 067.1 76.0 64.0 275.9 415.9


2008 234.6 93.0 780.6 1 108.2 74.2 69.9 292.7 436.8


2009 225.7 74.0 730.1 1 029.8 64.4 73.6 234.0 371.9


2010 241.6 85.1 846.0 1 172.6 69.9 74.7 304.2 448.7


2011 253.8 83.5 901.9 1 239.2 71.1 73.9 363.4 508.3


2012 250.7 91.6 944.9 1 287.2 77.5 79.4 381.6 538.5


Western Asia


2006 729.1 158.1 151.0 1 038.2 27.0 50.3 296.5 373.8


2007 753.7 155.2 179.5 1 088.5 34.4 51.2 344.4 430.0


2008 714.0 159.8 181.9 1 055.7 30.6 54.5 349.8 434.9


2009 717.0 135.8 172.4 1 025.2 22.3 53.1 320.1 395.6


2010 720.4 152.7 183.8 1 056.9 30.2 55.6 343.7 429.6


2011 737.4 147.9 212.1 1 097.4 22.3 54.6 365.3 442.2


2012 784.0 153.6 229.1 1 166.7 20.9 59.2 397.4 477.5


Southern and
Eastern Asia


2006 132.3 102.5 922.6 1 157.3 411.3 104.0 1 482.0 1 997.4


2007 128.1 104.7 959.7 1 192.5 455.0 106.9 1 674.7 2 236.7


2008 130.7 103.0 943.0 1 176.7 420.5 124.3 1 811.2 2 356.0


2009 107.6 115.2 823.7 1 046.5 498.8 126.1 2 034.0 2 659.0


2010 128.7 111.8 964.0 1 204.5 514.5 143.2 2 198.7 2 856.4


2011 112.5 110.1 952.2 1 174.7 546.7 154.0 2 357.2 3 057.9


2012 64.9 114.9 955.8 1 135.6 571.9 163.8 2 563.1 3 298.7


South-Eastern
Asia


2006 59.8 96.5 721.3 877.6 114.4 94.4 326.8 535.6


2007 56.4 98.2 779.0 933.6 131.3 102.6 363.0 596.9


2008 58.1 75.8 837.3 971.2 114.6 108.0 348.5 571.0


2009 47.7 94.7 840.3 982.7 115.2 90.7 332.0 537.9


2010 58.4 73.7 701.0 833.2 107.0 134.2 311.0 552.3


2011 66.1 130.2 858.3 1 054.6 128.8 119.5 360.4 608.7


2012 55.8 129.1 889.6 1 074.5 121.0 118.5 380.5 620.0


Subtotal:
developing
Asia


2006 921.2 357.0 1 794.8 3 073.1 552.7 248.8 2 105.3 2 906.8


2007 938.2 358.1 1 918.3 3 214.6 620.7 260.8 2 382.1 3 263.6


2008 902.7 338.6 1 962.2 3 203.6 565.6 286.8 2 509.5 3 361.9


2009 872.3 345.8 1 836.3 3 054.3 636.3 269.9 2 686.2 3 592.4


2010 907.5 338.3 1 848.8 3 094.6 651.8 333.1 2 853.4 3 838.2


2011 916.0 388.2 2 022.6 3 326.7 697.8 328.0 3 082.9 4 108.8


2012 904.7 397.5 2 074.5 3 376.7 713.8 341.5 3 340.9 4 396.2




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013156


Annex I. Worldseabornetradebycountrygroup(Millionsoftons)(continued)


Area Year


Goods loaded


Total
goods
loaded


Goods unloaded


Total
goods


unloaded


Oil & gas


Dry cargo


Oil & gas


Dry cargo
Crude


Petroleum
products
and gasa


Crude
Petroleum
products
and gasa


Developing
Oceania


2006 1.2 0.1 2.5 3.8 0.0 6.7 6.2 12.9


2007 0.9 0.1 2.5 7.1 0.0 7.0 6.5 13.5


2008 1.5 0.1 2.6 4.2 0.0 7.1 6.7 13.8


2009 1.5 0.2 4.6 6.3 0.0 3.6 9.5 13.1


2010 1.5 0.2 4.8 6.5 0.0 3.7 9.7 13.4


2011 1.6 0.2 5.3 7.1 0.0 3.9 9.6 13.5


2012 1.6 0.8 6.6 9.0 0.0 4.6 8.6 13.3


Subtotal:
developing
economies and
territories


2006 1 527.5 537.1 2 765.0 4 829.5 643.6 355.1 2 644.3 3 642.9


2007 1 553.9 530.7 2 932.6 5 020.8 742.4 376.3 2 954.3 4 073.0


2008 1 518.0 515.1 3 049.6 5 082.6 684.9 407.2 3 097.0 4 189.1


2009 1 453.5 502.9 2 842.0 4 798.4 745.3 386.9 3 232.1 4 364.2


2010 1 501.6 515.6 3 010.5 5 027.8 764.4 452.0 3 500.9 4 717.3


2011 1 509.4 540.4 3 247.0 5 296.8 806.7 452.1 3 750.0 5 008.8


2012 1 527.2 562.5 3 370.6 5 460.3 827.3 477.2 4 051.2 5 355.7


World total


2006 1 783.4 914.8 5 002.1 7 700.3 1 931.2 893.7 5 053.4 7 878.3


2007 1 813.4 933.5 5 287.1 8 034.1 1 995.7 903.8 5 240.8 8 140.2


2008 1 785.2 957.0 5 487.2 8 229.5 1 942.3 934.9 5 409.2 8 286.3


2009 1 710.5 931.1 5 216.4 7 858.0 1 874.1 921.3 5 036.6 7 832.0


2010 1 787.7 983.8 5 637.5 8 408.9 1 933.2 979.2 5 531.4 8 443.8


2011 1 759.5 1 034.2 5 990.5 8 784.3 1 896.5 1 037.7 5 863.5 8 797.7


2012 1 785.4 1 050.9 6 329.0 9 165.3 1 928.7 1 054.9 6 200.1 9 183.7


Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data supplied by reporting countries, as published on the relevant
government and port industry websites and by specialist sources. Figures for 2012 are estimates based on preliminary
data or on the last year for which data were available. Historical statistics on world total volume of international seaborne
trade are available electronically at http://stats.unctad.org/seabornetrade.


a Including LNG, LPG, naphtha, gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, light oil, heavy fuel oil and others.




STATISTICAL ANNEX 157


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAFRICA


Algeria 757 11 88 66 592


Angola 170 10 10 150


Benin 1 1


Cameroon 327 1 326


Cape Verde 35 3 13 19


Comoros 686 113 93 373 4 102


Congo 1 1


Côte d'Ivoire 2 1 1


Democratic Republic of the Congo 9 1 0 7


Djibouti 7 3 0 3


Egypt 1 171 149 595 140 52 236


EquatorialGuinea 16 4 4 8


Eritrea 12 2 10 1


Ethiopia 160 27 133


Gabon 211 0 5 205


Gambia 11 11


Ghana 22 2 4 16


Guinea 4 4


Guinea-Bissau 2 1 1


Kenya 9 1 8


Liberia 127 109 39 100 36 834 1 573 40 386 9 216


Libya 753 522 8 224


Madagascar 22 4 12 6


Mauritania 1 0 1


Mauritius 104 43 0 61


Morocco 254 5 12 47 190


Mozambique 19 11 8


Namibia 8 5 3


Nigeria 2 120 299 10 10 1 801


São Tomé and Principe 20 19 1


Senegal 9 0 1 8


Seychelles 337 293 4 40


Sierra Leone 1 157 166 172 488 222 110


Somalia 1 0 0


South Africa 70 12 0 58


Sudan 25 21 3


Togo 536 267 41 166 20 42


Tunisia 359 17 88 254


United Republic of Tanzania 4 774 4 360 67 271 38 39


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAFRICA
Total


141290 45397 37917 3453 40767 13756


AnnexII.(a)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofGT)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013158


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAMERICA


Anguilla 1 1


Antigua and Barbuda 10 934 38 949 4 044 5 596 306


Argentina 350 200 14 53 83


Aruba 0 0


Bahamas 54 511 18 433 10 370 826 1 550 23 332


Barbados 1 023 144 397 223 73 185


Belize 1 638 92 367 856 30 293


Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 322 42 201 63 5 10


Brazil 2 303 971 241 201 308 582


British Virgin Islands 7 1 6


Cayman Islands 3 592 298 859 4 2 431


Chile 549 238 160 67 30 55


Colombia 85 5 46 33


Costa Rica 5 2 3


Cuba 30 0 23 7


Curaçao 1 297 117 40 146 6 988


Dominica 1 143 353 691 40 60


Dominican Republic 99 80 14 5


Ecuador 239 205 5 30


El Salvador 0 0


Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 10 0 10


Grenada 1 1 1


Guatemala 1 0 1


Guyana 34 6 16 12


Haiti 1 1


Honduras 470 89 17 242 2 121


Jamaica 161 81 20 58 2


Mexico 1 336 638 109 40 549


Netherlands Antilles 5 5


Nicaragua 2 1 0 1


Panama 227 754 34 016 116 085 6 918 34 451 36 285


Paraguay 54 4 36 7 7


Peru 269 186 17 12 53


Saint Kitts and Nevis 898 183 228 287 16 185


Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 505 66 952 1 101 193 1 194


Suriname 5 2 3 0


Trinidad and Tobago 45 3 1 42


Turks and Caicos Islands 1 0 1


AnnexII.(a)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofGT)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 159


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Uruguay 64 7 8 48


Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1 111 450 100 194 5 361


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAMERICA
Total


313853 56865 131861 15500 42341 67285


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFASIA


Afghanistan 2 2


Bahrain 534 81 33 1 255 164


Bangladesh 1 049 44 678 265 28 34


Brunei Darussalam 542 5 6 531


Cambodia 1 731 54 202 1 310 28 137


China 44 223 8 166 22 928 3 421 5 221 4 487


China, Hong Kong SAR 77 904 14 243 44 474 2 015 14 479 2 692


China, Macao SAR 2 2


China, Taiwan Province of 2 338 142 1 156 106 801 131


Democratic People's Republic of Korea 701 61 47 547 11 36


India 9 534 4 734 2 746 560 269 1 226


Indonesia 10 776 2 361 1 330 2 658 1 233 3 194


Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1 492 156 126 448 631 131


Iraq 92 18 23 50


Jordan 73 52 21


Kuwait 2 473 1 886 46 7 313 221


Lao People's Democratic Republic 0 0


Lebanon 133 0 14 109 5 3


Malaysia 7 817 2 577 140 325 466 4 308


Maldives 83 7 61 7 7


Mongolia 426 42 169 167 12 35


Myanmar 164 3 139 22


Oman 27 2 2 23


Pakistan 391 175 177 13 26


Philippines 4 711 283 2 400 789 296 943


Qatar 903 303 70 1 235 295


Republic of Korea 11 149 781 6 530 1 148 1 037 1 652


Saudi Arabia 1 157 377 220 172 388


Singapore 58 090 20 411 16 507 1 207 11 379 8 586


Sri Lanka 173 8 58 71 16 20


Syrian Arab Republic 111 12 96 3


Thailand 3 040 886 894 400 218 643


Turkey 6 858 1 268 3 056 1 567 541 426


United Arab Emirates 990 203 64 70 247 405


AnnexII.(a)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofGT)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013160


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Viet Nam 4 512 925 978 1 871 147 590


Yemen 221 17 5 199


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFASIA
Total


254420 60 220 104837 19684 38045 31635


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFOCEANIA


Cook Islands 330 0 190 110 5 25


Fiji 30 9 21


French Polynesia 14 11 3


Guam 1 1


Kiribati 290 48 30 102 4 107


Marshall Islands 85 443 32 263 31 405 972 7 428 13 375


Micronesia (Federated States of) 9 8 1


New Caledonia 4 2 2


Northern Mariana Islands 0 0


Papua New Guinea 115 2 73 21 19


Samoa 11 9 2


Solomon Islands 5 2 2


Tonga 42 3 31 9


Tuvalu 1 438 618 219 125 3 473


Vanuatu 2 225 4 1 115 34 25 1 046


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFOCEANIA
Total


89956 32937 32958 1488 7487 15086


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES


Australia 1 612 85 136 141 1 251


Austria 0 0


Belgium 4 532 987 1 691 203 99 1 551


Bermuda 11 503 1 256 2 067 17 513 7 649


Bulgaria 357 8 246 83 20


Canada 2 831 632 234 1 001 15 950


Cyprus 20 464 3 364 10 085 1 087 4 434 1 493


Denmark 11 530 2 931 166 455 6 788 1 191


Estonia 290 10 22 3 256


Faroe Islands 218 36 56 24 102


Finland 1 737 338 118 766 10 505


France 6 197 1 975 178 266 2 117 1 660


Germany 15 053 372 442 337 13 354 548


Gibraltar 2 451 447 236 682 520 566


Greece 42 569 24 129 13 844 363 2 232 2 002


Greenland 5 3 3


Iceland 16 0 1 15


Ireland 177 0 75 71 30


Isle of Man 13 759 5 931 4 686 394 618 2 130


Israel 291 3 11 268 9


AnnexII.(a)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofGT)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 161


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Italy 18 098 4 579 4 309 2 750 861 5 598


Japan 15 732 2 691 4 897 1 801 100 6 244


Latvia 152 7 16 129


Lithuania 354 1 64 194 10 85


Luxembourg 1 498 209 58 456 166 609


Malta 44 113 13 697 18 966 2 181 4 707 4 562


Monaco 0 0


Netherlands 7 759 297 471 3 424 1 169 2 397


New Zealand 172 64 31 14 64


Norway 17 112 4 208 3 648 616 42 8 597


Poland 102 6 37 58


Portugal 1 131 310 86 150 33 553


Reunion 2 2


Romania 141 8 73 60


Slovakia 33 28 5


Slovenia 3 3


Spain 2 792 588 8 237 53 1 906


Sweden 3 243 337 17 1 161 1 728


Switzerland 714 51 511 82 56 14


United Kingdom 19 417 1 485 2 092 1 256 10 243 4 341


United States 11 279 2 244 264 2 573 2 530 3 669


Spain 522 37 1 48 5 431


Sweden 417 56 1 90 – 270


Switzerland 39 4 21 9 2 3


United Kingdom 1 346 104 38 181 186 837


United States of America 3 462 71 9 158 66 3 158


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES
Total


279438 73283 69593 23027 50978 62557


TRANSITIONECONOMIES


Albania 63 62 1


Azerbaijan 768 250 131 386


Belarus 34 31 3


Croatia 1 382 591 629 36 126


Georgia 321 17 39 226 6 33


Kazakhstan 104 53 51


Montenegro 51 43 6 2


Republic of Moldova 480 9 57 366 8 40


Russian Federation 6 052 1 478 296 2 453 63 1 762


Turkmenistan 75 29 9 37


Ukraine 595 23 357 215


TRANSITIONECONOMIES
Total


9924 2451 1094 3646 76 2657


Unknownflag 2652 414 28 361 11 1839


World total 1091534 271568 378287 67159 179706 194814


AnnexII.(a)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofGT)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013162


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAFRICA


Algeria 739 17 150 66 507


Angola 312 16 13 283


Benin 0 0


Cameroon 655 2 653


Cape Verde 28 4 18 5


Comoros 937 218 159 454 5 101


Congo 0 0


Côte d'Ivoire 10 1 9


Democratic Republic of the Congo 11 2 1 8


Djibouti 7 5 1 1


Egypt 1 722 255 1 075 139 63 190


EquatorialGuinea 13 7 3 4


Eritrea 14 3 10 0


Ethiopia 223 42 181


Gabon 404 0 5 399


Gambia 3 3


Ghana 25 4 5 16


Guinea 6 6


Guinea-Bissau 1 1


Kenya 7 2 5


Liberia 198 032 71 083 67 047 2 058 47 298 10 545


Libya 1 408 989 12 408


Madagascar 26 6 15 5


Mauritania 1 1 0


Mauritius 135 76 59


Morocco 128 7 11 55 55


Mozambique 21 15 6


Namibia 3 2 1


Nigeria 3 600 485 13 15 3 086


São Tomé and Principe 27 26 1


Senegal 5 0 2 3


Seychelles 585 529 4 53


Sierra Leone 1 521 254 280 607 251 128


Somalia 1 0 0


South Africa 63 17 0 45


Sudan 28 26 1


Togo 832 484 65 228 24 31


Tunisia 367 26 48 292


United Republic of Tanzania 8 815 8 291 105 350 49 20


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAFRICA
Total


220716 82799 68922 4318 47745 16 932


AnnexII.(b)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofDWT)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 163


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAMERICA


Anguilla 1 1


Antigua and Barbuda 14 142 57 1 565 5 207 7 057 255


Argentina 533 351 24 77 81


Aruba 0 0


Bahamas 73 702 34 105 17 754 845 1 801 19 198


Barbados 1 485 220 686 305 107 167


Belize 2 196 148 591 1 112 44 300


Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 536 67 370 87 7 6


Brazil 3 232 1 569 398 247 398 621


British Virgin Islands 2 1 1


Cayman Islands 4 310 552 1 368 6 2 384


Chile 804 399 262 64 38 40


Colombia 115 9 62 44


Costa Rica 2 1 0


Cuba 40 1 32 7


Curaçao 2 133 169 74 212 9 1 670


Dominica 2 037 618 1 301 61 57


Dominican Republic 166 149 16 1


Ecuador 364 343 6 15


El Salvador


Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 6 1 5


Grenada 1 1 0


Guatemala 1 1 0


Guyana 42 8 19 14


Haiti 1 1


Honduras 645 161 28 350 2 104


Jamaica 224 128 24 72 1


Mexico 1 835 1 054 195 21 565


Netherlands Antilles 4 4


Nicaragua 3 1 1 0


Panama 350 506 62 112 212 504 9 131 38 183 28 576


Paraguay 56 6 42 6 1


Peru 403 302 21 15 66


Saint Kitts and Nevis 1 231 292 374 323 19 222


Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4 919 103 1 563 1 496 252 1 505


Suriname 7 3 3 0


Trinidad and Tobago 26 4 1 21


Turks and Caicos Islands 0 0 0


AnnexII.(b)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofDWT)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013164


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Uruguay 43 10 11 22


Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1 679 783 175 308 6 407


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAMERICA
Total


467431 103599 239 361 20 092 48014 56365


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFASIA


Afghanistan 2 2


Bahrain 640 154 44 2 280 160


Bangladesh 1 656 80 1 137 368 38 33


Brunei Darussalam 449 7 8 434


Cambodia 2 319 82 324 1 780 36 98


China 68 642 14 104 39 654 4 490 6 274 4 120


China, Hong Kong SAR 129 806 26 115 81 416 2 662 16 473 3 140


China, Macao SAR 2 2


China, Taiwan Province of 3 487 210 2 130 152 926 68


Democratic People's Republic of Korea 1 008 100 82 782 14 30


India 15 876 8 569 4 908 799 345 1 254


Indonesia 14 267 3 894 2 303 3 362 1 629 3 080


Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1 965 263 218 601 774 109


Iraq 110 28 31 51


Jordan 61 53 8


Kuwait 4 169 3 510 78 7 330 244


Lao People's Democratic Republic 2 2


Lebanon 142 1 23 108 6 3


Malaysia 10 508 4 588 243 433 585 4 660


Maldives 124 15 92 9 7


Mongolia 643 73 277 235 16 42


Myanmar 182 5 163 15


Oman 14 3 2 10


Pakistan 693 322 321 18 31


Philippines 6 417 441 3 927 1 057 352 641


Qatar 1 224 546 116 1 266 295


Republic of Korea 17 720 1 308 12 087 1 693 1 304 1 328


Saudi Arabia 1 421 659 214 185 362


Singapore 89 697 36 893 30 164 1 455 13 408 7 779


Sri Lanka 239 15 99 94 17 14


Syrian Arab Republic 169 19 149 2


Thailand 4 811 1 590 1 435 584 287 914


Turkey 10 215 2 185 5 279 1 783 683 285


United Arab Emirates 1 287 341 86 77 271 511


AnnexII.(b)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofDWT)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 165


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Viet Nam 7 284 1 532 1 631 3 092 193 835


Yemen 442 28 4 410


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFASIA
Total


397695 107662 188000 26353 44701 30977


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFOCEANIA


Cook Islands 479 0 302 148 6 23


Fiji 15 6 9


French Polynesia 10 9 1


Guam 0 0


Kiribati 367 81 47 131 4 103


Marshall Islands 140 016 59 377 57 022 1 230 8 761 13 626


Micronesia (Federated States of) 8 7 1


New Caledonia 4 3 0


Northern Mariana Islands 0 0


Papua New Guinea 138 3 91 29 15


Samoa 10 9 0


Solomon Islands 3 2 1


Tonga 47 3 40 4


Tuvalu 2 351 1 123 361 163 5 698


Vanuatu 2 887 6 1 832 37 29 983


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFOCEANIA
Total


146335 60595 59564 1877 8833 15465


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES


Australia 1 947 133 193 132 1 489


Austria


Belgium 6 913 1 906 3 278 127 122 1 479


Bermuda 12 378 2 316 4 016 7 539 5 501


Bulgaria 483 11 383 76 13


Canada 3 371 1 035 371 1 362 15 589


Cyprus 31 706 5 854 18 161 1 329 5 300 1 063


Denmark 13 860 4 781 326 270 7 577 906


Estonia 75 16 15 3 41


Faroe Islands 219 52 72 30 64


Finland 1 338 569 180 426 14 150


France 7 434 3 655 344 123 2 342 971


Germany 17 128 567 856 260 15 100 346


Gibraltar 2 829 660 408 745 635 380


Greece 75 424 45 278 26 134 330 2 448 1 234


Greenland 4 3 1


Iceland 11 0 1 9


Ireland 244 0 113 103 28


Isle of Man 22 629 10 638 8 821 441 627 2 103


Israel 318 5 14 294 5


Italy 20 612 7 865 7 886 1 626 961 2 273


AnnexII.(b)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofDWT)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013166


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Japan 20 409 5 013 9 020 2 798 100 3 478


Latvia 72 9 22 42


Lithuania 289 2 94 129 14 51


Luxembourg 1 601 329 97 219 194 762


Malta 68 831 24 647 33 978 2 476 5 291 2 440


Monaco


Netherlands 8 712 462 813 4 309 1 359 1 769


New Zealand 166 98 23 17 28


Norway 20 974 7 443 6 125 506 47 6 854


Poland 75 9 33 34


Portugal 1 225 564 149 202 40 270


Reunion 1 1


Romania 149 11 61 76


Slovakia 46 40 6


Slovenia 1 1


Spain 2 572 1 017 11 198 66 1 281


Sweden 1 887 511 21 688 667


Switzerland 1 144 80 865 106 79 15


United Kingdom 21 095 2 320 3 899 980 11 206 2 690


United States 12 353 3 669 435 2 761 2 767 2 723


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES
Total


380526 131525 126974 23 011 57186 41830


TRANSITIONECONOMIES


Albania 93 92 1


Azerbaijan 684 355 131 197


Belarus 58 55 2


Croatia 2 269 1 092 1 096 43 39


Georgia 442 29 61 314 7 31


Kazakhstan 128 91 37


Montenegro 77 70 6 1


Republic of Moldova 566 16 102 410 10 27


Russian Federation 6 784 2 112 422 2 783 66 1 401


Turkmenistan 92 41 10 41


Ukraine 607 40 400 167


TRANSITIONECONOMIES
Total


11801 3777 1807 4189 83 1945


Unknownflag 4279 786 44 504 14 2 931
World total 1628783 490743 684673 80345 206577 166445


AnnexII.(b)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(ThousandsofDWT)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 167


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAFRICA


Algeria 111 9 4 12 86


Angola 49 8 15 26


Benin 5 5


Cameroon 16 4 12


Cape Verde 39 3 18 18


Comoros 272 17 4 138 1 112


Congo 5 5


Côte d'Ivoire 9 2 7


Democratic Republic of the Congo 13 1 1 11


Djibouti 14 1 1 12


Egypt 384 39 17 35 3 290


EquatorialGuinea 28 3 7 18


Eritrea 9 1 4 4


Ethiopia 10 1 9


Gabon 24 1 10 13


Gambia 8 8


Ghana 42 2 8 32


Guinea 1 1


Guinea-Bissau 9 7 2


Kenya 23 2 21


Liberia 3 144 749 819 140 1 001 435


Libya 91 12 7 72


Madagascar 39 4 23 12


Mauritania 5 2 3


Mauritius 26 2 1 23


Morocco 85 1 7 6 71


Mozambique 25 11 14


Namibia 6 2 4


Nigeria 374 65 1 16 292


São Tomé and Principe 18 15 3


Senegal 21 1 3 17


Seychelles 24 8 6 10


Sierra Leone 392 54 12 221 9 96


Somalia 4 1 3


South Africa 71 5 2 64


Sudan 17 3 14


Togo 101 10 3 63 4 21


Tunisia 59 1 13 45


United Republic of Tanzania 198 50 6 82 6 54


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAFRICA
Total


5771 1051 867 887 1 030 1 936


AnnexII.(c)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(Numberofships)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013168


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAMERICA


Anguilla 2 2


Antigua and Barbuda 1 302 6 39 774 403 80


Argentina 148 27 1 17 103


Aruba 1 1


Bahamas 1 446 270 322 161 53 640


Barbados 133 10 16 71 4 32


Belize 829 64 23 447 6 289


Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 92 14 5 53 1 19


Brazil 619 47 11 66 13 482


British Virgin Islands 20 3 17


Cayman Islands 174 6 27 3 138


Chile 172 14 8 41 3 106


Colombia 94 7 25 62


Costa Rica 10 2 8


Cuba 39 1 14 24


Curaçao 127 6 1 48 1 71


Dominica 117 16 16 28 57


Dominican Republic 27 1 6 20


Ecuador 80 37 7 36


El Salvador 2 2


Falkland Islands (Malvinas) a 3 1 2


Grenada 6 3 3


Guatemala 6 1 5


Guyana 52 4 31 17


Haiti 3 3


Honduras 645 100 1 332 1 211


Jamaica 26 4 4 9 9


Mexico 525 38 4 20 463


Nicaragua 5 1 1 3


Panama 8 580 955 2 772 1 601 734 2 518


Paraguay 47 4 26 2 15


Peru 78 10 2 1 65


Saint Kitts and Nevis 246 41 12 99 2 92


Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1 046 21 51 340 21 613


Suriname 10 3 5 2


Trinidad and Tobago 104 1 3 100


Turks and Caicos Islands 3 1 2


AnnexII.(c)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(Numberofships)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 169


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Uruguay 44 4 6 34


Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 244 20 2 38 2 182


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFAMERICA
Total


17107 1729 3315 4284 1256 6523


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFASIA


Afghanistan 3 3


Bahrain 232 5 2 4 5 216


Bangladesh 269 61 27 111 4 66


Brunei Darussalam 81 3 17 61


Cambodia 785 31 18 628 7 101


China 3 727 526 778 805 193 1 425


China, Hong Kong SAR 2 221 323 1 014 228 319 337


China, Macao SAR 1 1


China, Taiwan Province of 328 28 29 65 27 179


Democratic People's Republic of Korea 265 33 3 198 2 29


India 1 385 117 76 378 15 799


Indonesia 6 293 477 57 1 943 175 3 641


Iran (Islamic Republic of) 552 14 5 246 18 269


Iraq 75 5 10 60


Jordan 25 9 16


Kuwait 137 24 2 17 4 90


Lao People's Democratic Republic 1 1


Lebanon 50 1 2 38 1 8


Malaysia 1 539 169 6 210 35 1 119


Maldives 69 16 38 2 13


Mongolia 168 31 9 73 3 52


Myanmar 85 5 44 36


Oman 39 2 9 28


Pakistan 50 5 6 3 36


Philippines 1 383 203 72 589 18 501


Qatar 106 7 3 3 11 82


Republic of Korea 1 894 310 145 448 88 903


Saudi Arabia 286 31 14 3 238


Singapore 3 339 743 348 139 345 1 764


Sri Lanka 77 10 5 16 1 45


Syrian Arab Republic 63 1 48 14


Thailand 755 239 44 128 19 325


Turkey 1 365 197 114 514 40 500


United Arab Emirates 547 41 4 78 4 420


AnnexII.(c)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(Numberofships)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013170


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Viet Nam 1 772 118 58 1 337 22 237


Yemen 32 4 3 25


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFASIA
Total


29 999 3779 2828 8392 1 361 13 639


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFOCEANIA


Cook Islands 106 1 12 57 1 35


Fiji 40 17 23


French Polynesia 16 10 6


Guam 3 3


Kiribati 96 24 3 41 1 27


Marshall Islands 2 064 639 742 77 238 368


Micronesia (Federated States of) 17 13 4


New Caledonia 12 2 10


Northern Mariana Islands 1 1


Papua New Guinea 130 4 67 6 53


Samoa 9 4 5


Solomon Islands 20 13 7


Tonga 40 3 21 16


Tuvalu 216 45 11 43 1 116


Vanuatu 421 1 37 10 1 372


Liberia 33897 37681 4310 39910 5721 121519


Malta 18682 4661 3134 15417 3223 45117


Marshall Islands 24941 7175 1749 31527 10662 76054


Panama 106605 33779 24151 36082 14143 214760


Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1260 81 1959 181 540 4020


DEVELOPINGECONOMIESOFOCEANIA
Total


3 191 717 805 375 248 1046


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES


Australia 502 7 6 73 416


Austria 1 1


Belgium 216 13 21 23 4 155


Bermuda 168 24 26 1 13 104


Bulgaria 95 10 16 21 48


Canada 634 30 11 99 1 493


Cyprus 1 030 103 279 179 212 257


Denmark 663 133 3 105 98 324


Estonia 83 7 5 1 70


Faroe Islands 76 3 29 3 41


Finland 281 12 6 102 1 160


France 547 42 2 77 27 399


Germany 781 42 7 93 272 367


Gibraltar 304 61 6 136 39 62


Greece 1 551 458 258 197 35 603


AnnexII.(c)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(Numberofships)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 171


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


Greenland 8 5 3


Iceland 26 1 5 20


Ireland 88 1 8 30 49


Isle of Man 422 131 78 64 9 140


Israel 39 5 3 5 26


Italy 1 506 192 99 155 21 1 039


Japan 5 379 1 108 82 2 090 1 2 098


Latvia 58 8 9 41


Lithuania 71 1 5 35 1 29


Luxembourg 174 14 3 22 7 128


Malta 1 794 420 543 398 114 319


Monaco 1 1


Netherlands 1 250 28 12 605 64 541


New Zealand 91 5 13 2 71


Norway 1 593 123 98 306 2 1 064


Poland 172 9 18 145


Portugal 249 14 3 48 6 178


Reunion 7 7


Romania 152 10 17 125


Slovakia 18 15 3


Slovenia 8 8


Spain 522 37 1 48 5 431


Sweden 417 56 1 90 270


Switzerland 39 4 21 9 2 3


United Kingdom 1 346 104 38 181 186 837


United States 3 462 71 9 158 66 3 158


DEVELOPEDECONOMIES
Total


25824 3287 1642 5464 1197 14234


AnnexII.(c)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(Numberofships)(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013172


Source: Clarkson Research Services.
For additional data and years see http://stats.unctad.org/fleet
Note 1 All propelled sea-going merchant vessels of 100 GT and above, excluding inland waterway vessels, fishing vessels,


military vessels, yachts, and offshore fixed and mobile platforms and barges (with the exception of FPSOs and drillships).


a A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning
sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).


Total Oil tankers
Bulk


carriers
General-cargo


ships Containerships
Other
types


ECONOMIESINTRANSITION


Albania 68 65 3


Azerbaijan 306 51 35 220


Belarus 7 1 6


Croatia 264 20 22 53 169


Georgia 192 8 4 107 2 71


Kazakhstan 94 8 86


Montenegro 14 2 3 9


Republic of Moldova 142 4 3 121 2 12


Russian Federation 2 324 386 21 859 10 1 048


Turkmenistan 59 7 4 48


Ukraine 492 16 139 337


ECONOMIESINTRANSITION
Total


3 962 500 53 1386 14 2 009


Unknownflag 1088 113 2 326 3 644
World total 86942 11176 9512 21114 5109 40031


AnnexII.(c)Merchantfleetsoftheworldbyflagsofregistration,groupsofeconomiesandtypesofship,asat1January2013
(Numberofships)(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 173


AnnexIII. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,asat1January2013


Flag of
registration Antigua & Barbuda Bahamas China China, Hong Kong SAR


Country or
territory
of ownership


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Belgium – – – 12 167 0.2 – – – 36 2 482 1.9


Bermuda – – – 82 11 418 15.5 – – – 16 1 804 1.4


Brazil – – – 12 991 1.3 – – – – – –


Canada – – – 41 3 530 4.8 – – – 13 477 0.4


China – – – 11 93 0.1 2 665 66 936 98.2 1078 74 189 57.2


China, Hong Kong SAR 6 74 0.5 – – – 21 667 1.0 269 15 769 12.2


China,Taiwan Province of – – – – – – 3 201 0.3 46 4 196 3.2


Cyprus 3 30 0.2 2 11 – – – – 18 1 099 0.8


Denmark 12 75 0.5 53 909 1.2 – – – 49 3 432 2.6


France – – – 13 543 0.7 – – – 1 58 –


Germany 1 103 13 118 92.9 22 956 1.3 – – – 18 1 237 1.0


Greece 4 73 0.5 193 14 070 19.1 – – – 35 1 983 1.5


India 1 8 0.1 4 76 0.1 – – – – – –


Indonesia – – – 1 12 – 1 3 – 5 117 0.1


Iran (Islamic Republic of) – – – – – – – – – 17 722 0.6


Italy 1 7 0.1 11 867 1.2 – – – – – –


Japan – – – 93 7 149 9.7 1 46 0.1 102 5 411 4.2


Kuwait – – – – – – – – – – – –


Malaysia – – – 4 87 0.1 – – – 10 533 0.4


Monaco – – – 17 1 028 1.4 – – – – – –


Netherlands 22 126 0.9 20 2 115 2.9 – – – 1 4 –


Norway 13 73 0.5 185 4 086 5.5 – – – 34 1 930 1.5


Oman – – – 1 82 0.1 – – – – – –


Republic of Korea – – – 4 306 0.4 – – – 26 797 0.6


Russian Federation 5 31 0.2 6 121 0.2 – – – 1 8 –


Saudi Arabia – – – 18 5 283 7.2 – – – – – –


Singapore 1 11 0.1 20 601 0.8 3 149 0.2 68 5 058 3.9


Sweden – – – 9 400 0.5 – – – – – –


Switzerland 2 29 0.2 2 117 0.2 – – – 9 337 0.3


Thailand – – – 3 305 0.4 – – – 1 5 –


Turkey 11 61 0.4 5 122 0.2 – – – – – –


United Arab Emirates 1 2 – 41 1 582 2.1 – – – 10 702 0.5


United Kingdom 8 72 0.5 128 3 529 4.8 – – – 13 612 0.5


United States 8 29 0.2 115 3 284 4.5 – – – 66 6 032 4.6


Viet Nam – – – 1 2 – – – – – – –


Total Top 35 1 201 13 818 97.8 1 129 63 842 86.7 2 694 68 002 99.7 1 942 128 993 99.4


Other owners 63 277 2 214 9 825 13 – – – 17 708 1


Unknown Owners 6 30 – 2 2 – 22 173 – 1 36 –


Totalofflag
of registration 1 270 14 126 100 1 345 73 670 100 2 716 68 176 100 1 960 129 737 100





REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013174


AnnexIII. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,asat1January2013(continued)


Flag of
registration Cyprus Denmark(DIS) Germany Greece


Country or
territory
of ownership


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Belgium 8 43 0.1 – – – – – – – – –


Bermuda 1 300 0.9 – – – – – – – – –


Brazil 4 13 – – – – – – – – – –


Canada 24 772 2.4 – – – – – – – – –


China 12 417 1.3 – – – 1 13 0.1 1 12 –


China, Hong Kong SAR 5 292 0.9 – – – 2 135 0.8 – – –


China,Taiwan Province of – – – – – – – – – – – –


Cyprus 183 6 178 19.5 – – – 1 75 0.4 – – –


Denmark 5 16 – 348 12 688 92.6 5 19 0.1 1 12 –


France 7 16 – – – – – – – – – –


Germany 153 2 539 8.0 1 105 0.8 396 16 642 97.6 – – –


Greece 190 12 702 40.1 5 214 1.6 1 40 0.2 825 69 645 92.6


India 13 808 2.6 – – – – – – – – –


Indonesia – – – – – – 1 42 0.2 – – –


Iran (Islamic Republic of) – – – – – – – – – – – –


Italy 7 19 0.1 2 91 0.7 2 1 – – – –


Japan 11 523 1.7 – – – – – – 3 149 0.2


Kuwait – – – – – – – – – – – –


Malaysia – – – – – – – – – – – –


Monaco – – – – – – – – – 7 1 050 1.4


Netherlands 64 623 2.0 – – – 1 8 – – – –


Norway 47 314 1.0 9 65 0.5 1 2 – – – –


Oman – – – – – – – – – – – –


Republic of Korea – – – – – – – – – – – –


Russian Federation 44 2 155 6.8 – – – 1 5 – 1 1 –


Saudi Arabia – – – – – – – – – 1 1 –


Singapore 7 214 0.7 – – – – – – – – –


Sweden 4 12 – 22 396 2.9 2 3 – – – –


Switzerland 4 145 0.5 – – – 1 43 0.3 – – –


Thailand – – – – – – – – – – – –


Turkey 2 22 0.1 – – – – – – – – –


United Arab Emirates 14 171 0.5 – – – – – – – – –


United Kingdom 44 2 490 7.9 3 142 1.0 – – – 24 3 600 4.8


United States 4 14 – – – – – – – 7 611 0.8


Viet Nam – – – – – – – – – – – –


Total Top 35 857 30 797 97.3 390 13 702 100.0 415 17 029 99.9 870 75 081 99.8


Other owners 61 862 3 2 4 – 2 23 – 3 4 –


Unknown Owners 1 5 – – – – – – – 12 125 –


Totalofflag
of registration 919 31 665 100 392 13 707 100 417 17 052 100 885 75 209 100





STATISTICAL ANNEX 175


Flag of
registration IsleofMan Italy Japan Liberia


Country or
territory
of ownership


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Belgium – – – – – – – – – 1 179 0.1


Bermuda 13 3 704 16.4 – – – – – – 10 2 525 1.3


Brazil – – – – – – – – – 20 3 182 1.6


Canada 1 21 0.1 – – – – – – 1 31 –


China – – – 1 13 0.1 2 12 0.1 92 6 972 3.5


China, Hong Kong SAR – – – – – – – – – 2 335 0.2


China,Taiwan Province of – – – – – – 4 10 0.1 114 12 446 6.3


Cyprus – – – – – – – – – 23 1 066 0.5


Denmark 53 778 3.4 4 44 0.2 – – – 5 188 0.1


France – – – 12 42 0.2 – – – 2 231 0.1


Germany 48 1 059 4.7 9 57 0.3 – – – 1 298 65 927 33.3


Greece 63 6 433 28.4 7 436 2.1 – – – 618 42 583 21.5


India – – – – – – – – – 7 524 0.3


Indonesia – – – 1 5 – 2 9 0.1 2 214 0.1


Iran (Islamic Republic of) – – – – – – – – – – – –


Italy 1 82 0.4 673 19 098 93.5 – – – 24 1 058 0.5


Japan 16 2 267 10.0 6 375 1.8 738 17 216 99.3 113 9 159 4.6


Kuwait – – – – – – – – – – – –


Malaysia – – – – – – – – – 3 7 –


Monaco – – – 1 40 0.2 – – – 22 2 399 1.2


Netherlands – – – – – – – – – 76 2 229 1.1


Norway 58 1 431 6.3 1 13 0.1 2 73 0.4 32 1 236 0.6


Oman – – – – – – – – – – – –


Republic of Korea 4 563 2.5 – – – 2 5 – 6 623 0.3


Russian Federation – – – – – – – – – 92 8 350 4.2


Saudi Arabia – – – – – – – – – – – –


Singapore 3 166 0.7 – – – – – – 45 4 231 2.1


Sweden 1 37 0.2 1 7 – – – – 1 134 0.1


Switzerland – – – 2 16 0.1 – – – 13 511 0.3


Thailand – – – – – – 1 3 – – – –


Turkey – – – 7 56 0.3 – – – 19 375 0.2


United Arab Emirates – – – – – – – – – 75 9 225 4.7


United Kingdom 130 5 354 23.7 1 1 – – – – 120 7 369 3.7


United States – – – 5 74 0.4 – – – 89 5 852 3.0


Viet Nam – – – – – – – – – 2 71 –


Total Top 35 391 21 895 96.8 731 20 277 99.2 751 17 328 100.0 2 927 189 231 95.6


Other owners 17 724 3 6 153 1 2 2 – 166 8 577 4


Unknown Owners – – – 2 5 – 2 5 – 4 204 –


Totalofflag
of registration 408 22'619 100 739 20 435 100 755 17 334 100 3 097 198 012 100




AnnexIII. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,asat1January2013(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013176


Flag of
registration Malta MarshallIslands Norway(DIS) Panama


Country or
territory
of ownership


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Belgium 4 41 0.1 2 67 – – – – 5 325 0.1


Bermuda 3 206 0.3 36 5 783 4.1 4 678 3.8 18 3 633 1.0


Brazil – – – 7 1 381 1.0 5 15 0.1 26 2 517 0.7


Canada 3 168 0.2 17 752 0.5 – – – 10 251 0.1


China 18 594 0.9 25 1 380 1.0 – – – 838 31 057 8.9


China, Hong Kong SAR – – – 13 424 0.3 – – – 153 6075 1.7


China,Taiwan Province of – – – 10 1 868 1.3 – – – 413 17 424 5.0


Cyprus 34 1 448 2.1 45 2 748 2.0 – – – 16 757 0.2


Denmark 30 1 081 1.6 11 585 0.4 10 289 1.6 55 2 204 0.6


France 8 545 0.8 5 997 0.7 – – – 10 52 –


Germany 111 2 661 3.9 261 11 918 8.5 – – – 29 2 506 0.7


Greece 510 33 856 49.2 496 32 524 23.2 2 152 0.8 491 23 229 6.6


India 2 162 0.2 10 820 0.6 – – – 49 2 467 0.7


Indonesia 1 13 – 4 112 0.1 – – – 47 1 380 0.4


Iran (Islamic Republic of) 36 3 475 5.1 – – – – – – 8 74 –


Italy 50 1 377 2.0 8 721 0.5 – – – 33 701 0.2


Japan 13 818 1.2 90 6 558 4.7 – – – 2 481 158 909 45.4


Kuwait 10 1 309 1.9 5 323 0.2 – – – 6 276 0.1


Malaysia – – – 16 600 0.4 – – – 27 518 0.1


Monaco 8 165 0.2 42 3 348 2.4 – – – 9 569 0.2


Netherlands 19 320 0.5 28 931 0.7 1 5 – 42 1 240 0.4


Norway 95 1 213 1.8 88 6 184 4.4 455 15 769 87.2 79 3 079 0.9


Oman 6 1 912 2.8 6 1 911 1.4 – – – 17 2 229 0.6


Republic of Korea 5 25 – 105 12 344 8.8 – – – 572 42 544 12.2


Russian Federation 73 656 1.0 9 349 0.2 1 5 – 44 667 0.2


Saudi Arabia – – – 4 93 0.1 3 112 0.6 21 836 0.2


Singapore 3 136 0.2 106 7 319 5.2 – – – 238 8 327 2.4


Sweden 5 78 0.1 4 92 0.1 25 669 3.7 8 198 0.1


Switzerland 29 515 0.7 18 472 0.3 1 44 0.2 192 12 127 3.5


Thailand – – – 2 93 0.1 – – – 19 126 –


Turkey 296 9 645 14.0 95 5 539 4.0 – – – 148 1 785 0.5


United Arab Emirates 2 15 – 46 1 309 0.9 – – – 180 3 898 1.1


United Kingdom 63 1 310 1.9 31 1 858 1.3 5 213 1.2 76 3 192 0.9


United States 24 673 1.0 252 20 666 14.8 4 105 0.6 121 4 500 1.3


Viet Nam – – – – – – – – – 45 1 032 0.3


Total Top 35 1 461 64 417 93.6 1 897 132 067 94.3 516 18 054 99.8 6 526 340 703 97.4


Other owners 232 4 357 6 119 7 867 6 9 26 – 503 8 130 2


Unknown Owners 7 25 – 3 67 – 1 6 – 81 1 001 –


Totalofflag
of registration 1 700 68 798 100 2 019 140 002 100 526 18 086 100 7 110 349 833 100




AnnexIII. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,asat1January2013(continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 177


Flag of
registration Republic of Korea Singapore United Kingdom United States


Country or
territory
of ownership


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt %


Belgium – – – 13 719 0.8 – – – – – –


Bermuda – – – 7 374 0.4 3 487 2.3 – – –


Brazil – – – 15 5 131 5.7 – – – 8 23 0.2


Canada – – – – – – – – – 5 81 0.7


China – – – 40 3 582 4.0 3 208 1.0 – – –


China, Hong Kong SAR – – – 6 63 0.1 4 44 0.2 – – –


China,Taiwan Province of 1 79 0.5 85 4 196 4.7 5 352 1.7 – – –


Cyprus – – – 13 234 0.3 – – – – – –


Denmark – – – 170 13 742 15.4 42 1 937 9.2 24 1 257 10.7


France – – – 18 522 0.6 35 2 565 12.2 – – –


Germany 1 122 0.7 29 691 0.8 65 1 966 9.4 5 202 1.7


Greece – – – 29 828 0.9 2 75 0.4 1 47 0.4


India 1 52 0.3 36 2 229 2.5 2 27 0.1 – – –


Indonesia 2 5 – 49 858 1.0 – – – 1 6 –


Iran (Islamic Republic of) – – – – – – – – – – – –


Italy – – – 6 286 0.3 8 166 0.8 – – –


Japan 5 178 1.0 158 9 582 10.7 1 151 0.7 – – –


Kuwait – – – – – – – – – – – –


Malaysia – – – 57 5 624 6.3 – – – – – –


Monaco – – – 8 219 0.2 1 19 0.1 – – –


Netherlands – – – 1 1 – 20 208 1.0 – – –


Norway – – – 129 3 380 3.8 38 689 3.3 1 20 0.2


Oman – – – – – – – – – – – –


Republic of Korea 764 16 624 96.5 12 334 0.4 1 141 0.7 – – –


Russian Federation – – – 6 300 0.3 – – – – – –


Saudi Arabia – – – 3 17 – – – – – – –


Singapore 2 19 0.1 1 090 32 711 36.6 1 16 0.1 11 623 5.3


Sweden – – – 15 338 0.4 28 232 1.1 – – –


Switzerland – – – – – – 1 37 0.2 – – –


Thailand 2 6 – 35 983 1.1 – – – – – –


Turkey – – – 5 220 0.2 1 5 – 1 1 –


United Arab Emirates – – – 15 217 0.2 – – – 2 4 –


United Kingdom – – – 13 481 0.5 415 10 448 49.9 5 772 6.6


United States – – – 17 590 0.7 6 111 0.5 766 8 640 73.9


Viet Nam 2 12 0.1 – – – – – – – – –


Total Top 35 780 17 098 99.2 2 080 88 453 99.0 682 19 883 94.9 830 11 677 99.8


Other owners 4 53 – 43 921 1 32 1 063 5 5 8 –


Unknown Owners 23 82 – 2 6 – 1 1 – 3 13 –


Totalofflag
of registration 807 17 233 100 2 125 89 381 100 715 20 947 100 838 11 698 100




AnnexIII. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,asat1January2013(continued)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013178


Flag of
registration


Total, Top 20
Registries Others Grand Total


Country or
territory
of ownership


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt


Number
of


vessels


1 000
dwt


Belgium 81 4 023 164 4 705 245 8 729


Bermuda 193 30 913 17 1 983 210 32 896


Brazil 97 13 253 213 2 900 310 16 153


Canada 115 6 083 236 3 139 351 9 222


China 4 787 185 478 526 4 601 5 313 190 079


China, Hong Kong SAR 481 23 877 85 448 566 24 325


China,Taiwan Province of 681 40 772 133 3 488 814 44 260


Cyprus 338 13 646 37 278 375 13 924


Denmark 877 39 256 114 1 459 991 40 715


France 111 5 571 298 5436 409 11 007


Germany 3 549 121 707 284 4 072 3 833 125 779


Greece 3 472 238 888 223 5 963 3 695 244 851


India 125 7 174 617 15 267 742 22 441


Indonesia 117 2 777 1 413 12 525 1 530 15 301


Iran (Islamic Republic of) 61 4 271 168 11 046 229 15 317


Italy 826 24 474 58 869 884 25 343


Japan 3 831 218 491 160 5 324 3 991 223 815


Kuwait 21 1 908 55 4 993 76 6 900


Malaysia 117 7 368 497 9 747 614 17 115


Monaco 115 8 839 11 319 126 9 158


Netherlands 295 7 812 912 8 860 1 207 16 673


Norway 1 267 39 556 641 6 436 1 908 45 992


Oman 30 6 134 4 5 34 6 139


Republic of Korea 1 501 74 306 75 790 1 576 75 096


Russian Federation 283 12 646 1 444 6 739 1 727 19 384


Saudi Arabia 50 6 342 137 1 466 187 7 808


Singapore 1 598 59 579 290 4 573 1 888 64 153


Sweden 125 2 597 214 3 848 339 6 445


Switzerland 274 14 392 56 1 259 330 15 651


Thailand 63 1 521 352 4 576 415 6 097


Turkey 590 17 832 990 11 259 1 580 29 091


United Arab Emirates 386 17 124 313 2 349 699 19 474


United Kingdom 1 079 41 443 158 8 862 1 237 50 305


United States 1 484 51 180 459 7 098 1 943 58 278


Viet Nam 50 1 117 791 6 846 841 7 963


Total Top 35 29 070 1 352 349 12 145 173 527 41 215 1 525 876


Other owners 1 500 43 584 3 677 38 999 5 177 82 583


Unknown Owners 173 1 785 557 3 512 730 5 297


Totalofflag
of registration 30 743 1 397 718 16 379 216 037 47 122 1 613 756




Source: Compiled by the UNCTAD secretariat on the basis of data provided
by Clarkson Research Services.
Note: Cargo-carrying vessels of 1,000 GT and above.


AnnexIII. Truenationalityofthe20largestfleetsbyflagofregistration,
as at 1 January 2013 (continued)




STATISTICAL ANNEX 179


2010 2011 Rank 2011 (2010)
Country/territory
Albania 86 875 91 827 112 (113)
Algeria 279 785 295 733 90 (89)
Antigua and Barbuda 24 615 26 018 123 (123)
Argentina 2 021 676 2 159 110 41 (42)
Aruba 130 000 137 410 106 (107)
Australia 6 668 075 7 011 581 21 (20)
Austria 350 461 370 437 77 (77)
Bahamas 1 125 000 1 189 125 52 (53)
Bahrain 289 956 306 483 87 (87)
Bangladesh 1 356 099 1 431 851 49 (48)
Barbados 80 424 85 008 114 (114)
Belgium 10 984 824 11 034 037 13 (13)
Belize 31 919 34 200 122 (122)
Benin 316 744 334 798 84 (84)
Brazil 8 138 608 8 536 262 18 (18)
Brunei Darussalam 99 355 105 018 109 (109)
Bulgaria 142 611 150 740 103 (104)
Cambodia 224 206 236 986 94 (95)
Cameroon 285 070 301 319 89 (88)
Canada 4 829 806 5 058 741 28 (28)
Cayman Islands 40 281 42 577 121 (121)
Chile 3 171 959 3 450 401 33 (34)
China 130 290 443 143 896 697 1 (1)
China, Hong Kong SAR 23 699 242 24 384 000 4 (4)
China, Taiwan Province of 12 736 855 13 473 418 11 (10)
Colombia 2 443 786 2 402 742 38 (38)
Congo 338 916 358 234 81 (81)
Costa Rica 1 013 483 1 065 468 56 (55)
Côte d'Ivoire 607 730 642 371 70 (69)
Croatia 137 048 144 860 105 (106)
Cuba 228 346 246 773 92 (93)
Curaçao 90 000 113 (127)
Cyprus 349 357 360 652 80 (78)
Denmark 709 147 753 035 61 (60)
Djibouti 600 000 634 200 71 (70)
Dominican Republic 1 382 680 1 461 492 48 (47)
Ecuador 1 221 849 1 081 169 54 (51)
Egypt 6 709 053 7 737 183 19 (19)
El Salvador 145 774 154 083 102 (103)
Estonia 151 969 197 717 96 (102)
Finland 1 247 521 1 326 840 50 (49)
France 5 346 800 5 362 900 26 (25)
French Guiana 47 512 50 220 120 (120)
French Polynesia 68 889 72 816 115 (115)
Gabon 153 657 162 415 101 (101)
Georgia 226 115 239 004 93 (94)
Germany 14 821 767 17 218 712 8 (9)
Ghana 647 052 683 934 66 (66)
Greece 1 165 185 1 973 864 44 (52)
Guadeloupe 165 665 175 108 100 (100)
Guam 183 214 193 657 98 (99)
Guatemala 1 012 360 1 070 065 55 (56)


AnnexIV. Containerizedporttraffic(Alphabeticalorder)


2010 2011 Rank 2011 (2010)
Honduras 619 867 655 199 68 (67)
Iceland 192 778 193 500 99 (96)
India 9 752 908 9 979 224 14 (15)
Indonesia 8 482 636 8 966 146 16 (17)
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2 592 522 2 740 296 35 (35)
Ireland 790 067 763 280 60 (59)
Israel 2 281 552 2 394 000 39 (39)
Italy 9 787 403 9 529 351 15 (14)
Jamaica 1 891 770 1 999 601 43 (43)
Japan 18 098 346 19 417 757 7 (7)
Jordan 619 000 654 283 69 (68)
Kenya 696 000 735 672 62 (61)
Kuwait 991 545 1 048 063 57 (57)
Latvia 256 713 305 339 88 (90)
Lebanon 949 155 1 034 249 58 (58)
Libya 184 585 195 106 97 (98)
Lithuania 294 954 311 766 86 (86)
Madagascar 141 093 149 135 104 (105)
Malaysia 18 267 475 20 139 382 6 (6)
Maldives 65 016 68 722 118 (118)
Malta 2 450 665 2 444 981 37 (37)
Mauritania 65 705 69 450 117 (117)
Mauritius 332 662 350 624 82 (82)
Mexico 3 693 956 4 080 434 30 (32)
Morocco 2 058 430 2 083 000 42 (41)
Mozambique 254 701 269 219 91 (92)
Myanmar 190 046 200 879 95 (97)
Namibia 256 319 107 606 107 (91)
Netherlands 11 345 167 12 072 696 12 (12)
Netherlands Antilles 93 603 127 (111)
New Caledonia 90 574 95 277 111 (112)
New Zealand 2 463 278 2 516 706 36 (36)
Nicaragua 68 545 72 452 116 (116)
Nigeria 101 007 106 764 108 (108)
Norway 330 873 349 733 83 (83)
Oman 3 893 198 3 632 940 32 (30)
Pakistan 2 149 000 2 193 403 40 (40)
Panama 6 003 298 6 911 325 22 (22)
Papua New Guinea 295 286 313 598 85 (85)
Paraguay 8 179 8 645 125 (125)
Peru 1 534 056 1 814 743 45 (45)
Philippines 4 947 039 5 264 086 27 (27)
Poland 1 045 232 1 214 034 51 (54)
Portugal 1 622 247 1 758 167 46 (44)
Qatar 346 000 365 722 79 (80)
Republic of Korea 18 542 804 20 833 508 5 (5)
Romania 556 694 662 796 67 (72)
Russian Federation 3 199 980 3 448 947 34 (33)
Saint Helena 650 687 126 (126)
Saint Lucia 52 479 58 539 119 (119)
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines


18 852 19 927 124 (124)


Saudi Arabia 5 313 141 5 694 538 25(26)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013180


AnnexIV. Containerizedporttraffic(Alphabeticalorder)
(continued)


2010 2011 Rank 2011 (2010)
Senegal 349 231 369 137 78 (79)
Singapore 29 178 500 30 727 702 3 (3)
Slovenia 476 731 589 314 73 (73)
South Africa 3 806 427 3 990 193 31 (31)
Spain 12 613 016 13 837 160 10 (11)
Sri Lanka 4 000 000 4 262 887 29 (29)
Sudan 439 100 464 129 75 (75)
Sweden 1 390 504 1 515 217 47 (46)
Switzerland 99 048 104 694 110 (110)
Syrian Arab Republic 649 005 685 998 65 (65)
Thailand 6 648 532 7 171 394 20 (21)
Trinidad and Tobago 573 217 605 890 72 (71)
Tunisia 466 398 492 983 74 (74)
Turkey 5 574 018 5 990 103 24 (24)
Ukraine 659 541 696 641 64 (64)
United Arab Emirates 15 176 524 16 780 386 9 (8)
United Kingdom 8 590 282 8 920 679 17 (16)
United Republic of Tanzania 429 285 453 754 76 (76)
United States 42 337 513 42 999 149 2 (2)
Uruguay 671 952 861 164 59 (62)
Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of)


1 226 508 1 162 326 53 (50)


Viet Nam 5 983 583 6 335 437 23 (23)
Yemen 669 021 707 155 63 (63)
Grand Total 540 816 751 580 022 280




STATISTICAL ANNEX 181


Country or territory 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Albania 0.40 0.40 0.40 2.28 1.98 2.30 4.34 4.54 0.53 4.43


Algeria 10.00 9.72 8.70 7.86 7.75 8.37 31.45 31.06 7.80 6.91


American Samoa 5.17 5.30 4.86 6.28 6.44 4.60 4.85 4.56 4.39 4.19


Angola 9.67 10.46 9.46 9.90 10.22 11.31 10.71 11.27 13.95 13.80


Antigua and Barbuda 2.33 2.56 2.43 3.76 3.82 2.66 2.40 2.40 2.41 2.43


Argentina 20.09 24.95 25.58 25.63 25.70 25.99 27.61 30.62 34.21 33.51


Aruba 7.37 7.52 7.53 5.09 5.09 3.52 5.34 6.21 6.03 6.30


Australia 26.58 28.02 26.96 26.77 38.21 28.80 28.11 28.34 28.81 29.87


Bahamas 17.49 15.70 16.19 16.45 16.35 19.26 25.71 25.18 27.06 26.41


Bahrain 5.39 4.34 4.44 5.99 5.75 8.04 7.83 9.77 17.86 17.90


Bangladesh 5.20 5.07 5.29 6.36 6.40 7.91 7.55 8.15 8.02 7.96


Barbados 5.47 5.77 5.34 5.79 5.36 4.75 4.20 5.85 4.82 5.18


Belgium 73.16 74.17 76.15 73.93 77.98 82.80 84.00 88.47 78.85 82.21


Belize 2.19 2.59 2.62 2.61 2.32 2.30 3.95 3.85 9.99 10.32


Benin 10.13 10.23 10.99 11.16 12.02 13.52 11.51 12.69 15.04 14.28


Bermuda 1.54 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 15.92


Brazil 25.83 31.49 31.61 31.64 30.87 31.08 31.65 34.62 38.53 36.88


Brunei Darussalam 3.91 3.46 3.26 3.70 3.68 3.94 5.12 4.68 4.44 4.61


Bulgaria 6.17 5.61 4.47 4.83 5.09 5.78 5.46 5.37 6.36 5.89


Cambodia 3.89 3.25 2.93 3.25 3.47 4.67 4.52 5.36 3.45 5.34


Cameroon 10.46 10.62 11.41 11.65 11.05 11.60 11.34 11.40 13.44 10.85


Canada 39.67 39.81 36.32 34.40 34.28 41.34 42.39 38.41 38.29 38.44


Cape Verde 1.90 2.28 2.76 2.45 3.63 5.13 3.69 4.24 4.48 4.12


Cayman Islands 1.90 2.23 1.79 1.78 1.78 1.76 2.51 4.03 4.07 1.34


Chile 15.48 15.53 16.10 17.49 17.42 18.84 22.05 22.76 32.98 32.98


China 100.00 108.29 113.10 127.85 137.38 132.47 143.57 152.06 156.19 157.51


China, Hong Kong SAR 94.42 96.78 99.31 106.20 108.78 104.47 113.60 115.27 117.18 116.63


China, Taiwan Province of 59.56 63.74 65.64 62.43 62.58 60.90 64.37 66.69 66.62 64.23


Colombia 18.61 19.20 20.49 21.07 21.64 23.18 26.13 27.25 37.25 37.49


Comoros 6.07 5.84 5.39 5.51 5.15 5.00 5.74 7.14 5.17 5.21


Congo 8.29 9.10 9.12 9.61 11.80 11.37 10.45 10.78 12.57 15.82


Costa Rica 12.59 11.12 15.08 15.34 12.78 14.61 12.77 10.69 14.13 14.00


Côte d'Ivoire 14.39 14.52 12.98 14.98 16.93 19.39 17.48 17.38 16.45 17.55


Croatia 8.58 12.19 10.47 12.33 15.36 8.48 8.97 21.75 21.38 20.44


Cuba 6.78 6.51 6.43 6.71 6.12 5.92 6.57 6.55 5.96 5.77


Curaçao (until 2010
Netherlands Antilles) 8.16 8.23 7.82 9.22 8.56 8.57 7.97 8.14 6.59 8.14


Cyprus 14.39 18.53 17.39 18.01 11.81 13.31 16.20 17.12 16.02 16.39
Democratic
Republic of the Congo 3.05 3.03 2.66 2.68 3.36 3.80 5.24 3.73 4.05 4.01


Denmark 11.56 24.25 25.39 22.10 26.49 27.68 26.76 26.41 44.71 38.67


Djibouti 6.76 7.59 7.36 10.45 10.43 17.98 19.55 21.02 16.56 20.29


Dominica 2.33 2.51 2.33 2.40 2.31 2.73 1.88 2.08 2.08 1.59


AnnexV. UNCTADLinerShippingConnectivityIndex(Alphabeticalorder)




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013182


AnnexV. UNCTADLinerShippingConnectivityIndex(Alphabeticalorder)(continued)


Country or territory 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Dominican Republic 12.45 13.95 15.19 19.87 20.09 21.61 22.25 22.87 23.72 25.57


Ecuador 11.84 12.92 14.17 14.30 13.16 17.09 18.73 22.48 23.05 21.74


Egypt 42.86 49.23 50.01 45.37 52.53 51.99 47.55 51.15 57.39 57.48


El Salvador 6.30 7.32 8.07 7.90 8.67 10.34 9.64 12.02 8.75 8.36


EquatorialGuinea 4.04 3.87 3.76 3.36 3.86 3.73 4.37 3.68 4.54 4.02


Eritrea 3.36 1.58 2.23 0.00 3.26 3.26 0.02 4.02 4.17 4.02


Estonia 7.05 6.52 5.76 5.78 5.48 5.71 5.73 5.84 5.43 6.44


Faroe Islands 4.22 4.40 4.43 4.45 4.20 4.20 4.21 4.20 4.21 4.21


Fiji 8.26 8.32 7.24 7.35 10.31 8.74 9.44 9.23 12.39 12.05


Finland 9.45 10.16 8.58 10.70 9.72 10.15 8.36 11.27 15.51 9.34


France 67.34 70.00 67.78 64.84 66.24 67.01 74.94 71.84 70.09 74.94


French Polynesia 10.46 11.14 8.91 8.60 9.01 8.39 8.88 8.59 10.86 9.90


Gabon 8.78 8.76 8.72 8.57 8.93 9.16 8.55 7.97 9.23 8.95


Gambia 4.91 6.13 4.80 4.74 4.97 7.53 5.38 5.24 7.81 5.89


Georgia 3.46 3.81 2.94 3.22 4.03 3.83 4.02 3.79 4.99 4.17


Germany 76.59 78.41 80.66 88.95 89.26 84.30 90.88 93.32 90.63 88.61


Ghana 12.48 12.64 13.80 14.99 18.13 19.33 17.28 18.01 17.89 19.35


Greece 30.22 29.07 31.29 30.70 27.14 41.91 34.25 32.15 45.50 45.35


Greenland 2.32 2.32 2.27 2.27 2.36 2.27 2.27 2.30 2.30 2.30


Grenada 2.30 2.52 3.37 4.09 4.20 4.13 3.71 3.93 4.04 4.59


Guam 10.50 10.52 9.56 8.73 8.56 8.57 8.78 8.76 8.41 7.85


Guatemala 12.28 13.85 18.13 15.40 15.44 14.73 13.33 20.88 20.07 20.28


Guinea 6.13 6.89 8.71 8.47 6.41 8.32 6.28 6.21 7.42 8.06


Guinea-Bissau 2.12 5.19 5.03 5.22 5.34 3.54 3.50 4.07 4.31 4.00


Guyana 4.54 4.37 4.60 4.51 4.36 4.34 3.95 3.96 4.06 4.31


Haiti 4.91 3.43 2.91 2.87 3.44 4.40 7.58 4.75 5.08 5.12


Honduras 9.11 8.64 8.29 8.76 9.26 10.68 9.09 9.42 10.03 10.73


Iceland 4.72 4.88 4.75 4.72 4.72 4.73 4.70 4.68 4.68 4.66


India 34.14 36.88 42.90 40.47 42.18 40.97 41.40 41.52 41.29 44.35


Indonesia 25.88 28.84 25.84 26.27 24.85 25.68 25.60 25.91 26.28 27.41


Iran (Islamic Republic of) 13.69 14.23 17.37 23.59 22.91 28.90 30.73 30.27 22.62 21.30


Iraq 1.40 1.63 4.06 2.61 1.20 5.11 4.19 4.19 7.10 5.69


Ireland 8.78 9.66 8.18 8.85 7.64 7.60 8.53 5.94 12.99 12.68


Israel 20.37 20.06 20.44 21.42 19.83 18.65 33.20 28.49 31.24 32.42


Italy 58.13 62.20 58.11 58.84 55.87 69.97 59.57 70.18 66.33 67.26


Jamaica 21.32 21.99 23.02 25.50 18.23 19.56 33.09 28.16 21.57 25.32


Japan 69.15 66.73 64.54 62.73 66.63 66.33 67.43 67.81 63.09 65.68


Jordan 11.00 13.42 12.98 16.46 16.37 23.71 17.79 16.65 22.75 22.68


Kenya 8.59 8.98 9.30 10.85 10.95 12.83 13.09 12.00 11.75 11.38


Kiribati 3.06 3.28 3.05 3.06 3.06 2.85 2.86 3.11 2.91 2.91


Kuwait 5.87 6.77 4.14 6.22 6.14 6.54 8.31 5.60 6.60 7.12


Latvia 6.37 5.82 5.10 5.87 5.52 5.18 5.98 5.51 5.45 4.07




STATISTICAL ANNEX 183


AnnexV. UNCTADLinerShippingConnectivityIndex(Alphabeticalorder)(continued)


Country or territory 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Lebanon 10.57 12.53 25.57 30.01 28.92 29.55 30.29 35.09 43.21 43.16


Liberia 5.29 5.95 4.55 4.50 4.25 5.49 5.95 6.17 8.11 5.88


Libya 5.25 5.17 4.71 6.59 5.36 9.43 5.38 6.59 7.51 7.29


Lithuania 5.22 5.88 5.66 6.83 7.76 8.11 9.55 9.77 9.55 5.84


Madagascar 6.90 6.83 8.31 7.97 7.82 8.64 7.38 7.72 11.80 11.85


Malaysia 62.83 64.97 69.20 81.58 77.60 81.21 88.14 90.96 99.69 98.18


Maldives 4.15 4.08 3.90 4.75 5.45 5.43 1.65 1.62 1.60 8.12


Malta 27.53 25.70 30.32 29.53 29.92 37.71 37.53 40.95 45.02 49.79


Marshall Islands 3.49 3.68 3.26 3.06 3.06 2.85 2.83 3.08 2.91 2.91


Mauritania 5.36 5.99 6.25 7.90 7.93 7.50 5.61 5.62 8.20 6.53


Mauritius 13.13 12.26 11.53 17.17 17.43 14.76 16.68 15.37 23.86 24.72


Mexico 25.29 25.49 29.78 30.98 31.17 31.89 36.35 36.09 38.81 41.80


Micronesia
(Federated Sates of) 2.80 2.87 1.94 3.13 3.85 3.85 3.43 3.62 3.58 2.17


Montenegro (until 2009
Serbia and Montenegro) 2.92 2.92 2.96 2.96 3.20 0.02 4.48 4.04 1.35 2.35


Morocco 9.39 8.68 8.54 9.02 29.79 38.40 49.36 55.13 55.09 55.53


Mozambique 6.64 6.71 6.66 7.14 8.81 9.38 8.16 10.12 9.82 10.23


Myanmar 3.12 2.47 2.54 3.12 3.63 3.79 3.68 3.22 4.20 6.00


Namibia 6.28 6.61 8.52 8.37 11.12 13.61 14.45 12.02 15.18 15.50


Netherlands 78.81 79.95 80.97 84.79 87.57 88.66 89.96 92.10 88.93 87.46


New Caledonia 9.83 10.34 9.00 8.81 9.23 8.74 9.37 9.17 9.41 9.23


New Zealand 20.88 20.58 20.71 20.60 20.48 10.59 18.38 18.50 19.35 18.95


Nicaragua 4.75 5.25 8.05 7.89 8.91 10.58 8.68 8.41 8.23 8.30


Nigeria 12.83 12.79 13.02 13.69 18.30 19.89 18.28 19.85 21.81 21.35


Northern Mariana Islands 2.17 2.20 1.85 2.86 3.76 3.76 3.43 3.65 3.44 1.37


Norway 9.23 8.31 7.34 7.80 7.91 7.93 7.93 7.32 5.31 5.28


Oman 23.33 23.64 20.28 28.96 30.42 45.32 48.52 49.33 47.25 48.46


Pakistan 20.18 21.49 21.82 24.77 24.61 26.58 29.48 30.54 28.12 27.71


Palau 1.04 1.04 1.87 3.07 3.79 3.79 3.43 3.62 3.58 2.17


Panama 32.05 29.12 27.61 30.53 30.45 32.66 41.09 37.51 42.38 44.88


Papua New Guinea 6.97 6.40 4.67 6.86 6.92 6.58 6.38 8.83 6.86 6.61


Peru 14.79 14.95 16.33 16.90 17.38 16.96 21.79 21.18 32.80 32.84


Philippines 15.45 15.87 16.48 18.42 30.26 15.90 15.19 18.56 17.15 18.11


Poland 7.28 7.53 7.50 7.86 9.32 9.21 26.18 26.54 44.62 38.03


Portugal 17.54 16.84 23.55 25.42 34.97 32.97 38.06 21.08 46.23 46.08


Puerto Rico 14.82 15.23 14.68 15.96 15.62 10.92 10.65 10.70 13.67 9.71


Qatar 2.64 4.23 3.90 3.59 3.21 2.10 7.67 3.60 6.53 3.35


Republic of Korea 68.68 73.03 71.92 77.19 76.40 86.67 82.61 92.02 101.73 100.42


Romania 12.02 15.37 17.61 22.47 26.35 23.34 15.48 21.37 23.28 25.73


Russian Federation 11.90 12.72 12.81 14.06 15.31 20.64 20.88 20.64 37.01 38.17


Saint Kitts and Nevis 5.49 5.32 5.59 6.16 6.19 3.08 2.84 2.66 2.67 2.58


Saint Lucia 3.70 3.72 3.43 4.21 4.25 4.25 3.77 4.08 4.55 4.93




REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT 2013184


AnnexV. UNCTADLinerShippingConnectivityIndex(Alphabeticalorder)(continued)


Country or territory 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013


Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines 3.56 3.58 3.40 4.34 4.52 4.13 3.72 3.95 4.02 4.10


Samoa 5.44 5.33 5.09 6.50 6.66 4.62 5.18 4.56 4.39 4.19


São Tomé and Principe 0.91 1.28 1.57 1.64 2.54 2.38 3.33 2.13 2.28 6.87


Saudi Arabia 35.83 36.24 40.66 45.04 47.44 47.30 50.43 59.97 60.40 59.67


Senegal 10.15 10.09 11.24 17.08 17.64 14.96 12.98 12.27 13.59 11.08


Seychelles 4.88 4.93 5.27 5.29 4.49 4.90 5.16 6.45 6.50 8.08


Sierra Leone 5.84 6.50 5.12 5.08 4.74 5.56 5.80 5.41 7.40 5.15


Singapore 81.87 83.87 86.11 87.53 94.47 99.47 103.76 105.02 113.16 106.91


Slovenia 13.91 13.91 11.03 12.87 15.66 19.81 20.61 21.93 21.94 20.82


Solomon Islands 3.62 4.29 3.97 4.13 4.16 3.96 5.57 5.87 6.07 6.04


Somalia 3.09 1.28 2.43 3.05 3.24 2.82 4.20 4.20 4.34 4.20


South Africa 23.13 25.83 26.21 27.52 28.49 32.07 32.49 35.67 36.83 43.02


Spain 54.44 58.16 62.29 71.26 67.67 70.22 74.32 76.58 74.44 70.40


Sri Lanka 34.68 33.36 37.31 42.43 46.08 34.74 40.23 41.13 43.43 43.01


Sudan 6.95 6.19 5.67 5.66 5.38 9.28 10.05 9.33 12.75 8.42


Suriname 4.77 4.16 3.90 4.29 4.26 4.16 4.12 4.16 4.48 4.91


Sweden 14.76 26.61 28.17 25.82 30.27 31.34 30.58 30.02 49.45 42.32


Syrian Arab Republic 8.54 11.84 11.29 14.20 12.72 11.03 15.17 16.77 15.64 16.53


Thailand 31.01 31.92 33.89 35.31 36.48 36.78 43.76 36.70 37.66 38.32


Togo 10.19 10.62 11.09 10.63 12.56 14.42 14.24 14.08 14.07 14.76


Tonga 3.81 4.75 4.45 4.07 4.23 3.99 3.73 3.72 3.37 3.17


Trinidad and Tobago 13.18 10.61 11.18 13.72 12.88 15.88 15.76 17.89 18.90 17.26


Tunisia 8.76 7.62 7.04 7.23 6.95 6.52 6.46 6.33 6.35 5.59


Turkey 25.60 27.09 27.09 32.60 35.64 31.98 36.10 39.40 53.15 52.13


Ukraine 11.18 10.81 14.88 16.73 23.62 22.81 21.06 21.35 24.47 26.72


United Arab Emirates 38.06 39.22 46.70 48.21 48.80 60.45 63.37 62.50 61.09 66.97


United Kingdom 81.69 79.58 81.53 76.77 77.99 84.82 87.53 87.46 84.00 87.72


United Republic of Tanzania 8.10 8.59 8.71 10.58 10.46 9.54 10.61 11.49 11.07 11.10


United States 83.30 87.62 85.80 83.68 82.45 82.43 83.80 81.63 91.70 92.80


United States Virgin Islands 1.77 3.00 3.22 3.76 3.81 3.70 3.32 3.39 3.34 3.37


Uruguay 16.44 16.58 16.81 21.28 22.88 22.28 24.46 24.38 32.00 31.37


Vanuatu 3.92 4.48 4.41 4.34 4.36 4.22 3.75 3.70 3.88 3.42
Venezuela
(Bolivarian Republic of) 18.22 19.90 18.62 20.26 20.46 20.43 18.61 19.97 18.93 18.90


Viet Nam 12.86 14.30 15.14 17.59 18.73 26.39 31.36 49.71 48.71 43.26


Yemen 19.21 10.18 9.39 14.28 14.44 14.61 12.49 11.89 13.19 19.00


Source: UNCTAD, based on data provided by CI-Online and Lloyds List Intelligence.
Note: For more details see: http://stats.unctad.org/lsci




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